Files
pmg/guard/guard.go
T
f6e1d9e733 feat: authenticated Malysis analyzer with tenant exclusion support (#313)
* feat: authenticated Malysis analyzer with tenant exclusion support

When SafeDep Cloud credentials are available (keychain or environment),
PMG now uses an authenticated malware analysis query against
api.safedep.io instead of the unauthenticated community endpoint
(community-api.safedep.io). The API key and tenant ID are supplied via
the gRPC connection.

The authenticated response may carry a tenant-specific malicious package
exclusion. This is honored as an opt-in trust signal: a flagged package
is downgraded to allow only when a concrete exclusion (non-empty ID) is
present for the exact package version queried. Exclusions are never
honored for community queries and never weaken the verdict for packages
that were not flagged. Allowed-by-exclusion packages are surfaced as a
warning so the trust decision is never silent.

Changes are additive; non-authenticated usage is unchanged. Credential
resolution is extracted into internal/cloudauth and reused by both the
analyzer factory and the existing cloud sync client.

* fix: surface tenant exclusions in proxy mode; clarify comments

- Warn when proxy interceptor allows a flagged package due to a tenant
  exclusion, matching the guard flow so the trust decision is not silent.
- Remove stray doc comment above warnIfExcluded.
- Clarify that a verified-malware verdict can be downgraded by an
  exclusion in applyExclusion.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-01 15:32:22 +05:30

