mirror of
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* feat(sandbox): introduce presets - additive workload allowance bundles Presets are named, additive-only bundles of sandbox allowances for a specific workload (git hooks tooling, Astro/Vite/Next.js dev servers). They solve the per-workload tuning friction from #384 without weakening the default posture: no built-in profile references a preset, presets cannot carry deny rules or profile booleans (strict YAML decoding), and mandatory denies still win everywhere except the existing exact-match suppression. - Preset schema with metadata (author, labels) and schema_version gating - Registry over ordered sources (embedded builtin, user dir); builtin wins name collisions; source abstraction is the extension point for a future hosted registry and SafeDep cloud sync - Official presets: git, astro, vite, nextjs (with threat notes) - Overlay/runtime integration: pmg sandbox allow preset=<name> and --sandbox-allow preset=<name>, stored by reference, resolved at apply time, missing presets warn (fail closed) instead of aborting - Profile integration: presets: [...] list resolved after inherits - CLI: pmg sandbox preset list (metadata filters, --json), show (prints YAML with threat notes), lint - Docs: user guide (docs/sandbox-presets.md) and design spec Closes #384 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): address review findings on presets - Presets never modify deny lists: a profile authored deny now survives a preset allowing the same path (deny-beats-allow keeps it enforced). Regression test added. - Profile inspection commands (show, diff, lint) construct the profile registry with the user-aware preset registry so they agree with runtime resolution of custom profiles referencing user presets. - Handle stderr write error when warning about unresolvable presets. - Compute preset show underline from the uncolored header. - Use path.Join for embed.FS reads (slash-separated on all platforms). - Clarify in docs that lint-staged/astro are examples of preset workloads. - Drop the design spec from the PR per review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): harden preset precedence against authored denies Addresses external security review findings on the preset mechanism: - Bubblewrap: a mandatory write-denied path listed in allow_read lost its protection when a later writable parent bind covered it (bwrap last mount wins) - exactly the git preset shape (allow_read .git/config + allow_write .git/**). The mandatory deny now re-binds the path read-only after all writable mounts instead of being skipped. Regression test asserts mount ordering. Landlock and Seatbelt were unaffected (tests added for the same policy shape on Landlock). - Environment: ScrubEnv is allow-wins, so a preset environment allowance could override a profile-authored deny. Preset env allowances overlapping an authored deny pattern are now dropped at application time (conservative bidirectional glob overlap, fail closed). Surviving entries still opt out of built-in credential scrubbing as intended. - Network: removed allow_outbound from the preset schema. Both platform translators are all-or-nothing for outbound (one allow rule means blanket network access), so a preset outbound entry would silently change network posture far beyond what its YAML conveys. Strict decoding rejects the key. - Added a dual-path expansion equivalence test (profile presets: field vs overlay/--sandbox-allow) and documented the precedence guarantees in docs/sandbox-presets.md. Explicit --sandbox-allow and pmg sandbox allow overrides keep their existing semantics. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * docs(sandbox): document env and preset allowances in allow command and overlay docs pmg sandbox allow help, the --sandbox-allow flag usage, and the project overlay docs enumerated only read/write/exec/net types. Add env and preset to all of them, with an overlay example for persisting an env allowance and a note on why env entries are not auto-promoted by --last. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * chore(sandbox): trim preset code comments to corner cases and minimal godocs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): exact glob intersection for preset env deny overlap The bidirectional literal-text heuristic missed overlapping globs with different literal structure: preset allow AWS_*_KEY and authored deny AWS_SECRET_* both match AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY but neither pattern matches the other's text, so the allowance merged and allow-wins scrubbing exposed the variable. EnvPatternsOverlap now computes exact intersection non-emptiness for the name glob dialect (case-insensitive, '*' any sequence, '?' single char) via memoized DP. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): preset env allowances are exact names, not globs Glob-vs-glob intersection is a losing game: every dialect extension (character classes today) silently reopens the deny-bypass hole. Restricting preset environment allowances to literal variable names makes the authored-deny precedence check exact by construction: each deny pattern is evaluated against the concrete name with the same matcher ScrubEnv uses at runtime, so the decision cannot diverge from enforcement regardless of deny dialect. Removes the glob intersection machinery. Profile and --sandbox-allow env globs are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * fix(sandbox): reject mandatory-deny targets in preset paths Preset validation relied on IsSensitiveProjectTarget, which covers fewer files than util.DANGEROUS_FILES. A preset naming .git-credentials, .pgpass, .docker/config.json or .config/gh exactly would exact-match suppress the mandatory deny; .git/config in allow_write would suppress the write protection. Preset paths are now checked against DANGEROUS_FILES (single source of truth), .git/hooks is rejected in any direction, and .git/config is rejected for write/exec while read stays allowed for git repo discovery. Docs state the two deliberate opt-outs precisely. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * feat(sandbox): preset init and edit commands for community authoring pmg sandbox preset init scaffolds a valid user preset (metadata flags, threat-note template, starter rule) and refuses built-in names since builtins win resolution. pmg sandbox preset edit opens the file via the shared editor package and validates the result, warning when a user preset is shadowed by a built-in. Docs lead with the scaffolded flow and spell out builtin-vs-community provenance in preset list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn * refactor(sandbox): move mandatory-target matching into util Preset path validation re-encoded knowledge util already owns: the dangerous-files comparison and hardcoded .git/config and .git/hooks strings. util now exports GitConfigPath, GitHooksPath (also used by GetMandatoryDenyPatterns), PathCoveredBy and DangerousFileMatch, and preset validation consumes them so the mandatory deny policy has a single definition. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
1216 lines
35 KiB
Go
1216 lines
35 KiB
Go
//go:build linux
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// +build linux
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package platform
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import (
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/safedep/dry/utils"
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"github.com/safedep/pmg/sandbox"
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"github.com/safedep/pmg/sandbox/util"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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func TestBubblewrapTranslatorBasicTranslation(t *testing.T) {
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policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Name: "test",
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Description: "test policy",
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PackageManagers: []string{"npm"},
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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AllowRead: []string{"/tmp"},
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AllowWrite: []string{"/tmp"},
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},
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Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
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AllowOutbound: []string{"registry.npmjs.org:443"},
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},
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}
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config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
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translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
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args, err := translator.translate(policy)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotEmpty(t, args)
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// Convert to string for easier assertion
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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// Essential system paths should be mounted read-only
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--ro-bind-try")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/usr")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/lib")
