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v0.17.0 — Wave 3: sandbox DB, DB isolation, mobile UI, cloud auth, X account, roadmap engine (#303)
* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers
Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn
(SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via
projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only.
When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox
and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces,
never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at
every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a
grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the
just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named
containers from a crash-missed teardown.
Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature
flag card entry.
* docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem
* feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network)
Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the
orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their
sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or
reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth —
membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published
ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and
the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with
docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block).
ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the
topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection:
under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse
than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The
flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the
compose networks: stanzas.
Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK
polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker
exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing.
* feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass
Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe,
memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below
md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable
snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first
tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar
(Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded).
Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions
+ the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal /
playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders
approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps;
Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg
(fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights;
recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer
gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get
safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar.
Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first
overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc,
vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes).
* feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session)
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed
beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while
off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in
off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo
or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session
cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published
:8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system
self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes.
Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no
registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK.
Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound
to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password
invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every
authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never
expires — no unexpected logouts.
Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes
/auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the
dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged.
Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every
non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to
clear the middleware deprecation warning.
* feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off)
ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the
ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a
release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService
.approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop,
x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is
local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet
is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False,
Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a
panel queue.
The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton
x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only
has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or
egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency;
NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op.
XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet.
Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now
re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED
before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the
winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level
commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test.
* feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off)
ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens
ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False,
Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot
_dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer
board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO
explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one
propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle —
goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table,
no migration; head stays 059).
The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a
BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject
records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task.
RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap.
Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker
before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its
own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped).
Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared
source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are
LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged
origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup).
* chore(release): 0.17.0
Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod
Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth
(FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap
engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0.
Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py,
pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added.
Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF
in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off
(CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail
startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED
stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology).
* chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes
Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two
were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator
controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot
(else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry
compose keeps both off.
* fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds
The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown
prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example
current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing
strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research.
* fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate)
The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate
rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon):
- sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes /
_list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace
- x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items
- x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions
- orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a
MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the
wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic)
- auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A)
Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean.
* fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry)
The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly
but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry
(quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean.
Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates
before reaching deptry.
* feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off)
Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by
default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply
half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting.
New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop
(_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting
(the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when
x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the
panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle +
the poll loop are no-ops with replies off.
* fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes
Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode:
- client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel
token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a
login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes
/auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects
when cloud_auth_enabled.
- make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping
surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a
token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against
the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now
strips surrounding single/double quotes.
* fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state
- GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit
SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the
fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so
author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit
Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with
a piped subject.
- The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible
place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state
pointing at Settings -> X credentials.
* docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3)
Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in
the 0.17.0 span, code-verified:
- wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine
(+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG
architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols,
migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context
dual-path across the map slices.
- waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory
(search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the
PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED).
- correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin
routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a
_require_ceo gate (wave 2c).
docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md
snapshot untouched.
* fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault)
The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths
(IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source
_upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row
and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and
poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent
_checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin.
Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the
constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value
is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The
batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice
in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session
ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row.
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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## Purpose
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The AgentOrchestrator is the runtime brain of RoboCo: it owns the per-agent Docker container lifecycle, the per-tick dispatcher that matches tasks to agents, the stale-claim reaper, the provider rate-limit/overload park-and-probe recovery loop, and the default-off background engines (self-heal, CI-watch, dep-update, release-manager, strategy, external-PR poll). It claims tasks on behalf of agents before spawning, injects briefings/manifests/git context at spawn time, captures per-session token usage, and persists durable runtime state (WaitingRecord, respawn_tracker) across restarts.
