* refactor: remove guard mode execution paths and guard-only packages
Guard (non-proxy) mode is removed; all package-manager commands now
always run the proxy flow. Removes the guard engine, the common flow,
the extractor package, the npm/pypi dependency resolvers and the
PackageResolver plumbing that only guard mode consumed.
The guard package retains only PackageManagerGuardInteraction, which
the proxy flow and confirmation interceptors reuse for user prompts.
Proxy behavior is unchanged.
* refactor: remove proxy opt-out surfaces, guard references in config, action and docs
Removes Config.ProxyMode, ProxyConfig.Enabled, IsProxyModeEnabled, the
proxy_mode legacy fallback, PMG_PROXY_ENABLED handling and the
--proxy-mode / --include-dev-dependencies flags. Proxy interception can
no longer be disabled.
Also removes the proxy-mode input from the GitHub Action, the
proxy-mode doctor check and setup info row, updates the E2E workflow to
stop passing --proxy-mode=false, and sweeps guard-mode wording from
docs and the config template.
The legacy proxy_install_only flat key and PMG_PROXY_INSTALL_ONLY env
var remain supported. audit.FlowTypeGuard is kept so previously
recorded audit events still translate for cloud sync.
* feat: fail loudly when a removed proxy opt-out is still configured
A leftover proxy.enabled: false / proxy_mode: false config key or
PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=false / PMG_PROXY_MODE=false env var previously meant
guard mode; silently ignoring it would switch those users to proxy
interception without notice. PMG now exits with an actionable error
naming the exact source. Precedence mirrors the old resolution order:
env (ignored under lockdown) > proxy.enabled > legacy proxy_mode.
The pmg config subtree is exempt so the config file can still be fixed
with pmg config edit/set. The GitHub Action's proxy-mode input is kept
as a tombstone that fails the action when set to false and warns
otherwise.
* refactor: extract flows.RunProxy and address review findings
Collapses the identical parse-then-run body duplicated across the 12
package manager commands into flows.RunProxy. Documents the cache-hit /
offline analysis trade-off versus the removed guard manifest path,
fixes a stale non-proxy label in the E2E workflow and a stale guard
reference in the uvx parser comment.
* fix(config): mirror old proxy opt-out precedence exactly
PMG_PROXY_MODE only ever took effect through the legacy fallback, which
was gated on the presence of a proxy: key in the config file (even a
null one). Promoting it to the top env tier caused two inversions: a
stale PMG_PROXY_MODE=false hard-failed configs that resolved to proxy
mode, and PMG_PROXY_MODE=true silently overrode an explicit
proxy.enabled: false file opt-out. The check now resolves in the old
order: PMG_PROXY_ENABLED > proxy: section (presence gates the legacy
tier) > PMG_PROXY_MODE > flat proxy_mode.
parseOptOutBool also accepts numeric values (0 = false) to match
viper's WeaklyTypedInput/cast.ToBool coercion, so proxy.enabled: 0 and
proxy_mode: 0 are detected as opt-outs.
* refactor: move package manager interaction out of guard
* refactor: trim package manager interaction
* fix(config): normalize config keys viper-style in proxy opt-out check
Viper resolved config file keys case-insensitively and expanded dotted
keys, so spellings like Proxy:, Enabled:, a literal proxy.enabled key or
Proxy_Mode selected guard mode before the removal. The opt-out check now
lowercases keys recursively and nests dotted keys before matching, so
those existing opt-outs fail loudly instead of being silently ignored.
* refactor: remove inert transitive controls, dead parser state and guard audit variant
transitive / transitive_depth lost their only consumers with the
dependency resolvers; remove the config fields, flags, template and doc
entries, and the report/audit plumbing that misreported transitive
analysis as enabled.
Remove write-only parser state (PackageInstallTarget.Extras,
ParsedCommand.ManifestFiles, ShouldExtractFromManifest); IsManifestInstall
stays as it feeds sandbox gating via IsInstallationCommand.
Remove audit.FlowTypeGuard and its cloud mapping; guard events recorded
by pre-removal versions in an unsynced WAL translate to UNSPECIFIED.
* fix: address review findings on the opt-out wiring and cleanups
Move the removed-opt-out rejection from the CLI PersistentPreRun into
proxyFlow.Run: the check now fires exactly for package-manager runs, so
non-install commands (pmg setup remove, doctor, config, version) stay
usable to fix or remove an opted-out installation, and future commands
inherit or avoid the check by construction instead of by exemption list.
