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* feat(cooldown): respect trusted_packages in dependency cooldown Trusted packages are now treated as a superset waiver that bypasses every PMG control (malware analysis, cooldown, and any future controls). A globally trusted package is automatically exempt from the cooldown window and no longer needs a duplicate entry in dependency_cooldown.skip. The skip list remains the narrower, cooldown-only waiver for packages that must bypass the cooldown wait but still be malware-scanned. * refactor(cooldown): tag skip reason and audit-log skipped packages Address review feedback on #342: - Restore cooldownSkip to a pure single-list function (SRP); the merge into trusted_packages now happens in a separate mergeCooldownSkip step, driven by the exported CooldownSkip wrapper. - Extend CooldownSkipInfo with a CooldownSkipReason (TrustedPackage / CooldownSkipList) on both SkipAll and per-version entries, so callers can tell apart the broad waiver from the cooldown-only one. When both lists match the same package, trusted_packages wins. - Add audit.LogCooldownSkipped and emit it from the npm and PyPI interceptors on the SkipAll path, alongside the existing info log, carrying the source list as the reason. * refactor(cooldown): inline list merge, audit per-version exemptions Address further review feedback: - Drop the separate mergeCooldownSkip helper; cooldownSkip now writes into a shared *CooldownSkipInfo and is called twice from CooldownSkip (cooldown skip list first, trusted_packages on top so trusted entries override the reason on overlap). - Audit log every exemption, not just SkipAll: a new auditCooldownSkip helper in proxy/interceptors/cooldown.go emits one event per match (package-wide or per-version), each tagged with its source list. LogCooldownSkipped gains a version argument for the per-version case. - Cover the trusted_packages reason path in TestCooldownSkip. * fix(cooldown): avoid double-auditing trusted package exemptions auditCooldownSkip now only emits EventTypeCooldownSkipped for entries that came from dependency_cooldown.skip. Trusted-package exemptions already get an EventTypeInstallTrustedAllowed event at tarball-download time (proxy/interceptors/base_registry.go), so emitting a cooldown event for them too would double-count the same waiver. * emit trusted and cooldown skip events to cloud * fix tests * refactor(cooldown): return value from collectCooldownSkip, short-circuit on trusted SkipAll Address PR review feedback: - Rename cooldownSkip to collectCooldownSkip and return CooldownSkipInfo instead of mutating an input pointer. - Add mergeCooldownSkip to combine per-list results with trusted_packages taking precedence on overlap. - CooldownSkip now consults trusted_packages first and returns immediately on a package-wide trusted exemption (DC skip list cannot add anything). - Extend tests to cover disjoint pinned entries across both lists and the case where DC version-less subsumes a trusted pinned entry. * fix(audit): address cooldown review feedback * fix(cooldown): audit cooldown skips at download time with concrete version Backend rejects PackageVersion messages without a version, and audit logs should reflect the runtime fact (a specific version was skipped) rather than the config rule. Move the audit emission from metadata-request handling to download-request handling, where the concrete version is known, and require version in LogCooldownSkipped. * chore(audit): drop dead scope assignment in LogCooldownSkipped * refactor(cooldown): move skip-list logic into cooldown handlers Registry interceptors no longer compute CooldownSkip or branch on SkipAll; they just call HandleMetadataRequest. The npm and pypi cooldown handlers own the skip lookup, the package-wide exemption short-circuit, and (for pypi) the canonical-name denormalization. Also align LogCooldownSkipped with other LogXxx signatures by taking *packagev1.PackageVersion. * fix: Simplify audit logging for dependency cooldown skip * refactor: Simplify cooldown handling and maintain separation of concepts for trusted and DC skip packages * fix: Code review fixes * fix: Emit cooldown skipped audit event ONLY when an in-window version is skipped --------- Co-authored-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com>
310 lines
12 KiB
Go
310 lines
12 KiB
Go
package interceptors
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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packagev1 "buf.build/gen/go/safedep/api/protocolbuffers/go/safedep/messages/package/v1"
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"github.com/safedep/dry/log"
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"github.com/safedep/pmg/analyzer"
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"github.com/safedep/pmg/config"
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"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/audit"
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"github.com/safedep/pmg/proxy"
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gobreaker "github.com/sony/gobreaker/v2"
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"golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
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)
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// baseRegistryInterceptor provides common functionality for registry interceptors
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// It contains ecosystem-agnostic methods that can be reused by specific registry implementations
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type baseRegistryInterceptor struct {
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analyzer analyzer.PackageVersionAnalyzer
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cache AnalysisCache
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statsCollector *AnalysisStatsCollector
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confirmationChan chan *ConfirmationRequest
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circuitBreaker *gobreaker.CircuitBreaker[*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult]
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execContext InterceptorContext
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// inflight collapses concurrent analyses of the same package version into a
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// single upstream call. During a large install the same transitive
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// dependency is frequently requested across several connections at once.
