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* refactor: remove guard mode execution paths and guard-only packages Guard (non-proxy) mode is removed; all package-manager commands now always run the proxy flow. Removes the guard engine, the common flow, the extractor package, the npm/pypi dependency resolvers and the PackageResolver plumbing that only guard mode consumed. The guard package retains only PackageManagerGuardInteraction, which the proxy flow and confirmation interceptors reuse for user prompts. Proxy behavior is unchanged. * refactor: remove proxy opt-out surfaces, guard references in config, action and docs Removes Config.ProxyMode, ProxyConfig.Enabled, IsProxyModeEnabled, the proxy_mode legacy fallback, PMG_PROXY_ENABLED handling and the --proxy-mode / --include-dev-dependencies flags. Proxy interception can no longer be disabled. Also removes the proxy-mode input from the GitHub Action, the proxy-mode doctor check and setup info row, updates the E2E workflow to stop passing --proxy-mode=false, and sweeps guard-mode wording from docs and the config template. The legacy proxy_install_only flat key and PMG_PROXY_INSTALL_ONLY env var remain supported. audit.FlowTypeGuard is kept so previously recorded audit events still translate for cloud sync. * feat: fail loudly when a removed proxy opt-out is still configured A leftover proxy.enabled: false / proxy_mode: false config key or PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=false / PMG_PROXY_MODE=false env var previously meant guard mode; silently ignoring it would switch those users to proxy interception without notice. PMG now exits with an actionable error naming the exact source. Precedence mirrors the old resolution order: env (ignored under lockdown) > proxy.enabled > legacy proxy_mode. The pmg config subtree is exempt so the config file can still be fixed with pmg config edit/set. The GitHub Action's proxy-mode input is kept as a tombstone that fails the action when set to false and warns otherwise. * refactor: extract flows.RunProxy and address review findings Collapses the identical parse-then-run body duplicated across the 12 package manager commands into flows.RunProxy. Documents the cache-hit / offline analysis trade-off versus the removed guard manifest path, fixes a stale non-proxy label in the E2E workflow and a stale guard reference in the uvx parser comment. * fix(config): mirror old proxy opt-out precedence exactly PMG_PROXY_MODE only ever took effect through the legacy fallback, which was gated on the presence of a proxy: key in the config file (even a null one). Promoting it to the top env tier caused two inversions: a stale PMG_PROXY_MODE=false hard-failed configs that resolved to proxy mode, and PMG_PROXY_MODE=true silently overrode an explicit proxy.enabled: false file opt-out. The check now resolves in the old order: PMG_PROXY_ENABLED > proxy: section (presence gates the legacy tier) > PMG_PROXY_MODE > flat proxy_mode. parseOptOutBool also accepts numeric values (0 = false) to match viper's WeaklyTypedInput/cast.ToBool coercion, so proxy.enabled: 0 and proxy_mode: 0 are detected as opt-outs. * refactor: move package manager interaction out of guard * refactor: trim package manager interaction * fix(config): normalize config keys viper-style in proxy opt-out check Viper resolved config file keys case-insensitively and expanded dotted keys, so spellings like Proxy:, Enabled:, a literal proxy.enabled key or Proxy_Mode selected guard mode before the removal. The opt-out check now lowercases keys recursively and nests dotted keys before matching, so those existing opt-outs fail loudly instead of being silently ignored. * refactor: remove inert transitive controls, dead parser state and guard audit variant transitive / transitive_depth lost their only consumers with the dependency resolvers; remove the config fields, flags, template and doc entries, and the report/audit plumbing that misreported transitive analysis as enabled. Remove write-only parser state (PackageInstallTarget.Extras, ParsedCommand.ManifestFiles, ShouldExtractFromManifest); IsManifestInstall stays as it feeds sandbox gating via IsInstallationCommand. Remove audit.FlowTypeGuard and its cloud mapping; guard events recorded by pre-removal versions in an unsynced WAL translate to UNSPECIFIED. * fix: address review findings on the opt-out wiring and cleanups Move the removed-opt-out rejection from the CLI PersistentPreRun into proxyFlow.Run: the check now fires exactly for package-manager runs, so non-install commands (pmg setup remove, doctor, config, version) stay usable to fix or remove an opted-out installation, and future commands inherit or avoid the check by construction instead of by exemption list. Also: make the e2e malicious-package assertion actually fail the job when an install is not blocked, route pmg go through flows.RunProxy, and drop the dead extras return from pypiParsePackageInfo (extras are still stripped from package names). * fix(config): make the removed opt-out check faithful to the old resolution The gate that silenced the legacy proxy_mode surfaces matched the raw proxy key case-sensitively in the old code, while values resolved viper-style (case-insensitive, dotted keys); applying each semantic where the old code did fixes both divergences: a case-variant Proxy: section no longer hides a flat proxy_mode: false opt-out, and a dotted proxy.enabled: false overridden by proxy_mode: true no longer errors. Replace the generic key-tree normalization with two targeted lookups (the check only ever resolves proxy.enabled and proxy_mode), which also makes colliding spellings resolve deterministically. Coerce legacy-tier values cast.ToBool-style so PMG_PROXY_MODE=off style opt-outs are detected, log the config read error instead of swallowing it, and shorten the error to a one-line statement with the specific remedy in the help text. Add lockdown coverage (env inert both directions) and a repeated-run determinism test. * fix(config): fall back to defaults for unrecognized proxy opt-out values The old loader swallowed viper errors and ran on defaults, so values like proxy.enabled: yes or PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=banana silently discarded the whole config and defaulted to proxy. Treat them the same way now: unrecognized values mean the default (proxy on) instead of a hard error, and the doc comment no longer claims the old loader failed loudly. Only values that actually meant guard mode fail. Also check the removed opt-out before the CA trust check in pmg go, restoring the old error precedence: a config problem must not steer the user into an unnecessary OS trust store change. * fix(e2e): PMG_PROXY_MODE assertion must match the legacy gate semantics The runner's setup step writes the template config, which has a proxy: section — and with one present the legacy PMG_PROXY_MODE was always inert, so expecting a loud failure there asserts pre-fidelity-fix behavior. Assert both sides instead: inert (command succeeds) with the standard config, loud failure against an empty config dir where the legacy fallback actually applied. * refactor(config): collapse parseOptOutBool to ParseBool over the string form YAML hands us typed values (bool, int), so route them through fmt.Sprintf %v and strconv.ParseBool instead of a per-type switch. Identical behavior for every recognized value; numbers other than 0/1 now read as no opinion instead of cast.ToBool's nonzero-true, which no real config relies on.
96 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
96 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
package interceptors
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import (
