2026-06-24 01:15:57 +02:00
|
|
|
"""The orchestrator's internal API calls must carry an authorized identity.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Regression guard for the wedge where dispatcher ``httpx`` clients were built
|
|
|
|
|
without an agent identity, so the orchestrator's self-PATCHes (auto-block /
|
|
|
|
|
auto-resume / auto-recover / SLA annotation) were rejected ``401 Missing
|
|
|
|
|
X-Agent-ID`` and silently no-op'd — leaving paused/blocked parents stuck and
|
|
|
|
|
their dependents stranded. The fix gives every API-facing dispatcher client the
|
|
|
|
|
system identity; these tests lock that the identity is both *present* and
|
|
|
|
|
*authorized* for task writes (otherwise the self-call would 403 instead of act).
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-28 11:07:56 +02:00
|
|
|
import secrets
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import pytest
|
|
|
|
|
from roboco.agents_config import verify_agent_token
|
2026-06-24 01:15:57 +02:00
|
|
|
from roboco.foundation import identity as _foundation
|
|
|
|
|
from roboco.models import AgentRole
|
|
|
|
|
from roboco.models.permissions import TASK_PERMISSIONS, TaskAction
|
2026-06-28 11:07:56 +02:00
|
|
|
from roboco.runtime.orchestrator import _SYSTEM_API_HEADERS, _system_api_headers
|
2026-06-24 01:15:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_system_api_headers_match_the_system_identity() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
system = _foundation.AGENTS["system"]
|
|
|
|
|
assert _SYSTEM_API_HEADERS["X-Agent-ID"] == str(system.uuid)
|
|
|
|
|
assert _SYSTEM_API_HEADERS["X-Agent-Role"] == "system"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_system_identity_is_authorized_for_task_writes() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
# admin_set_status — the audited override path the orchestrator's
|
|
|
|
|
# auto-recover / auto-resume drive — is gated behind TaskAction.ASSIGN.
|
|
|
|
|
# The identity the orchestrator sends must hold it.
|
|
|
|
|
assert TaskAction.ASSIGN in TASK_PERMISSIONS[AgentRole.SYSTEM]
|
2026-06-28 11:07:56 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_system_api_headers_carry_signed_token(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
# F038/F039: the orchestrator's self-API calls must carry a signed
|
|
|
|
|
# X-Agent-Token for the system identity, or arming
|
|
|
|
|
# ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_REQUIRED=true 401s every silent recovery op
|
|
|
|
|
# (auto-block / auto-resume / auto-recover / SLA annotation) and wedges
|
|
|
|
|
# paused/blocked parents — the self-PATCH 401 fix is incomplete without it.
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", secrets.token_hex(32))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
headers = _system_api_headers()
|
|
|
|
|
token = headers["X-Agent-Token"]
|
|
|
|
|
assert token and token != "UNSIGNED"
|
|
|
|
|
assert verify_agent_token(token, headers["X-Agent-ID"], "system", "")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_system_api_headers_unsigned_when_secret_unset(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
# Dev fallback: with no secret set, the token is the UNSIGNED sentinel and
|
|
|
|
|
# auth is not required, so the self-call still succeeds. The header is
|
|
|
|
|
# present either way so a future arm-when-secret-set doesn't silently break.
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.delenv("ROBOCO_AGENT_AUTH_SECRET", raising=False)
|
|
|
|
|
headers = _system_api_headers()
|
|
|
|
|
assert headers["X-Agent-Token"] == "UNSIGNED"
|