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The AgentOrchestrator is the runtime brain of RoboCo: it owns the per-agent Docker container lifecycle, the per-tick dispatcher that matches tasks to agents, the stale-claim reaper, the provider rate-limit/overload park-and-probe recovery loop, and the default-off background engines (self-heal, CI-watch, dep-update, release-manager, strategy, external-PR poll, X-engine mentions poll, board roadmap engine). It claims tasks on behalf of agents before spawning, injects briefings/manifests/git context at spawn time, provisions a per-spawn sandbox DB/Redis when opted in, captures per-session token usage, and persists durable runtime state (WaitingRecord, respawn_tracker) across restarts.
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## Files
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@@ -79,10 +79,22 @@ The AgentOrchestrator is the runtime brain of RoboCo: it owns the per-agent Dock
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| AgentOrchestrator._should_skip_live_reap | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:8750 | Spare a live container from reaping UNLESS wedged (grok) or gateway-broken past grace (those kill+evict). |
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| AgentOrchestrator._assignee_is_provider_parked | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:8527 | True if a task's assignee is provider-parked; reaper skips it so the claim survives for probe-resume. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._reap_with_service | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:8770 | Inner stale-claim reaper: skip live (unless wedged/broken), skip provider-parked, unclaim_for_reaper the rest. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._maybe_provision_sandbox | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:2029 | Provision this spawn's sandbox DB/Redis via `SandboxProvisioner` when `sandbox_db_enabled` + the project's `sandbox_services` are set; None (byte-for-byte legacy path) otherwise. Fail-loud once opted in — a provisioning failure refuses the spawn. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._append_sandbox_env | staticmethod | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:2639 | Inject `ROBOCO_TEST_DB_*`/`ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_*` env from `config.sandbox_info`, called INSTEAD OF `_append_gate_env` whenever a sandbox was provisioned for this spawn. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._sandbox_janitor_sweep | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:9426 | Best-effort: remove sandbox containers whose owner agent is gone; rides the reaper tick, error-isolated. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._x_mentions_poll_loop | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:7431 | Default-off X-engine mentions-poll tick loop (`x_engine_enabled`); release-post drafts are event-driven, not from this loop. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._run_x_mentions_cycle | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:7453 | One mentions-poll pass: `get_x_engine(db).run_cycle()` + commit; testable without the sleep. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._roadmap_engine_loop | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:7462 | Default-off board roadmap-engine tick loop (`roadmap_engine_enabled`); opens one held exploration cycle per interval. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._run_roadmap_engine_cycle | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:7484 | One roadmap-engine pass: `get_roadmap_engine(db).run_cycle()` + commit; testable without the sleep. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._dispatch_roadmap_exploration | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:10284 | One-shot Product-Owner spawn to author a themed roadmap cycle; bypasses the two-reviewer board-review-pair machinery (PO-solo in v1). |
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| AgentOrchestrator._dispatch_all_work | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:8814 | Reset tick-handled set, reap stale claims, enforce grok budget, run all 17 dispatchers under one httpx client with per-dispatcher isolation. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._pm_respawn_should_gate | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:8915 | Per-(slug,task) respawn circuit breaker; tracing_gap rule-following resets (bounded) + durable persist; CEO notify once when tripped. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._handle_pm_assigned_task | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:9084 | Spawn/respawn the PM for an assigned coordination root subject to the respawn gate. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._maybe_spawn_pm_closure | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:9498 | Spawn a PM to close a paused/blocked parent whose subtasks are all terminal (debounced via _is_recently_paused). |
