mirror of
https://github.com/rennf93/roboco.git
synced 2026-08-03 07:23:24 +02:00
v0.17.0 — Wave 3: sandbox DB, DB isolation, mobile UI, cloud auth, X account, roadmap engine (#303)
* feat(sandbox): throwaway per-agent Postgres/Redis sandbox containers
Orchestrator-provisioned sibling containers per agent spawn
(SandboxProvisioner, roboco/runtime/sandbox.py). Per-project opt-in via
projects.sandbox_services (migration 057); master switch
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED, default-off, armed in the NAS compose only.
When active, ROBOCO_TEST_DB_* / ROBOCO_TEST_REDIS_* point at the sandbox
and the prod-creds gate-env injection is suppressed (sandbox replaces,
never coexists). Sandbox lifetime tracks the agent container: teardown at
every removal path, orphan janitor at startup + each reaper tick with a
grace window for mid-flight spawns. The pre-spawn stale-clear spares the
just-provisioned sandbox; provision pre-clears stale same-named
containers from a crash-missed teardown.
Panel: per-project sandbox-service switches in the edit dialog + feature
flag card entry.
* docs: CLAUDE.md entry for the sandboxed dev DB/Redis subsystem
* feat(security): isolate prod Postgres/Redis from agent containers (roboco_data network)
Second user-defined bridge roboco_data carries postgres+redis only; the
orchestrator is multi-homed (default + data). Spawned agents and their
sandbox sidecars stay on roboco_default and can no longer resolve or
reach roboco-postgres:5432 / roboco-redis:6379 (redis has no auth —
membership is its only containment). Normal bridge, so host-published
ports (15432/16379) keep working. Applied to both build composes and
the registry compose; docker-compose.yml re-synced byte-identical with
docker-compose.yaml (it had drifted by the sandbox flag block).
ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED (config default false, armed alongside the
topology) suppresses the legacy _append_gate_env prod-creds injection:
under isolation those creds dead-end, and unreachable creds are worse
than none. DB-needing projects opt into sandbox_services instead. The
flag is deliberately not a panel feature flag - it must travel with the
compose networks: stanzas.
Preserved by construction: agent<->agent A2A and orchestrator->agent SDK
polls on :9000, MCP->orchestrator on :8000, ollama reachability, docker
exec/inspect (daemon socket), host port publishing.
* feat(panel): full mobile responsiveness pass
Shared primitives: useIsMobile (useSyncExternalStore, hydration-safe,
memoized matchMedia subscribe), ResponsiveTable table->card switch below
md (single subtree mounted, no duplicated interactive rows), scrollable
snap TabsList in the base primitive (justify-center-safe so the first
tab stays reachable on overflow), persistent md:hidden bottom tab bar
(Overview/Tasks/Kanban/Chat, safe-area padded).
Applied: card lists for tasks/projects/products/work-sessions/sessions
+ the three raw metrics tables; CEO approval queue / release proposal /
playbook review action rows stack on narrow; command-center reorders
approvals above the fold on mobile; task-header metadata wraps;
Communications + A2A become URL-driven single-pane drill-downs below lg
(fixes the unconstrained-height ScrollArea bug) with dvh heights;
recharts label density/radius adapts via useIsMobile; git diff viewer
gets mobile font + wrap toggle; vh->dvh sweep; chat composers get
safe-area-inset padding; dashboard main p-4 md:p-6 + pb-20 for the bar.
Verified at 375px on the built app: bottom bar, drawer, approval-first
overview, swipeable kanban tab strip. All gates green (eslint, tsc,
vitest 249, next build 24/24 routes).
* feat(auth): cloud auth via FastAPI Users (default-off, single-user cookie session)
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED (default off) lets the panel/API be exposed
beyond localhost without changing the CEO's local no-login flow while
off — get_agent_context and the WS gate are byte-for-byte unchanged in
off-mode. On: header-trust dies for humans — any agent-role claim (ceo
or a privileged PM/board role) with no valid HMAC token or session
cookie is 401, closing the header-spoof hole on the host-published
:8000 port for every role. The agent-fleet HMAC path and the system
self-PATCH keep working unmodified in both modes.
Single seeded CEO user (migration 058 users table, UserTable), no
registration router — idempotent env-driven upsert at startup by PK.
