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* fix: Sandbox policy tuning for tmp write access * fix: Remove numbers from test * Update sandbox/profiles/pnpm-restrictive.yml Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> * fix: Sandbox E2E test to consider Linux bubblewrap tmpfs mount * Update sandbox/profiles/pnpm-restrictive.yml Co-authored-by: Sahil Bansal <bansalsahil315@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> * fix: Migrate deny rules from pnpm to npm policy --------- Signed-off-by: Abhisek Datta <abhisek.datta@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Sahil Bansal <bansalsahil315@gmail.com>
82 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
82 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
package util
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import (
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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)
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// DANGEROUS_FILES are files that should always be blocked from write access
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// to prevent credential theft and security compromise.
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var DANGEROUS_FILES = []string{
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".env",
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".env.*",
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".aws",
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".gcloud",
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".kube",
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".ssh",
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".gnupg",
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".docker/config.json",
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}
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// GetMandatoryDenyPatterns returns filesystem paths that should always be blocked
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// from write access for security reasons. These are automatically injected into
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// all sandbox policies regardless of user configuration.
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//
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// Parameters:
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// - allowGitConfig: if false, blocks write access to .git/config (recommended)
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//
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// Returns patterns in both absolute (from HOME) and glob forms for comprehensive coverage.
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func GetMandatoryDenyPatterns(allowGitConfig bool) []string {
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patterns := []string{}
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// Get current working directory for CWD-relative patterns
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cwd, err := os.Getwd()
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if err != nil {
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// Fallback to basic patterns if we can't get CWD
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cwd = "."
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}
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// Get home directory for HOME-relative patterns
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home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
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if err != nil {
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// If we can't get home, skip home-based patterns
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home = ""
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}
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// Add dangerous files from CWD
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for _, fileName := range DANGEROUS_FILES {
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// Absolute path in CWD
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patterns = append(patterns, filepath.Join(cwd, fileName))
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// Glob pattern to catch in subdirectories
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patterns = append(patterns, filepath.Join("**", fileName))
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}
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// Add dangerous files from HOME (if available)
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if home != "" {
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for _, fileName := range DANGEROUS_FILES {
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patterns = append(patterns, filepath.Join(home, fileName))
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}
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}
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// Git hooks are blocked in CWD and HOME for security (can execute arbitrary code)
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// We don't use global globs like **/.git/hooks to allow legitimate temp dir operations
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// (e.g., npx cloning repos to /tmp)
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patterns = append(patterns, filepath.Join(cwd, ".git/hooks"))
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patterns = append(patterns, filepath.Join(cwd, ".git/hooks/**"))
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if home != "" {
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patterns = append(patterns, filepath.Join(home, ".git/hooks"))
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patterns = append(patterns, filepath.Join(home, ".git/hooks/**"))
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}
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// Git config is conditionally blocked in CWD and HOME
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if !allowGitConfig {
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patterns = append(patterns, filepath.Join(cwd, ".git/config"))
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if home != "" {
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patterns = append(patterns, filepath.Join(home, ".git/config"))
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}
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}
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return patterns
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}
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