Files
pmg/proxy/transparent.go
T
Sahilb315 82ddbc70af feat(proxy): accept transparent redirected connections
The proxy only accepted explicit clients, which announce their
destination with a CONNECT request. A client whose connection is
redirected at the kernel level speaks TLS immediately instead, so
http.Server tries to parse a TLS record as an HTTP request line and
drops the connection.

Demultiplex on the first byte of an accepted connection. A TLS
handshake record (0x16) cannot begin an HTTP method, so it separates
the two cleanly. Redirected connections have their destination
recovered from the ClientHello SNI and are served by synthesising the
CONNECT the client never sent, which keeps the MITM decision, cert
generation and interceptor chain on the existing code path.

Redirected connections deliberately bypass http.Server. It issues a
background read while a handler runs, which consumes the first byte of
the replayed ClientHello and corrupts the handshake. The CONNECT
response is also suppressed, since a client mid handshake expects a
ServerHello and would read those bytes as a malformed TLS record.

Off by default. Enabled with `pmg proxy start --transparent` or
proxy.server.transparent, and only useful alongside a redirect
mechanism such as an eBPF connect rewrite.
2026-07-27 12:31:24 +05:30

303 lines
8.5 KiB
Go

package proxy
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"time"
"github.com/safedep/dry/log"
)
// tlsHandshakeRecord is the first byte of a TLS handshake record. No HTTP
// method starts with it, so it cleanly separates a redirected client (which
// speaks TLS immediately) from an explicit proxy client (which sends CONNECT).
const tlsHandshakeRecord = 0x16
// transparentPort is the port used for the synthesised CONNECT. A connect
// rewrite overwrites the destination before the connection is made, so the
// original port is not recoverable here. Only 443 is redirected today.
const transparentPort = 443
// maxConnectResponseBytes bounds how much of the proxy's CONNECT response is
// buffered while looking for its terminator, so a malformed response cannot
// grow the buffer without limit.
const maxConnectResponseBytes = 8 << 10
// defaultSniffTimeout bounds how long a freshly accepted connection may take
// to reveal whether it is HTTP or TLS.
const defaultSniffTimeout = 30 * time.Second
var (
errSniffOnly = errors.New("proxy: client hello sniff completed")
errNoSNI = errors.New("proxy: client hello carries no server name")
)
// transparentListener accepts both explicit proxy clients and redirected
// clients on one listener. A redirected client believes it reached the real
// registry, so it never sends CONNECT. Its destination is recovered from the
// ClientHello's SNI and handed to the proxy handler as a CONNECT request,
// which keeps every downstream decision on the existing code path.
type transparentListener struct {
net.Listener
handler http.Handler
sniffTimeout time.Duration
}
func newTransparentListener(inner net.Listener, handler http.Handler) net.Listener {
return &transparentListener{
Listener: inner,
handler: handler,
sniffTimeout: defaultSniffTimeout,
}
}
// Accept returns explicit clients to the http.Server as usual. Redirected
// clients are served on their own goroutine and never returned, because
// http.Server issues a background read while a handler runs and would consume
// the first byte of the replayed ClientHello.
func (l *transparentListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
for {
conn, err := l.Listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
explicit, redirected, err := l.classify(conn)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("Transparent listener dropped connection from %s: %v", conn.RemoteAddr(), err)
closeConn(conn)
continue
}
if explicit != nil {
return explicit, nil
}
go l.serveRedirected(redirected)
}
}
// redirectedConn is an accepted connection whose destination was recovered
// from its ClientHello.
type redirectedConn struct {
conn *transparentConn
host string
}
func (l *transparentListener) classify(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, *redirectedConn, error) {
if err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(l.sniffTimeout)); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to set sniff deadline: %w", err)
}
buffered := bufio.NewReader(conn)
first, err := buffered.Peek(1)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to peek first byte: %w", err)
}
if first[0] != tlsHandshakeRecord {
if err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to clear sniff deadline: %w", err)
}
return &bufferedConn{Conn: conn, reader: buffered}, nil, nil
}
host, hello, err := sniffServerName(conn, buffered)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to clear sniff deadline: %w", err)
}
replay := &transparentConn{
Conn: conn,
body: io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(hello), buffered),