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// Without de-duplication each would issue its own gRPC call to the external
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// analysis service, amplifying load and latency (head-of-line blocking).
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inflight singleflight.Group
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}
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func newAnalyzerCircuitBreaker(name string) *gobreaker.CircuitBreaker[*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult] {
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return newAnalyzerCircuitBreakerWithTimeout(name, 30*time.Second)
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}
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func newAnalyzerCircuitBreakerWithTimeout(name string, cooldown time.Duration) *gobreaker.CircuitBreaker[*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult] {
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return gobreaker.NewCircuitBreaker[*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult](gobreaker.Settings{
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Name: name,
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MaxRequests: 1,
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Timeout: cooldown,
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ReadyToTrip: func(counts gobreaker.Counts) bool {
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return counts.ConsecutiveFailures >= 3
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},
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OnStateChange: func(name string, from gobreaker.State, to gobreaker.State) {
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log.Infof("Circuit breaker %s: %s -> %s", name, from, to)
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},
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})
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}
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var _ proxy.Interceptor = (*baseRegistryInterceptor)(nil)
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// Name returns a default name - should be overridden by specific implementations
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func (b *baseRegistryInterceptor) Name() string {
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return "base-registry-interceptor"
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}
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// ShouldIntercept returns false by default - must be overridden by specific implementations
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func (b *baseRegistryInterceptor) ShouldIntercept(ctx *proxy.RequestContext) bool {
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return false
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}
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// HandleRequest returns allow by default - should be overridden by specific implementations
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func (b *baseRegistryInterceptor) HandleRequest(ctx *proxy.RequestContext) (*proxy.InterceptorResponse, error) {
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return &proxy.InterceptorResponse{Action: proxy.ActionAllow}, nil
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}
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// fastAllow short-circuits the request when no security control should run for
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// this concrete version: insecure-installation mode (analysis globally off) or a
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// trusted package (waives every control). It returns (response, true) when it
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// handled the request; (nil, false) otherwise. Insecure is checked first to
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// preserve the previous ordering inside analyzePackage.