526 lines
17 KiB
Go

package guard
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"slices"
"sync"
"time"
packagev1 "buf.build/gen/go/safedep/api/protocolbuffers/go/safedep/messages/package/v1"
"github.com/safedep/dry/log"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/analyzer"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/config"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/extractor"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/audit"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/ui"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/packagemanager"
)
// CommandExecutor executes a parsed package manager command directly.
// It is injected into the guard so that callers control execution behavior
// (e.g., dry-run, sandbox application) without guard depending on internal packages.
type CommandExecutor func(ctx context.Context, pc *packagemanager.ParsedCommand) error
type PackageManagerGuardInteraction struct {
// SetStatus is called to set the status of the guard in the UI
SetStatus func(status string)
// ClearStatus is called to clear the status of the guard in the UI
ClearStatus func()
// ShowWarning is called to show a warning message to the user
ShowWarning func(message string)
// GetConfirmationOnMalware is called to get the confirmation of the user on the malware packages
GetConfirmationOnMalware func(malwarePackages []*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult) (bool, error)
// Block is called to block the installation of the malware packages. One or more malicious
// packages are passed as arguments. These are the packages that were detected as malicious.
// Client code must perform the necessary error handling and termination of the process.
Block func(config *ui.BlockConfig) error
// inputReader is the reader to use for user input during confirmations.
// If nil, os.Stdin is used. This is set via SetInput to allow PTY input routing.
inputReader io.Reader
}
// SetInput sets the input reader for user confirmations.
// This allows the PTY switchboard to route input to the prompt during confirmations.
func (i *PackageManagerGuardInteraction) SetInput(r io.Reader) {
i.inputReader = r
}
// Reader returns the configured input reader, or os.Stdin if none is set.
func (i *PackageManagerGuardInteraction) Reader() io.Reader {
if i.inputReader != nil {
return i.inputReader
}
return os.Stdin
}
type PackageManagerGuardConfig struct {
ResolveDependencies bool
MaxConcurrentAnalyzes int
AnalysisTimeout time.Duration
DryRun bool
InsecureInstallation bool
}
func DefaultPackageManagerGuardConfig() PackageManagerGuardConfig {
return PackageManagerGuardConfig{
ResolveDependencies: true,
MaxConcurrentAnalyzes: 10,
AnalysisTimeout: 5 * time.Minute,
DryRun: false,
InsecureInstallation: false,
}
}
// GuardResult captures execution statistics from the guard for reporting.
// It contains pure data - the calling flow is responsible for interpreting
// the outcome based on this data.
type GuardResult struct {
TotalAnalyzed int
TrustedSkipped int
AllowedCount int
ConfirmedCount int
BlockedCount int
BlockedPackages []*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult
ConfirmedPackages []*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult
// WasUserCancelled is true if the user declined to install suspicious packages
WasUserCancelled bool
}
type packageManagerGuard struct {
config PackageManagerGuardConfig
interaction PackageManagerGuardInteraction
analyzers []analyzer.PackageVersionAnalyzer
packageManager packagemanager.PackageManager
packageResolver packagemanager.PackageResolver
executor CommandExecutor
}
func NewPackageManagerGuard(config PackageManagerGuardConfig,
packageManager packagemanager.PackageManager,
packageResolver packagemanager.PackageResolver,
analyzers []analyzer.PackageVersionAnalyzer,
interaction PackageManagerGuardInteraction,
executor CommandExecutor,
) (*packageManagerGuard, error) {
return &packageManagerGuard{
interaction: interaction,
analyzers: analyzers,
packageManager: packageManager,
packageResolver: packageResolver,
config: config,
executor: executor,
}, nil
}
func (g *packageManagerGuard) Run(ctx context.Context, args []string, parsedCommand *packagemanager.ParsedCommand) (*GuardResult, error) {
log.Debugf("Running package manager guard with args: %v", args)
result := &GuardResult{}
// Log the installation start
if g.packageManager != nil {
audit.LogInstallStarted(g.packageManager.Name(), args)
}
if g.config.InsecureInstallation {
log.Debugf("Bypassing block for unconfirmed malicious packages due to PMG_INSECURE_INSTALLATION")
g.showWarning("INSECURE INSTALLATION MODE - Malware protection bypassed!")
return result, g.continueExecution(ctx, parsedCommand)
}
if !parsedCommand.HasInstallTarget() {
// Check if this is a manifest-based installation
if parsedCommand.ShouldExtractFromManifest() {
log.Debugf("Detected manifest-based installation, extracting packages from manifest files")
return g.handleManifestInstallation(ctx, parsedCommand)
}
log.Debugf("No install target found, continuing execution")
return result, g.continueExecution(ctx, parsedCommand)
}
blockConfig := ui.NewDefaultBlockConfig()
// TODO: We should track the dependency tree here so that we can trace a
// dependency to one of the parent packages from install targets
packagesToAnalyze := []*packagev1.PackageVersion{}
for _, installTarget := range parsedCommand.InstallTargets {
packagesToAnalyze = append(packagesToAnalyze, installTarget.PackageVersion)
}
log.Debugf("Found %d install targets", len(parsedCommand.InstallTargets))
g.setStatus(fmt.Sprintf("Resolving dependencies for %d package(s)", len(parsedCommand.InstallTargets)))