}
return nil, &redirectedConn{conn: replay, host: host}, nil
}
// serveRedirected drives the proxy handler for a redirected connection by
// synthesising the CONNECT request the client never sent.
func (l *transparentListener) serveRedirected(redirected *redirectedConn) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
log.Errorf("Panic serving redirected connection: %v", r)
closeConn(redirected.conn)
}
}()
hostPort := net.JoinHostPort(redirected.host, strconv.Itoa(transparentPort))
req := &http.Request{
Method: http.MethodConnect,
Host: hostPort,
URL: &url.URL{Host: hostPort},
Header: make(http.Header),
Proto: "HTTP/1.1",
ProtoMajor: 1,
ProtoMinor: 1,
RemoteAddr: redirected.conn.RemoteAddr().String(),
Body: http.NoBody,
}
writer := &hijackWriter{conn: redirected.conn, header: make(http.Header)}
log.Debugf("Serving redirected connection from %s as CONNECT %s",
redirected.conn.RemoteAddr(), hostPort)
l.handler.ServeHTTP(writer, req)
// The proxy hijacks on the paths that matter and owns the connection from
// then on. Anything that returns without hijacking has nothing more to say.
if !writer.hijacked {
closeConn(redirected.conn)
}
}
func closeConn(conn net.Conn) {
if err := conn.Close(); err != nil {
log.Debugf("Failed to close connection: %v", err)
}
}
// hijackWriter is the minimal http.ResponseWriter the proxy handler needs. The
// CONNECT path immediately hijacks and writes to the connection directly.
type hijackWriter struct {
conn net.Conn
header http.Header
hijacked bool
}
func (w *hijackWriter) Header() http.Header { return w.header }
func (w *hijackWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return w.conn.Write(p) }
func (w *hijackWriter) WriteHeader(int) {}
func (w *hijackWriter) Hijack() (net.Conn, *bufio.ReadWriter, error) {
w.hijacked = true
return w.conn, bufio.NewReadWriter(bufio.NewReader(w.conn), bufio.NewWriter(w.conn)), nil
}
// bufferedConn serves reads from a bufio.Reader so bytes consumed while
// sniffing are not lost. Explicit proxy clients take this path unchanged.
type bufferedConn struct {
net.Conn
reader *bufio.Reader
}
func (c *bufferedConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
return c.reader.Read(p)
}
// sniffConn feeds the TLS handshake from src while recording every byte it
// consumes, so the ClientHello can be replayed afterwards. Writes are refused
// to abort the handshake once the server name has been read.
type sniffConn struct {
net.Conn
src io.Reader
consumed bytes.Buffer
}
func (c *sniffConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
n, err := c.src.Read(p)
if n > 0 {
c.consumed.Write(p[:n])
}
return n, err
}
func (c *sniffConn) Write(_ []byte) (int, error) {
return 0, errSniffOnly
}
// sniffServerName reads just far enough into the TLS handshake to learn the
// requested server name. GetConfigForClient fires after the ClientHello is
// parsed, so returning an error there stops the handshake before anything is
// sent back to the client.
func sniffServerName(conn net.Conn, src io.Reader) (string, []byte, error) {
sniffer := &sniffConn{Conn: conn, src: src}
var serverName string
config := &tls.Config{
GetConfigForClient: func(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) {
serverName = hello.ServerName
return nil, errSniffOnly
},
}
// The handshake is expected to fail, that is how it is stopped. Only treat
// it as an error when no server name was recovered.
handshakeErr := tls.Server(sniffer, config).Handshake()
if serverName == "" {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", errNoSNI, handshakeErr)
}
return serverName, sniffer.consumed.Bytes(), nil
}
// transparentConn replays the ClientHello consumed during sniffing and hides
// the CONNECT response from a client that never sent a CONNECT.
type transparentConn struct {
net.Conn
body io.Reader
responseDropped bool
pending bytes.Buffer
}
func (c *transparentConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
return c.body.Read(p)
}
// Write drops the proxy's response to the synthetic CONNECT. The client is
// mid TLS handshake and expects a ServerHello, so those bytes would be read
// as a malformed TLS record and kill the connection. Everything after the
// response terminator is the real handshake and passes straight through.
func (c *transparentConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
if c.responseDropped {
return c.Conn.Write(p)
}
c.pending.Write(p)
terminator := bytes.Index(c.pending.Bytes(), []byte("\r\n\r\n"))
if terminator < 0 {
if c.pending.Len() > maxConnectResponseBytes {
return 0, errors.New("proxy: CONNECT response exceeded buffer before terminator")
}
return len(p), nil
}
c.responseDropped = true
remainder := bytes.Clone(c.pending.Bytes()[terminator+4:])
c.pending.Reset()
if len(remainder) > 0 {
if _, err := c.Conn.Write(remainder); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
}
return len(p), nil
}