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// Essential devices should be mounted
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--dev-bind-try")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/dev/null")
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// Proc filesystem should be mounted
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--proc")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/proc")
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// User-specified paths should be mounted
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/tmp")
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// Network should be allowed (no --unshare-net)
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assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-net")
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// Process isolation should be enabled
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-pid")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-ipc")
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// Die with parent
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--die-with-parent")
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}
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func TestBubblewrapTranslatorFilesystemRules(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy
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assert func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy)
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}{
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{
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name: "simple read-only path",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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AllowRead: []string{"/usr/local"},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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// Should have read-only bind for the path
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--ro-bind-try")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/usr/local")
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},
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},
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{
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name: "simple read-write path",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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AllowWrite: []string{"/tmp/test"},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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// Should have read-write bind for the path
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--bind-try")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/tmp/test")
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},
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},
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{
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name: "variable expansion in paths",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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AllowRead: []string{"${HOME}/.npmrc"},
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AllowWrite: []string{"${CWD}/node_modules"},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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homeDir, err := os.UserHomeDir()
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require.NoError(t, err)
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cwd, err := os.Getwd()
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// Variables should be expanded
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, homeDir+"/.npmrc")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, cwd+"/node_modules")
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},
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},
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{
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name: "deny write with read-only bind",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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DenyWrite: []string{"/etc/passwd"},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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if _, err := os.Stat("/etc/passwd"); err == nil {
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assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, "/etc/passwd")
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assertReadBind(t, args, "/etc/passwd")
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}
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},
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},
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{
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name: "deny read masks file with dev null",
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policy: func() *sandbox.SandboxPolicy {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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path := filepath.Join(dir, "secret.txt")
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require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("secret"), 0o600))
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return &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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DenyRead: []string{path},
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},
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}
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}(),
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assertDevNullMount(t, args, policy.Filesystem.DenyRead[0])
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},
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},
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{
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name: "deny read hides directory with tmpfs",
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policy: func() *sandbox.SandboxPolicy {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "secret.txt"), []byte("secret"), 0o600))
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return &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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DenyRead: []string{dir},
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},
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}
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}(),
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assertTmpfsAt(t, args, policy.Filesystem.DenyRead[0])
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},
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},
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{
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name: "deny read globstar uses parent directory approximation",
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policy: func() *sandbox.SandboxPolicy {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(dir, "nested"), 0o700))
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require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "nested", "secret.txt"), []byte("secret"), 0o600))
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return &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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DenyRead: []string{filepath.Join(dir, "**")},
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},
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}
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}(),
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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parentDir := filepath.Dir(policy.Filesystem.DenyRead[0])
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assertTmpfsAt(t, args, parentDir)
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assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, filepath.Join(parentDir, "nested", "secret.txt"))
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},
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},
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{
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name: "multiple paths",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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AllowRead: []string{
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"/usr/bin",
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"/usr/lib",
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"/var/log",
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},
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AllowWrite: []string{
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"/tmp/output",
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"/var/tmp/cache",
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},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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// All read paths should be present
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/usr/bin")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/usr/lib")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/var/log")
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// All write paths should be present
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/tmp/output")