Also: make the e2e malicious-package assertion actually fail the job
when an install is not blocked, route pmg go through flows.RunProxy,
and drop the dead extras return from pypiParsePackageInfo (extras are
still stripped from package names).
* fix(config): make the removed opt-out check faithful to the old resolution
The gate that silenced the legacy proxy_mode surfaces matched the raw
proxy key case-sensitively in the old code, while values resolved
viper-style (case-insensitive, dotted keys); applying each semantic
where the old code did fixes both divergences: a case-variant Proxy:
section no longer hides a flat proxy_mode: false opt-out, and a dotted
proxy.enabled: false overridden by proxy_mode: true no longer errors.
Replace the generic key-tree normalization with two targeted lookups
(the check only ever resolves proxy.enabled and proxy_mode), which also
makes colliding spellings resolve deterministically. Coerce legacy-tier
values cast.ToBool-style so PMG_PROXY_MODE=off style opt-outs are
detected, log the config read error instead of swallowing it, and
shorten the error to a one-line statement with the specific remedy in
the help text.
Add lockdown coverage (env inert both directions) and a repeated-run
determinism test.
* fix(config): fall back to defaults for unrecognized proxy opt-out values
The old loader swallowed viper errors and ran on defaults, so values
like proxy.enabled: yes or PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=banana silently discarded
the whole config and defaulted to proxy. Treat them the same way now:
unrecognized values mean the default (proxy on) instead of a hard
error, and the doc comment no longer claims the old loader failed
loudly. Only values that actually meant guard mode fail.
Also check the removed opt-out before the CA trust check in pmg go,
restoring the old error precedence: a config problem must not steer
the user into an unnecessary OS trust store change.
* fix(e2e): PMG_PROXY_MODE assertion must match the legacy gate semantics
The runner's setup step writes the template config, which has a proxy:
section — and with one present the legacy PMG_PROXY_MODE was always
inert, so expecting a loud failure there asserts pre-fidelity-fix
behavior. Assert both sides instead: inert (command succeeds) with the
standard config, loud failure against an empty config dir where the
legacy fallback actually applied.
* refactor(config): collapse parseOptOutBool to ParseBool over the string form
YAML hands us typed values (bool, int), so route them through
fmt.Sprintf %v and strconv.ParseBool instead of a per-type switch.
Identical behavior for every recognized value; numbers other than 0/1
now read as no opinion instead of cast.ToBool's nonzero-true, which no
real config relies on.
* feat(sandbox): introduce presets - additive workload allowance bundles
Presets are named, additive-only bundles of sandbox allowances for a
specific workload (git hooks tooling, Astro/Vite/Next.js dev servers).
They solve the per-workload tuning friction from #384 without weakening
the default posture: no built-in profile references a preset, presets
cannot carry deny rules or profile booleans (strict YAML decoding), and
mandatory denies still win everywhere except the existing exact-match
suppression.
- Preset schema with metadata (author, labels) and schema_version gating
- Registry over ordered sources (embedded builtin, user dir); builtin
wins name collisions; source abstraction is the extension point for a
future hosted registry and SafeDep cloud sync
- Official presets: git, astro, vite, nextjs (with threat notes)
- Overlay/runtime integration: pmg sandbox allow preset=<name> and
--sandbox-allow preset=<name>, stored by reference, resolved at apply
time, missing presets warn (fail closed) instead of aborting
- Profile integration: presets: [...] list resolved after inherits
- CLI: pmg sandbox preset list (metadata filters, --json), show (prints
YAML with threat notes), lint
- Docs: user guide (docs/sandbox-presets.md) and design spec
Closes#384
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
* fix(sandbox): address review findings on presets
- Presets never modify deny lists: a profile authored deny now survives a
preset allowing the same path (deny-beats-allow keeps it enforced).
Regression test added.
- Profile inspection commands (show, diff, lint) construct the profile
registry with the user-aware preset registry so they agree with runtime
resolution of custom profiles referencing user presets.
- Handle stderr write error when warning about unresolvable presets.
- Compute preset show underline from the uncolored header.
- Use path.Join for embed.FS reads (slash-separated on all platforms).
- Clarify in docs that lint-staged/astro are examples of preset workloads.
