Files
pmg/sandbox/policy.go
T
ee684a29a9 feat(sandbox): presets — additive workload allowance bundles (#387)
* feat(sandbox): introduce presets - additive workload allowance bundles

Presets are named, additive-only bundles of sandbox allowances for a
specific workload (git hooks tooling, Astro/Vite/Next.js dev servers).
They solve the per-workload tuning friction from #384 without weakening
the default posture: no built-in profile references a preset, presets
cannot carry deny rules or profile booleans (strict YAML decoding), and
mandatory denies still win everywhere except the existing exact-match
suppression.

- Preset schema with metadata (author, labels) and schema_version gating
- Registry over ordered sources (embedded builtin, user dir); builtin
  wins name collisions; source abstraction is the extension point for a
  future hosted registry and SafeDep cloud sync
- Official presets: git, astro, vite, nextjs (with threat notes)
- Overlay/runtime integration: pmg sandbox allow preset=<name> and
  --sandbox-allow preset=<name>, stored by reference, resolved at apply
  time, missing presets warn (fail closed) instead of aborting
- Profile integration: presets: [...] list resolved after inherits
- CLI: pmg sandbox preset list (metadata filters, --json), show (prints
  YAML with threat notes), lint
- Docs: user guide (docs/sandbox-presets.md) and design spec

Closes #384

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): address review findings on presets

- Presets never modify deny lists: a profile authored deny now survives a
  preset allowing the same path (deny-beats-allow keeps it enforced).
  Regression test added.
- Profile inspection commands (show, diff, lint) construct the profile
  registry with the user-aware preset registry so they agree with runtime
  resolution of custom profiles referencing user presets.
- Handle stderr write error when warning about unresolvable presets.
- Compute preset show underline from the uncolored header.
- Use path.Join for embed.FS reads (slash-separated on all platforms).
- Clarify in docs that lint-staged/astro are examples of preset workloads.
- Drop the design spec from the PR per review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): harden preset precedence against authored denies

Addresses external security review findings on the preset mechanism:

- Bubblewrap: a mandatory write-denied path listed in allow_read lost its
  protection when a later writable parent bind covered it (bwrap last
  mount wins) - exactly the git preset shape (allow_read .git/config +
  allow_write .git/**). The mandatory deny now re-binds the path
  read-only after all writable mounts instead of being skipped.
  Regression test asserts mount ordering. Landlock and Seatbelt were
  unaffected (tests added for the same policy shape on Landlock).
- Environment: ScrubEnv is allow-wins, so a preset environment allowance
  could override a profile-authored deny. Preset env allowances
  overlapping an authored deny pattern are now dropped at application
  time (conservative bidirectional glob overlap, fail closed). Surviving
  entries still opt out of built-in credential scrubbing as intended.
- Network: removed allow_outbound from the preset schema. Both platform
  translators are all-or-nothing for outbound (one allow rule means
  blanket network access), so a preset outbound entry would silently
  change network posture far beyond what its YAML conveys. Strict
  decoding rejects the key.
- Added a dual-path expansion equivalence test (profile presets: field
  vs overlay/--sandbox-allow) and documented the precedence guarantees
  in docs/sandbox-presets.md.

Explicit --sandbox-allow and pmg sandbox allow overrides keep their
existing semantics.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* docs(sandbox): document env and preset allowances in allow command and overlay docs

pmg sandbox allow help, the --sandbox-allow flag usage, and the project
overlay docs enumerated only read/write/exec/net types. Add env and
preset to all of them, with an overlay example for persisting an env
allowance and a note on why env entries are not auto-promoted by --last.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* chore(sandbox): trim preset code comments to corner cases and minimal godocs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): exact glob intersection for preset env deny overlap

The bidirectional literal-text heuristic missed overlapping globs with
different literal structure: preset allow AWS_*_KEY and authored deny
AWS_SECRET_* both match AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY but neither pattern
matches the other's text, so the allowance merged and allow-wins
scrubbing exposed the variable. EnvPatternsOverlap now computes exact
intersection non-emptiness for the name glob dialect (case-insensitive,
'*' any sequence, '?' single char) via memoized DP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): preset env allowances are exact names, not globs

Glob-vs-glob intersection is a losing game: every dialect extension
(character classes today) silently reopens the deny-bypass hole.
Restricting preset environment allowances to literal variable names
makes the authored-deny precedence check exact by construction: each
deny pattern is evaluated against the concrete name with the same
matcher ScrubEnv uses at runtime, so the decision cannot diverge from
enforcement regardless of deny dialect. Removes the glob intersection
machinery. Profile and --sandbox-allow env globs are unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): reject mandatory-deny targets in preset paths

