Files
pmg/internal/ui/report.go
T
Sahil BansalandGitHub 94781d6bda Remove guard mode: proxy interception is now the only flow (#386)
* refactor: remove guard mode execution paths and guard-only packages

Guard (non-proxy) mode is removed; all package-manager commands now
always run the proxy flow. Removes the guard engine, the common flow,
the extractor package, the npm/pypi dependency resolvers and the
PackageResolver plumbing that only guard mode consumed.

The guard package retains only PackageManagerGuardInteraction, which
the proxy flow and confirmation interceptors reuse for user prompts.
Proxy behavior is unchanged.

* refactor: remove proxy opt-out surfaces, guard references in config, action and docs

Removes Config.ProxyMode, ProxyConfig.Enabled, IsProxyModeEnabled, the
proxy_mode legacy fallback, PMG_PROXY_ENABLED handling and the
--proxy-mode / --include-dev-dependencies flags. Proxy interception can
no longer be disabled.

Also removes the proxy-mode input from the GitHub Action, the
proxy-mode doctor check and setup info row, updates the E2E workflow to
stop passing --proxy-mode=false, and sweeps guard-mode wording from
docs and the config template.

The legacy proxy_install_only flat key and PMG_PROXY_INSTALL_ONLY env
var remain supported. audit.FlowTypeGuard is kept so previously
recorded audit events still translate for cloud sync.

* feat: fail loudly when a removed proxy opt-out is still configured

A leftover proxy.enabled: false / proxy_mode: false config key or
PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=false / PMG_PROXY_MODE=false env var previously meant
guard mode; silently ignoring it would switch those users to proxy
interception without notice. PMG now exits with an actionable error
naming the exact source. Precedence mirrors the old resolution order:
env (ignored under lockdown) > proxy.enabled > legacy proxy_mode.

The pmg config subtree is exempt so the config file can still be fixed
with pmg config edit/set. The GitHub Action's proxy-mode input is kept
as a tombstone that fails the action when set to false and warns
otherwise.

* refactor: extract flows.RunProxy and address review findings

Collapses the identical parse-then-run body duplicated across the 12
package manager commands into flows.RunProxy. Documents the cache-hit /
offline analysis trade-off versus the removed guard manifest path,
fixes a stale non-proxy label in the E2E workflow and a stale guard
reference in the uvx parser comment.

* fix(config): mirror old proxy opt-out precedence exactly

PMG_PROXY_MODE only ever took effect through the legacy fallback, which
was gated on the presence of a proxy: key in the config file (even a
null one). Promoting it to the top env tier caused two inversions: a
stale PMG_PROXY_MODE=false hard-failed configs that resolved to proxy
mode, and PMG_PROXY_MODE=true silently overrode an explicit
proxy.enabled: false file opt-out. The check now resolves in the old
order: PMG_PROXY_ENABLED > proxy: section (presence gates the legacy
tier) > PMG_PROXY_MODE > flat proxy_mode.

parseOptOutBool also accepts numeric values (0 = false) to match
viper's WeaklyTypedInput/cast.ToBool coercion, so proxy.enabled: 0 and
proxy_mode: 0 are detected as opt-outs.

* refactor: move package manager interaction out of guard

* refactor: trim package manager interaction

* fix(config): normalize config keys viper-style in proxy opt-out check

Viper resolved config file keys case-insensitively and expanded dotted
keys, so spellings like Proxy:, Enabled:, a literal proxy.enabled key or
Proxy_Mode selected guard mode before the removal. The opt-out check now
lowercases keys recursively and nests dotted keys before matching, so
those existing opt-outs fail loudly instead of being silently ignored.

* refactor: remove inert transitive controls, dead parser state and guard audit variant

transitive / transitive_depth lost their only consumers with the
dependency resolvers; remove the config fields, flags, template and doc
entries, and the report/audit plumbing that misreported transitive
analysis as enabled.

Remove write-only parser state (PackageInstallTarget.Extras,
ParsedCommand.ManifestFiles, ShouldExtractFromManifest); IsManifestInstall
stays as it feeds sandbox gating via IsInstallationCommand.

Remove audit.FlowTypeGuard and its cloud mapping; guard events recorded
by pre-removal versions in an unsynced WAL translate to UNSPECIFIED.

* fix: address review findings on the opt-out wiring and cleanups

Move the removed-opt-out rejection from the CLI PersistentPreRun into
proxyFlow.Run: the check now fires exactly for package-manager runs, so
non-install commands (pmg setup remove, doctor, config, version) stay
usable to fix or remove an opted-out installation, and future commands
inherit or avoid the check by construction instead of by exemption list.

Also: make the e2e malicious-package assertion actually fail the job
when an install is not blocked, route pmg go through flows.RunProxy,
and drop the dead extras return from pypiParsePackageInfo (extras are
still stripped from package names).