- Drop the design spec from the PR per review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
* fix(sandbox): harden preset precedence against authored denies
Addresses external security review findings on the preset mechanism:
- Bubblewrap: a mandatory write-denied path listed in allow_read lost its
protection when a later writable parent bind covered it (bwrap last
mount wins) - exactly the git preset shape (allow_read .git/config +
allow_write .git/**). The mandatory deny now re-binds the path
read-only after all writable mounts instead of being skipped.
Regression test asserts mount ordering. Landlock and Seatbelt were
unaffected (tests added for the same policy shape on Landlock).
- Environment: ScrubEnv is allow-wins, so a preset environment allowance
could override a profile-authored deny. Preset env allowances
overlapping an authored deny pattern are now dropped at application
time (conservative bidirectional glob overlap, fail closed). Surviving
entries still opt out of built-in credential scrubbing as intended.
- Network: removed allow_outbound from the preset schema. Both platform
translators are all-or-nothing for outbound (one allow rule means
blanket network access), so a preset outbound entry would silently
change network posture far beyond what its YAML conveys. Strict
decoding rejects the key.
- Added a dual-path expansion equivalence test (profile presets: field
vs overlay/--sandbox-allow) and documented the precedence guarantees
in docs/sandbox-presets.md.
Explicit --sandbox-allow and pmg sandbox allow overrides keep their
existing semantics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
* docs(sandbox): document env and preset allowances in allow command and overlay docs
pmg sandbox allow help, the --sandbox-allow flag usage, and the project
overlay docs enumerated only read/write/exec/net types. Add env and
preset to all of them, with an overlay example for persisting an env
allowance and a note on why env entries are not auto-promoted by --last.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
* chore(sandbox): trim preset code comments to corner cases and minimal godocs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
* fix(sandbox): exact glob intersection for preset env deny overlap
The bidirectional literal-text heuristic missed overlapping globs with
different literal structure: preset allow AWS_*_KEY and authored deny
AWS_SECRET_* both match AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY but neither pattern
matches the other's text, so the allowance merged and allow-wins
scrubbing exposed the variable. EnvPatternsOverlap now computes exact
intersection non-emptiness for the name glob dialect (case-insensitive,
'*' any sequence, '?' single char) via memoized DP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
* fix(sandbox): preset env allowances are exact names, not globs
Glob-vs-glob intersection is a losing game: every dialect extension
(character classes today) silently reopens the deny-bypass hole.
Restricting preset environment allowances to literal variable names
makes the authored-deny precedence check exact by construction: each
deny pattern is evaluated against the concrete name with the same
matcher ScrubEnv uses at runtime, so the decision cannot diverge from
enforcement regardless of deny dialect. Removes the glob intersection
machinery. Profile and --sandbox-allow env globs are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
* fix(sandbox): reject mandatory-deny targets in preset paths
Preset validation relied on IsSensitiveProjectTarget, which covers fewer
files than util.DANGEROUS_FILES. A preset naming .git-credentials,
.pgpass, .docker/config.json or .config/gh exactly would exact-match
suppress the mandatory deny; .git/config in allow_write would suppress
the write protection. Preset paths are now checked against
DANGEROUS_FILES (single source of truth), .git/hooks is rejected in any
direction, and .git/config is rejected for write/exec while read stays
allowed for git repo discovery. Docs state the two deliberate opt-outs
precisely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
* feat(sandbox): preset init and edit commands for community authoring
pmg sandbox preset init scaffolds a valid user preset (metadata flags,
threat-note template, starter rule) and refuses built-in names since
builtins win resolution. pmg sandbox preset edit opens the file via the
shared editor package and validates the result, warning when a user
preset is shadowed by a built-in. Docs lead with the scaffolded flow and
spell out builtin-vs-community provenance in preset list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
* refactor(sandbox): move mandatory-target matching into util
Preset path validation re-encoded knowledge util already owns: the
dangerous-files comparison and hardcoded .git/config and .git/hooks
strings. util now exports GitConfigPath, GitHooksPath (also used by
GetMandatoryDenyPatterns), PathCoveredBy and DangerousFileMatch, and
preset validation consumes them so the mandatory deny policy has a
single definition.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PETCfE4crLcmodosz12qRn
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sandbox): Seatbelt lockdown translation confines outbound to the PMG proxy
Under network_via_proxy_only the Seatbelt profile now denies all
network-outbound (with a target=direct violation marker) and allows only
the loopback proxy port. SBPL is last-match-wins, so the broad deny is
emitted first, specific allows after, and the allow_network_bind rules
last — keeping loopback-to-loopback dev traffic working under lockdown.
allow_direct_dns re-opens the /var/run/mDNSResponder unix socket that
the deny otherwise covers.