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func (b *baseRegistryInterceptor) fastAllow(
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ctx *proxy.RequestContext,
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ecosystem packagev1.Ecosystem,
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name, version string,
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) (*proxy.InterceptorResponse, bool) {
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pkgVersion := &packagev1.PackageVersion{
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Package: &packagev1.Package{Ecosystem: ecosystem, Name: name},
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Version: version,
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}
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if config.Get().InsecureInstallation {
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log.Debugf("[%s] Skipping insecure installation", ctx.RequestID)
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audit.LogInstallInsecureBypass(pkgVersion)
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return &proxy.InterceptorResponse{Action: proxy.ActionAllow}, true
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}
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if config.IsTrustedPackageRef(ecosystem, name, version) {
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log.Debugf("[%s] Skipping trusted package: %s/%s@%s", ctx.RequestID, ecosystem.String(), name, version)
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audit.LogInstallTrustedAllowed(pkgVersion)
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return &proxy.InterceptorResponse{Action: proxy.ActionAllow}, true
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}
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return nil, false
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}
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// analyzePackage analyzes a package using the configured analyzer with caching
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// This method is ecosystem-agnostic and can be used by any registry interceptor
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func (b *baseRegistryInterceptor) analyzePackage(
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ctx *proxy.RequestContext,
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ecosystem packagev1.Ecosystem,
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packageName string,
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packageVersion string,
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) (*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult, error) {
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pkgVersion := &packagev1.PackageVersion{
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Package: &packagev1.Package{
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Ecosystem: ecosystem,
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Name: packageName,
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},
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Version: packageVersion,
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}
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if cached, ok := b.cache.Get(ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion); ok {
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log.Debugf("[%s] Using cached analysis result for %s@%s", ctx.RequestID, packageName, packageVersion)
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return cached, nil
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}
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log.Debugf("[%s] Analyzing package %s@%s", ctx.RequestID, packageName, packageVersion)
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key := ecosystem.String() + ":" + packageName + ":" + packageVersion
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resultAny, err, _ := b.inflight.Do(key, func() (interface{}, error) {
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// Re-check the cache: a previous in-flight analysis for this key may
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// have populated it after our own cache miss above.
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if cached, ok := b.cache.Get(ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion); ok {
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return cached, nil
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}
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result, err := b.circuitBreaker.Execute(func() (*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult, error) {
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analysisCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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res, err := b.analyzer.Analyze(analysisCtx, pkgVersion)
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if err != nil {
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// NotFound means the package is not in the analysis DB — this is expected
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// and should not count as a circuit breaker failure.
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// Since gRPC v1.75.0, status.FromError unwraps error chains via errors.As.
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if s, ok := status.FromError(err); ok && s.Code() == codes.NotFound {
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log.Debugf("[%s] Package %s@%s not found in analysis DB, allowing", ctx.RequestID, packageName, packageVersion)
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return &analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult{
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PackageVersion: pkgVersion,
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Action: analyzer.ActionAllow,
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}, nil
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}
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}
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return res, err
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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b.cache.Set(ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion, result)
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return result, nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("analyzer failed: %w", err)
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}
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// Fail loudly rather than panic in the proxy hot path if a future change to
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// the singleflight closure ever returns a different type or a nil result.
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result, ok := resultAny.(*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult)
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if !ok || result == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("analyzer returned unexpected result type %T for %s@%s", resultAny, packageName, packageVersion)
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}
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log.Debugf("[%s] Analysis complete for %s@%s: action=%d", ctx.RequestID, packageName, packageVersion, result.Action)
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return result, nil
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}
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// handleAnalysisResult processes the analysis result and returns appropriate response action
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// This method is ecosystem agnostic and handles the analysis result uniformly
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func (b *baseRegistryInterceptor) handleAnalysisResult(
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ctx *proxy.RequestContext,
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ecosystem packagev1.Ecosystem,
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packageName string,
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packageVersion string,
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result *analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult,
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) (*proxy.InterceptorResponse, error) {
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switch result.Action {
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case analyzer.ActionBlock:
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log.Warnf("[%s] Blocking malicious package %s@%s", ctx.RequestID, packageName, packageVersion)
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audit.LogMalwareBlocked(result.PackageVersion, result.Summary, result.AnalysisID, result.ReferenceURL, result.IsMalware, result.IsVerified)
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if b.statsCollector != nil {