* fix(config): make the removed opt-out check faithful to the old resolution

The gate that silenced the legacy proxy_mode surfaces matched the raw
proxy key case-sensitively in the old code, while values resolved
viper-style (case-insensitive, dotted keys); applying each semantic
where the old code did fixes both divergences: a case-variant Proxy:
section no longer hides a flat proxy_mode: false opt-out, and a dotted
proxy.enabled: false overridden by proxy_mode: true no longer errors.

Replace the generic key-tree normalization with two targeted lookups
(the check only ever resolves proxy.enabled and proxy_mode), which also
makes colliding spellings resolve deterministically. Coerce legacy-tier
values cast.ToBool-style so PMG_PROXY_MODE=off style opt-outs are
detected, log the config read error instead of swallowing it, and
shorten the error to a one-line statement with the specific remedy in
the help text.

Add lockdown coverage (env inert both directions) and a repeated-run
determinism test.

* fix(config): fall back to defaults for unrecognized proxy opt-out values

The old loader swallowed viper errors and ran on defaults, so values
like proxy.enabled: yes or PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=banana silently discarded
the whole config and defaulted to proxy. Treat them the same way now:
unrecognized values mean the default (proxy on) instead of a hard
error, and the doc comment no longer claims the old loader failed
loudly. Only values that actually meant guard mode fail.

Also check the removed opt-out before the CA trust check in pmg go,
restoring the old error precedence: a config problem must not steer
the user into an unnecessary OS trust store change.

* fix(e2e): PMG_PROXY_MODE assertion must match the legacy gate semantics

The runner's setup step writes the template config, which has a proxy:
section — and with one present the legacy PMG_PROXY_MODE was always
inert, so expecting a loud failure there asserts pre-fidelity-fix
behavior. Assert both sides instead: inert (command succeeds) with the
standard config, loud failure against an empty config dir where the
legacy fallback actually applied.

* refactor(config): collapse parseOptOutBool to ParseBool over the string form

YAML hands us typed values (bool, int), so route them through
fmt.Sprintf %v and strconv.ParseBool instead of a per-type switch.
Identical behavior for every recognized value; numbers other than 0/1
now read as no opinion instead of cast.ToBool's nonzero-true, which no
real config relies on.
2026-07-22 15:19:19 +05:30

