Files
pmg/sandbox/platform/landlock_translator_linux_test.go
T
ee684a29a9 feat(sandbox): presets — additive workload allowance bundles (#387)
* feat(sandbox): introduce presets - additive workload allowance bundles

Presets are named, additive-only bundles of sandbox allowances for a
specific workload (git hooks tooling, Astro/Vite/Next.js dev servers).
They solve the per-workload tuning friction from #384 without weakening
the default posture: no built-in profile references a preset, presets
cannot carry deny rules or profile booleans (strict YAML decoding), and
mandatory denies still win everywhere except the existing exact-match
suppression.

- Preset schema with metadata (author, labels) and schema_version gating
- Registry over ordered sources (embedded builtin, user dir); builtin
  wins name collisions; source abstraction is the extension point for a
  future hosted registry and SafeDep cloud sync
- Official presets: git, astro, vite, nextjs (with threat notes)
- Overlay/runtime integration: pmg sandbox allow preset=<name> and
  --sandbox-allow preset=<name>, stored by reference, resolved at apply
  time, missing presets warn (fail closed) instead of aborting
- Profile integration: presets: [...] list resolved after inherits
- CLI: pmg sandbox preset list (metadata filters, --json), show (prints
  YAML with threat notes), lint
- Docs: user guide (docs/sandbox-presets.md) and design spec

Closes #384

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): address review findings on presets

- Presets never modify deny lists: a profile authored deny now survives a
  preset allowing the same path (deny-beats-allow keeps it enforced).
  Regression test added.
- Profile inspection commands (show, diff, lint) construct the profile
  registry with the user-aware preset registry so they agree with runtime
  resolution of custom profiles referencing user presets.
- Handle stderr write error when warning about unresolvable presets.
- Compute preset show underline from the uncolored header.
- Use path.Join for embed.FS reads (slash-separated on all platforms).
- Clarify in docs that lint-staged/astro are examples of preset workloads.
- Drop the design spec from the PR per review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): harden preset precedence against authored denies

Addresses external security review findings on the preset mechanism:

- Bubblewrap: a mandatory write-denied path listed in allow_read lost its
  protection when a later writable parent bind covered it (bwrap last
  mount wins) - exactly the git preset shape (allow_read .git/config +
  allow_write .git/**). The mandatory deny now re-binds the path
  read-only after all writable mounts instead of being skipped.
  Regression test asserts mount ordering. Landlock and Seatbelt were
  unaffected (tests added for the same policy shape on Landlock).
- Environment: ScrubEnv is allow-wins, so a preset environment allowance
  could override a profile-authored deny. Preset env allowances
  overlapping an authored deny pattern are now dropped at application
  time (conservative bidirectional glob overlap, fail closed). Surviving
  entries still opt out of built-in credential scrubbing as intended.
- Network: removed allow_outbound from the preset schema. Both platform
  translators are all-or-nothing for outbound (one allow rule means
  blanket network access), so a preset outbound entry would silently
  change network posture far beyond what its YAML conveys. Strict
  decoding rejects the key.
- Added a dual-path expansion equivalence test (profile presets: field
  vs overlay/--sandbox-allow) and documented the precedence guarantees
  in docs/sandbox-presets.md.

Explicit --sandbox-allow and pmg sandbox allow overrides keep their
existing semantics.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* docs(sandbox): document env and preset allowances in allow command and overlay docs

pmg sandbox allow help, the --sandbox-allow flag usage, and the project
overlay docs enumerated only read/write/exec/net types. Add env and
preset to all of them, with an overlay example for persisting an env
allowance and a note on why env entries are not auto-promoted by --last.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* chore(sandbox): trim preset code comments to corner cases and minimal godocs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): exact glob intersection for preset env deny overlap

The bidirectional literal-text heuristic missed overlapping globs with
different literal structure: preset allow AWS_*_KEY and authored deny
AWS_SECRET_* both match AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY but neither pattern
matches the other's text, so the allowance merged and allow-wins
scrubbing exposed the variable. EnvPatternsOverlap now computes exact
intersection non-emptiness for the name glob dialect (case-insensitive,
'*' any sequence, '?' single char) via memoized DP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): preset env allowances are exact names, not globs

Glob-vs-glob intersection is a losing game: every dialect extension
(character classes today) silently reopens the deny-bypass hole.
Restricting preset environment allowances to literal variable names
makes the authored-deny precedence check exact by construction: each
deny pattern is evaluated against the concrete name with the same
matcher ScrubEnv uses at runtime, so the decision cannot diverge from
enforcement regardless of deny dialect. Removes the glob intersection
machinery. Profile and --sandbox-allow env globs are unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): reject mandatory-deny targets in preset paths