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| AgentOrchestrator._AUTO_SUBMIT_VERB_BY_ROLE | ClassVar[dict] | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:10650 | Wave-1 PR-gate turn cut: maps cell_pm -> (cell_pm, submit_up) and main_pm -> (main_pm, submit_root), the flow route+verb that assembles the parent's PR for each coordinator role. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._auto_submit_target | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:10655 | Resolve (role, route, verb, pm_uuid) for an auto-submittable parent; None when `pr_gate_auto_submit_enabled` is off, the parent is branchless coordination (no PR to assemble), the role has no submit verb, or no PM identity resolves. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._try_auto_submit | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:10677 | Wave-1 PR-gate turn cut: run the owning PM's submit_up/submit_root verb system-side via the internal flow API (no PM spawn) when every child of an assembled parent is terminal; True on gate acceptance (fires `task.auto_submitted` audit + `_mark_task_handled`), False on ANY refusal (flag off, branchless parent, unmapped role, gate rejection, or transport error) so the caller falls back to the classic PM closure spawn. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._closure_handled_without_pm | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:10740 | Recover an auto-paused/blocked parent's status first (so the next actor lands on an actionable in_progress parent), then try `_try_auto_submit`; True skips the PM closure spawn entirely. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._maybe_spawn_pm_closure | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:10768 | If this parent task is ready for closure, try the system-side submit turn cut first (`_closure_handled_without_pm`); only spawn its PM when that declines (debounced via _is_recently_paused). |
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| AgentOrchestrator._dispatch_dev_work | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:9733 | Fetch pending/needs_revision/in_progress/claimed code tasks and route each through _dev_dispatch_one. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._dev_dispatch_one | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:9861 | Per-task dev dispatch: HITL skip, role/type mismatch guard, existing-owner respawn or pending spawn. |
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| AgentOrchestrator._spawn_pending_dev | method | roboco/runtime/orchestrator.py:9800 | Validate + spawn a dev for a pre-assigned pending task; applies the per-dev lane barrier _blocked_by_earlier_lane_sibling. |
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@@ -152,12 +164,13 @@ stateDiagram-v2
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- Rate-limit/overload park-and-probe: `_park_provider_unavailable` (+ grok 75/78 variants) → `_rate_limit_probe_loop` (30s) → `_on_probe_success`/`_on_probe_failure` → `resolve_wait`
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- Gateway-health: `_probe_gateway_health` → `_gateway_broken_past_grace` → `_maybe_recover_broken_gateway` (kill+evict)
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- Respawn tracker: `_pm_respawn_should_gate` → `_persist_respawn_record` (durable upsert) + `restore_respawn_tracker` at startup
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- Default-off loops: `_self_heal_loop`, `_ci_watch_loop`, `_dep_update_loop`, `_release_manager_loop`, `_strategy_engine_loop`, `_external_pr_poll_loop`
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- PM closure / PR-gate turn cut (wave 1): `_maybe_spawn_pm_closure` → `_closure_handled_without_pm` (recover paused/blocked status) → `_try_auto_submit` (system-side submit_up/submit_root via `_AUTO_SUBMIT_VERB_BY_ROLE`, gated by `pr_gate_auto_submit_enabled`); only a gate refusal falls through to an actual PM spawn
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- Default-off loops: `_self_heal_loop`, `_ci_watch_loop`, `_dep_update_loop`, `_release_manager_loop`, `_strategy_engine_loop`, `_external_pr_poll_loop`, `_x_mentions_poll_loop`, `_roadmap_engine_loop`
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- Interactive: `start_intake_session` / `_spawn_intake_container` / `_spawn_secretary_container` / `_reap_idle_interactive_sessions`
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- Shutdown (`stop`): cancel loops → `stop_agent(release_claim=True)` (skip provider-parked) → `_drain_bg_tasks` → `_stopped`
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## Dependencies
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- Internal: `roboco.config.settings`; `roboco.db.base.get_session_factory`; tables `RespawnTrackerTable`, `WaitingRecordTable`, `TaskTable`, `GatewayTriggerTable`, `agent_spawn_sessions`, `daily_usage_rollups`; `roboco.events.get_event_bus`; `roboco.llm.providers` (`ClaudeCodeProvider`, `GrokCliProvider`, `grok_auth`); `roboco.services.gateway` (`RateLimitStateTracker`, `role_config`, `claim_guards`); `WorkspaceService`, `TaskService`, `GitService`, `ConventionsService`, `SequencingService`, `CiWatchEngine`, `DepUpdateEngine`, `ReleaseManagerEngine`, `ReleaseReadinessService`, `MemoryDistiller`; `roboco.runtime.compose_prompt`; `AGENT_IMAGES`.