393 lines
11 KiB
Go

package ui
import (
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/analyzer"
"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/models"
)
// FlowType indicates which execution flow was used
type FlowType int
const (
FlowTypeProxy FlowType = iota
)
func (f FlowType) String() string {
switch f {
case FlowTypeProxy:
return "proxy"
default:
return "unknown"
}
}
// ExecutionOutcome represents the final result of the PMG execution
type ExecutionOutcome int
const (
OutcomeSuccess ExecutionOutcome = iota
OutcomeBlocked
OutcomeUserCancelled
OutcomeDryRun
OutcomeError
OutcomeInsecureBypass
)
func (o ExecutionOutcome) String() string {
switch o {
case OutcomeSuccess:
return "success"
case OutcomeBlocked:
return "blocked"
case OutcomeUserCancelled:
return "user_cancelled"
case OutcomeDryRun:
return "dry_run"
case OutcomeError:
return "error"
case OutcomeInsecureBypass:
return "insecure_bypass"
default:
return "unknown"
}
}
// ReportData captures execution statistics for the post-execution report.
// This is a pure data model with no rendering logic.
type ReportData struct {
// Execution metadata
PackageManagerName string
StartTime time.Time
Duration time.Duration
// Package statistics
TotalAnalyzed int
TrustedSkipped int
// Analysis breakdown
AllowedCount int
ConfirmedCount int
BlockedCount int
// Details for verbose mode
BlockedPackages []*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult
ConfirmedPackages []*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult
// Packages blocked by the dependency cooldown policy (proxy mode only)
CooldownBlockedPackages []models.CooldownBlock
// AdvisoryMessage is the optional org-configured message appended to block
// output regardless of which control blocked. Set from advisory_message.
AdvisoryMessage string
// Configuration context
FlowType FlowType
DryRun bool
InsecureMode bool
ParanoidMode bool
SandboxEnabled bool
SandboxProfile string
// Outcome
Outcome ExecutionOutcome
}
// NewReportData creates a new ReportData with sensible defaults
func NewReportData() *ReportData {
return &ReportData{
StartTime: time.Now(),
Outcome: OutcomeSuccess,
}
}
// Finalize sets the duration based on start time
func (r *ReportData) Finalize() {
r.Duration = time.Since(r.StartTime)
}
// HasIssues returns true if any packages were blocked or required confirmation
func (r *ReportData) HasIssues() bool {
return r.BlockedCount > 0 || r.ConfirmedCount > 0 || len(r.CooldownBlockedPackages) > 0
}
// WasSuccessful returns true if execution completed without blocks or errors
func (r *ReportData) WasSuccessful() bool {
return r.Outcome == OutcomeSuccess || r.Outcome == OutcomeDryRun
}
// Report renders the execution report based on verbosity level.
// This is the public API - flows call this with collected data.
func Report(data *ReportData) {
data.Finalize()
StopSpinner()
switch verbosityLevel {
case VerbosityLevelSilent:
reportSilent(data)
case VerbosityLevelNormal:
reportNormal(data)
case VerbosityLevelVerbose:
reportVerbose(data)
}
}
// MalwareBlockedHeadline is the headline printed when a malicious package is
// blocked. Exported so out-of-process consumers (e.g. `pmg setup doctor`) can
// detect a genuine block from captured output instead of inferring it from a
// non-zero exit code, which any failure would also produce.
const MalwareBlockedHeadline = "Malicious package blocked"
func printMalwareBlockSection(data *ReportData) {
if len(data.BlockedPackages) == 0 {
return
}
fmt.Println()
fmt.Printf("%s %s\n", Colors.Red("✗"), Colors.Red(MalwareBlockedHeadline))
printMaliciousPackagesList(data.BlockedPackages)
fmt.Println()
}
// reportSilent shows output only when the install was blocked: silent mode
// hides PMG except for errors and malicious package detection. Cooldown-only
// blocks stay hidden, matching the documented silent contract.
func reportSilent(data *ReportData) {
if data.Outcome != OutcomeBlocked || len(data.BlockedPackages) == 0 {
return
}
printMalwareBlockSection(data)
printAdvisoryMessage(data.AdvisoryMessage)
}
// reportNormal shows minimal, assuring output
func reportNormal(data *ReportData) {
if data.Outcome == OutcomeDryRun {
return // Dry run already shows its own message
}
if data.Outcome == OutcomeError {
return // Error handling done elsewhere
}
if data.Outcome == OutcomeInsecureBypass {
// Security-sensitive: Always show warning when protection is bypassed
icon := Colors.Red("⚠")
message := "INSECURE MODE - Malware protection bypassed"
if data.TotalAnalyzed > 0 {
fmt.Printf("%s %s (%d packages installed without analysis)\n",
icon, Colors.Red(message), data.TotalAnalyzed)
} else {
fmt.Printf("%s %s\n", icon, Colors.Red(message))
}
return
}
if data.TotalAnalyzed == 0 {
// No packages analyzed (e.g., npm install with no new packages)
return
}
var icon string
var message string
switch data.Outcome {
case OutcomeBlocked:
printMalwareBlockSection(data)
if len(data.CooldownBlockedPackages) > 0 {
fmt.Println()
n := len(data.CooldownBlockedPackages)
fmt.Printf("%s %s\n",
Colors.Yellow("⊘"),
Colors.Yellow(fmt.Sprintf("Dependency cooldown — %s blocked", pluralizePackages(n))))
printCooldownPackagesList(data.CooldownBlockedPackages)
fmt.Println()
}
if data.AdvisoryMessage != "" {
printAdvisoryMessage(data.AdvisoryMessage)
fmt.Println()
}
onlyCooldown := len(data.BlockedPackages) == 0 && len(data.CooldownBlockedPackages) > 0
if onlyCooldown {
