* feat: add Linux system-wide setup
Install shared shims, managed configuration, and login-shell PATH integration so golden images and multi-user hosts can protect package installs for every user.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* chore: keep local design documents untracked
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: harden and simplify Linux system install
Tighten shim detection, profile repair, and install ordering while
trimming over-specific doctor/info hints from the system-install path.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: clarify system-install doctor alias and shim path checks
Use UserBinDir for PATH checks and pass aliases as not required under
system install without treating that as active interception.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: tighten event-log soft-fail warning prefix
Prefix the warning with [pmg] and drop the redundant continuing clause.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* ci: add Linux system-install e2e and pin pnpm for add flake
Cover root system setup, PATH/profile.d, managed config, non-root
interception, and remove. Pin pnpm 11.10.0 on the package-manager e2e
job after an integrity crash on pnpm add.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* chore: bump packageManager to pnpm 11.10.0 for e2e
Align package.json with the pnpm version we want in CI so action-setup
stops erroring on a version mismatch after the e2e integrity flake.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* ci: use npm init for pnpm e2e to avoid integrity crash
pnpm 11.x `pnpm init` still writes onFail:download; `pnpm add` then
fails after PMG analysis even on 11.10.0. Seed the temp package with
npm init instead.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* chore: revert packageManager pin to pnpm 11.1.3
The e2e integrity crash is avoided by npm init; the 11.10.0 bump is
no longer needed.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: harden system-install review findings
Require root-owned, non-group/other-writable pmg for --system install;
allow remove without that validation. Doctor checks npm resolution for
PATH precedence, uses ImpliesInterception instead of message matching,
and documents version-manager shadowing. Pass profile bin dir from the
shim manager and note that system config ignores per-user files.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: harden doctor PATH checks and attribute cloud events by OS user
Doctor now verifies every installed package manager against the shim
directory, and system-install validation only requires a safe parent
directory. Cloud sync records username/uid on invocation context for
multi-user hosts sharing one endpoint.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: address system-install review findings
- shim: make system executable resolution injectable so tests pass under
umask 002; skip the root-owner test when running as root
- doctor: treat resolution into either the system or per-user shim dir as
intercepted, and collapse the shim-in-PATH check to a single call site
- setup: make remove (both --system and per-user) best-effort with
errors.Join so one failed step no longer strands the other artifact
- shim: allow a group-writable install parent dir (Debian/Ubuntu ship
/usr/local/bin as root:staff 2775) while still rejecting world-writable
and non-root-owned parents
- audit: attribute cloud events to SUDO_USER when running under sudo
- docs: drop the soft-fail event-logging claim (hard-fail is retained)
* ci: normalize /usr/local/bin perms before system-install e2e
The GitHub ubuntu-latest runner ships /usr/local/bin world-writable so
tooling can install without sudo. System install correctly refuses a
world-writable dir for the shared binary (any local user could replace
it and hijack every user's npm/pip). No FHS-compliant distro or Docker
image ships it world-writable — it is always root:root 0755 or
root:staff 2775 — so this normalizes only the anomalous CI runner back
to standard perms and still exercises the real /usr/local/bin path.
* fix: actionable remedy for root-created per-user config dir
A pmg run as root with a preserved HOME (GitHub runners, sudo -E, su
without -) creates the invoking user's ~/.config/safedep as root-owned,
and event-log init then fail-closes every later non-root command.
Make that state self-solvable:
- event-log init permission errors exit with a usefulerror naming the
likely cause and the chown fix instead of a bare fatal
- pmg setup doctor probes event-log dir writability and reports the
same fix via a new per-result Fix override
- document the mechanism and remedy in system-install.md, along with
the binary ownership requirements for --system
- consolidate this branch's doctor tests into doctor_test.go
* fix: resolve per-user paths from root's own home when running as root
Path resolution trusted HOME (and XDG_*), which sudo and su can preserve
from the invoking user (GitHub runners, sudo -E, su without -). Any pmg
run as root then created root-owned ~/.config/safedep inside that user's
home, and event-log init fail-closed every later non-root pmg/npm/pip
run for them. System install made sudo pmg the documented flow, turning
this latent bug into the happy path.
When euid is 0, configDir and cacheDir now resolve from root's passwd
home instead of the environment, so root state lands under /root and
user homes are never touched. PMG_CONFIG_DIR/PMG_CACHE_DIR still win,
non-root resolution is unchanged, and Windows is unaffected (no euid).
Event-log init stays fatal on failure; sudo-run package events are
attributed via SUDO_USER and synced by the exit auto-sync as usual.
E2E: GitHub runners preserve HOME under sudo, so assert that no sudo
pmg run leaks state into the runner's home, and that the managed-config
refusal fails for the documented reason rather than a permission brick.