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/var/tmp/cache")
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},
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range cases {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
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translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
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args, err := translator.translate(tt.policy)
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tt.assert(t, args, err, tt.policy)
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})
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}
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}
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func TestBubblewrapTranslatorGlobPatterns(t *testing.T) {
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// Create a temporary directory structure for testing glob expansion
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tmpDir := t.TempDir()
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// Create test files
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require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir1"), 0755))
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require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir2"), 0755))
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require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "file1.txt"), []byte("test"), 0644))
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require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "file2.log"), []byte("test"), 0644))
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy
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assert func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error)
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}{
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{
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name: "glob pattern with *",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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AllowRead: []string{tmpDir + "/*.txt"},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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// Should expand to concrete file
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "file1.txt")
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// Should NOT match .log files
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assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "file2.log")
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},
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},
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{
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name: "glob pattern with ** (recursive)",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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AllowWrite: []string{tmpDir + "/**"},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assertWriteBind(t, args, tmpDir)
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assertNoWriteBind(t, args, filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir1"))
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assertNoWriteBind(t, args, filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir2"))
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},
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},
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{
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name: "non-existent glob pattern",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
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AllowRead: []string{"/nonexistent/path/**"},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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// Should still include the base path (even if doesn't exist)
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/nonexistent/path")
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},
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range cases {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
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translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
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args, err := translator.translate(tt.policy)
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tt.assert(t, args, err)
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})
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}
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}
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func TestBubblewrapTranslatorNetworkIsolation(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy
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assert func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error)
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}{
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{
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name: "network allowed with allow rules",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
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AllowOutbound: []string{"registry.npmjs.org:443"},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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// Should NOT have --unshare-net (network allowed)
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assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-net")
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},
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},
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{
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name: "network isolated with deny all",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{
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DenyOutbound: []string{"*:*"},
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},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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// Should have --unshare-net (network denied)
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-net")
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},
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},
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{
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name: "network isolated by default when no rules",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
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// With default config (unshareNetworkByDefault: true), should isolate
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assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--unshare-net")
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},
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},
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{
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name: "network allowed when config disables default isolation",
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policy: &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
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Network: sandbox.NetworkPolicy{},
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},
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assert: func(t *testing.T, args []string, err error) {
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// This test needs a custom config, so we can't assert here
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// Just verify no error
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},
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range cases {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
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translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
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args, err := translator.translate(tt.policy)
|
|
tt.assert(t, args, err)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorPTYSupport(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Run("PTY disabled by default", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
AllowPTY: utils.PtrTo(false),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
|
|
|
|
// Should NOT have PTY device bindings
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "/dev/pts")
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "/dev/ptmx")
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("PTY enabled when requested", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
AllowPTY: utils.PtrTo(true),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
|
|
|
|
// Should have PTY device bindings
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/dev/pts")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/dev/ptmx")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--dev-bind-try")
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorMandatoryDenies(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Create temp directory with some dangerous files
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
sshDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, ".ssh")
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(sshDir, 0700))
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(sshDir, "id_rsa"), []byte("fake key"), 0600))
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
// Even with broad write permissions...
