v0.17.0 — Wave 3: sandbox DB, DB isolation, mobile UI, cloud auth, X account, roadmap engine (#303)

* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers

Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn
(SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via
projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only.

When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox
and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces,
never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at
every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a
grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the
just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named
containers from a crash-missed teardown.

Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature
flag card entry.

* docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem

* feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network)

Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the
orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their
sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or
reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth —
membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published
ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and
the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with
docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block).

ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the
topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection:
under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse
than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The
flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the
compose networks: stanzas.

Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK
polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker
exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing.

* feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass

Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe,
memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below
md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable
snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first
tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar
(Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded).

Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions
+ the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal /
playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders
approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps;
Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg
(fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights;
recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer
gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get
safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar.

Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first
overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc,
vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes).

* feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session)

ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed
beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while
off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in
off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo
or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session
cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published
:8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system
self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes.

Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no
registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK.
Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound
to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password
invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every
authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never
expires — no unexpected logouts.

Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes
/auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the
dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged.

Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every
non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to
clear the middleware deprecation warning.

* feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off)

ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the
ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a
release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService
.approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop,
x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is
local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet
is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False,
Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a
panel queue.

The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton
x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only
has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or
egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency;
NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op.

XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet.

Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now
re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED
before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the
winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level
commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test.

* feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off)

ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens
ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False,
Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot
_dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer
board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO
explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one
propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle —
goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table,
no migration; head stays 059).

The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a
BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject
records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task.
RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap.

Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker
before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its
own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped).

Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared
source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are
LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged
origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup).

* chore(release): 0.17.0

Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod
Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth
(FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap
engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0.

Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py,
pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added.

Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF
in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off
(CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail
startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED
stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology).

* chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes

Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two
were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator
controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot
(else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry
compose keeps both off.

* fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds

The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown
prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example
current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing
strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research.

* fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate)

The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate
rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon):
- sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes /
  _list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace
- x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items
- x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions
- orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a
  MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the
  wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic)
- auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A)

Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean.

* fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry)

The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly
but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry
(quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean.
Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates
before reaching deptry.

* feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off)

Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by
default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply
half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting.

New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop
(_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting
(the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when
x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the
panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle +
the poll loop are no-ops with replies off.

* fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes

Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode:
- client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel
  token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a
  login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes
  /auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects
  when cloud_auth_enabled.
- make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping
  surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a
  token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against
  the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now
  strips surrounding single/double quotes.

* fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state

- GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit
  SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the
  fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so
  author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit
  Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with
  a piped subject.
- The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible
  place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state
  pointing at Settings -> X credentials.

* docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3)

Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in
the 0.17.0 span, code-verified:
- wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine
  (+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG
  architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols,
  migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context
  dual-path across the map slices.
- waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory
  (search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the
  PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED).
- correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin
  routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a
  _require_ceo gate (wave 2c).

docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md
snapshot untouched.

* fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault)

The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths
(IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source
_upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row
and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and
poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent
_checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin.

Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the
constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value
is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The
batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice
in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session
ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row.