* fix: triage the unwritable config dir remedy by cause
The chown hint is only correct when another account created files
inside the current user's own home. When a leaked HOME or
XDG_CONFIG_HOME points at another user's home (e.g. sudo -u on GitHub
runners), following it would chown that user's directory and brick
their pmg instead. Classify the failure against the passwd home,
which the leaked environment cannot influence, and prescribe:
- dir inside own home: restore ownership with chown
- dir outside own home: fix the leaked environment, never chown
- explicit PMG_CONFIG_DIR: make it writable
Used by both the fatal event-log error and the doctor check, and the
docs troubleshooting now carries the same two-case triage.
* ci: pin XDG_CONFIG_HOME for the cross-user e2e step; terse doctor fix
GitHub runners export XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/home/runner/.config and it leaks
through sudo -u, so the pmgtest pmg resolved the runner user's config
dir and fail-closed on its runner-owned log file (run 29289868727 shows
the triaged error catching exactly this). Set it inside the login shell
so it wins regardless of how the leak is delivered.
The remedy now returns a full-help and doctor-table pair from a single
triage, and drops the do-not-chown tail from the leak message.
* fix: adapt event-log error to the two-value remedy signature
Belongs with the previous commit; it was left unstaged and e0580b1
does not compile without it.
* fix: fall back to env path resolution when root has no passwd entry
Running as uid 0 without a resolvable root passwd entry (scratch
containers, minimal chroots) panicked at startup on every command,
because the euid-based path resolution had no fallback. Fall back to
env-derived resolution there: without a passwd database there is no
user switching, so the cross-user poisoning that branch prevents
cannot occur.
Also restore the underlying cause in the generic event-log init error
(minimal output hid it after the usefulerror change), and document
that root's per-user data lives under /root regardless of a preserved
HOME.
* fix: gate SUDO_USER trust and root path diversion; add doctor binary check
Address review findings on the system-install PR:
- cloud_sink: honor SUDO_USER for audit attribution only when euid==0.
Without the gate any user could set SUDO_USER and spoof cloud-audit
attribution to another account. Matches the guard in cmd/setup/cert.go.
- config: divert per-user paths to root's passwd home only on an actual
sudo elevation (euid==0 && SUDO_USER set), not for every root euid.
The blanket root diversion ignored HOME/XDG_CONFIG_HOME and silently
stopped reading genuine root users' config (golden Docker images),
regressing two tests that only fail when the suite runs as root.
Genuine root honors the environment as before; su without - leaves no
marker and stays a documented, loud-failing residual.
- doctor: add a system-only check re-validating that the binary the
installed shims exec is still root-owned and non-writable, catching
permission/ownership drift after install.
- shim: fold the duplicated shim-scan loop into firstShimContent.
* fix: harden system dirs at install; keep sudo attribution without passwd
Address remaining review comments:
- shim: force root:root 0755 on the managed system dirs (shim tree and
profile.d) after MkdirAll. A pre-created dir with weaker ownership,
possible under Debian's group-writable /usr/local/lib, would let a
non-root user replace the shims every account executes.
- audit: when SUDO_USER has no passwd entry (minimal containers),
attribute cloud events from sudo's recorded SUDO_USER/SUDO_UID env
instead of falling back to root. Still gated on euid 0.
- setup: reword the root-without---system warning; alias/shim install
follows HOME, so claiming it configures only root's home was wrong.
- shim: skip the non-root-owner validation test on Windows, where file
ownership is not resolvable.
* fix: reject system binaries unreachable by other users; consistent info
The system-install validation checked the binary's own permissions and
the parent's tamper-safety but never reachability: a 0755 root-owned
binary under a 0700 directory (e.g. /root/pmg) passed every check while
every non-root user's shim failed with exit 127. Walk the directory
chain to / and require the search bit for others; doctor's system
binary check inherits this. E2E gains a reject case for a binary under
a non-searchable directory.
setup info: render alias/user-shim/system-shim rows through one
installed-state formatter (location when installed, "not installed"
otherwise) instead of a mix of booleans, paths, and prose.
* fix: stop reowning /etc/profile.d; document group-writable and su gaps
writeSystemProfile chowned/chmod'd /etc/profile.d itself, a shared
system directory pmg does not own, silently overriding any perms a
sysadmin set on it. Secure only the file pmg writes (pmg.sh) via
secureSystemFile, which also forces 0644 explicitly so a restrictive
root umask cannot leave the snippet non-world-readable (which would
drop the shim dir from other users' login-shell PATH).
