Files
pmg/sandbox/platform/bubblewrap_translator_linux_test.go
T
ee684a29a9 feat(sandbox): presets — additive workload allowance bundles (#387)
* feat(sandbox): introduce presets - additive workload allowance bundles

Presets are named, additive-only bundles of sandbox allowances for a
specific workload (git hooks tooling, Astro/Vite/Next.js dev servers).
They solve the per-workload tuning friction from #384 without weakening
the default posture: no built-in profile references a preset, presets
cannot carry deny rules or profile booleans (strict YAML decoding), and
mandatory denies still win everywhere except the existing exact-match
suppression.

- Preset schema with metadata (author, labels) and schema_version gating
- Registry over ordered sources (embedded builtin, user dir); builtin
  wins name collisions; source abstraction is the extension point for a
  future hosted registry and SafeDep cloud sync
- Official presets: git, astro, vite, nextjs (with threat notes)
- Overlay/runtime integration: pmg sandbox allow preset=<name> and
  --sandbox-allow preset=<name>, stored by reference, resolved at apply
  time, missing presets warn (fail closed) instead of aborting
- Profile integration: presets: [...] list resolved after inherits
- CLI: pmg sandbox preset list (metadata filters, --json), show (prints
  YAML with threat notes), lint
- Docs: user guide (docs/sandbox-presets.md) and design spec

Closes #384

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): address review findings on presets

- Presets never modify deny lists: a profile authored deny now survives a
  preset allowing the same path (deny-beats-allow keeps it enforced).
  Regression test added.
- Profile inspection commands (show, diff, lint) construct the profile
  registry with the user-aware preset registry so they agree with runtime
  resolution of custom profiles referencing user presets.
- Handle stderr write error when warning about unresolvable presets.
- Compute preset show underline from the uncolored header.
- Use path.Join for embed.FS reads (slash-separated on all platforms).
- Clarify in docs that lint-staged/astro are examples of preset workloads.
- Drop the design spec from the PR per review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): harden preset precedence against authored denies

Addresses external security review findings on the preset mechanism:

- Bubblewrap: a mandatory write-denied path listed in allow_read lost its
  protection when a later writable parent bind covered it (bwrap last
  mount wins) - exactly the git preset shape (allow_read .git/config +
  allow_write .git/**). The mandatory deny now re-binds the path
  read-only after all writable mounts instead of being skipped.
  Regression test asserts mount ordering. Landlock and Seatbelt were
  unaffected (tests added for the same policy shape on Landlock).
- Environment: ScrubEnv is allow-wins, so a preset environment allowance
  could override a profile-authored deny. Preset env allowances
  overlapping an authored deny pattern are now dropped at application
  time (conservative bidirectional glob overlap, fail closed). Surviving
  entries still opt out of built-in credential scrubbing as intended.
- Network: removed allow_outbound from the preset schema. Both platform
  translators are all-or-nothing for outbound (one allow rule means
  blanket network access), so a preset outbound entry would silently
  change network posture far beyond what its YAML conveys. Strict
  decoding rejects the key.
- Added a dual-path expansion equivalence test (profile presets: field
  vs overlay/--sandbox-allow) and documented the precedence guarantees
  in docs/sandbox-presets.md.

Explicit --sandbox-allow and pmg sandbox allow overrides keep their
existing semantics.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* docs(sandbox): document env and preset allowances in allow command and overlay docs

pmg sandbox allow help, the --sandbox-allow flag usage, and the project
overlay docs enumerated only read/write/exec/net types. Add env and
preset to all of them, with an overlay example for persisting an env
allowance and a note on why env entries are not auto-promoted by --last.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* chore(sandbox): trim preset code comments to corner cases and minimal godocs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): exact glob intersection for preset env deny overlap

The bidirectional literal-text heuristic missed overlapping globs with
different literal structure: preset allow AWS_*_KEY and authored deny
AWS_SECRET_* both match AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY but neither pattern
matches the other's text, so the allowance merged and allow-wins
scrubbing exposed the variable. EnvPatternsOverlap now computes exact
intersection non-emptiness for the name glob dialect (case-insensitive,
'*' any sequence, '?' single char) via memoized DP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): preset env allowances are exact names, not globs