|
|
AllowWrite: []string{tmpDir + "/**"},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
|
|
|
|
// Mandatory deny patterns should be present
|
|
// Note: The actual paths depend on the current working directory and home
|
|
// We just verify that /dev/null mounting is used
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--ro-bind")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "/dev/null")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorGitConfigDeny(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Run("git config denied by default", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
AllowGitConfig: utils.PtrTo(false),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
_, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Git config should be in deny patterns
|
|
// (we can't easily assert the exact args without creating a .git directory)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("git config allowed when explicitly set", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
AllowGitConfig: utils.PtrTo(true),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
_, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Should succeed without adding git config to deny patterns
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapConfigDefaults(t *testing.T) {
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
|
|
// Essential system paths
|
|
assert.NotEmpty(t, config.essentialSystemPaths)
|
|
assert.Contains(t, config.essentialSystemPaths, "/usr")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, config.essentialSystemPaths, "/lib")
|
|
|
|
// Essential devices
|
|
assert.NotEmpty(t, config.essentialDevices)
|
|
assert.Contains(t, config.essentialDevices, "/dev/null")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, config.essentialDevices, "/dev/random")
|
|
|
|
// Glob limits
|
|
assert.Equal(t, 5, config.maxGlobDepth)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, 10000, config.maxGlobPaths)
|
|
|
|
// Isolation settings
|
|
assert.True(t, config.unshareNetworkByDefault)
|
|
assert.True(t, config.unsharePID)
|
|
assert.True(t, config.unshareIPC)
|
|
assert.True(t, config.dieWithParent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapConfigEssentialPaths(t *testing.T) {
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
|
|
// Get essential system paths (filters out non-existent)
|
|
paths := config.getEssentialSystemPaths()
|
|
assert.NotEmpty(t, paths)
|
|
|
|
// All returned paths should exist
|
|
for _, path := range paths {
|
|
_, err := os.Stat(path)
|
|
assert.NoError(t, err, "Essential path %s should exist", path)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapConfigEssentialDevices(t *testing.T) {
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
|
|
// Get essential devices (filters out non-existent)
|
|
devices := config.getEssentialDevices()
|
|
assert.NotEmpty(t, devices)
|
|
|
|
// All returned devices should exist
|
|
for _, device := range devices {
|
|
_, err := os.Stat(device)
|
|
assert.NoError(t, err, "Essential device %s should exist", device)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorProcessDenyWriteRule(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Run("existing file is mounted read-only", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
|
|
// Create a test file that exists
|
|
testFile := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "existing.txt")
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(testFile, []byte("test"), 0644))
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
DenyWrite: []string{testFile},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, testFile)
|
|
assertReadBind(t, args, testFile)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("non-existent file is skipped to avoid creating empty files", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
|
|
// Non-existent file - should be skipped because bwrap requires a real
|
|
// mount target for file-level read-only bind overrides.