Docs: add Limitations entries for the group-writable install dir
bypass (validation is defeatable on non-sticky group-writable dirs
like Debian's /usr/local/bin) and the elevation-only scope (su without
- can still poison the caller's home; sudo -u cannot poison another
account). Trim the requireSafeParentDir comment to a pointer.
* refactor: separate unwritable-dir diagnosis from remedy rendering
Address the open review threads on #376:
- rename realUserHomeDir to currentUserHomeDir and fail when the passwd
entry has no home directory
- split UnwritableConfigDirRemedy into classifyUnwritableDir (cause
diagnosis) and pure message rendering so each function has one job
- replace cmd/setup's duplicate pathIsUnderDir with the shared
config.PathWithinDir, now guarding empty inputs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011rWmR6NS47FpedJsrTWk8A
* fix: repair umask-clamped modes on system shims and managed config
os.WriteFile and os.MkdirAll honor the process umask, so a hardened root
umask (e.g. 077) produced 0700 shims other users cannot execute and a
0600/0700 managed config non-root pmg runs cannot read - silently
disabling the system-wide policy. Chmod/chown the artifacts explicitly
after writing, with unix regression tests running under umask 077.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011rWmR6NS47FpedJsrTWk8A
* refactor: address system-install maintainability review
- move PathWithinDir and the root-owned mkdir/chmod helpers into a new
internal/fsutil package; config no longer exports a generic fs util
- create managed-config directories with MkdirAllRootOwned, which only
sets ownership and mode on directories it creates - drops the
hardcoded safedep parent-dir heuristic and never touches pre-existing
directories
- collapse NewSystemShimManagerForRemove into NewSystemShimManager and
validate the executable in Install, where the action needs it; Remove
works regardless of binary state
- rename ShimConfig.ManageProfile to SystemProfile and document it
- name the Linux-only system paths linuxSystemBinDir/ProfilePath and
document the Unix-only validation semantics
- share the PMG_BIN shim variable name between writeShimScript and
parseShimPMGBin via the shimPMGBinVar constant
- cloud attribution falls back to the effective uid when SUDO_UID is
absent, so sudo-invoked commands are not misattributed to root
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011rWmR6NS47FpedJsrTWk8A
---------
Co-authored-by: Sahilb315 <bansalsahil315@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
8.2 KiB
System Install (Linux)
Use system install when one machine or image should protect every user account: shared VMs, golden Docker images, and similar setups.
sudo pmg setup install --system
Requires Linux and root. Install PMG as root into a standard system path such as /usr/local/bin. A user-local build (e.g. ~/go/bin/pmg) is rejected.
--system enforces this because every user's shims run the PMG binary by absolute path. Before installing, it checks that the binary is root-owned, world-executable, not group- or other-writable, located in a root-owned directory that isn't world-writable, and reachable through world-searchable directories (a binary under /root, mode 0700, is rejected because other users could never execute it).
Per-user pmg setup install remains available and does not conflict with a system install.
To uninstall:
sudo pmg setup remove --system
sudo pmg setup remove --system --config-file # also remove the system config file
Files created
| Item | Path |
|---|---|
| Configuration | /etc/safedep/pmg/config.yml |
| Package-manager shims | /usr/local/lib/pmg/bin |
| Shell PATH snippet | /etc/profile.d/pmg.sh |
Making shims visible on PATH
System install writes shims to /usr/local/lib/pmg/bin. Processes only use them when that directory is on PATH ahead of the real npm, pip, and other package managers.
Linux VMs and login shells
pmg setup install --system installs /etc/profile.d/pmg.sh, which prepends the shim directory for login shells.
sudo pmg setup install --system
New login sessions pick this up automatically. For an already open shell, start a new login session or run:
source /etc/profile.d/pmg.sh
Confirm with:
which npm # should resolve under /usr/local/lib/pmg/bin
pmg setup doctor
Docker and container images
Docker RUN does not load /etc/profile.d. After system install you must set ENV PATH so build steps and the runtime container see the shims:
FROM node:22-bookworm
RUN curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/safedep/pmg/main/install.sh | sh \
&& pmg setup install --system
# Required: profile.d is not sourced during docker build
ENV PATH="/usr/local/lib/pmg/bin:$PATH"
# Optional: switch user; PATH from ENV still applies
RUN mkdir -p /app && chown node:node /app
WORKDIR /app
USER node
COPY --chown=node:node package*.json ./
RUN npm ci
Derived images inherit that ENV. Later RUN npm install / RUN pip install go through PMG for any USER.
If a child Dockerfile sets ENV PATH=... again, keep /usr/local/lib/pmg/bin ahead of the real npm/pip directories. Leaving it out (or behind those toolchains) drops interception.