Glob-vs-glob intersection is a losing game: every dialect extension
(character classes today) silently reopens the deny-bypass hole.
Restricting preset environment allowances to literal variable names
makes the authored-deny precedence check exact by construction: each
deny pattern is evaluated against the concrete name with the same
matcher ScrubEnv uses at runtime, so the decision cannot diverge from
enforcement regardless of deny dialect. Removes the glob intersection
machinery. Profile and --sandbox-allow env globs are unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* fix(sandbox): reject mandatory-deny targets in preset paths

Preset validation relied on IsSensitiveProjectTarget, which covers fewer
files than util.DANGEROUS_FILES. A preset naming .git-credentials,
.pgpass, .docker/config.json or .config/gh exactly would exact-match
suppress the mandatory deny; .git/config in allow_write would suppress
the write protection. Preset paths are now checked against
DANGEROUS_FILES (single source of truth), .git/hooks is rejected in any
direction, and .git/config is rejected for write/exec while read stays
allowed for git repo discovery. Docs state the two deliberate opt-outs
precisely.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* feat(sandbox): preset init and edit commands for community authoring

pmg sandbox preset init scaffolds a valid user preset (metadata flags,
threat-note template, starter rule) and refuses built-in names since
builtins win resolution. pmg sandbox preset edit opens the file via the
shared editor package and validates the result, warning when a user
preset is shadowed by a built-in. Docs lead with the scaffolded flow and
spell out builtin-vs-community provenance in preset list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

* refactor(sandbox): move mandatory-target matching into util

Preset path validation re-encoded knowledge util already owns: the
dangerous-files comparison and hardcoded .git/config and .git/hooks
strings. util now exports GitConfigPath, GitHooksPath (also used by
GetMandatoryDenyPatterns), PathCoveredBy and DangerousFileMatch, and
preset validation consumes them so the mandatory deny policy has a
single definition.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 15:14:07 +05:30

