[sweep] strip Fxxx audit-ID tokens + trim bloated comments/docstrings + add behavior-change docs

Post-audit sweep over the 135 audit-fix commits since 19a474d3:

1. Stripped every # Fxxx: audit-ID token from comments AND every Fxxx token
   from docstring openings across 211 blocks / ~626 lines. The CEO flagged
   these twice: audit-issue IDs in code confuse future devs/agents. The
   descriptive text is preserved; only the Fxxx token is removed (and bloated
   narrative blocks trimmed to 1-3 lines keeping the one non-obvious invariant).
2. Trimmed bloated comments/docstrings to the concise standard (1-3 lines).
3. Added missing behavior-change docs for the audit-fix batch: prompts/roles
   (documenter, pr_reviewer, qa), user-facing docs (api auth, websockets,
   agent-gateway, megatask, merge-model, task-lifecycle, grok, resilience,
   conventions, panel, security, troubleshooting), and the RAG corpus (cell-pm,
   main-pm, pr-reviewer, qa roles; conventions; messaging-tools; escalation;
   megatask; task-claiming workflows).

Comment/docstring/prose ONLY — zero code-line edits (verified: the diff
contains no def/class/return/if/for/await/assignment/call lines). Gates green:
ruff format + ruff check clean, mypy clean on roboco/. The only pytest failures
are the pre-existing sync_branch tracing-decision gap (B1, 250be5c2) — not
sweep-caused and tracked separately.

tests/foundation/test_identity.py

@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ def test_team_for_slug() -> None:
 
 
 def test_role_for_slug_or_none_unknown_returns_none() -> None:
-    """F019/F031: a safe variant for defensive skip-guards — an unknown/stale
+    """A safe variant for defensive skip-guards — an unknown/stale
     slug returns None instead of raising KeyError, so a stale assignee or
     notification-target slug can't crash the whole dispatcher tick."""
     assert identity.role_for_slug_or_none("nonexistent-slug") is None

tests/foundation/test_lifecycle_spec.py

@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ def test_can_invoke_intent_developer_open_pr_no_commits_tracing_gap() -> None:
 
 
 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# F101: open_pr must enforce the PR-open state gate (parity with the HTTP path)
+# open_pr must enforce the PR-open state gate (parity with the HTTP path)
 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
 
 
@@ -584,10 +584,8 @@ def _owned_task(**overrides: Any) -> SimpleNamespace:
 
 
 def test_open_pr_rejected_on_claimed_task() -> None:
-    """F101: ``open_pr`` has ``composes=()`` so the spec gate applied NO
-    source-status check — a dev could open a PR from ``claimed`` (before
-    ``in_progress``), skipping the active-dev state the HTTP path's
-    ``_assert_pr_create_allowed`` enforces. The state gate now rejects it."""
+    """``open_pr`` must be rejected from ``claimed`` — only ``in_progress`` may
+    open a PR (mirrors the HTTP path's ``_assert_pr_create_allowed``)."""
     actor = uuid4()
     d = spec.can_invoke_intent(
         spec.Role.DEVELOPER,
@@ -673,14 +671,8 @@ def test_open_pr_state_gate_takes_priority_over_unowned() -> None:
 
 
 def test_escalate_up_rejected_on_completed_task() -> None:
-    """F043: a PM must not resurrect a COMPLETED task via escalate_up.
-
-    escalate_up has composes=() and historically no source-status guard, so the
-    spec gate accepted it on a terminal task and apply_escalation set it back to
-    BLOCKED — bypassing the state machine's terminal-state invariant. The spec
-    now rejects terminal tasks (completed / cancelled) before the journal:decision
-    write fires.
-    """
+    """A PM must not resurrect a COMPLETED task via ``escalate_up`` — the spec
+    gate rejects terminal tasks before the journal:decision write fires."""
     d = spec.can_invoke_intent(
         spec.Role.CELL_PM,
         "escalate_up",
@@ -692,7 +684,7 @@ def test_escalate_up_rejected_on_completed_task() -> None:
 
 
 def test_escalate_up_rejected_on_cancelled_task() -> None:
-    """F043: cancelled is terminal — escalate_up must not resurrect it either."""
+    """Cancelled is terminal — escalate_up must not resurrect it either."""
     d = spec.can_invoke_intent(
         spec.Role.MAIN_PM,
         "escalate_up",
@@ -704,7 +696,7 @@ def test_escalate_up_rejected_on_cancelled_task() -> None:
 
 
 def test_escalate_up_allowed_on_blocked_task() -> None:
-    """F043: the terminal guard must not over-restrict — BLOCKED is the natural
+    """The terminal guard must not over-restrict — BLOCKED is the natural
     escalation source and must still be allowed."""
     d = spec.can_invoke_intent(
         spec.Role.CELL_PM,