|
|
nonExistentPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, ".env")
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowWrite: []string{tmpDir}, // Allow writes to tmpDir
|
|
DenyWrite: []string{nonExistentPath},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
|
|
|
|
// Non-existent file should NOT be in args
|
|
// Using --ro-bind /dev/null on non-existent paths creates empty files
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, nonExistentPath)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("existing directory is mounted read-only", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
|
|
// Create a directory
|
|
testDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "secrets")
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(testDir, 0755))
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
DenyWrite: []string{testDir},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
|
|
|
|
// Existing directory should be mounted read-only
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--ro-bind-try")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, testDir)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapTranslatorTmpdirSupport(t *testing.T) {
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
|
|
|
|
// Tmpdir should be mounted as writable
|
|
tmpDir := os.TempDir()
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "--bind")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, tmpDir)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestExpandGlobstarPattern(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
|
|
// Create a directory structure
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "dir1", "subdir"), 0755))
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "dir2"), 0755))
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "file.txt"), []byte("test"), 0644))
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "dir1", "file2.txt"), []byte("test"), 0644))
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
pattern string
|
|
maxDepth int
|
|
maxPaths int
|
|
assert func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error)
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "simple globstar",
|
|
pattern: tmpDir + "/**",
|
|
maxDepth: 3,
|
|
maxPaths: 100,
|
|
assert: func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error) {
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
assert.NotEmpty(t, matches)
|
|
// Should include base directory
|
|
assert.Contains(t, matches, tmpDir)
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "globstar with depth limit",
|
|
pattern: tmpDir + "/**",
|
|
maxDepth: 1,
|
|
maxPaths: 100,
|
|
assert: func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error) {
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
// Should be limited by depth
|
|
for _, match := range matches {
|
|
rel, err := filepath.Rel(tmpDir, match)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
depth := len(filepath.SplitList(rel))
|
|
assert.LessOrEqual(t, depth, 2) // Base + 1 level
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "globstar with count limit",
|
|
pattern: tmpDir + "/**",
|
|
maxDepth: 10,
|
|
maxPaths: 2,
|
|
assert: func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error) {
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
// Should be limited by count
|
|
assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(matches), 2)
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "non-existent base path",
|
|
pattern: "/nonexistent/path/**",
|
|
maxDepth: 3,
|
|
maxPaths: 100,
|
|
assert: func(t *testing.T, matches []string, err error) {
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
// Should return the base path even if it doesn't exist
|
|
assert.Contains(t, matches, "/nonexistent/path")
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range cases {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
matches, err := translator.expandGlobstarPattern(tt.pattern, tt.maxDepth, tt.maxPaths)
|
|
tt.assert(t, matches, err)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestGlobFallbackThreshold verifies coarse-grained fallback behavior when patterns match too many paths
|
|
func TestGlobFallbackThreshold(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
|
|
// Create 150 files (exceeds threshold of 100)
|
|
for i := 0; i < 150; i++ {
|
|
filePath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, fmt.Sprintf("file%d.txt", i))
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filePath, []byte("test"), 0644))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test-fallback",
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowRead: []string{tmpDir + "/*.txt"},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
|
|
|
|
// Should bind parent directory (tmpDir), not individual files
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, tmpDir)
|
|
|
|
// Should NOT contain individual file paths (fallback to parent dir)
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "file1.txt")
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "file50.txt")
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "file100.txt")
|
|
|
|
// Verify total argument count is reasonable (coarse-grained fallback should prevent explosion)
|
|
assert.Less(t, len(args), 300, "Coarse-grained fallback should prevent argument explosion")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestGlobFallbackThresholdGlobstar tests fallback with ** globstar patterns
|
|
func TestGlobFallbackThresholdGlobstar(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
|
|
// Create deep directory structure with 200 files (exceeds threshold)
|
|
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
|
|
subDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, fmt.Sprintf("dir%d", i))
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(subDir, 0755))
|
|
for j := 0; j < 20; j++ {
|
|
filePath := filepath.Join(subDir, fmt.Sprintf("file%d.txt", j))
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filePath, []byte("test"), 0644))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test-fallback-globstar",
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowWrite: []string{tmpDir + "/**"},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
|
|
|
|
// Should bind parent directory (tmpDir)
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, tmpDir)
|
|
|
|
// Should NOT contain individual subdirectory paths (fallback to parent)
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "dir1")
|
|
assert.NotContains(t, argsStr, "dir5")
|
|
|
|
// Verify total argument count is reasonable
|
|
assert.Less(t, len(args), 300, "Coarse-grained fallback should prevent argument explosion")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestBubblewrapAllowWriteGlobstarBindsParentOnly verifies globstar allow_write rules
|
|
// bind the parent tree (e.g. .venv) instead of per-file mounts that break pip in-project venvs.