1216 lines
35 KiB
Go

//go:build linux
// +build linux
package platform
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/safedep/dry/utils"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/sandbox"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/sandbox/util"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorBasicTranslation(t *testing.T) {
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test",
Description: "test policy",
PackageManagers: []string{"npm"},
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{"/tmp"},
AllowWrite: []string{"/tmp"},
},
Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
AllowOutbound: []string{"registry.npmjs.org:443"},
},
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, args)
// Convert to string for easier assertion
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Essential system paths should be mounted read-only
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--ro-bind-try")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/usr")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/lib")
// Essential devices should be mounted
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--dev-bind-try")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/dev/null")
// Proc filesystem should be mounted
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--proc")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/proc")
// User-specified paths should be mounted
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/tmp")
// Network should be allowed (no --unshare-net)
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-net")
// Process isolation should be enabled
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-pid")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-ipc")
// Die with parent
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--die-with-parent")
}
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorFilesystemRules(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy
assert func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy)
}{
{
name: "simple read-only path",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{"/usr/local"},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should have read-only bind for the path
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--ro-bind-try")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/usr/local")
},
},
{
name: "simple read-write path",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowWrite: []string{"/tmp/test"},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should have read-write bind for the path
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--bind-try")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/tmp/test")
},
},
{
name: "variable expansion in paths",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{"${HOME}/.npmrc"},
AllowWrite: []string{"${CWD}/node_modules"},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
homeDir, err := os.UserHomeDir()
require.NoError(t, err)
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
require.NoError(t, err)
// Variables should be expanded
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, homeDir+"/.npmrc")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, cwd+"/node_modules")
},
},
{
name: "deny write with read-only bind",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
DenyWrite: []string{"/etc/passwd"},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
require.NoError(t, err)
if _, err := os.Stat("/etc/passwd"); err == nil {
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, "/etc/passwd")
assertReadBind(t, args, "/etc/passwd")
}
},
},
{
name: "deny read masks file with dev null",
policy: func() *sandbox.SandboxPolicy {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "secret.txt")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("secret"), 0o600))
return &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
DenyRead: []string{path},
},
}
}(),
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
require.NoError(t, err)
assertDevNullMount(t, args, policy.Filesystem.DenyRead[0])
},
},
{
name: "deny read hides directory with tmpfs",
policy: func() *sandbox.SandboxPolicy {
dir := t.TempDir()
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "secret.txt"), []byte("secret"), 0o600))
return &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
DenyRead: []string{dir},
},
}
}(),
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
require.NoError(t, err)
assertTmpfsAt(t, args, policy.Filesystem.DenyRead[0])
},
},
{
name: "deny read globstar uses parent directory approximation",
policy: func() *sandbox.SandboxPolicy {
dir := t.TempDir()
require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(dir, "nested"), 0o700))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "nested", "secret.txt"), []byte("secret"), 0o600))
return &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
DenyRead: []string{filepath.Join(dir, "**")},
},
}
}(),
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
require.NoError(t, err)
parentDir := filepath.Dir(policy.Filesystem.DenyRead[0])
assertTmpfsAt(t, args, parentDir)
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, filepath.Join(parentDir, "nested", "secret.txt"))
},
},
{
name: "multiple paths",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{
"/usr/bin",
"/usr/lib",
"/var/log",
},
AllowWrite: []string{
"/tmp/output",
"/var/tmp/cache",
},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// All read paths should be present
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/usr/bin")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/usr/lib")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/var/log")
// All write paths should be present
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/tmp/output")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/var/tmp/cache")
},
},
}
for _, tt := range cases {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(tt.policy)
tt.assert(t, args, err, tt.policy)
})
}
}
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorGlobPatterns(t *testing.T) {
// Create a temporary directory structure for testing glob expansion
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
// Create test files
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir1"), 0755))
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir2"), 0755))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "file1.txt"), []byte("test"), 0644))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "file2.log"), []byte("test"), 0644))
cases := []struct {
name string
policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy
assert func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error)
}{
{
name: "glob pattern with *",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{tmpDir + "/*.txt"},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should expand to concrete file
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "file1.txt")
// Should NOT match .log files
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "file2.log")
},
},
{
name: "glob pattern with ** (recursive)",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowWrite: []string{tmpDir + "/**"},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
assertWriteBind(t, args, tmpDir)
assertNoWriteBind(t, args, filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir1"))
assertNoWriteBind(t, args, filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir2"))
},
},
{
name: "non-existent glob pattern",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{"/nonexistent/path/**"},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should still include the base path (even if doesn't exist)
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/nonexistent/path")
},
},
}
for _, tt := range cases {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(tt.policy)
tt.assert(t, args, err)
})
}
}
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorNetworkIsolation(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy
assert func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error)
}{
{
name: "network allowed with allow rules",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
AllowOutbound: []string{"registry.npmjs.org:443"},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should NOT have --unshare-net (network allowed)
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-net")
},
},
{
name: "network isolated with deny all",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
DenyOutbound: []string{"*:*"},
},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should have --unshare-net (network denied)
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-net")
},
},
{
name: "network isolated by default when no rules",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// With default config (unshareNetworkByDefault: true), should isolate
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-net")
},
},
{
name: "network allowed when config disables default isolation",
policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{},
},
assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
// This test needs a custom config, so we can't assert here
// Just verify no error
},
},
}
for _, tt := range cases {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(tt.policy)
tt.assert(t, args, err)
})
}
}
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorPTYSupport(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("PTY disabled by default", func(t *testing.T) {
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
AllowPTY: utils.PtrTo(false),
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should NOT have PTY device bindings
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "/dev/pts")
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "/dev/ptmx")
})
t.Run("PTY enabled when requested", func(t *testing.T) {
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
AllowPTY: utils.PtrTo(true),
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should have PTY device bindings
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/dev/pts")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/dev/ptmx")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--dev-bind-try")
})
}
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorMandatoryDenies(t *testing.T) {
// Create temp directory with some dangerous files
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
sshDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, ".ssh")
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(sshDir, 0700))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(sshDir, "id_rsa"), []byte("fake key"), 0600))
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
// Even with broad write permissions...
AllowWrite: []string{tmpDir + "/**"},
},
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Mandatory deny patterns should be present
// Note: The actual paths depend on the current working directory and home
// We just verify that /dev/null mounting is used
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--ro-bind")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/dev/null")
}
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorGitConfigDeny(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("git config denied by default", func(t *testing.T) {
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
AllowGitConfig: utils.PtrTo(false),
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
_, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Git config should be in deny patterns
// (we can't easily assert the exact args without creating a .git directory)
})
t.Run("git config allowed when explicitly set", func(t *testing.T) {
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
AllowGitConfig: utils.PtrTo(true),
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
_, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Should succeed without adding git config to deny patterns
})
}
func TestBubblewrapConfigDefaults(t *testing.T) {
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
// Essential system paths
assert.NotEmpty(t, config.essentialSystemPaths)
assert.Contains(t, config.essentialSystemPaths, "/usr")
assert.Contains(t, config.essentialSystemPaths, "/lib")
// Essential devices
assert.NotEmpty(t, config.essentialDevices)
assert.Contains(t, config.essentialDevices, "/dev/null")
assert.Contains(t, config.essentialDevices, "/dev/random")
// Glob limits
assert.Equal(t, 5, config.maxGlobDepth)
assert.Equal(t, 10000, config.maxGlobPaths)
// Isolation settings
assert.True(t, config.unshareNetworkByDefault)
assert.True(t, config.unsharePID)
assert.True(t, config.unshareIPC)
assert.True(t, config.dieWithParent)
}
func TestBubblewrapConfigEssentialPaths(t *testing.T) {
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
// Get essential system paths (filters out non-existent)
paths := config.getEssentialSystemPaths()
assert.NotEmpty(t, paths)
// All returned paths should exist
for _, path := range paths {
_, err := os.Stat(path)
assert.NoError(t, err, "Essential path %s should exist", path)
}
}
func TestBubblewrapConfigEssentialDevices(t *testing.T) {
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
// Get essential devices (filters out non-existent)
