Add a section specifying that environment protection is tunable through
the same paths as every other sandbox resource: a new 'env' --sandbox-allow
type, project overlay round-trip (no schema bump), allow-only semantics,
and lockdown governance. Clarify enforcement ordering (scrub runs after
overlay and runtime overrides merge into the policy) and that there is no
violation-driven auto-suggestion for env, so discoverability comes from
audit logging.
https://claude.ai/code/session_017Da1sAYLYpeEgogm6f9VYW
Drop generic *_TOKEN / *_SECRET catch-alls from the built-in default deny
list to avoid clipping legitimate build variables. The matching engine
still supports glob patterns so users can opt into broad denies per
sandbox profile (e.g. deny: ["*_TOKEN", "AWS_*"]).
https://claude.ai/code/session_017Da1sAYLYpeEgogm6f9VYW
Add a design spec for scrubbing sensitive environment variables from
package-manager child processes, mirroring the DANGEROUS_FILES model:
built-in default deny list, per-profile allow overrides, enforced at the
ApplySandbox chokepoint. Motivated by the Miasma/Shai-Hulud toolkit's
env-based credential harvesting.
https://claude.ai/code/session_017Da1sAYLYpeEgogm6f9VYW
Claude