|
|
// See https://github.com/safedep/pmg/issues/315
|
|
func TestBubblewrapAllowWriteGlobstarBindsParentOnly(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
venvDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, ".venv")
|
|
binDir := filepath.Join(venvDir, "bin")
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(binDir, 0755))
|
|
pythonPath := filepath.Join(binDir, "python")
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.Symlink("/usr/bin/python3", pythonPath))
|
|
|
|
// Populate enough shallow files that old logic would fine-grain bind without hitting fallback.
|
|
for i := 0; i < 30; i++ {
|
|
path := filepath.Join(venvDir, fmt.Sprintf("file%d.txt", i))
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("x"), 0644))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test-venv-write",
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowRead: []string{tmpDir + "/**"},
|
|
AllowWrite: []string{venvDir + "/**"},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
assertWriteBind(t, args, venvDir)
|
|
assertNoWriteBind(t, args, pythonPath)
|
|
assertReadBind(t, args, pythonPath)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestGlobNoFallbackSmallPattern tests that small patterns don't trigger fallback
|
|
func TestGlobNoFallbackSmallPattern(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
|
|
// Create only 10 files (below threshold)
|
|
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
|
|
filePath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, fmt.Sprintf("file%d.txt", i))
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filePath, []byte("test"), 0644))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test-no-fallback",
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowRead: []string{tmpDir + "/*.txt"},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
argsStr := argSliceToString(args)
|
|
|
|
// Should bind individual files (no fallback)
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "file0.txt")
|
|
assert.Contains(t, argsStr, "file5.txt")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTotalArgsLimit verifies global argument limit warning
|
|
func TestTotalArgsLimit(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Create policy with many patterns that would exceed limit
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test-args-limit",
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowRead: make([]string, 1000), // 1000 patterns
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fill with literal paths to avoid glob expansion
|
|
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
|
|
policy.Filesystem.AllowRead[i] = fmt.Sprintf("/tmp/path%d", i)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
config.totalArgsLimit = 500 // Set low for testing
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err) // Should not error, just warn
|
|
|
|
// Verify args were generated despite exceeding limit
|
|
assert.Greater(t, len(args), config.totalArgsLimit)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestExtractParentDir tests the extractParentDir helper function
|
|
func TestExtractParentDir(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
pattern string
|
|
expected string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "double star pattern",
|
|
pattern: "/home/user/node_modules/**",
|
|
expected: "/home/user/node_modules",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "single star pattern",
|
|
pattern: "/tmp/*.txt",
|
|
expected: "/tmp",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "middle glob",
|
|
pattern: "/usr/lib/*.so",
|
|
expected: "/usr/lib",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "complex glob",
|
|
pattern: "/home/user/.cache/**/*.log",
|
|
expected: "/home/user/.cache",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "file-level glob with dot",
|
|
pattern: "/home/user/project/package.json.*",
|
|
expected: "/home/user/project",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "file-level glob in CWD",
|
|
pattern: "/home/user/project/*.lock",
|
|
expected: "/home/user/project",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "question mark glob",
|
|
pattern: "/tmp/file?.txt",
|
|
expected: "/tmp",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "bracket glob",
|
|
pattern: "/usr/lib/lib[abc].so",
|
|
expected: "/usr/lib",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "no glob",
|
|
pattern: "/home/user/file.txt",
|
|
expected: "/home/user/file.txt",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "trailing double star",
|
|
pattern: "/home/user/cache/**",
|
|
expected: "/home/user/cache",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "trailing single star",
|
|
pattern: "/var/log/*",
|
|
expected: "/var/log",