devices := config.getEssentialDevices()
assert.NotEmpty(t, devices)
// All returned devices should exist
for _, device := range devices {
_, err := os.Stat(device)
assert.NoError(t, err, "Essential device %s should exist", device)
}
}
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorProcessDenyWriteRule(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("existing file is mounted read-only", func(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
// Create a test file that exists
testFile := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "existing.txt")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(testFile, []byte("test"), 0644))
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
DenyWrite: []string{testFile},
},
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, testFile)
assertReadBind(t, args, testFile)
})
t.Run("non-existent file is skipped to avoid creating empty files", func(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
// Non-existent file - should be skipped because bwrap requires a real
// mount target for file-level read-only bind overrides.
nonExistentPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, ".env")
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowWrite: []string{tmpDir}, // Allow writes to tmpDir
DenyWrite: []string{nonExistentPath},
},
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Non-existent file should NOT be in args
// Using --ro-bind /dev/null on non-existent paths creates empty files
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, nonExistentPath)
})
t.Run("existing directory is mounted read-only", func(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
// Create a directory
testDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "secrets")
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(testDir, 0755))
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
DenyWrite: []string{testDir},
},
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Existing directory should be mounted read-only
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--ro-bind-try")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, testDir)
})
}
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorTmpdirSupport(t *testing.T) {
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Tmpdir should be mounted as writable
tmpDir := os.TempDir()
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--bind")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, tmpDir)
}
func TestExpandGlobstarPattern(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
// Create a directory structure
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "dir1", "subdir"), 0755))
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "dir2"), 0755))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "file.txt"), []byte("test"), 0644))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "dir1", "file2.txt"), []byte("test"), 0644))
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
cases := []struct {
name string
pattern string
maxDepth int
maxPaths int
assert func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error)
}{
{
name: "simple globstar",
pattern: tmpDir + "/**",
maxDepth: 3,
maxPaths: 100,
assert: func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEmpty(t, matches)
// Should include base directory
assert.Contains(t, matches, tmpDir)
},
},
{
name: "globstar with depth limit",
pattern: tmpDir + "/**",
maxDepth: 1,
maxPaths: 100,
assert: func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
// Should be limited by depth
for _, match := range matches {
rel, err := filepath.Rel(tmpDir, match)
require.NoError(t, err)
depth := len(filepath.SplitList(rel))
assert.LessOrEqual(t, depth, 2) // Base + 1 level
}
},
},
{
name: "globstar with count limit",
pattern: tmpDir + "/**",
maxDepth: 10,
maxPaths: 2,
assert: func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
// Should be limited by count
assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(matches), 2)
},
},
{
name: "non-existent base path",
pattern: "/nonexistent/path/**",
maxDepth: 3,
maxPaths: 100,
assert: func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error) {
require.NoError(t, err)
// Should return the base path even if it doesn't exist
assert.Contains(t, matches, "/nonexistent/path")
},
},
}
for _, tt := range cases {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
matches, err := translator.expandGlobstarPattern(tt.pattern, tt.maxDepth, tt.maxPaths)
tt.assert(t, matches, err)
})
}
}
// TestGlobFallbackThreshold verifies coarse-grained fallback behavior when patterns match too many paths
func TestGlobFallbackThreshold(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
// Create 150 files (exceeds threshold of 100)
for i := 0; i < 150; i++ {
filePath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, fmt.Sprintf("file%d.txt", i))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filePath, []byte("test"), 0644))
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test-fallback",
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{tmpDir + "/*.txt"},
},
}
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should bind parent directory (tmpDir), not individual files
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, tmpDir)
// Should NOT contain individual file paths (fallback to parent dir)
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "file1.txt")
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "file50.txt")
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "file100.txt")
// Verify total argument count is reasonable (coarse-grained fallback should prevent explosion)
assert.Less(t, len(args), 300, "Coarse-grained fallback should prevent argument explosion")
}
// TestGlobFallbackThresholdGlobstar tests fallback with ** globstar patterns
func TestGlobFallbackThresholdGlobstar(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
// Create deep directory structure with 200 files (exceeds threshold)
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
subDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, fmt.Sprintf("dir%d", i))
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(subDir, 0755))
for j := 0; j < 20; j++ {
filePath := filepath.Join(subDir, fmt.Sprintf("file%d.txt", j))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filePath, []byte("test"), 0644))
}
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test-fallback-globstar",
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowWrite: []string{tmpDir + "/**"},
},
}
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should bind parent directory (tmpDir)