if g.config.ResolveDependencies {
for _, pkg := range parsedCommand.InstallTargets {
if pkg.PackageVersion.GetVersion() == "" {
log.Debugf("Resolving latest version for package: %s", pkg.PackageVersion.Package.Name)
latestVersion, err := g.packageResolver.ResolveLatestVersion(ctx, pkg.PackageVersion.GetPackage())
if err != nil {
return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve latest version: %w", err)
}
pkg.PackageVersion.Version = latestVersion.GetVersion()
}
log.Debugf("Resolving dependencies for package: %s@%s", pkg.PackageVersion.Package.Name, pkg.PackageVersion.Version)
dependencies, err := g.packageResolver.ResolveDependencies(ctx, pkg.PackageVersion)
if err != nil {
return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve dependencies: %w", err)
}
log.Debugf("Resolved %d dependencies for package: %s@%s", len(dependencies),
pkg.PackageVersion.Package.Name, pkg.PackageVersion.Version)
packagesToAnalyze = append(packagesToAnalyze, dependencies...)
}
}
log.Debugf("Checking %d packages for malware", len(packagesToAnalyze))
g.setStatus(fmt.Sprintf("Analyzing %d dependencies for malware", len(packagesToAnalyze)))
analysisResults, trustedSkipped, err := g.concurrentAnalyzePackages(ctx, packagesToAnalyze)
if err != nil {
return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to analyze packages: %w", err)
}
// Populate result statistics
result.TotalAnalyzed = len(packagesToAnalyze)
result.TrustedSkipped = trustedSkipped
confirmableMalwarePackages := []*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult{}
for _, analysisResult := range analysisResults {
if analysisResult.Action == analyzer.ActionBlock {
result.BlockedCount++
result.BlockedPackages = append(result.BlockedPackages, analysisResult)
blockConfig.MalwarePackages = append(blockConfig.MalwarePackages, analysisResult)
g.logMalwareDetection(analysisResult, true)
return result, nil
}
if analysisResult.Action == analyzer.ActionConfirm {
confirmableMalwarePackages = append(confirmableMalwarePackages, analysisResult)
} else {
result.AllowedCount++
g.warnIfExcluded(analysisResult)
}
}
if len(confirmableMalwarePackages) > 0 {
confirmed, err := g.getConfirmationOnMalware(ctx, confirmableMalwarePackages)
if err != nil {
return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to get confirmation on malware: %w", err)
}
if !confirmed {
blockConfig.ShowReference = false
blockConfig.MalwarePackages = confirmableMalwarePackages
for _, pkg := range confirmableMalwarePackages {
g.logMalwareDetection(pkg, true)
result.BlockedCount++
result.BlockedPackages = append(result.BlockedPackages, pkg)
}
result.WasUserCancelled = true
return result, nil
}
// User confirmed installation despite warning
for _, pkg := range confirmableMalwarePackages {
g.logMalwareDetection(pkg, false)
result.ConfirmedCount++
result.ConfirmedPackages = append(result.ConfirmedPackages, pkg)
}
}
log.Debugf("No malicious packages found, continuing execution")
// Log successful installation allowance
if len(parsedCommand.InstallTargets) > 0 {
for _, target := range parsedCommand.InstallTargets {
audit.LogInstallAllowed(target.PackageVersion, len(packagesToAnalyze))
}
}
g.clearStatus()
return result, g.continueExecution(ctx, parsedCommand)
}
func (g *packageManagerGuard) continueExecution(ctx context.Context, pc *packagemanager.ParsedCommand) error {
return g.executor(ctx, pc)
}
func (g *packageManagerGuard) concurrentAnalyzePackages(ctx context.Context,
packages []*packagev1.PackageVersion) ([]*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult, int, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, g.config.AnalysisTimeout)
defer cancel()
wg := sync.WaitGroup{}
jobs := make(chan *packagev1.PackageVersion, len(packages))
results := make(chan *analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult, len(packages))
for i := 0; i < g.config.MaxConcurrentAnalyzes; i++ {
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for pkg := range jobs {
for _, analyzer := range g.analyzers {
analysisResult, err := analyzer.Analyze(ctx, pkg)
if err != nil {
// This is not an error because we may not have results for all packages
log.Debugf("failed to analyze package: %v", err)
continue
}
results <- analysisResult
}
}
}()
}
// Queue all packages for analysis, tracking trusted packages skipped
trustedSkipped := 0
for _, pkg := range packages {
if config.IsTrustedPackage(pkg) {
log.Debugf("Skipping trusted package: %s/%s@%s",
pkg.GetPackage().GetEcosystem(), pkg.GetPackage().GetName(), pkg.GetVersion())
trustedSkipped++
continue
}
jobs <- pkg
}
close(jobs)
analysisResults := []*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult{}
// We must wait for the results go routine to collect all results
rwg := sync.WaitGroup{}
rwg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer rwg.Done()
for result := range results {
analysisResults = append(analysisResults, result)
}
}()
waiter := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
wg.Wait()
close(results)
rwg.Wait()
close(waiter)
}()
select {
case <-waiter:
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("analysis timed out")
}
return analysisResults, trustedSkipped, nil
}
func (g *packageManagerGuard) getConfirmationOnMalware(ctx context.Context, malwarePackages []*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult) (bool, error) {
if g.interaction.GetConfirmationOnMalware == nil {
return false, nil
}
return g.interaction.GetConfirmationOnMalware(malwarePackages)
}
func (g *packageManagerGuard) setStatus(status string) {
if g.interaction.SetStatus == nil {
return
}
g.interaction.SetStatus(status)
}