Cookie transport (httponly/secure/samesite=lax) + a JWTStrategy bound
to a fingerprint of the current password hash (rotating the password
invalidates every prior session). Sliding 30-day session: every
authenticated request re-mints the cookie, so an active session never
expires — no unexpected logouts.
Panel: (auth)/login page + proxy.ts (Next 16 rename of middleware; probes
/auth/status over the docker-internal URL, fails open to off) gate the
dashboard; client.ts gets withCredentials + 401->/login. nginx unchanged.
Review hardening: broadened the on-mode rejection from ceo-only to every
non-CEO role without a valid token (was only closed when
ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED was also armed); Next-16 proxy.ts rename to
clear the middleware deprecation warning.
* feat(x): RoboCo X account engine — HoM drafts, per-post CEO approval (default-off)
ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off, inert without creds). Mirrors the
ReleaseManagerEngine held-artifact shape: XEngine drafts a post when a
release publishes (via a draft_release_post seam on ReleaseProposalService
.approve) and drafts replies to meaningful mentions (dedicated poll loop,
x_seen_mentions dedup ledger, per-cycle/open caps). Drafting is
local-model-only, clamped to 280 chars. Nothing auto-posts — every tweet
is a held task (source x_post/x_reply, confirmed_by_human=False,
Secretary-owned, dispatcher-skipped) the CEO edits/approves/rejects in a
panel queue.
The four OAuth 1.0a secrets live Fernet-encrypted in a singleton
x_credentials row (migration 059, all-or-nothing, API returns only
has_credentials); decryption is server-side, agents never hold creds or
egress. Hand-rolled OAuth 1.0a HMAC-SHA1 signer, no new dependency;
NullXClient makes the unconfigured path a graceful no-op.
XPostService.approve (CEO-only) is the sole caller of post_tweet.
Review hardening: closed a double-post race — the approve path now
re-reads committed task state inside the Redis lock and commits COMPLETED
before releasing, so a concurrent approve that acquires the lock after the
winner released can't re-post (SET-NX is non-waiting, and the route-level
commit landed after the lock dropped). Added a regression test.
* feat(roadmap): board roadmap engine — PO proposes themed cycles, CEO approves per-item (default-off)
ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED (default off). Weekly, RoadmapEngine opens
ONE held exploration task (source=board_roadmap, confirmed_by_human=False,
Product-Owner-assigned), deduped to one open cycle. A dedicated one-shot
_dispatch_roadmap_exploration spawns the PO solo (not the two-reviewer
board path, which would also spawn HoM + fire Approve-&-Start). The PO
explores read-only (git/KB/metrics/releases/charter/web) and makes one
propose_roadmap call (PO-only content verb) authoring a themed cycle —
goal + 3-7 item drafts — persisted as a roadmap_cycle marker (no table,
no migration; head stays 059).
The CEO acts per-item in the panel roadmap queue: approve materializes a
BACKLOG task (source=roadmap, no assignee — never auto-starts), reject
records a reason; all-items-terminal completes the exploration task.
RoadmapService is idempotent per item. Dispatchers skip board_roadmap.
Includes a real SQLAlchemy dirty-check fix (deep-copy the JSON marker
before mutating, or the in-place edit + reassign compares equal to its
own baseline and the UPDATE is skipped).
Review hardening: create_task_from_draft now honors a draft-declared
source only from a {prompter, roadmap} whitelist — drafts are
LLM-authored, so an unbounded source could impersonate a privileged
origin (release_manager would even wedge that engine's dedup).
* chore(release): 0.17.0
Wave 3 — six default-off subsystems: sandboxed dev DB/Redis, prod
Postgres/Redis network isolation, full mobile UI pass, cloud auth
(FastAPI Users), the RoboCo X account engine, and the board roadmap
engine. Plus the waves 1+2 work already on master since 0.16.0.
Version bumped across the canonical set (config.py, __init__.py,
pyproject.toml, panel/package.json, uv.lock); CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
cut to [0.17.0]; docs/map delta added.