Preset validation relied on IsSensitiveProjectTarget, which covers fewer
files than util.DANGEROUS_FILES. A preset naming .git-credentials,
.pgpass, .docker/config.json or .config/gh exactly would exact-match
suppress the mandatory deny; .git/config in allow_write would suppress
the write protection. Preset paths are now checked against
DANGEROUS_FILES (single source of truth), .git/hooks is rejected in any
direction, and .git/config is rejected for write/exec while read stays
allowed for git repo discovery. Docs state the two deliberate opt-outs
precisely.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* feat(sandbox): preset init and edit commands for community authoring

pmg sandbox preset init scaffolds a valid user preset (metadata flags,
threat-note template, starter rule) and refuses built-in names since
builtins win resolution. pmg sandbox preset edit opens the file via the
shared editor package and validates the result, warning when a user
preset is shadowed by a built-in. Docs lead with the scaffolded flow and
spell out builtin-vs-community provenance in preset list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* refactor(sandbox): move mandatory-target matching into util

Preset path validation re-encoded knowledge util already owns: the
dangerous-files comparison and hardcoded .git/config and .git/hooks
strings. util now exports GitConfigPath, GitHooksPath (also used by
GetMandatoryDenyPatterns), PathCoveredBy and DangerousFileMatch, and
preset validation consumes them so the mandatory deny policy has a
single definition.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 15:14:07 +05:30