---------

Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>

panel/src/components/settings/__tests__/x-credentials-card.test.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
+import { fireEvent, render, screen, waitFor } from "@testing-library/react";
+import { QueryClient, QueryClientProvider } from "@tanstack/react-query";
+import type { ReactNode } from "react";
+
+const { getCredentialsStatus, setCredentials } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  getCredentialsStatus: vi.fn(async () => ({ has_credentials: false })),
+  setCredentials: vi.fn(async () => ({ has_credentials: true })),
+}));
+
+vi.mock("@/lib/api", () => ({
+  xApi: { getCredentialsStatus, setCredentials },
+}));
+
+import { XCredentialsCard } from "../x-credentials-card";
+
+function withQueryClient(ui: ReactNode) {
+  const client = new QueryClient({
+    defaultOptions: { queries: { retry: false }, mutations: { retry: false } },
+  });
+  return <QueryClientProvider client={client}>{ui}</QueryClientProvider>;
+}
+
+describe("XCredentialsCard", () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    getCredentialsStatus.mockClear();
+    setCredentials.mockClear();
+  });
+  afterEach(() => {
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it("shows 'no credentials configured' by default and never renders a secret", async () => {
+    render(withQueryClient(<XCredentialsCard />));
+    expect(
+      await screen.findByText("No credentials configured"),
+    ).toBeInTheDocument();
+  });
+
+  it("disables Save until all 4 fields are filled", async () => {
+    render(withQueryClient(<XCredentialsCard />));
+    await screen.findByText("No credentials configured");
+    const saveButton = screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Save" });
+    expect(saveButton).toBeDisabled();
+
+    fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("API key"), {
+      target: { value: "ak" },
+    });
+    expect(saveButton).toBeDisabled(); // still 3 unfilled
+
+    fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("API key secret"), {
+      target: { value: "as" },
+    });
+    fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Access token"), {
+      target: { value: "at" },
+    });
+    fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Access token secret"), {
+      target: { value: "ats" },
+    });
+    expect(saveButton).not.toBeDisabled();
+  });
+
+  it("saves all 4 secrets and clears the inputs on success", async () => {
+    render(withQueryClient(<XCredentialsCard />));
+    await screen.findByText("No credentials configured");
+
+    fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("API key"), {
+      target: { value: "ak" },
+    });
+    fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("API key secret"), {
+      target: { value: "as" },
+    });
+    fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Access token"), {
+      target: { value: "at" },
+    });
+    fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText("Access token secret"), {
+      target: { value: "ats" },
+    });
+    fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole("button", { name: "Save" }));
+
+    await waitFor(() =>
+      expect(setCredentials).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+        api_key: "ak",
+        api_secret: "as",
+        access_token: "at",
+        access_token_secret: "ats",
+      }),
+    );
+    await waitFor(() =>
+      expect(
+        (screen.getByLabelText("API key") as HTMLInputElement).value,
+      ).toBe(""),
+    );
+  });
+});

panel/src/components/settings/feature-flags-card.tsx

@@ -46,8 +46,16 @@ const FLAG_DESCRIPTIONS: Record<string, string> = {
     "Run the deterministic release-readiness sweep and propose a release for you to approve or reject — it never publishes without your approval, and the executor is fail-closed on a red gate.",
   org_memory_enabled:
     "Close the learn→reuse loop: distill a lesson at task completion, index journal reflections, and auto-inject similar past lessons + approved playbooks into an agent's briefing on claim.",
+  sandbox_db_enabled:
+    "Provision a throwaway Postgres/Redis sibling container per agent spawn (per-project opt-in) instead of injecting RoboCo's own production DB credentials into the agent's gate.",
   routing_strict:
     "Fail-closed model routing: refuse to silently downgrade an agent to the legacy Anthropic path when its configured provider is disabled (raise instead). Off => graceful degradation with a warning.",
+  x_engine_enabled:
+    "Draft release-announcement posts for the X (Twitter) account — every draft is held in a queue for you to edit, approve, or reject; nothing posts automatically, and it stays inert until you set credentials in the X card below.",
+  x_replies_enabled:
+    "Also poll X mentions and draft replies (still held for your approval — nothing auto-replies). Off by default: reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so leave this off if you only want release posts.",
+  roadmap_engine_enabled:
+    "Weekly: the Product Owner explores the company's projects and proposes a themed cycle of 3-7 roadmap items — you approve or reject each one individually; approved items land in the backlog and nothing auto-starts.",
 };
 