Compose: every optional feature armed :-true in the NAS composes, OFF
in the user-facing registry compose. Two opt-in exceptions default off
(CLOUD_AUTH — needs email/password/secret + TLS, would otherwise fail
startup; ROUTING_STRICT — fail-closed spawning). DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED
stays on in both (coupled to the roboco_data topology).
* chore(compose): arm cloud_auth + routing_strict ON in the NAS composes
Every feature defaults ON in the NAS composes per policy — these two
were wrongly left off. Both keep the ${VAR:-true} form so the operator
controls the real runtime via .env: cloud auth needs
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL/_PASSWORD/_SECRET + TLS set there before a boot
(else startup fails loud), and routing_strict is fail-closed. Registry
compose keeps both off.
* fix(ci): reflow board.md prose (quality gate) + document v0.17.0 env creds
The roadmap section added hard-wrapped prose that failed the markdown
prose gate; reflowed (token-invariant). Also brought .env.example
current: cloud auth (now armed — needs SECRET or startup fails), routing
strict, the X engine (panel-entered OAuth), and web research.
* fix(ci): reduce cyclomatic complexity of five wave-3 blocks (xenon gate)
The wave-3 subagents introduced C-rank functions the CI xenon gate
rejects (my per-item reviews ran ruff/mypy/pytest but not xenon):
- sandbox.janitor_sweep -> extract _list_labeled_sandboxes /
_list_live_agent_containers / _prune_grace
- x_client.fetch_mentions -> extract _parse_mention_items
- x_engine.run_cycle -> extract _process_mentions
- orchestrator._dispatch_pm_work -> extract the source-skip into a
MODULE-level _is_held_ceo_source (module, not method, so the
wholesale-mocked dispatcher unit tests exercise the real logic)
- auth/seed.ensure_seed_user -> extract _apply_seed_updates (module avg -> A)
Behavior-preserving; full suite green (11902), xenon clean.
* fix(ci): declare pyjwt + fastapi-users-db-sqlalchemy as direct deps (deptry)
The cloud-auth code imports jwt and fastapi_users_db_sqlalchemy directly
but they were only transitive deps (via fastapi-users), which deptry
(quality gate, DEP003) rejects. Declared explicitly; deptry roboco/ clean.
Missed originally because local make quality stopped at earlier gates
before reaching deptry.
* feat(x): gate mention replies behind ROBOCO_X_REPLIES_ENABLED (default off)
Per CEO decision: the X engine should only post about releases by
default. Reading mentions needs a paid X API tier, so the mention-reply
half is now a deliberate opt-in on top of release posting.
New default-off flag x_replies_enabled gates the mentions poll loop
(_x_mentions_poll_loop) and XEngine.run_cycle; release-post drafting
(the release-proposal approve hook) is unaffected and still runs when
x_engine_enabled + credentials are set. Added to FEATURE_FLAGS + the
panel card. Tests: release posting works with replies off; run_cycle +
the poll loop are no-ops with replies off.
* fix: 401 only redirects to /login when cloud auth is on; panel-token strips .env quotes
Two bugs that together dead-ended login in secure mode:
- client.ts redirected to /login on ANY 401, so a mismatched panel
token (header-trust/secure mode, cloud auth off) bounced the user to a
login page whose backend route isn't mounted -> 404. Now it probes
/auth/status (bare fetch, no interceptor re-entry) and only redirects
when cloud_auth_enabled.
- make panel-token read the .env secret with grep|cut without stripping
surrounding quotes, so a quoted ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET produced a
token signed with the quotes included — which never verifies against
the orchestrator (docker-compose/pydantic unquote the secret). Now
strips surrounding single/double quotes.
* fix: git-log 500 on '|' in commit message; X queue shows an empty state
- GET /api/git/log 500'd (ValueError: Invalid isoformat) when a commit
SUBJECT contained a '|' (e.g. the 'curl|sh' lockdown commit): the
fixed '|' field delimiter let the subject's pipe shift the split so
author+date collapsed into one field. Switched to \x1f (Unit
Separator), which can't appear in commit content. Regression test with
a piped subject.
- The X Post Queue returned null when empty, so there was no visible
place for the X drafts. It now renders a discoverable empty state
pointing at Settings -> X credentials.