Preset validation relied on IsSensitiveProjectTarget, which covers fewer
files than util.DANGEROUS_FILES. A preset naming .git-credentials,
.pgpass, .docker/config.json or .config/gh exactly would exact-match
suppress the mandatory deny; .git/config in allow_write would suppress
the write protection. Preset paths are now checked against
DANGEROUS_FILES (single source of truth), .git/hooks is rejected in any
direction, and .git/config is rejected for write/exec while read stays
allowed for git repo discovery. Docs state the two deliberate opt-outs
precisely.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* feat(sandbox): preset init and edit commands for community authoring

pmg sandbox preset init scaffolds a valid user preset (metadata flags,
threat-note template, starter rule) and refuses built-in names since
builtins win resolution. pmg sandbox preset edit opens the file via the
shared editor package and validates the result, warning when a user
preset is shadowed by a built-in. Docs lead with the scaffolded flow and
spell out builtin-vs-community provenance in preset list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* refactor(sandbox): move mandatory-target matching into util

Preset path validation re-encoded knowledge util already owns: the
dangerous-files comparison and hardcoded .git/config and .git/hooks
strings. util now exports GitConfigPath, GitHooksPath (also used by
GetMandatoryDenyPatterns), PathCoveredBy and DangerousFileMatch, and
preset validation consumes them so the mandatory deny policy has a
single definition.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 15:14:07 +05:30