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range cases {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
result := translator.extractParentDir(tt.pattern)
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestExtractGlobstarWriteBaseDir(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
pattern string
|
|
expected string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "suffix globstar (profiles)",
|
|
pattern: "/home/user/.venv/**",
|
|
expected: "/home/user/.venv",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "in-pattern globstars",
|
|
pattern: "/a/b/**/d/**/e",
|
|
expected: "/a/b",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "middle globstar with file suffix",
|
|
pattern: "/usr/lib/**/*.so",
|
|
expected: "/usr/lib",
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range cases {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, extractGlobstarWriteBaseDir(tt.pattern))
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapGlobstarWriteMultiSegmentBind(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
|
|
baseDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "a", "b")
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(baseDir, 0755))
|
|
|
|
pattern := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "a", "b", "**", "d", "**", "e")
|
|
config := newDefaultBubblewrapConfig()
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(config)
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test-multi-globstar-write",
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowWrite: []string{pattern},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
assertWriteBind(t, args, baseDir)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Helper function to convert arg slice to string for easier assertion
|
|
func argSliceToString(args []string) string {
|
|
result := ""
|
|
for _, arg := range args {
|
|
result += arg + " "
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return result
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapMandatoryDenySuppression(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
t.Run("read-side opt-out preserves real ro-bind and skips tmpfs and /dev/null", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Real .env in an isolated CWD so processDenyRule does not skip the
|
|
// path as non-existent.
|
|
dir := t.TempDir()
|
|
envPath := filepath.Join(dir, ".env")
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(envPath, []byte("X=1\n"), 0o600))
|
|
|
|
origCwd, err := os.Getwd()
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.Chdir(dir))
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
_ = os.Chdir(origCwd)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test",
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowRead: []string{envPath},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
args := translateForTest(t, policy)
|
|
|
|
assertNoTmpfsAt(t, args, envPath)
|
|
// /dev/null overlay would mask reads; allow_read --ro-bind already
|
|
// denies writes via EROFS, so the mandatory write deny is redundant.
|
|
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, envPath)
|
|
assertReadBind(t, args, envPath)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("user deny_write preserves read for paths also in allow_read", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
dir := t.TempDir()
|
|
envPath := filepath.Join(dir, ".env")
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(envPath, []byte("X=1\n"), 0o600))
|
|
|
|
origCwd, err := os.Getwd()
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.Chdir(dir))
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
_ = os.Chdir(origCwd)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test",
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowRead: []string{envPath},
|
|
AllowWrite: []string{dir},
|
|
DenyWrite: []string{envPath},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
args := translateForTest(t, policy)
|
|
|
|
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, envPath)
|
|
assertReadOnlyBindAfterWritableBind(t, args, envPath, dir)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("write-side opt-out skips both tmpfs and /dev/null for that path", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test",
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowWrite: []string{filepath.Join(cwd, ".env")},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
args := translateForTest(t, policy)
|
|
|
|
assertNoTmpfsAt(t, args, filepath.Join(cwd, ".env"))
|
|
assertNoDevNullMount(t, args, filepath.Join(cwd, ".env"))
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("no opt-out: tmpfs fires for the path", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// tmpfs only fires for paths that exist on the host; assert at the
|
|
// GetMandatoryDenyPatterns level instead of the translator output.
