mirror of
https://github.com/safedep/pmg.git
synced 2026-08-03 07:24:09 +02:00
Remove guard mode: proxy interception is now the only flow (#386)
* refactor: remove guard mode execution paths and guard-only packages Guard (non-proxy) mode is removed; all package-manager commands now always run the proxy flow. Removes the guard engine, the common flow, the extractor package, the npm/pypi dependency resolvers and the PackageResolver plumbing that only guard mode consumed. The guard package retains only PackageManagerGuardInteraction, which the proxy flow and confirmation interceptors reuse for user prompts. Proxy behavior is unchanged. * refactor: remove proxy opt-out surfaces, guard references in config, action and docs Removes Config.ProxyMode, ProxyConfig.Enabled, IsProxyModeEnabled, the proxy_mode legacy fallback, PMG_PROXY_ENABLED handling and the --proxy-mode / --include-dev-dependencies flags. Proxy interception can no longer be disabled. Also removes the proxy-mode input from the GitHub Action, the proxy-mode doctor check and setup info row, updates the E2E workflow to stop passing --proxy-mode=false, and sweeps guard-mode wording from docs and the config template. The legacy proxy_install_only flat key and PMG_PROXY_INSTALL_ONLY env var remain supported. audit.FlowTypeGuard is kept so previously recorded audit events still translate for cloud sync. * feat: fail loudly when a removed proxy opt-out is still configured A leftover proxy.enabled: false / proxy_mode: false config key or PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=false / PMG_PROXY_MODE=false env var previously meant guard mode; silently ignoring it would switch those users to proxy interception without notice. PMG now exits with an actionable error naming the exact source. Precedence mirrors the old resolution order: env (ignored under lockdown) > proxy.enabled > legacy proxy_mode. The pmg config subtree is exempt so the config file can still be fixed with pmg config edit/set. The GitHub Action's proxy-mode input is kept as a tombstone that fails the action when set to false and warns otherwise. * refactor: extract flows.RunProxy and address review findings Collapses the identical parse-then-run body duplicated across the 12 package manager commands into flows.RunProxy. Documents the cache-hit / offline analysis trade-off versus the removed guard manifest path, fixes a stale non-proxy label in the E2E workflow and a stale guard reference in the uvx parser comment. * fix(config): mirror old proxy opt-out precedence exactly PMG_PROXY_MODE only ever took effect through the legacy fallback, which was gated on the presence of a proxy: key in the config file (even a null one). Promoting it to the top env tier caused two inversions: a stale PMG_PROXY_MODE=false hard-failed configs that resolved to proxy mode, and PMG_PROXY_MODE=true silently overrode an explicit proxy.enabled: false file opt-out. The check now resolves in the old order: PMG_PROXY_ENABLED > proxy: section (presence gates the legacy tier) > PMG_PROXY_MODE > flat proxy_mode. parseOptOutBool also accepts numeric values (0 = false) to match viper's WeaklyTypedInput/cast.ToBool coercion, so proxy.enabled: 0 and proxy_mode: 0 are detected as opt-outs. * refactor: move package manager interaction out of guard * refactor: trim package manager interaction * fix(config): normalize config keys viper-style in proxy opt-out check Viper resolved config file keys case-insensitively and expanded dotted keys, so spellings like Proxy:, Enabled:, a literal proxy.enabled key or Proxy_Mode selected guard mode before the removal. The opt-out check now lowercases keys recursively and nests dotted keys before matching, so those existing opt-outs fail loudly instead of being silently ignored. * refactor: remove inert transitive controls, dead parser state and guard audit variant transitive / transitive_depth lost their only consumers with the dependency resolvers; remove the config fields, flags, template and doc entries, and the report/audit plumbing that misreported transitive analysis as enabled. Remove write-only parser state (PackageInstallTarget.Extras, ParsedCommand.ManifestFiles, ShouldExtractFromManifest); IsManifestInstall stays as it feeds sandbox gating via IsInstallationCommand. Remove audit.FlowTypeGuard and its cloud mapping; guard events recorded by pre-removal versions in an unsynced WAL translate to UNSPECIFIED. * fix: address review findings on the opt-out wiring and cleanups Move the removed-opt-out rejection from the CLI PersistentPreRun into proxyFlow.Run: the check now fires exactly for package-manager runs, so non-install commands (pmg setup remove, doctor, config, version) stay