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packagev1 "buf.build/gen/go/safedep/api/protocolbuffers/go/safedep/messages/package/v1"
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"github.com/safedep/dry/log"
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"github.com/safedep/pmg/analyzer"
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"github.com/safedep/pmg/packagemanager"
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)
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// ConfirmationRequest represents a request for user confirmation on a suspicious package
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type ConfirmationRequest struct {
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PackageVersion *packagev1.PackageVersion
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AnalysisResult *analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult
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// ResponseChan is used to send the user's response back.
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ResponseChan chan bool
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}
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// ConfirmationHook is a set of hooks that can be used to customize the confirmation process.
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type ConfirmationHook struct {
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// BeforeInteraction is called before the user interaction is started.
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BeforeInteraction func([]*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult) error
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// AfterInteraction is called after the user interaction is finished.
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AfterInteraction func([]*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult, bool) error
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}
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// HandleConfirmationRequests processes confirmation requests sequentially
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// This function should be run in a goroutine and will process requests
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// from the confirmation channel one at a time, blocking on user input.
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//
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// The function will exit when the confirmation channel is closed.
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func HandleConfirmationRequests(confirmationChan chan *ConfirmationRequest,
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interaction *packagemanager.PackageManagerInteraction, hooks *ConfirmationHook) {
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if hooks == nil {
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hooks = &ConfirmationHook{}
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}
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for req := range confirmationChan {
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func() {
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// The default response is false ie. user did not confirm the installation.
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// The code here falls through and eventually sets this flag to true if user
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// confirms the installation.
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responseVal := false
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// We must make sure to close the response channel to prevent goroutine leaks.
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// Idiomatic go suggests that the writer should close the channel.
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defer func() {
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req.ResponseChan <- responseVal
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close(req.ResponseChan)
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}()
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packageName := req.PackageVersion.GetPackage().GetName()
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log.Debugf("Processing confirmation request for package %s", packageName)
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// Hook to allow the caller to customize the confirmation process.
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// Hook failures are non-fatal and will not break the confirmation process.
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if hooks.BeforeInteraction != nil {
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if err := hooks.BeforeInteraction([]*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult{req.AnalysisResult}); err != nil {
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log.Errorf("Error before interaction for package %s: %v", packageName, err)
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}
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}
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// Call the user interaction handler to get confirmation
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// This blocks waiting for stdin input
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confirmed, confirmationErr := interaction.GetConfirmationOnMalware([]*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult{req.AnalysisResult})
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// Must guarantee to call the after interaction hook regardless of the confirmation error.
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if hooks.AfterInteraction != nil {
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if err := hooks.AfterInteraction([]*analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult{req.AnalysisResult}, confirmed); err != nil {
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log.Errorf("Error after interaction for package %s: %v", packageName, err)
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}
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}
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if confirmationErr != nil {
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log.Errorf("Error getting confirmation for package %s: %v", packageName, confirmationErr)
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return
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}
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// Set the response value to the user's confirmation
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responseVal = confirmed
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}()
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}
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log.Debugf("Confirmation handler exiting (channel closed)")
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}
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// NewConfirmationRequest creates a new confirmation request with a response channel
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func NewConfirmationRequest(pkgVersion *packagev1.PackageVersion, result *analyzer.PackageVersionAnalysisResult) *ConfirmationRequest {
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return &ConfirmationRequest{
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PackageVersion: pkgVersion,
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AnalysisResult: result,
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ResponseChan: make(chan bool, 1),
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}
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}
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