216 lines
8.6 KiB
Go

package sandbox
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/safedep/dry/utils"
)
// SandboxPolicy represents a parsed and validated sandbox policy that defines
// filesystem, network, and process execution restrictions for package managers.
// Policy violations will block execution. Policy supports inheritance from parent policies.
type SandboxPolicy struct {
// These fields are not affected by inheritance and are set from the child policy.
Name string `yaml:"name" json:"name"`
Description string `yaml:"description" json:"description"`
Inherits string `yaml:"inherits,omitempty" json:"inherits,omitempty"`
PackageManagers []string `yaml:"package_managers" json:"package_managers"`
// Presets are expanded by the registry after inheritance resolution.
// Names are kept post-expansion for provenance display.
Presets []string `yaml:"presets,omitempty" json:"presets,omitempty"`
// These fields are affected by inheritance and are merged with the parent policy.
// Any new values added here should be handled in the MergeWithParent method.
Filesystem FilesystemPolicy `yaml:"filesystem" json:"filesystem"`
Network NetworkPolicy `yaml:"network" json:"network"`
Process ProcessPolicy `yaml:"process" json:"process"`
Environment EnvironmentPolicy `yaml:"environment" json:"environment"`
// The boolean fields are pointers to allow for nil values so that the YAML parser
// can set the values from the child policy if present. We can differentiate between
// nil and false values. Any new values added here should be handled in the
// MergeWithParent method. When present in the child policy, the parent value is ignored.
// When not present in the child policy, the parent value is used.
// AllowGitConfig allows write access to .git/config file.
AllowGitConfig *bool `yaml:"allow_git_config" json:"allow_git_config"`
// AllowPTY allows pseudo-terminal (PTY) operations.
AllowPTY *bool `yaml:"allow_pty" json:"allow_pty"`
// AllowNetworkBind allows binding to localhost (127.0.0.1 / ::1) for listening.
AllowNetworkBind *bool `yaml:"allow_network_bind" json:"allow_network_bind"`
// NetworkViaProxyOnly confines all outbound network access to the PMG
// proxy. Requires the proxy flow; drivers fail closed without a running
// proxy.
NetworkViaProxyOnly *bool `yaml:"network_via_proxy_only" json:"network_via_proxy_only"`
// AllowDirectDNS re-opens direct DNS (mDNSResponder) under
// NetworkViaProxyOnly. No effect otherwise. Default false: the proxy
// resolves names and direct DNS is an exfiltration channel.
AllowDirectDNS *bool `yaml:"allow_direct_dns" json:"allow_direct_dns"`
}
// FilesystemPolicy defines allowed and denied filesystem access patterns.
// Deny rules have higher priority than allow rules.
type FilesystemPolicy struct {
AllowRead []string `yaml:"allow_read" json:"allow_read"`
AllowWrite []string `yaml:"allow_write" json:"allow_write"`
DenyRead []string `yaml:"deny_read" json:"deny_read"`
DenyWrite []string `yaml:"deny_write" json:"deny_write"`
}
// NetworkPolicy defines allowed and denied network access patterns.
// Patterns are in the format "host:port" or "*:*" for wildcards.
type NetworkPolicy struct {
AllowOutbound []string `yaml:"allow_outbound" json:"allow_outbound"`
DenyOutbound []string `yaml:"deny_outbound" json:"deny_outbound"`
AllowBind []string `yaml:"allow_bind" json:"allow_bind"`
}
// ProcessPolicy defines allowed and denied process execution patterns.
// Patterns can be specific paths or glob patterns.
type ProcessPolicy struct {
AllowExec []string `yaml:"allow_exec" json:"allow_exec"`
DenyExec []string `yaml:"deny_exec" json:"deny_exec"`
}
// EnvironmentPolicy controls which environment variables are scrubbed from the
// child process. Deny extends the built-in util.DANGEROUS_ENV_VARS list; Allow
// suppresses matching denies (allow wins). Patterns are case-insensitive name
// globs. Enforcement happens in sandbox/util.ScrubEnv at process spawn.
type EnvironmentPolicy struct {
Allow []string `yaml:"allow" json:"allow"`
Deny []string `yaml:"deny" json:"deny"`
}
// Validate validates the sandbox policy for correctness before inheritance resolution.
// Returns an error if the policy is invalid.
// Note: Validation for "at least one rule" check is deferred to ValidateResolved(),
// since a child policy might have no rules of its own but inherit rules from its parent.
func (p *SandboxPolicy) Validate() error {
if p.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("policy name is required")
}
if len(p.PackageManagers) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("policy must specify at least one package manager")
}
return nil
}
// ValidateResolved validates a policy after inheritance has been resolved.
// This is called after MergeWithParent to ensure the final policy is valid.
func (p *SandboxPolicy) ValidateResolved() error {
if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
// Check that at least one access rule is defined (after inheritance)
hasRules := len(p.Filesystem.AllowRead) > 0 ||
len(p.Filesystem.AllowWrite) > 0 ||
len(p.Filesystem.DenyRead) > 0 ||
len(p.Filesystem.DenyWrite) > 0 ||
len(p.Network.AllowOutbound) > 0 ||
len(p.Network.DenyOutbound) > 0 ||
len(p.Process.AllowExec) > 0 ||
len(p.Process.DenyExec) > 0 ||
len(p.Environment.Allow) > 0 ||
len(p.Environment.Deny) > 0
if !hasRules {
return fmt.Errorf("policy must define at least one access rule (after inheritance resolution)")
}
return nil
}
// AppliesToPackageManager returns true if this policy applies to the given package manager.
func (p *SandboxPolicy) AppliesToPackageManager(pm string) bool {
pmLower := strings.ToLower(pm)
for _, supported := range p.PackageManagers {
if strings.ToLower(supported) == pmLower {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// MergeWithParent merges the child policy with its parent policy.
// Lists are unioned (additive), package_managers are replaced, booleans are overridden.
// This method modifies the receiver (child policy) in place.
func (child *SandboxPolicy) MergeWithParent(parent *SandboxPolicy) {
// Union filesystem lists
child.Filesystem.AllowRead = unionStringSlices(parent.Filesystem.AllowRead, child.Filesystem.AllowRead)
child.Filesystem.AllowWrite = unionStringSlices(parent.Filesystem.AllowWrite, child.Filesystem.AllowWrite)
child.Filesystem.DenyRead = unionStringSlices(parent.Filesystem.DenyRead, child.Filesystem.DenyRead)
child.Filesystem.DenyWrite = unionStringSlices(parent.Filesystem.DenyWrite, child.Filesystem.DenyWrite)
// Union network lists
child.Network.AllowOutbound = unionStringSlices(parent.Network.AllowOutbound, child.Network.AllowOutbound)
child.Network.DenyOutbound = unionStringSlices(parent.Network.DenyOutbound, child.Network.DenyOutbound)
child.Network.AllowBind = unionStringSlices(parent.Network.AllowBind, child.Network.AllowBind)
// Union process lists
child.Process.AllowExec = unionStringSlices(parent.Process.AllowExec, child.Process.AllowExec)
child.Process.DenyExec = unionStringSlices(parent.Process.DenyExec, child.Process.DenyExec)
// Union environment lists
child.Environment.Allow = unionStringSlices(parent.Environment.Allow, child.Environment.Allow)
child.Environment.Deny = unionStringSlices(parent.Environment.Deny, child.Environment.Deny)
// Union preset references
child.Presets = unionStringSlices(parent.Presets, child.Presets)
// Set boolean fields by duplicating the parent value if not present in the child.
if child.AllowPTY == nil {
child.AllowPTY = utils.PtrTo(utils.SafelyGetValue(parent.AllowPTY))
}
if child.AllowGitConfig == nil {
child.AllowGitConfig = utils.PtrTo(utils.SafelyGetValue(parent.AllowGitConfig))
}
if child.AllowNetworkBind == nil {
child.AllowNetworkBind = utils.PtrTo(utils.SafelyGetValue(parent.AllowNetworkBind))
}
if child.NetworkViaProxyOnly == nil {
child.NetworkViaProxyOnly = utils.PtrTo(utils.SafelyGetValue(parent.NetworkViaProxyOnly))
}
if child.AllowDirectDNS == nil {
child.AllowDirectDNS = utils.PtrTo(utils.SafelyGetValue(parent.AllowDirectDNS))
}
}
// unionStringSlices returns a new slice containing all unique elements from both slices.
// Order is preserved: parent entries first, then child entries (excluding duplicates).
func unionStringSlices(parent, child []string) []string {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
result := make([]string, 0, len(parent)+len(child))
// Add all parent entries
for _, item := range parent {
if !seen[item] {
seen[item] = true
result = append(result, item)
}
}
// Add child entries that aren't duplicates
for _, item := range child {
if !seen[item] {
seen[item] = true
result = append(result, item)
}
}
return result
}