Replaces the temporary fail-closed rejection in the Seatbelt driver with
the real translation; non-lockdown profiles translate byte-identically
to before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
* test(sandbox): assert deny marker presence before ordering comparison
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
* feat(sandbox): render lockdown profiles without a proxy as deny-only with runtime note
pmg sandbox profile show renders profiles for debugging and must not
fail on lockdown profiles. Without a running proxy the translator keeps
the broad deny (rendered profile stays fail-closed, never looser than
runtime) and documents the runtime-only proxy-port allow in an SBPL
comment instead of fabricating a port. Execution is unaffected: the
driver validates the proxy address before translating.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sandbox): ExecutionContext plumbing and fail-closed lockdown contract
Network lockdown needs the PMG proxy's address, which is only known at
spawn time. Thread an ExecutionContext from the proxy flow through the
runner and executor into every sandbox driver, and enforce the
network_via_proxy_only fail-closed contract: lockdown without a running
loopback proxy, or on a driver that cannot enforce it, is a hard error —
never a silent fallback to unrestricted network.
- sandbox.ExecutionContext{ProxyAddr} + 4-arg Sandbox.Execute
- sandbox.ValidateLockdown validates the proxy address (loopback only)
with usefulerror code SandboxRequiresProxy
- Seatbelt validates lockdown before translation (translation itself
lands next); bubblewrap and landlock reject lockdown as unsupported
until Linux enforcement is implemented
- executor.WithExecutionContext, runner.ExecuteOptions.SandboxProxyAddr,
proxy flow passes the live proxy address
- ApplySandbox also validates centrally before invoking the driver
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
* fix(sandbox): require numeric in-range proxy port in ValidateLockdown
The validated port string is embedded into generated sandbox profiles,
so service names, zero, and out-of-range ports are refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
* fix(sandbox): fail closed on Seatbelt lockdown until translation lands
A lockdown policy that passed proxy validation would silently receive
the pre-lockdown network rules from the translator. Reject it until the
lockdown profile translation is implemented, keeping the window between
plumbing and enforcement fail-closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
* chore: review feedback — drop redundant comment, simplify stub help text
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sandbox): add network_via_proxy_only and allow_direct_dns policy fields
Config surface for network lockdown: network_via_proxy_only confines a
sandboxed package manager's outbound network to the PMG proxy;
allow_direct_dns is its escape hatch re-opening direct DNS. Both follow
the existing pointer-bool inheritance pattern in MergeWithParent. Lint
warns when allow_direct_dns is set without network_via_proxy_only, where
it has no effect.
The fields are declared and inherited but unread; enforcement lands with
the ExecutionContext plumbing and Seatbelt lockdown translation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
* fix(sandbox): deep-copy new pointer flags in profile resolution
expandPolicyPaths re-points the older pointer booleans so callers cannot
corrupt the registry-cached policy; the new NetworkViaProxyOnly and
AllowDirectDNS fields need the same isolation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ci: add macOS test job
Darwin-tagged tests (Seatbelt translator, diagnostics, upcoming network
lockdown tests) never ran in CI: the test matrix covered ubuntu and
windows only. The M0 sandbox lockdown milestone is macOS-first, so macOS
coverage must exist before enforcement work lands.
Also establishes the convention that darwin integration tests requiring
sandbox-exec must fail (not skip) when running in CI, so missing tooling
cannot silently hide security tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
* test(sandbox): make Seatbelt render golden test machine-independent
The golden file baked the authoring machine's HOME, CWD and TMPDIR parent
into the expected profile, so TestRenderSeatbelt_Golden could only pass on
that machine. It never ran in CI before the macOS job exposed it.
Normalize CWD, home and TMPDIR parents (raw and query-escaped forms) to
stable placeholders before comparison, longest path first so prefix
overlaps survive, and rewrite the golden accordingly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
* ci: make setup-go cache explicit in macOS job
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PqMU5GNBbQvQct9nxek1VS
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(uvx): add uvx (uv tool run) package executor
Adds support for `uvx`, implemented as a PyPI Executor alongside pipx.
uvx is an alias for `uv tool run`: it installs a tool into an ephemeral
environment and runs it, so it has no install/list subcommand and the
first positional argument (or --from) is the package to audit.