|
|
r := util.GetMandatoryDenyPatterns(util.MandatoryDenyOptions{})
|
|
assert.Contains(t, r.DenyRead, filepath.Join(cwd, ".env"))
|
|
assert.Contains(t, r.DenyWrite, filepath.Join(cwd, ".env"))
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func translateForTest(t *testing.T, policy *sandbox.SandboxPolicy) []string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
tr := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(newDefaultBubblewrapConfig())
|
|
args, err := tr.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
return args
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertNoTmpfsAt(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
for i := 0; i+1 < len(args); i++ {
|
|
if args[i] == "--tmpfs" && args[i+1] == path {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected no --tmpfs at %q, but found one", path)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertTmpfsAt(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
for i := 0; i+1 < len(args); i++ {
|
|
if args[i] == "--tmpfs" && args[i+1] == path {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected --tmpfs at %q, but none found", path)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertNoDevNullMount(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
|
|
if (args[i] == "--ro-bind" || args[i] == "--bind") && args[i+1] == "/dev/null" && args[i+2] == path {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected no /dev/null mount at %q, but found one", path)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertDevNullMount(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
|
|
if args[i] == "--ro-bind" && args[i+1] == "/dev/null" && args[i+2] == path {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected /dev/null mount at %q, but none found", path)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertReadBind(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
|
|
if (args[i] == "--ro-bind" || args[i] == "--ro-bind-try") && args[i+1] == path && args[i+2] == path {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected --ro-bind %q %q, not found in args: %v", path, path, args)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertWriteBind(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
|
|
if (args[i] == "--bind" || args[i] == "--bind-try") && args[i+1] == path && args[i+2] == path {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected --bind-try %q %q, not found in args: %v", path, path, args)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertNoWriteBind(t *testing.T, args []string, path string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
|
|
if (args[i] == "--bind" || args[i] == "--bind-try") && args[i+1] == path && args[i+2] == path {
|
|
t.Fatalf("unexpected writable bind at %q in args: %v", path, args)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func assertReadOnlyBindAfterWritableBind(t *testing.T, args []string, readOnlyPath string, writablePath string) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
|
|
writableBindIndex := -1
|
|
readOnlyBindIndex := -1
|
|
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
|
|
if (args[i] == "--bind" || args[i] == "--bind-try") && args[i+1] == writablePath && args[i+2] == writablePath {
|
|
writableBindIndex = i
|
|
}
|
|
if (args[i] == "--ro-bind" || args[i] == "--ro-bind-try") && args[i+1] == readOnlyPath && args[i+2] == readOnlyPath {
|
|
readOnlyBindIndex = i
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
require.NotEqual(t, -1, writableBindIndex, "expected writable bind for %q in args: %v", writablePath, args)
|
|
require.NotEqual(t, -1, readOnlyBindIndex, "expected read-only bind for %q in args: %v", readOnlyPath, args)
|
|
assert.Greater(t, readOnlyBindIndex, writableBindIndex, "deny_write read-only bind must override earlier writable parent bind")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestBubblewrapMandatoryWriteDenySurvivesWritableParent(t *testing.T) {
|
|
dir := t.TempDir()
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, ".git"), 0o755))
|
|
gitConfig := filepath.Join(dir, ".git", "config")
|
|
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(gitConfig, []byte("[core]\n"), 0o644))
|
|
t.Chdir(dir)
|
|
|
|
policy := &sandbox.SandboxPolicy{
|
|
Name: "test",
|
|
PackageManagers: []string{"pnpm"},
|
|
Filesystem: sandbox.FilesystemPolicy{
|
|
AllowRead: []string{gitConfig},
|
|
AllowWrite: []string{filepath.Join(dir, ".git") + "/**"},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
translator := newBubblewrapPolicyTranslator(newDefaultBubblewrapConfig())
|
|
args, err := translator.translate(policy)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
lastWritableGitBind := -1
|
|
lastROConfigBind := -1
|
|
for i := 0; i+2 < len(args); i++ {
|
|
if (args[i] == "--bind" || args[i] == "--bind-try") && strings.HasPrefix(args[i+1], filepath.Join(dir, ".git")) {
|
|
lastWritableGitBind = i
|
|
}
|
|
if (args[i] == "--ro-bind" || args[i] == "--ro-bind-try") && args[i+1] == gitConfig && args[i+2] == gitConfig {
|
|
lastROConfigBind = i
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, lastWritableGitBind, 0, "expected a writable bind for the .git tree")
|
|
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, lastROConfigBind, 0,
|
|
"mandatory write deny for .git/config must be re-applied even when the path is in allow_read")
|
|
assert.Greater(t, lastROConfigBind, lastWritableGitBind,
|
|
"read-only .git/config bind must come after the writable .git bind (bwrap last mount wins)")
|
|
}
|