628 lines
16 KiB
Go

//go:build linux
package platform
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
llsyscall "github.com/landlock-lsm/go-landlock/landlock/syscall"
"github.com/safedep/dry/utils"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/sandbox"
)
func newTestPolicy() *sandbox.SandboxPolicy {
return &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test-policy",
PackageManagers: []string{"npm"},
}
}
func findRule(rules []landlockPathRule, path string) *landlockPathRule {
for i := range rules {
if rules[i].Path == path {
return &rules[i]
}
}
return nil
}
func findDenyPath(entries []denyPathEntry, path string) *denyPathEntry {
for i := range entries {
if entries[i].Path == path {
return &entries[i]
}
}
return nil
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_AllowRead(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
paths []string
wantPaths []string
}{
{
name: "single path",
paths: []string{"/usr/lib"},
wantPaths: []string{"/usr/lib"},
},
{
name: "multiple paths",
paths: []string{"/usr/lib", "/etc"},
wantPaths: []string{"/usr/lib", "/etc"},
},
}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
expectedAccess := uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSReadFile | llsyscall.AccessFSReadDir | llsyscall.AccessFSExecute)
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = tt.paths
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
for _, wantPath := range tt.wantPaths {
rule := findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, wantPath)
if rule == nil {
t.Errorf("expected rule for path %s, not found", wantPath)
continue
}
if rule.Access != expectedAccess {
t.Errorf("path %s: access = %x, want %x", wantPath, rule.Access, expectedAccess)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_AllowWrite(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
abiVersion int
wantRefer bool
wantTrunc bool
}{
{
name: "V1 - no Refer, no Truncate",
abiVersion: 1,
wantRefer: false,
wantTrunc: false,
},
{
name: "V2 - has Refer, no Truncate",
abiVersion: 2,
wantRefer: true,
wantTrunc: false,
},
{
name: "V3 - has Refer and Truncate",
abiVersion: 3,
wantRefer: true,
wantTrunc: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
abi := newLandlockABI(tt.abiVersion)
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite = []string{"/tmp/test"}
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
rule := findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, "/tmp/test")
if rule == nil {
t.Fatal("expected rule for /tmp/test, not found")
}
hasRefer := rule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSRefer) != 0
hasTrunc := rule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSTruncate) != 0
if hasRefer != tt.wantRefer {
t.Errorf("Refer flag: got %v, want %v", hasRefer, tt.wantRefer)
}
if hasTrunc != tt.wantTrunc {
t.Errorf("Truncate flag: got %v, want %v", hasTrunc, tt.wantTrunc)
}
// Verify base write flags are always present
if rule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSWriteFile) == 0 {
t.Error("WriteFile flag should always be present")
}
if rule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSMakeReg) == 0 {
t.Error("MakeReg flag should always be present")
}
})
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_AllowExec(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Process.AllowExec = []string{"/usr/bin/node", "/usr/bin/npm"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Execute access includes ReadFile because the kernel must read the
// shebang line of script files to determine the interpreter.
expectedAccess := uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSExecute | llsyscall.AccessFSReadFile)
for _, path := range []string{"/usr/bin/node", "/usr/bin/npm"} {
rule := findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, path)
if rule == nil {
t.Errorf("expected rule for %s, not found", path)
continue
}
if rule.Access != expectedAccess {
t.Errorf("path %s: access = %x, want %x", path, rule.Access, expectedAccess)
}
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_DenyRead(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.DenyRead = []string{"/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
for _, path := range []string{"/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd"} {
entry := findDenyPath(ep.DenyPaths, path)
if entry == nil {
t.Errorf("expected deny entry for %s, not found", path)
continue
}
if entry.Mode != denyRead {
t.Errorf("path %s: mode = %d, want denyRead (%d)", path, entry.Mode, denyRead)
}
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_DenyWrite(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
// DenyWrite is only effective within writable areas. Add /etc as writable
// so the deny rule for /etc/hosts is not pruned as redundant.
policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite = []string{"/etc/**"}
policy.Filesystem.DenyWrite = []string{"/etc/hosts"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
entry := findDenyPath(ep.DenyPaths, "/etc/hosts")
if entry == nil {
t.Fatal("expected deny entry for /etc/hosts, not found")
}
if entry.Mode != denyWrite {
t.Errorf("mode = %d, want denyWrite (%d)", entry.Mode, denyWrite)
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_DenyWriteSkippedWhenNotWritable(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
// No AllowWrite for /etc, so deny_write for /etc/hosts is redundant
// (Landlock already prevents writes).
policy.Filesystem.DenyWrite = []string{"/etc/hosts"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
entry := findDenyPath(ep.DenyPaths, "/etc/hosts")
if entry != nil {
t.Error("expected deny entry for /etc/hosts to be pruned (not in writable area)")
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_DenyExec(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Process.DenyExec = []string{"/usr/bin/curl", "/usr/bin/wget"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
for _, path := range []string{"/usr/bin/curl", "/usr/bin/wget"} {
found := false
for _, p := range ep.DenyExecPaths {
if p == path {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
t.Errorf("expected %s in DenyExecPaths, not found", path)
}
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_MandatoryDenies(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{"/usr"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Mandatory denies should always be present with denyBoth mode
if len(ep.DenyPaths) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected mandatory deny paths, got none")
}
// Check that at least some mandatory denies have denyBoth mode
hasDenyBoth := false
for _, entry := range ep.DenyPaths {
if entry.Mode == denyBoth {
hasDenyBoth = true
break
}
}
if !hasDenyBoth {
t.Error("expected at least one mandatory deny with denyBoth mode")
}
// Check that .env is in the mandatory denies (it should always be there)
hasEnvDeny := false
for _, entry := range ep.DenyPaths {
if strings.HasSuffix(entry.Path, "/.env") && entry.Mode == denyBoth {
hasEnvDeny = true
break
}
}
if !hasEnvDeny {
t.Error("expected .env in mandatory deny paths with denyBoth mode")
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_AllowReadSuppression(t *testing.T) {
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
require.NoError(t, err)
cwdEnv := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(cwd, ".env"))
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{cwdEnv}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
require.NoError(t, err)
envEntry := findDenyPath(ep.DenyPaths, cwdEnv)
require.NotNil(t, envEntry)
assert.Equal(t, denyWrite, envEntry.Mode)
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_ImplicitRules(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{"/usr"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