Parsing highlights:
- --from overrides the positional command as the package to audit
- --with packages are audited as additional environment dependencies
- name@version shorthand (ruff@0.3.0, ruff@latest) is normalized
- flag parsing stops at the tool name so the tool's own flags are not
misread as uvx options; uvx's value/boolean flags are registered so
none greedily consume the package positional
- VCS/URL/local-path specs are skipped for registry auditing
Wires up command registration, analytics, shell alias/shim, cloud audit
mapping, a dedicated `uvx` sandbox profile (UV_*/PIP_* env, uv cache and
tool dirs), config policy, docs, unit tests and an E2E workflow step.
Closes#326https://claude.ai/code/session_011hyLxq7oWJX5Dp4tCEfG19
* chore(uvx): align docs and base profile with uvx support
Incorporates the low-risk, non-parser improvements from the community
PR #345 (author non-responsive) into our implementation:
- list uvx (and the previously-missing pipx) as PyPI managers in the
pypi-restrictive base profile package_managers and its README, so the
base profile applies directly when selected via --sandbox-profile
- document uvx in docs/github-action.md and docs/proxy-mode.md
- add version / IsExplicitVersion assertions to the uvx parser tests
Our pflag-based parser is kept as-is: unlike #345 it audits --with
packages and handles all uvx short flags (e.g. -w), both of which the
community PR misses.
* fix(uvx): skip interpreter requests; use require in tests
Addresses review feedback on PR #357:
- uvx interpreter requests (`uvx python`, `uvx python@3.12`, `uvx pypy`,
...) launch an isolated interpreter rather than installing a PyPI tool.
Treating the positional as a package made the guard flow resolve/analyze
pkg:pypi/python (and python==3.12), which could wrongly block or fail a
valid invocation. Skip these for the positional; --with packages on the
same command are still audited.
- Use require.NoError / require.Len for fatal assertions in the uvx tests,
matching the repo's testing convention, so a failure stops the subtest
before a nil dereference instead of panicking.
* docs(uvx): document fail-open and --with-requirements trade-offs
Record the two deliberate parsing decisions raised in review as in-code
trade-off comments (no behavior change):
- unknown flags are tolerated (fail open), consistent with the other
executors; the residual gap only affects non-proxy guard mode since the
default proxy flow intercepts every registry download.
- --with-requirements / --with-editable values are consumed but not
expanded into audit targets; expanding them needs manifest-extractor and
guard changes, tracked as follow-up. Proxy mode still covers them.
* docs(uvx): drop --with-requirements limitation note
Per maintainer review: guard mode is being deprecated and auditing the
contents of an existing requirements file is a scanner's responsibility,
not PMG's. Remove the "known limitation / follow-up" note; the flags stay
registered only so their values are not mistaken for the tool positional.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): support pnpm workspaces and macOS cache dir in pnpm profile
pnpm in a workspace (monorepo) creates a node_modules directory inside
every workspace package to symlink direct dependencies. The profile only
allowed writes to the root node_modules, so installs failed with EPERM
on mkdir of e.g. apps/mobile/node_modules.
pnpm on macOS also writes its cache (lockfile verification, metadata)
under ~/Library/Caches/pnpm, while the base profile only covers the XDG
path ~/.cache/pnpm.
Fixes are scoped to the pnpm leaf profile, not the shared
npm-restrictive base.
Ref: https://github.com/safedep/pmg/issues/329
* fix(sandbox): emit regex parent rule for nested-glob allow patterns on Seatbelt
For allow patterns ending in /**, the translator auto-allows the parent
directory so mkdir/stat of the directory itself succeeds. The rule was
always emitted as a literal, which can never match when the parent still
contains glob characters (e.g. ${CWD}/**/node_modules from a workspace
allowance) — silently leaving the directory's own creation denied.
Emit a regex rule for glob-bearing parents instead. This stays strictly
narrower than the Linux drivers (Bubblewrap binds the prefix before the
first /** read-write; Landlock grants the glob expansion or its parent),
and deny rules are emitted after allows, so mandatory credential denies
still override.
Ref: https://github.com/safedep/pmg/issues/329
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): bind parent dir for globstar allow_write on bwrap
Fine-grained per-path mounts under read-only project binds broke pip
install into in-project .venv directories. Always mount the parent tree
for ** write rules instead.