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- Internal: `roboco.config.settings`; `roboco.db.base.get_session_factory`; tables `RespawnTrackerTable`, `WaitingRecordTable`, `TaskTable`, `GatewayTriggerTable`, `agent_spawn_sessions`, `daily_usage_rollups`; `roboco.events.get_event_bus`; `roboco.llm.providers` (`ClaudeCodeProvider`, `GrokCliProvider`, `grok_auth`); `roboco.services.gateway` (`RateLimitStateTracker`, `role_config`, `claim_guards`); `WorkspaceService`, `TaskService`, `GitService`, `ConventionsService`, `SequencingService`, `CiWatchEngine`, `DepUpdateEngine`, `ReleaseManagerEngine`, `ReleaseReadinessService`, `MemoryDistiller`; `roboco.runtime.sandbox.SandboxProvisioner`; `roboco.services.x_engine.get_x_engine`; `roboco.services.roadmap_engine.get_roadmap_engine`; `roboco.runtime.compose_prompt`; `AGENT_IMAGES`.
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- External: Docker daemon (inspect/exec/run/rm); Redis; PostgreSQL+pgvector; Ollama; Claude Code SDK container image; grok CLI + `~/.grok/auth.json`; the orchestrator's own HTTP API (`/tasks`, `/notifications`, `/audit`) via httpx with `_system_api_headers`.
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## Entry Points
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@@ -179,6 +192,12 @@ stateDiagram-v2
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- `ROBOCO_GROK_MAX_COST_USD` — grok budget kill-switch; `_GROK_RATE_LIMIT_EXIT_CODE=75`, `_GROK_AUTH_EXIT_CODE=78`, `_PROBE_GIVE_UP_THRESHOLD=30`.
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- `ROBOCO_CLAUDE_STUCK_KILL_SECONDS` (default 3600, min 600) — heartbeat-stale kill threshold for non-GROK agents; controls `_maybe_kill_stuck_claude`.
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- `ROBOCO_DISPATCHER_INTERVAL_SECONDS` (30), `ROBOCO_INTERACTIVE_IDLE_REAP_SECONDS`, `ROBOCO_GROK_*` backoff constants.
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- `ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED` (default off) — master switch for the sandboxed per-agent-spawn Postgres/Redis provisioner (`_maybe_provision_sandbox`/`_append_sandbox_env`/`_sandbox_janitor_sweep`); a project participates only when its `sandbox_services` column is also set.
|
||||
- `ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED` (default off; set by the compose topology that carries the `roboco_data` network) — suppresses the legacy `_append_gate_env` prod-creds injection when postgres/redis are unreachable from the agent mesh.
|
||||
- `ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED` (+ `_EMAIL`/`_PASSWORD`/`_SECRET`/`_COOKIE_MAX_AGE`, default off) — cloud auth master switch; read by `roboco.api.deps.get_agent_context`/`roboco.api.auth.*`, not the orchestrator itself, but gates whether a spawned agent's own HMAC-token identity path is the sole non-CEO auth route.
|
||||
- `ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED` (+ `_mentions_interval_seconds` / `_mentions_max_per_cycle` / `_mentions_min_engagement` / `_max_open_posts` / `_account_user_id` / `_request_timeout_seconds`, default off) — gates `_x_mentions_poll_loop`.
|
||||
- `ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED` (+ `_interval_seconds` default 604800 / `_min_items_per_cycle` / `_max_items_per_cycle`, default off) — gates `_roadmap_engine_loop`.
|
||||
- `ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED` (`pr_gate_auto_submit_enabled`, default **True**) — wave-1 PR-gate turn cut: when every child of an assembled parent is terminal, `_try_auto_submit` runs the owning PM's submit_up/submit_root gate system-side instead of spawning the PM for that turn; a gate rejection (freshness/integrity) falls back to the classic PM closure spawn.