icon = Colors.Yellow("⊘")
message = fmt.Sprintf("PMG: %s analyzed, %s blocked by cooldown",
pluralizePackages(data.TotalAnalyzed), pluralizePackages(data.BlockedCount))
} else {
icon = Colors.Red("✗")
message = fmt.Sprintf("PMG: %d packages analyzed, %d blocked",
data.TotalAnalyzed, data.BlockedCount)
}
case OutcomeUserCancelled:
icon = Colors.Yellow("✗")
message = fmt.Sprintf("PMG: %d packages analyzed, installation cancelled",
data.TotalAnalyzed)
default:
// Success case
if data.HasIssues() {
icon = Colors.Yellow("!")
message = fmt.Sprintf("PMG: %d packages analyzed (%d confirmed)",
data.TotalAnalyzed, data.ConfirmedCount)
} else {
icon = Colors.Green("✓")
message = fmt.Sprintf("PMG: %d packages analyzed", data.TotalAnalyzed)
}
}
fmt.Printf("%s %s\n", icon, Colors.Dim(message))
}
// reportVerbose shows detailed debugging information
func reportVerbose(data *ReportData) {
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println(Colors.Cyan("PMG Execution Report"))
fmt.Println(Colors.Normal("────────────────────────────────────────"))
// Outcome summary line
printOutcomeLine(data)
// Statistics section
fmt.Println()
if data.TrustedSkipped > 0 {
fmt.Printf(" %s %d analyzed (%d trusted skipped)\n",
Colors.Bold("Packages:"),
data.TotalAnalyzed,
data.TrustedSkipped)
} else {
fmt.Printf(" %s %d analyzed\n",
Colors.Bold("Packages:"),
data.TotalAnalyzed)
}
fmt.Printf(" %s %s (allowed: %d, confirmed: %d, blocked: %d)\n",
Colors.Bold("Analysis:"),
formatDuration(data.Duration),
data.AllowedCount,
data.ConfirmedCount,
data.BlockedCount)
// Configuration section
fmt.Println()
fmt.Printf(" %s %s | %s flow | paranoid: %s\n",
Colors.Bold("Config:"),
data.PackageManagerName,
data.FlowType.String(),
boolToOnOff(data.ParanoidMode))
if data.SandboxEnabled {
profile := data.SandboxProfile
if profile == "" {
profile = "default"
}
fmt.Printf(" %s enabled (%s)\n",
Colors.Bold("Sandbox:"),
profile)
}
// Show blocked/confirmed package details in verbose mode
if len(data.BlockedPackages) > 0 {
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println(Colors.Red(" Blocked packages:"))
for _, pkg := range data.BlockedPackages {
printPackageDetail(pkg)
}
}
if len(data.ConfirmedPackages) > 0 {
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println(Colors.Yellow(" User-confirmed packages:"))
for _, pkg := range data.ConfirmedPackages {
printPackageDetail(pkg)
}
}
if len(data.CooldownBlockedPackages) > 0 {
fmt.Println()
fmt.Println(Colors.Yellow(" Blocked by dependency cooldown:"))
for _, pkg := range data.CooldownBlockedPackages {
dateStr := ""
if !pkg.PublishDate.IsZero() {
dateStr = fmt.Sprintf(" (%s)", pkg.PublishDate.Format("2006-01-02"))
}
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n", Colors.Yellow("⊘"), Colors.Yellow(fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", pkg.Name, pkg.Version)))
fmt.Printf(" %s\n", Colors.Dim(fmt.Sprintf(
"Published %s ago%s — cooldown: %d days, available in %s",
pluralizeDays(pkg.DaysAgo), dateStr, pkg.CooldownDays, pluralizeDays(pkg.DaysLeft),
)))
fmt.Printf(" %s\n", Colors.Dim(fmt.Sprintf(
"Tip: wait %s for cooldown to expire",
pluralizeDays(pkg.DaysLeft),
)))
}
}
if data.Outcome == OutcomeBlocked && data.AdvisoryMessage != "" {
fmt.Println()
printAdvisoryMessage(data.AdvisoryMessage)
}
fmt.Println()
}
func printOutcomeLine(data *ReportData) {
switch data.Outcome {
case OutcomeSuccess:
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n", Colors.Green("✓"), Colors.Green("Installation completed successfully"))
case OutcomeBlocked:
hasMalware := len(data.BlockedPackages) > 0
hasCooldown := len(data.CooldownBlockedPackages) > 0
switch {
case hasMalware && hasCooldown:
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n", Colors.Red("✗"), Colors.Red("Installation blocked — malicious package detected + cooldown policy"))
case hasCooldown:
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n", Colors.Yellow("⊘"), Colors.Yellow("Installation blocked — dependency cooldown policy"))
default:
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n", Colors.Red("✗"), Colors.Red("Installation blocked — malicious package detected"))
}
case OutcomeUserCancelled:
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n", Colors.Yellow("✗"), Colors.Yellow("Installation cancelled by user"))
case OutcomeDryRun:
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n", Colors.Cyan("○"), Colors.Cyan("Dry run completed - no packages installed"))
case OutcomeError:
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n", Colors.Red("✗"), Colors.Red("Execution failed with error"))
case OutcomeInsecureBypass:
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n", Colors.Yellow("⚠"), Colors.Yellow("Installation completed (insecure mode - protection bypassed)"))
}
}
func printPackageDetail(pkg *analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult) {
if pkg == nil || pkg.PackageVersion == nil {
return
}
name := pkg.PackageVersion.GetPackage().GetName()
version := pkg.PackageVersion.GetVersion()
fmt.Printf(" - %s@%s\n", name, version)
if pkg.ReferenceURL != "" {
fmt.Printf(" %s\n", Colors.Dim(pkg.ReferenceURL))
}
}
func formatDuration(d time.Duration) string {
if d < time.Second {
return fmt.Sprintf("%dms", d.Milliseconds())
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%.1fs", d.Seconds())
}
func boolToOnOff(b bool) string {
if b {
return "on"
}
return "off"
}