readAccess := uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSReadFile | llsyscall.AccessFSReadDir | llsyscall.AccessFSExecute)
// /proc must be present with read access
procRule := findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, "/proc")
if procRule == nil {
t.Error("expected implicit /proc rule")
} else if procRule.Access != readAccess {
t.Errorf("/proc access = %x, want read access %x", procRule.Access, readAccess)
}
// /dev/null, /dev/zero, /dev/random, /dev/urandom must be present with read+write
for _, dev := range []string{"/dev/null", "/dev/zero", "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom"} {
rule := findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, dev)
if rule == nil {
t.Errorf("expected implicit rule for %s", dev)
continue
}
// Should have both read and write access
if rule.Access&readAccess != readAccess {
t.Errorf("%s: missing read access flags", dev)
}
if rule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSWriteFile) == 0 {
t.Errorf("%s: missing write access flags", dev)
}
}
// os.TempDir() must be present with write access
tmpDir := os.TempDir()
tmpRule := findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, tmpDir)
if tmpRule == nil {
t.Errorf("expected implicit rule for %s", tmpDir)
} else if tmpRule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSWriteFile) == 0 {
t.Errorf("%s: missing write access flags", tmpDir)
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_AllowPTY_True(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.AllowPTY = utils.PtrTo(true)
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{"/usr"}
abi := newLandlockABI(5) // V5 has IoctlDev
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if !ep.AllowPTY {
t.Error("expected AllowPTY to be true")
}
// Check /dev/pts
ptsRule := findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, "/dev/pts")
if ptsRule == nil {
t.Fatal("expected rule for /dev/pts")
}
if ptsRule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSReadFile) == 0 {
t.Error("/dev/pts: missing read access")
}
if ptsRule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSWriteFile) == 0 {
t.Error("/dev/pts: missing write access")
}
// V5+ should have IoctlDev
if ptsRule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSIoctlDev) == 0 {
t.Error("/dev/pts: missing IoctlDev access on V5+")
}
// Check /dev/ptmx
ptmxRule := findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, "/dev/ptmx")
if ptmxRule == nil {
t.Fatal("expected rule for /dev/ptmx")
}
if ptmxRule.Access&uint64(llsyscall.AccessFSIoctlDev) == 0 {
t.Error("/dev/ptmx: missing IoctlDev access on V5+")
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_AllowPTY_Nil(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.AllowPTY = nil // nil means false
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{"/usr"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if ep.AllowPTY {
t.Error("expected AllowPTY to be false when nil")
}
// /dev/pts and /dev/ptmx should NOT be in rules
if findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, "/dev/pts") != nil {
t.Error("unexpected rule for /dev/pts when AllowPTY is nil")
}
if findRule(ep.FilesystemRules, "/dev/ptmx") != nil {
t.Error("unexpected rule for /dev/ptmx when AllowPTY is nil")
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_ProcExplicitAllow(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{"/proc/cpuinfo"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if !ep.SkipPIDNamespace {
t.Error("expected SkipPIDNamespace=true when /proc/cpuinfo is allowed")
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_ProcSelfOnly(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{"/proc/self/status", "/proc/self/fd"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if ep.SkipPIDNamespace {
t.Error("expected SkipPIDNamespace=false when only /proc/self paths are allowed")
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_ProcDenyDropped(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.DenyRead = []string{"/proc/kcore", "/etc/shadow"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// /proc/kcore should be dropped
for _, entry := range ep.DenyPaths {
if strings.HasPrefix(entry.Path, "/proc") {
t.Errorf("expected /proc deny entries to be dropped, found: %s", entry.Path)
}
}
// /etc/shadow should remain
found := false
for _, entry := range ep.DenyPaths {
if entry.Path == "/etc/shadow" {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
t.Error("expected /etc/shadow deny entry to remain")
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_AllowGitConfig_Nil(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.AllowGitConfig = nil // nil means false -> .git/config should be in mandatory denies
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{"/usr"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// .git/config should be in deny paths
hasGitConfigDeny := false
for _, entry := range ep.DenyPaths {
if strings.HasSuffix(entry.Path, ".git/config") {
hasGitConfigDeny = true
break
}
}
if !hasGitConfigDeny {
t.Error("expected .git/config in mandatory deny paths when AllowGitConfig is nil")
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_AllowGitConfig_True(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.AllowGitConfig = utils.PtrTo(true)
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{"/usr"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// .git/config should NOT be in deny paths
for _, entry := range ep.DenyPaths {
if strings.HasSuffix(entry.Path, ".git/config") {
t.Error("expected .git/config to NOT be in mandatory deny paths when AllowGitConfig is true")
break
}
}
}
func TestLandlockPolicyExplicitlyAllowsProc(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
readPaths []string
writePaths []string
want bool
}{
{
name: "no proc paths",
readPaths: []string{"/usr/lib", "/etc"},
want: false,
},
{
name: "/proc/self only",
readPaths: []string{"/proc/self"},
want: false,
},
{
name: "/proc/self/status",
readPaths: []string{"/proc/self/status"},
want: false,
},
{
name: "/proc/cpuinfo triggers",
readPaths: []string{"/proc/cpuinfo"},
want: true,
},
{
name: "/proc/1/status triggers",
readPaths: []string{"/proc/1/status"},
want: true,
},
{
name: "/proc in write paths triggers",
writePaths: []string{"/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space"},
want: true,
},
{
name: "/proc alone triggers",
readPaths: []string{"/proc"},
want: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = tt.readPaths
policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite = tt.writePaths
got := landlockPolicyExplicitlyAllowsProc(policy)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("landlockPolicyExplicitlyAllowsProc() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestLandlockTranslatePolicy_GitPresetShapeKeepsConfigWriteDeny(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
t.Chdir(dir)
policy := newTestPolicy()
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead = []string{filepath.Join(dir, ".git/config")}
policy.Filesystem.AllowWrite = []string{filepath.Join(dir, ".git") + "/**"}
abi := newLandlockABI(3)
ep, err := landlockTranslatePolicy(policy, abi)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
var hasWriteDeny, hasReadDeny bool
for _, entry := range ep.DenyPaths {
if strings.HasSuffix(entry.Path, ".git/config") {
if entry.Mode == denyWrite {
hasWriteDeny = true
}
if entry.Mode == denyRead {
hasReadDeny = true
}
}
}
if !hasWriteDeny {
t.Error("expected .git/config write deny to survive allow_read + allow_write ${CWD}/.git/** (git preset shape)")
}
if hasReadDeny {
t.Error("expected .git/config read deny to be suppressed by the exact allow_read entry")
}
}