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fix(agents): block subagent spawning at the Claude Code level (disallow Task) (#377)
The fleet-wide subagent ban was implemented as an allowlist omission, but Task is a default-permitted Claude Code built-in — an allowlist auto-approves, it does not restrict. Under permission_mode="dontAsk" (intake/secretary SDK) and defaultMode="bypassPermissions" (fleet), Task ran regardless and can_use_tool was never invoked for it, so every Claude-path agent could still spawn subagents despite allows_subagent=False. Only the grok path blocked it. Explicitly disallow the subagent tool at every Claude-path spawn point: disallowed_tools=["Task"] on the intake and secretary SDK drivers, and "Task" in the fleet settings.json base_deny (an explicit deny applies even under bypassPermissions). This mirrors the grok path's --disallowed-tools Agent. Pins the ban in test_cc_lockdown.py (fleet settings deny Task) and a new test_sdk_driver_subagent_ban.py (intake + secretary options disallow Task). Co-authored-by: Renn F <rennf93@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
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"""The SDK-driver agents (intake, secretary) hard-disallow the `Task` tool.
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`Task` is a default-permitted Claude Code built-in: omitting it from
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`allowed_tools` only removes an auto-approve entry, it does not restrict, and
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`permission_mode="dontAsk"` never routes a pre-permitted built-in through the
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`can_use_tool` gate. So the ONLY claude-code-level block is an explicit
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`disallowed_tools=["Task"]` (→ CLI `--disallowedTools Task`). These pin that
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the intake interviewer and the Secretary cannot fan out subagents.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from roboco.agent_sdk.intake_driver import build_intake_options
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from roboco.agent_sdk.secretary_driver import build_secretary_options
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def test_intake_options_disallow_task() -> None:
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opts = build_intake_options(
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system_prompt="x", cwd="/tmp", session_id="s1", model="sonnet"
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)
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assert "Task" in opts.disallowed_tools
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assert "Task" not in opts.allowed_tools
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def test_secretary_options_disallow_task() -> None:
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opts = build_secretary_options(system_prompt="x", cwd="/tmp", model="sonnet")
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assert "Task" in opts.disallowed_tools
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assert "Task" not in opts.allowed_tools
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@@ -106,6 +106,41 @@ class TestSharedClaudeCredentialsDenied:
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assert inner.startswith("//"), f"must use // absolute form: {entry}"
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class TestSubagentBanned:
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"""Every role's settings.json denies the `Task` subagent tool.
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`Task` is a default-permitted Claude Code built-in; under
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defaultMode=bypassPermissions the manifest/allowlist omission does NOT
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remove it — only an explicit `permissions.deny` entry does. Without this
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the fleet-wide subagent ban (CEO, 2026-07-09) is unenforced on the Claude
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path (the grok path already blocks it via `--disallowed-tools Agent`).
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"""
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def test_developer_settings_deny_task(self) -> None:
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orch = _orch()
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path = orch._generate_agent_settings(
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agent_id="be-dev-1",
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role="developer",
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workspace_path=_WS,
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cell_workspace_path=_CELL,
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)
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deny = json.loads(Path(path).read_text())["permissions"]["deny"]
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assert "Task" in deny, deny
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def test_read_only_role_also_denies_task(self) -> None:
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"""A read-only role (pr_reviewer, the top prompt-injection target)
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gets the same base_deny → no subagent escape hatch."""
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orch = _orch()
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path = orch._generate_agent_settings(
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agent_id="be-pr-reviewer",
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role="pr_reviewer",
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workspace_path=_WS,
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cell_workspace_path=_CELL,
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)
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deny = json.loads(Path(path).read_text())["permissions"]["deny"]
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assert "Task" in deny, deny
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class TestSlashCommandsDisabled:
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"""--disable-slash-commands accompanies every container agent spawn."""
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