Fixes#315
* test(sandbox): tighten globstar bind assertions and ensure ~/.npm exists for e2e
Strengthen TestBubblewrapAllowWriteGlobstarBindsParentOnly to verify the
parent dir is writably bound and the child path is read-only bound, not
just substring presence. Pre-create ~/.npm in the e2e harness so
bubblewrap --bind-try does not skip the npm cache dir on fresh runners.
* switch pnpm to /tmp in sandbox e2e
* test(sandbox): update glob ** test for parent-bind semantics
Globstar allow_write now binds the parent dir only (e2e740d), so the
test should assert the parent is writably bound and child subdirs are
not individually bound, instead of substring-matching subdir names.
* fix(sandbox): bind correct base dir for in-pattern globstar allow_write
Globstar allow_write previously used extractGlobParentDir, which walks past
the first ** and yields the wrong root for patterns like /a/b/**/d/**/e.
Introduce extractGlobstarWriteBaseDir, which takes the prefix before the
first /**, and use it in processWriteRule. Also dedup the coarse-fallback
parent-bind loop to mirror the read-rule fallback.
* fix(sandbox): classify helper-tool errors with usefulerror
Sandbox helper commands (profile lint/diff/show/init/list) used to bubble
up plain fmt.Errorf chains from the registry layer, which the TUI then
classified as Unknown and decorated with a bug-report link. Wrap each
error path at the cmd/sandbox boundary so the TUI prints NotFound,
InvalidArgument, or PermissionDenied with actionable hints instead.
Closes#269
* refactor(sandbox): classify registry errors via sentinel wrapping
Replace the fragile substring match in profileLoadError with errors.Is
against new sandbox.ErrProfileNotFound / sandbox.ErrProfileInvalid
sentinels. Every fmt.Errorf in registry.go that previously communicated
"missing" or "malformed" by message text now wraps the corresponding
sentinel, so the cmd layer can classify without inspecting strings.
* fix(sandbox): detect IO error class when wrapping helper errors
Replace static ErrCodeUnknown / ErrCodePermissionDenied wrappings with
ioErrorCode, which inspects the error chain for fs.ErrPermission and
fs.ErrNotExist before falling back. Applied to runProfileList (where an
unreadable user profile directory now classifies as PermissionDenied),
registryInitError, and the stat/MkdirAll/WriteFile paths in profile init.
Also drop redundant doc comments on helpers whose names are self-evident.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(sandbox): allow opt-out of mandatory deny via explicit allow rules
Mandatory deny patterns (.env, .aws, .ssh, .gcloud, .kube, .gnupg,
.docker/config.json, .git/config) can now be opted out by listing the
exact literal post-expansion path in policy filesystem.allow_read /
allow_write, OR via --sandbox-allow read=... / write=... at runtime.
Both channels are treated at par.
Suppression is exact-match. Listing the CWD-absolute or HOME-absolute
form of a dangerous file additionally suppresses its **/<file> glob
sibling on the same direction so a single opt-out is sufficient.
Broad globs (${CWD}/**) and relative paths in user allow lists do not
suppress. The unnamed absolute form remains denied. .git/hooks is
unconditional and never suppressible (arbitrary code execution risk).
GetMandatoryDenyPatterns now returns split DenyRead / DenyWrite
slices and reports SuppressedRead / SuppressedWrite for audit. Both
translators emit per-direction deny rules and log.Warnf each
suppression. On Linux/bubblewrap, the tmpfs hide is restricted to the
intersection of DenyRead and DenyWrite; one-sided suppression falls
back to /dev/null (write) or the user's allow_read --ro-bind (read).
bwrap has no primitive that allows writes while denying reads, so
write-only opt-outs warn that the read-side mandatory deny is
unenforceable.
Updates docs/sandbox.md to document the opt-out, exact-match
semantics, and the Linux platform limitation. Updates pmg-e2e.yml to
create ./.env so the sandbox e2e test exercises the BLOCK case.
Closes#232
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: Code review fixes
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: Add support for bubblewrap sandbox
* fix: Glob pattern expansion limit for linux
* fix: Bug in glob pattern expansion for bwrap
* fix: README on trust
* fix: Multiple bubblewrap translator fix
* test: Add E2E for linux sandbox
* fix: Refactor bwrap sandbox to use common dangerous files
* fix: Path test case
* fix: Non-existent path handling bug
* refactor: Misc cleanup
* fix: Avoid bind mount for non-existentent deny protection
* fix: Off by one bug in path depth handling
* ci: Disable AppArmor on GHA runner
* fix: Disable apparmor userns restrictions