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, tmpDir)
// Should NOT contain individual subdirectory paths (fallback to parent)
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "dir1")
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "dir5")
// Verify total argument count is reasonable
assert.Less(t, len(args), 300, "Coarse-grained fallback should prevent argument explosion")
}
// TestBubblewrapAllowWriteGlobstarBindsParentOnly verifies globstar allow_write rules
// bind the parent tree (e.g. .venv) instead of per-file mounts that break pip in-project venvs.
// See https://github.com/safedep/pmg/issues/315
func TestBubblewrapAllowWriteGlobstarBindsParentOnly(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
venvDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, ".venv")
binDir := filepath.Join(venvDir, "bin")
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(binDir, 0755))
pythonPath := filepath.Join(binDir, "python")
require.NoError(t, os.Symlink("/usr/bin/python3", pythonPath))
// Populate enough shallow files that old logic would fine-grain bind without hitting fallback.
for i := 0; i < 30; i++ {
path := filepath.Join(venvDir, fmt.Sprintf("file%d.txt", i))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("x"), 0644))
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test-venv-write",
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{tmpDir + "/**"},
AllowWrite: []string{venvDir + "/**"},
},
}
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
assertWriteBind(t, args, venvDir)
assertNoWriteBind(t, args, pythonPath)
assertReadBind(t, args, pythonPath)
}
// TestGlobNoFallbackSmallPattern tests that small patterns don't trigger fallback
func TestGlobNoFallbackSmallPattern(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
// Create only 10 files (below threshold)
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
filePath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, fmt.Sprintf("file%d.txt", i))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filePath, []byte("test"), 0644))
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test-no-fallback",
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{tmpDir + "/*.txt"},
},
}
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
// Should bind individual files (no fallback)
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "file0.txt")
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "file5.txt")
}
// TestTotalArgsLimit verifies global argument limit warning
func TestTotalArgsLimit(t *testing.T) {
// Create policy with many patterns that would exceed limit
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test-args-limit",
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: make([]string, 1000), // 1000 patterns
},
}
// Fill with literal paths to avoid glob expansion
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead[i] = fmt.Sprintf("/tmp/path%d", i)
}
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
config.totalArgsLimit = 500 // Set low for testing
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err) // Should not error, just warn
// Verify args were generated despite exceeding limit
assert.Greater(t, len(args), config.totalArgsLimit)
}
// TestExtractParentDir tests the extractParentDir helper function
func TestExtractParentDir(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
pattern string
expected string
}{
{
name: "double star pattern",
pattern: "/home/user/node_modules/**",
expected: "/home/user/node_modules",
},
{
name: "single star pattern",
pattern: "/tmp/*.txt",
expected: "/tmp",
},
{
name: "middle glob",
pattern: "/usr/lib/*.so",
expected: "/usr/lib",
},
{
name: "complex glob",
pattern: "/home/user/.cache/**/*.log",
expected: "/home/user/.cache",
},
{
name: "file-level glob with dot",
pattern: "/home/user/project/package.json.*",
expected: "/home/user/project",
},
{
name: "file-level glob in CWD",
pattern: "/home/user/project/*.lock",
expected: "/home/user/project",
},
{
name: "question mark glob",
pattern: "/tmp/file?.txt",
expected: "/tmp",
},
{
name: "bracket glob",
pattern: "/usr/lib/lib[abc].so",
expected: "/usr/lib",
},
{
name: "no glob",
pattern: "/home/user/file.txt",
expected: "/home/user/file.txt",
},
{
name: "trailing double star",
pattern: "/home/user/cache/**",
expected: "/home/user/cache",
},
{
name: "trailing single star",
pattern: "/var/log/*",
expected: "/var/log",
},
}
for _, tt := range cases {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
result := translator.extractParentDir(tt.pattern)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result)
})
}
}
func TestExtractGlobstarWriteBaseDir(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
pattern string
expected string
}{
{
name: "suffix globstar (profiles)",
pattern: "/home/user/.venv/**",
expected: "/home/user/.venv",
},
{
name: "in-pattern globstars",
pattern: "/a/b/**/d/**/e",
expected: "/a/b",
},
{
name: "middle globstar with file suffix",
pattern: "/usr/lib/**/*.so",
expected: "/usr/lib",
},
}
for _, tt := range cases {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, extractGlobstarWriteBaseDir(tt.pattern))
})
}
}
func TestBubblewrapGlobstarWriteMultiSegmentBind(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
baseDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "a", "b")
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(baseDir, 0755))
pattern := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "a", "b", "**", "d", "**", "e")
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test-multi-globstar-write",
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowWrite: []string{pattern},
},
}
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
assertWriteBind(t, args, baseDir)
}
// Helper function to convert arg slice to string for easier assertion
func argSliceToString(args []string) string {
result := ""
for _, arg := range args {
result += arg + " "
}
return result
}
func TestBubblewrapMandatoryDenySuppression(t *testing.T) {
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Run("read-side opt-out preserves real ro-bind and skips tmpfs and /dev/null", func(t *testing.T) {
// Real .env in an isolated CWD so processDenyRule does not skip the
// path as non-existent.
dir := t.TempDir()
envPath := filepath.Join(dir, ".env")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(envPath, []byte("X=1\n"), 0o600))
origCwd, err := os.Getwd()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, os.Chdir(dir))
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = os.Chdir(origCwd)
})
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test",
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{envPath},