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b.statsCollector.RecordBlocked(result)
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}
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message := fmt.Sprintf("Malicious package blocked: %s/%s@%s\n\nReason: %s\n\nReference: %s",
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ecosystem.String(),
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packageName, packageVersion,
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result.Summary,
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result.ReferenceURL)
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return &proxy.InterceptorResponse{
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Action: proxy.ActionBlock,
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BlockCode: http.StatusForbidden,
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BlockMessage: message,
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}, nil
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case analyzer.ActionConfirm:
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log.Warnf("[%s] Package %s/%s@%s is suspicious, requesting user confirmation", ctx.RequestID, ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion)
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confirmed, err := b.requestUserConfirmation(ctx, result)
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if err != nil {
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log.Errorf("[%s] Failed to get user confirmation: %v", ctx.RequestID, err)
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if b.statsCollector != nil {
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b.statsCollector.RecordBlocked(result)
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}
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return &proxy.InterceptorResponse{
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Action: proxy.ActionBlock,
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BlockCode: http.StatusForbidden,
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BlockMessage: fmt.Sprintf("Failed to get user confirmation for suspicious package %s/%s@%s", ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion),
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}, nil
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}
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if !confirmed {
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log.Infof("[%s] User declined installation of suspicious package %s/%s@%s", ctx.RequestID, ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion)
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audit.LogMalwareBlocked(result.PackageVersion, result.Summary, result.AnalysisID, result.ReferenceURL, result.IsMalware, result.IsVerified)
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if b.statsCollector != nil {
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b.statsCollector.RecordUserCancelled(result)
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}
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message := fmt.Sprintf("Installation blocked by user: %s/%s@%s\n\nReason: %s\n\nReference: %s",
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ecosystem.String(),
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packageName, packageVersion,
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result.Summary,
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result.ReferenceURL)
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return &proxy.InterceptorResponse{
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Action: proxy.ActionBlock,
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BlockCode: http.StatusForbidden,
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BlockMessage: message,
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}, nil
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}
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audit.LogMalwareConfirmed(result.PackageVersion, result.AnalysisID, result.IsMalware, result.IsVerified)
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audit.LogInstallAllowed(result.PackageVersion, 1)
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if b.statsCollector != nil {
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b.statsCollector.RecordConfirmed(result)
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}
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log.Infof("[%s] User confirmed installation of suspicious package %s/%s@%s", ctx.RequestID, ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion)
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return &proxy.InterceptorResponse{Action: proxy.ActionAllow}, nil
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case analyzer.ActionAllow:
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audit.LogInstallAllowed(result.PackageVersion, 1)
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if b.statsCollector != nil {
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b.statsCollector.RecordAllowed(result)
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}
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// A flagged package allowed only because of a tenant-specific exclusion is
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// a security-relevant trust decision; surface it so it is never silent.
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if result.IsExcluded {
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log.Warnf("[%s] Allowing flagged package %s/%s@%s due to tenant exclusion (%s)",
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ctx.RequestID, ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion, result.ExclusionReason)
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} else {
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log.Debugf("[%s] Package %s/%s@%s is safe, allowing request", ctx.RequestID, ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion)
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}
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return &proxy.InterceptorResponse{Action: proxy.ActionAllow}, nil
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default:
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audit.LogInstallAllowed(result.PackageVersion, 1)
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if b.statsCollector != nil {
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b.statsCollector.RecordAllowed(result)
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}
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log.Warnf("[%s] Unknown analysis action %d for package %s/%s@%s, allowing by default", ctx.RequestID, result.Action, ecosystem.String(), packageName, packageVersion)
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return &proxy.InterceptorResponse{Action: proxy.ActionAllow}, nil
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}
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}
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// requestUserConfirmation sends a confirmation request and blocks waiting for user response
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func (b *baseRegistryInterceptor) requestUserConfirmation(
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ctx *proxy.RequestContext,
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result *analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult,
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) (bool, error) {
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req := NewConfirmationRequest(result.PackageVersion, result)
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select {
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case b.confirmationChan <- req:
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case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
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return false, fmt.Errorf("timeout sending confirmation request")
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}
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// Block waiting for user response
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// Producer is responsible for closing the response channel to prevent goroutine leaks.
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select {
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case confirmed := <-req.ResponseChan:
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return confirmed, nil
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case <-time.After(5 * time.Minute):
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return false, fmt.Errorf("timeout waiting for user confirmation")
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}
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}
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