PMG running on the Docker host cannot inspect package installations inside docker build. PMG must be installed in the image as shown above.
Configuration
The system config file is authoritative for every user. A per-user config.yml is ignored while /etc/safedep/pmg/config.yml exists.
pmg config set and pmg config edit fail under a system config. Update the file as root, or redeploy it through your image or configuration management.
Optional lockdown (global_lockdown: true) is documented in config.md.
Limitations
- Virtualenv. After
source .venv/bin/activate, barepipuses the venv binary and skips PMG shims. Callpmg pip …explicitly. - Version managers. Tools like nvm, pyenv, volta, and asdf often prepend their own bin directories from shell rc files that run after
/etc/profile.d. That can put realnpm/pipahead of PMG shims even when the shim directory is onPATH. Prefer putting/usr/local/lib/pmg/binfirst in a durableENV PATH/ login PATH, or callpmg npm/pmg pipexplicitly.pmg setup doctorwarns for any supported package manager that resolves outside the shim directory. - No shell aliases. System install only installs PATH shims. There is no
~/.pmg.rcalias layer. - Config changes.
pmg config setandpmg config editare unavailable while the system config is active. Edit/etc/safedep/pmg/config.ymlas root, or redeploy the file. - Custom sandbox
policy_templates. Relative paths in the system config resolve under each user's config directory, not/etc/safedep/pmg. Prefer absolute paths. pmg sandbox allow. Blocked when the system config setsglobal_lockdown: true.- Group-writable install directory. The binary must be root-owned and non-writable, but if its directory is group-writable without the sticky bit (Debian/Ubuntu ship
/usr/local/binasroot:staffmode2775), a group member can delete the root-owned binary and replace it, bypassing the check.staffis empty by default, so default exposure is nil; on a multi-user host where the group is not trusted, runsudo chmod g-w /usr/local/binor install into aroot:rootdirectory. - Elevation only, not impersonation. Root's per-user data is diverted to
/rootonly forsudoto root (detected viaSUDO_USER).suwithout-becomes root with no marker, so it can still create root-owned files in the caller's home; the caller sees a clear error and chown fix on their nextpmgrun.sudo -u <user>runs with only that user's rights, so it cannot poison another account at all, it just fails. Prefersudoorsu -, or setPMG_CONFIG_DIR.
User data directories
Shared policy lives under /etc/safedep/pmg. Runtime data stays per user:
| Data | Default location |
|---|---|
| Event logs | ~/.config/safedep/pmg/logs/ |
| Cloud sync state | ~/.config/safedep/pmg/cloud-sync.db |
| Cache | ~/.cache/safedep/pmg/ |
| Sandbox overlays | ~/.config/safedep/pmg/sandbox/overlays/ |
| Persistent CA keypair | ~/.config/safedep/pmg/ca-cert.pem, ca-key.pem |
You can relocate these with PMG_CONFIG_DIR and PMG_CACHE_DIR.
When pmg runs under sudo (a non-root user elevated to root), its per-user data resolves under root's own home (/root), not the invoking user's, even if sudo preserved their HOME. Running directly as root honors HOME/XDG_CONFIG_HOME as usual, so golden images that set those on purpose keep working. This detection relies on sudo's SUDO_USER marker: su without - leaks the caller's environment but leaves no marker, so a root shell obtained that way can still write into the caller's home. Prefer su - or sudo.
The invoking user must be able to write their config directory. PMG records an event log there on each run and fails the command if it cannot (unless event logging is disabled in config).
In Docker images, avoid creating /home/<user>/.config/safedep as root during the build. Either fix ownership for the runtime user, or set PMG_CONFIG_DIR to a writable location.
If every pmg command fails with permission denied on the event log, check where the reported path points:
- Inside your own home: a root run created it as root (
suwithout-, images that setENV HOMEbefore dropping root, or an older pmg undersudo). Restore ownership:sudo chown -R $(id -un) ~/.config/safedep - Inside another user's home: your environment leaked that user's
HOMEorXDG_CONFIG_HOME(e.g.sudo -u <user>on GitHub-hosted runners). Fix the environment (export XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$HOME/.config"). Do not chown another user's directory; that bricks their pmg instead.
The error message and pmg setup doctor print the fix matching your case.
For cloud sync, enable cloud in the system config and provide credentials (SAFEDEP_API_KEY and SAFEDEP_TENANT_ID, or a keychain login on developer machines).
Certificates
System install does not set up a MITM certificate authority. For npm and pip on Linux, PMG's default ephemeral CA and environment-variable injection are enough.
To install a persistent CA into the OS trust store, use a separate command:
pmg setup cert install --system
Run that as your normal user. Details are in cert.md.