func (g *packageManagerGuard) showWarning(message string) {
if g.interaction.ShowWarning == nil {
return
}
g.interaction.ShowWarning(message)
}
func (g *packageManagerGuard) clearStatus() {
if g.interaction.ClearStatus == nil {
return
}
g.interaction.ClearStatus()
}
func (g *packageManagerGuard) handleManifestInstallation(ctx context.Context, parsedCommand *packagemanager.ParsedCommand) (*GuardResult, error) {
result := &GuardResult{}
extractorConfig := extractor.NewDefaultExtractorConfig()
extractorConfig.ExtractorPackageManager = extractor.PackageManagerName(g.packageManager.Name())
extractorConfig.ManifestFiles = parsedCommand.ManifestFiles
packageExtractor := extractor.New(*extractorConfig)
packages, err := packageExtractor.ExtractManifest()
if err != nil {
return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to extract packages from manifest files: %w", err)
}
blockConfig := ui.NewDefaultBlockConfig()
if len(packages) == 0 {
log.Debugf("No packages found in manifest files, continuing execution")
return result, g.continueExecution(ctx, parsedCommand)
}
log.Debugf("Extracted %d packages from manifest files", len(packages))
packagesToAnalyze := []*packagev1.PackageVersion{}
// Add all packages to analyze that are extracted from manifest files
packagesToAnalyze = append(packagesToAnalyze, packages...)
// Only resolve dependencies for requirements.txt because other lockfiles dependencies are already resolved
if g.config.ResolveDependencies && slices.Contains(parsedCommand.ManifestFiles, "requirements.txt") {
g.setStatus(fmt.Sprintf("Resolving dependencies for %d package(s)", len(packages)))
for _, pkg := range packages {
if pkg.GetVersion() == "" {
log.Debugf("Resolving latest version for package: %s", pkg.Package.Name)
latestVersion, err := g.packageResolver.ResolveLatestVersion(ctx, pkg.GetPackage())
if err != nil {
return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve latest version: %w", err)
}
pkg.Version = latestVersion.GetVersion()
}
log.Debugf("Resolving dependencies for package: %s@%s", pkg.Package.Name, pkg.Version)
dependencies, err := g.packageResolver.ResolveDependencies(ctx, pkg)
if err != nil {
return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve dependencies: %w", err)
}
log.Debugf("Resolved %d dependencies for package: %s@%s", len(dependencies),
pkg.Package.Name, pkg.Version)
packagesToAnalyze = append(packagesToAnalyze, dependencies...)
}
}
log.Debugf("Checking %d packages for malware", len(packagesToAnalyze))
g.setStatus(fmt.Sprintf("Analyzing %d dependencies from manifest files", len(packagesToAnalyze)))
analysisResults, trustedSkipped, err := g.concurrentAnalyzePackages(ctx, packagesToAnalyze)
if err != nil {
return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to analyze packages: %w", err)
}
// Populate result statistics
result.TotalAnalyzed = len(packagesToAnalyze)
result.TrustedSkipped = trustedSkipped
confirmableMalwarePackages := []*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult{}
for _, analysisResult := range analysisResults {
if analysisResult.Action == analyzer.ActionBlock {
result.BlockedCount++
result.BlockedPackages = append(result.BlockedPackages, analysisResult)
blockConfig.MalwarePackages = append(blockConfig.MalwarePackages, analysisResult)
g.logMalwareDetection(analysisResult, true)
return result, nil
}
if analysisResult.Action == analyzer.ActionConfirm {
confirmableMalwarePackages = append(confirmableMalwarePackages, analysisResult)
} else {
result.AllowedCount++
g.warnIfExcluded(analysisResult)
}
}
if len(confirmableMalwarePackages) > 0 {
confirmed, err := g.getConfirmationOnMalware(ctx, confirmableMalwarePackages)
if err != nil {
return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to get confirmation on malware: %w", err)
}
if !confirmed {
blockConfig.ShowReference = false
blockConfig.MalwarePackages = confirmableMalwarePackages
for _, pkg := range confirmableMalwarePackages {
g.logMalwareDetection(pkg, true)
result.BlockedCount++
result.BlockedPackages = append(result.BlockedPackages, pkg)
}
result.WasUserCancelled = true
return result, nil
}
// User confirmed installation despite warning
for _, pkg := range confirmableMalwarePackages {
g.logMalwareDetection(pkg, false)
result.ConfirmedCount++
result.ConfirmedPackages = append(result.ConfirmedPackages, pkg)
}
}
log.Debugf("No malicious packages found in manifest files, continuing execution")
// Log successful installation allowance for manifest-based installations
if len(packages) > 0 {
audit.LogInstallAllowed(packages[0], len(packagesToAnalyze))
}
g.clearStatus()
return result, g.continueExecution(ctx, parsedCommand)
}
// warnIfExcluded surfaces a security-relevant notice when a flagged package was
// allowed only because of a tenant-specific exclusion, so it is never silently
// trusted.
func (g *packageManagerGuard) warnIfExcluded(result *analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult) {
if result == nil || !result.IsExcluded || result.PackageVersion == nil {
return
}
pkg := result.PackageVersion
g.showWarning(fmt.Sprintf("Allowing flagged package %s@%s due to tenant exclusion (%s)",
pkg.GetPackage().GetName(), pkg.GetVersion(), result.ExclusionReason))
}
func (g *packageManagerGuard) logMalwareDetection(result *analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult, blocked bool) {
if result == nil || result.PackageVersion == nil {
return
}
if blocked {
audit.LogMalwareBlocked(result.PackageVersion, result.Summary, result.AnalysisID, result.ReferenceURL, result.IsMalware, result.IsVerified)
} else {
audit.LogMalwareConfirmed(result.PackageVersion, result.AnalysisID, result.IsMalware, result.IsVerified)
}
}