|
||||
|
||||
## Gotchas
|
||||
- Respawn-tracker rows are restored at startup and re-stamped to live values; terminal/missing-task rows are evicted, so a stale row can't gate a fresh task. The upsert is race-free but fire-and-forget persists are ordered by `_respawn_persist_lock` acquisition (= schedule order); a stale persist resolving after a fresh one would otherwise re-burn the strike threshold on restart.
|
||||
@@ -189,6 +208,8 @@ stateDiagram-v2
|
||||
- Fire-and-forget `_bg_tasks` (respawn_tracker upserts, audit rows) are drained at shutdown under `_SHUTDOWN_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`; past the deadline they're cancelled, so a cancelled persist degrades to in-memory-only (can only suppress a spawn, never manufacture one).
|
||||
- Budget-kill (`_enforce_grok_cost_budget`) finalizes the spawn session BEFORE popping the instance so captured usage/cost isn't lost; the reaper then releases the freed claim.
|
||||
- `_should_skip_live_reap` short-circuits like the original `and`: when not live, none of the three kill checks is awaited. The three kill paths are: `_maybe_kill_wedged_grok` (grok idle TTL), `_maybe_kill_stuck_claude` (non-GROK agent stuck past `claude_stuck_kill_seconds`, default 3600s), and `_maybe_recover_broken_gateway`. A Claude agent stuck in a genuine verb loop (still firing gateway verbs, so heartbeat advances) remains spared — the stuck-claude TTL only catches heartbeat-stale containers.
|
||||
- `_try_auto_submit` posts to the internal flow API AS the owning PM (`X-Agent-ID`/`X-Agent-Role` headers set to the PM's own identity) — it is not a privilege escalation since the PM already owns that verb, but it means an `auto_submitted` gate action is indistinguishable in the PM's own audit trail from one it issued itself; the `task.auto_submitted` audit event (fired only from `_try_auto_submit`) is the sole marker that the PM turn was skipped.
|
||||
- `_auto_submit_target` requires BOTH `branch_name` and `project_id` on the parent — a MegaTask umbrella (branchless coordination) always fails this check and falls through to the classic PM closure spawn, which is correct (an umbrella assembles no PR) but means the turn cut never applies to the top of a MegaTask tree, only its root-subtasks.
|
||||
|
||||
## Drift from CLAUDE.md
|
||||
- None material. The orchestrator runs the six default-off loops CLAUDE.md lists (self-heal, CI-watch, dep-update, release-manager, strategy, external-PR poll); `ROBOCO_ORG_MEMORY_ENABLED` has no orchestrator loop (capture/retrieval live in `TaskService`/`EvidenceRepo`, by design). Respawn-tracker durability (migration 051), `_instances` reconciled-from-Docker, and the park-and-probe shape all match the prose.
|
||||
@@ -203,6 +224,7 @@ stateDiagram-v2
|
||||
> - `d34bc1a7` ci-watch/dep-update dedupe: `_repo_key` normalizes git_url (strip `.git`, trailing slash, lowercase) and empty-string workflow treated as default so the DB dedupe and the orchestrator poll-set collapse agree.
|
||||
> - `7be10057` Agent image: stop baking `VIRTUAL_ENV=/app/.venv` — comment in `_generate_mcp_config` updated to drop the stale VIRTUAL_ENV reference.
|
||||
> - `6b441e42` Converters: `InvalidIdentifierError` now caught explicitly in `_release_stopped_agent_claim` with a structured warning log instead of a silent broad-except return.
|
||||
> - `d1cf6ecb` Wave 1: PR-gate turn cut, task search, trace timestamps, Secretary edits + e2e scenarios 2–3 (#295) — adds `config.pr_gate_auto_submit_enabled` (default True) + `_AUTO_SUBMIT_VERB_BY_ROLE` / `_auto_submit_target` / `_try_auto_submit` / `_closure_handled_without_pm`, wired into `_maybe_spawn_pm_closure` so an assembled, all-children-terminal parent is submitted to the PR gate system-side instead of always spawning the PM for that turn; fires a new `task.auto_submitted` audit event.
|
||||
|
||||
## Regression Risks
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user