* docs: bring docs/rag + docs/map current for v0.17.0 (waves 1-3)
Agent-facing RAG corpus and codebase map updated for every feature in
the 0.17.0 span, code-verified:
- wave 3: sandbox DB, DB network isolation, cloud auth, X engine
(+ x_replies_enabled sub-flag), board roadmap engine — new RAG
architecture pages + role/tool/config-reference updates; new symbols,
migrations 057-059, panel surfaces, and the get_agent_context
dual-path across the map slices.
- waves 1-2: A2A live view + switchboard, prompter memory
(search_past_tasks), Secretary edit access + PM-lighter scope, the
PR-gate auto-submit turn cut (ROBOCO_PR_GATE_AUTO_SUBMIT_ENABLED).
- correctness fix: api-routes-schemas.md no longer claims the A2A admin
routes are reachable by any authenticated agent — they carry a
_require_ceo gate (wave 2c).
docs/internal, _front.md deltas, and the frozen _complete_map.md
snapshot untouched.
* fix(rag): atomic upsert for indexed-doc tracking (kills e2e segfault)
The indexed-document tracking write used check-then-insert in two paths
(IndexedDocumentRepository.upsert_batch and the file-source
_upsert_doc_record). Under concurrent indexing both callers saw no row
and both inserted, so the second violated uq_indexed_doc_source and
poisoned its transaction — surfacing in CI as the intermittent
_checkin_failed SIGSEGV on the failed connection's pool checkin.
Both paths now use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE against the
constraint: coalesce keeps an existing title/preview when the new value
is empty (matching the old guards) and metadata is jsonb-merged. The
batch dedupes within itself first (ON CONFLICT can't touch a row twice
in one statement). expire_all after the Core upsert keeps same-session
ORM reads consistent with the merged DB row.
---------
Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Renzo F
+66
-2
@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ services:
|
||||
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg16
|
||||
container_name: roboco-postgres
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
# data-only network: agent containers (on roboco_default) cannot reach
|
||||
# the production DB; only the multi-homed orchestrator can. Host port
|
||||
# publishing (15432) is unaffected — roboco_data is a normal bridge.
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- data
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
POSTGRES_USER: roboco
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: roboco
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +32,10 @@ services:
|
||||
image: redis:8-alpine
|
||||
container_name: roboco-redis
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
# data-only network — see postgres. Redis has no auth, so network
|
||||
# membership is its ONLY containment against agent containers.
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- data
|
||||
command: redis-server --appendonly yes
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "16379:6379"
|
||||
@@ -278,6 +287,11 @@ services:
|
||||
image: roboco-orchestrator
|
||||
container_name: roboco-orchestrator
|
||||
restart: unless-stopped
|
||||
# Multi-homed: the agent mesh (default) for spawned agents / panel /
|
||||
# ollama, plus the data network for postgres/redis.
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- default
|
||||
- data
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "8000:8000"
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
@@ -342,8 +356,8 @@ services:
|
||||
# PROJECT_SLUG to the registered project that IS RoboCo; CI_WORKFLOW scopes
|
||||
# the signal to the real CI workflow (RoboCo has several workflows, so the
|
||||
# unscoped "latest run" would be unreliable).
|
||||
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ENABLED:-false}
|
||||
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ORIGINATE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ORIGINATE_ENABLED:-false}
|
||||
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ORIGINATE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_ORIGINATE_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_PROJECT_SLUG: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_PROJECT_SLUG:-roboco-api}
|
||||
ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_CI_WORKFLOW: ${ROBOCO_SELF_HEAL_CI_WORKFLOW:-ci.yml}
|
||||
# Agent runtime toolchain matching: provision each agent workspace with
|
||||
@@ -372,15 +386,58 @@ services:
|
||||
# CI (reuses SELF_HEAL_PROJECT_SLUG as the RoboCo repo).
|
||||
# - Org-memory loop: distils a completion lesson + auto-injects relevant
|
||||
# past lessons/playbooks into each claim's briefing (local model only).
|
||||
# - X engine: drafts release-announcement + mention-reply posts, ALL
|
||||
# held for per-post CEO approval in the panel; inert without stored
|
||||
# X credentials (Settings -> the X card) regardless of this flag.
|
||||
ROBOCO_CI_WATCH_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_CI_WATCH_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_DEP_UPDATE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_DEP_UPDATE_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_RELEASE_MANAGER_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_RELEASE_MANAGER_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_ORG_MEMORY_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_ORG_MEMORY_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_X_ENGINE_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
# - Board roadmap engine: weekly, opens ONE held exploration task for
|
||||
# the Product Owner, who proposes a themed cycle of roadmap items;
|
||||
# the CEO approves each item individually into the backlog.
|
||||
ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_ROADMAP_ENGINE_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
# Sandboxed per-agent test DB/Redis: orchestrator-provisioned throwaway
|
||||
# sibling containers per spawn, replacing the prod-creds gate-env
|
||||
# injection for an opted-in project (its `sandbox_services` column set).
|
||||
# Config default is OFF; enabled HERE (personal deploy), deliberately
|
||||
# left OFF in docker-compose.registry.yml so the published default
|
||||
# stays conservative until verified on a live run.
|
||||
ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_SANDBOX_DB_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
# DB network isolation is LIVE in this file (postgres/redis on the
|
||||
# data-only network): suppress the legacy prod-creds gate-env
|
||||
# injection — agents can't reach roboco-postgres anyway, and handing
|
||||
# out creds that dead-end in a connect timeout is worse than none.
|
||||
# This flag must always travel with the networks: topology above.
|
||||
ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED: ${ROBOCO_DB_NETWORK_ISOLATED:-true}
|
||||
# Strategy engine (proactive strategy signals) + internal PR review — both
|
||||
# default-OFF in config; ARMED here for the NAS deploy like the rest. Left
|
||||
# OFF in docker-compose.registry.yml so the published default stays conservative.
|
||||
ROBOCO_STRATEGY_ENGINE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_STRATEGY_ENGINE_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_INTERNAL_PR_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_INTERNAL_PR_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
# Remaining default-OFF capabilities, ARMED here (personal deploy): web
|
||||
# research (inert without ROBOCO_RESEARCH_API_KEY → empty results), pitch
|
||||
# auto-provisioning (inert until a pitch is approved + a git token is set),
|
||||
# and transcript pruning (retention maintenance). All left OFF in the
|
||||
# registry compose. Override any via .env.
|
||||
ROBOCO_RESEARCH_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_RESEARCH_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_PROVISIONING_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_PROVISIONING_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_TRANSCRIPT_PRUNE_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_TRANSCRIPT_PRUNE_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
# Two knobs that also default ON here (like every feature), but change
|
||||
# FAILURE / AUTH behavior — the .env must be set up for each before a real
|
||||
# boot, which the operator owns:
|
||||
# - CLOUD_AUTH: exposes the panel behind a login. Set
|
||||
# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_EMAIL / _PASSWORD / _SECRET in .env (startup fails
|
||||
# loud without the secret) and terminate TLS (the session cookie is
|
||||
# secure-only); leave ROBOCO_PANEL_AGENT_TOKEN unset (it bypasses
|
||||
# login). To test-deploy before the creds exist, set
|
||||
# ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED=false in .env for that run.
|
||||
# - ROUTING_STRICT: fail-closed model routing — a spawn whose provider is
|
||||
# disabled RAISES instead of degrading. Audit model_assignments first
|
||||
# (a stale row pointing at a disabled provider would crash that spawn).
|
||||
ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED: ${ROBOCO_CLOUD_AUTH_ENABLED:-true}
|
||||
ROBOCO_ROUTING_STRICT: ${ROBOCO_ROUTING_STRICT:-true}
|
||||
# Spawn preflight (token-opt Phase 3) — refuse a non-gateway delivery role
|
||||
# that would respawn forever. Default-OFF in config; ARMED here (inert in
|
||||
# practice: every real delivery role is gateway-enabled). OFF in registry.
|
||||
@@ -490,3 +547,10 @@ services:
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
default:
|
||||
name: roboco_default
|
||||
# DB isolation: postgres/redis live ONLY here; the orchestrator is the
|
||||
# only service homed on both. Spawned agent containers + sandbox sidecars
|
||||
# join roboco_default (AGENT_NETWORK) and cannot resolve or reach the
|
||||
# production DB/Redis. Normal bridge (not internal) so host-published
|
||||
# ports keep working.
|
||||
data:
|
||||
name: roboco_data
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user