 export function FeatureFlagsCard() {

panel/src/components/settings/x-credentials-card.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+"use client";
+
+import { useState } from "react";
+import { useMutation, useQuery, useQueryClient } from "@tanstack/react-query";
+import { xApi } from "@/lib/api";
+import {
+  Card,
+  CardContent,
+  CardDescription,
+  CardHeader,
+  CardTitle,
+} from "@/components/ui/card";
+import { Label } from "@/components/ui/label";
+import { Input } from "@/components/ui/input";
+import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
+import { AtSign, Key, KeyRound, Save } from "lucide-react";
+import { toast } from "sonner";
+
+const FIELDS: Array<{
+  key: "api_key" | "api_secret" | "access_token" | "access_token_secret";
+  label: string;
+}> = [
+  { key: "api_key", label: "API key" },
+  { key: "api_secret", label: "API key secret" },
+  { key: "access_token", label: "Access token" },
+  { key: "access_token_secret", label: "Access token secret" },
+];
+
+// The CEO's one-time (or rotate) entry of the 4 OAuth 1.0a user-context
+// secrets from the X developer app. Write-only — the stored values are never
+// displayed back, only whether they're set (mirrors the git-token card).
+export function XCredentialsCard() {
+  const queryClient = useQueryClient();
+  const [values, setValues] = useState({
+    api_key: "",
+    api_secret: "",
+    access_token: "",
+    access_token_secret: "",
+  });
+
+  const { data: status, isLoading } = useQuery({
+    queryKey: ["x", "credentials"],
+    queryFn: () => xApi.getCredentialsStatus(),
+  });
+
+  const saveMutation = useMutation({
+    mutationFn: () => xApi.setCredentials(values),
+    onSuccess: () => {
+      queryClient.invalidateQueries({ queryKey: ["x", "credentials"] });
+      setValues({
+        api_key: "",
+        api_secret: "",
+        access_token: "",
+        access_token_secret: "",
+      });
+      toast.success("X credentials saved");
+    },
+    onError: (error) => {
+      toast.error(
+        `Failed to save: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Unknown error"}`,
+      );
+    },
+  });
+
+  const allFilled = FIELDS.every((f) => values[f.key].trim().length > 0);
+  const noneFilled = FIELDS.every((f) => values[f.key].trim().length === 0);
+  // A genuine save is either "set all 4" or, when something is already
+  // stored, "clear all 4". All-empty with nothing stored is a true no-op.
+  const canSave = allFilled || (noneFilled && !!status?.has_credentials);
+
+  return (
+    <Card>
+      <CardHeader>
+        <CardTitle className="flex items-center gap-2">
+          <AtSign className="h-5 w-5" />X (Twitter) Credentials
+        </CardTitle>
+        <CardDescription>
+          The 4 OAuth 1.0a user-context secrets from your X developer app.
+          Stored encrypted server-side; agents never see them and this panel
+          never displays them again once saved.
+        </CardDescription>
+      </CardHeader>
+      <CardContent className="space-y-4">
+        <div className="flex items-center gap-2 rounded-md border p-3">
+          {status?.has_credentials ? (
+            <>
+              <Key className="h-4 w-4 text-green-500" />
+              <span className="text-sm text-green-600 dark:text-green-400">
+                Credentials are set
+              </span>
+            </>
+          ) : (
+            <>
+              <KeyRound className="h-4 w-4 text-amber-500" />
+              <span className="text-sm text-amber-600 dark:text-amber-400">
+                {isLoading ? "Checking..." : "No credentials configured"}
+              </span>
+            </>
+          )}
+        </div>
+
+        <div className="grid grid-cols-1 gap-4 sm:grid-cols-2">
+          {FIELDS.map((field) => (
+            <div key={field.key} className="space-y-2">
+              <Label htmlFor={`x-cred-${field.key}`}>
+                {status?.has_credentials ? `Replace ${field.label}` : field.label}
+              </Label>
+              <Input
+                id={`x-cred-${field.key}`}
+                type="password"
+                value={values[field.key]}
+                onChange={(e) =>
+                  setValues((prev) => ({ ...prev, [field.key]: e.target.value }))
+                }
+                placeholder="••••••••••••"
+              />
+            </div>
+          ))}
+        </div>
+
+        <p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
+          Set all 4 to save (or rotate); leave all 4 blank and save to clear.
+        </p>
+
+        <Button
+          onClick={() => saveMutation.mutate()}
+          disabled={saveMutation.isPending || !canSave}
+        >
+          <Save className="mr-2 h-4 w-4" />
+          {saveMutation.isPending ? "Saving..." : "Save"}
+        </Button>
+      </CardContent>
+    </Card>
+  );
+}