},
}
args := translateForTest(t, policy)
assertNoTmpfsAt(t, args, envPath)
// /dev/null overlay would mask reads; allow_read --ro-bind already
// denies writes via EROFS, so the mandatory write deny is redundant.
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, envPath)
assertReadBind(t, args, envPath)
})
t.Run("user deny_write preserves read for paths also in allow_read", func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
envPath := filepath.Join(dir, ".env")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(envPath, []byte("X=1\n"), 0o600))
origCwd, err := os.Getwd()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, os.Chdir(dir))
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = os.Chdir(origCwd)
})
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test",
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{envPath},
AllowWrite: []string{dir},
DenyWrite: []string{envPath},
},
}
args := translateForTest(t, policy)
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, envPath)
assertReadOnlyBindAfterWritableBind(t, args, envPath, dir)
})
t.Run("write-side opt-out skips both tmpfs and /dev/null for that path", func(t *testing.T) {
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test",
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowWrite: []string{filepath.Join(cwd, ".env")},
},
}
args := translateForTest(t, policy)
assertNoTmpfsAt(t, args, filepath.Join(cwd, ".env"))
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, filepath.Join(cwd, ".env"))
})
t.Run("no opt-out: tmpfs fires for the path", func(t *testing.T) {
// tmpfs only fires for paths that exist on the host; assert at the
// GetMandatoryDenyPatterns level instead of the translator output.
r := util.GetMandatoryDenyPatterns(util.MandatoryDenyOptions{})
assert.Contains(t, r.DenyRead, filepath.Join(cwd, ".env"))
assert.Contains(t, r.DenyWrite, filepath.Join(cwd, ".env"))
})
}
func translateForTest(t *testing.T, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) []string {
t.Helper()
tr := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(newDefaultBubblewrapConfig())
args, err := tr.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
return args
}
func assertNoTmpfsAt(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
t.Helper()
for i := 0; i+1 < len(args); i++ {
if args[i] == "--tmpfs" && args[i+1] == path {
t.Fatalf("expected no --tmpfs at %q, but found one", path)
}
}
}
func assertTmpfsAt(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
t.Helper()
for i := 0; i+1 < len(args); i++ {
if args[i] == "--tmpfs" && args[i+1] == path {
return
}
}
t.Fatalf("expected --tmpfs at %q, but none found", path)
}
func assertNoDevNullMount(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
t.Helper()
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
if (args[i] == "--ro-bind" || args[i] == "--bind") && args[i+1] == "/dev/null" && args[i+2] == path {
t.Fatalf("expected no /dev/null mount at %q, but found one", path)
}
}
}
func assertDevNullMount(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
t.Helper()
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
if args[i] == "--ro-bind" && args[i+1] == "/dev/null" && args[i+2] == path {
return
}
}
t.Fatalf("expected /dev/null mount at %q, but none found", path)
}
func assertReadBind(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
t.Helper()
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
if (args[i] == "--ro-bind" || args[i] == "--ro-bind-try") && args[i+1] == path && args[i+2] == path {
return
}
}
t.Fatalf("expected --ro-bind %q %q, not found in args: %v", path, path, args)
}
func assertWriteBind(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
t.Helper()
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
if (args[i] == "--bind" || args[i] == "--bind-try") && args[i+1] == path && args[i+2] == path {
return
}
}
t.Fatalf("expected --bind-try %q %q, not found in args: %v", path, path, args)
}
func assertNoWriteBind(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
t.Helper()
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
if (args[i] == "--bind" || args[i] == "--bind-try") && args[i+1] == path && args[i+2] == path {
t.Fatalf("unexpected writable bind at %q in args: %v", path, args)
}
}
}
func assertReadOnlyBindAfterWritableBind(t *testing.T, args []string, readOnlyPath string, writablePath string) {
t.Helper()
writableBindIndex := -1
readOnlyBindIndex := -1
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
if (args[i] == "--bind" || args[i] == "--bind-try") && args[i+1] == writablePath && args[i+2] == writablePath {
writableBindIndex = i
}
if (args[i] == "--ro-bind" || args[i] == "--ro-bind-try") && args[i+1] == readOnlyPath && args[i+2] == readOnlyPath {
readOnlyBindIndex = i
}
}
require.NotEqual(t, -1, writableBindIndex, "expected writable bind for %q in args: %v", writablePath, args)
require.NotEqual(t, -1, readOnlyBindIndex, "expected read-only bind for %q in args: %v", readOnlyPath, args)
assert.Greater(t, readOnlyBindIndex, writableBindIndex, "deny_write read-only bind must override earlier writable parent bind")
}
func TestBubblewrapMandatoryWriteDenySurvivesWritableParent(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, ".git"), 0o755))
gitConfig := filepath.Join(dir, ".git", "config")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(gitConfig, []byte("[core]\n"), 0o644))
t.Chdir(dir)
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
Name: "test",
PackageManagers: []string{"pnpm"},
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
AllowRead: []string{gitConfig},
AllowWrite: []string{filepath.Join(dir, ".git") + "/**"},
},
}
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(newDefaultBubblewrapConfig())
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
require.NoError(t, err)
lastWritableGitBind := -1
lastROConfigBind := -1
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
if (args[i] == "--bind" || args[i] == "--bind-try") && strings.HasPrefix(args[i+1], filepath.Join(dir, ".git")) {
lastWritableGitBind = i
}
if (args[i] == "--ro-bind" || args[i] == "--ro-bind-try") && args[i+1] == gitConfig && args[i+2] == gitConfig {
lastROConfigBind = i
}
}
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, lastWritableGitBind, 0, "expected a writable bind for the .git tree")
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, lastROConfigBind, 0,
"mandatory write deny for .git/config must be re-applied even when the path is in allow_read")
assert.Greater(t, lastROConfigBind, lastWritableGitBind,
"read-only .git/config bind must come after the writable .git bind (bwrap last mount wins)")
}