usable to fix or remove an opted-out installation, and future commands inherit or avoid the check by construction instead of by exemption list. Also: make the e2e malicious-package assertion actually fail the job when an install is not blocked, route pmg go through flows.RunProxy, and drop the dead extras return from pypiParsePackageInfo (extras are still stripped from package names). * fix(config): make the removed opt-out check faithful to the old resolution The gate that silenced the legacy proxy_mode surfaces matched the raw proxy key case-sensitively in the old code, while values resolved viper-style (case-insensitive, dotted keys); applying each semantic where the old code did fixes both divergences: a case-variant Proxy: section no longer hides a flat proxy_mode: false opt-out, and a dotted proxy.enabled: false overridden by proxy_mode: true no longer errors. Replace the generic key-tree normalization with two targeted lookups (the check only ever resolves proxy.enabled and proxy_mode), which also makes colliding spellings resolve deterministically. Coerce legacy-tier values cast.ToBool-style so PMG_PROXY_MODE=off style opt-outs are detected, log the config read error instead of swallowing it, and shorten the error to a one-line statement with the specific remedy in the help text. Add lockdown coverage (env inert both directions) and a repeated-run determinism test. * fix(config): fall back to defaults for unrecognized proxy opt-out values The old loader swallowed viper errors and ran on defaults, so values like proxy.enabled: yes or PMG_PROXY_ENABLED=banana silently discarded the whole config and defaulted to proxy. Treat them the same way now: unrecognized values mean the default (proxy on) instead of a hard error, and the doc comment no longer claims the old loader failed loudly. Only values that actually meant guard mode fail. Also check the removed opt-out before the CA trust check in pmg go, restoring the old error precedence: a config problem must not steer the user into an unnecessary OS trust store change. * fix(e2e): PMG_PROXY_MODE assertion must match the legacy gate semantics The runner's setup step writes the template config, which has a proxy: section — and with one present the legacy PMG_PROXY_MODE was always inert, so expecting a loud failure there asserts pre-fidelity-fix behavior. Assert both sides instead: inert (command succeeds) with the standard config, loud failure against an empty config dir where the legacy fallback actually applied. * refactor(config): collapse parseOptOutBool to ParseBool over the string form YAML hands us typed values (bool, int), so route them through fmt.Sprintf %v and strconv.ParseBool instead of a per-type switch. Identical behavior for every recognized value; numbers other than 0/1 now read as no opinion instead of cast.ToBool's nonzero-true, which no real config relies on.
This commit is contained in:
Sahil Bansal
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package flows
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/analyzer"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/config"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/guard"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/audit"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/runner"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/ui"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/packagemanager"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type commonFlow struct {
|
||||
pm packagemanager.PackageManager
|
||||
packageResolver packagemanager.PackageResolver
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Creates a common flow of execution for all package managers. This should work for most
|
||||
// of the cases unless a package manager has its own unique requirements. Configuration
|
||||
// should be passed through the context (Global Config)
|
||||
func Common(pm packagemanager.PackageManager, pkgResolver packagemanager.PackageResolver) *commonFlow {
|
||||
return &commonFlow{
|
||||
pm: pm,
|
||||
packageResolver: pkgResolver,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *commonFlow) Run(ctx context.Context, args []string, parsedCmd *packagemanager.ParsedCommand) error {
|
||||
var analyzers []analyzer.PackageVersionAnalyzer
|
||||
|
||||
// Configure sandbox based on command type and enforcement policy
|
||||
config.ConfigureSandbox(parsedCmd.IsInstallationCommand() || parsedCmd.MayDownloadPackages())
|
||||
|
||||
cfg := config.Get()
|
||||
|
||||
// Initialize report data at the start
|
||||
reportData := ui.NewReportData()
|
||||
reportData.PackageManagerName = f.pm.Name()
|
||||
reportData.FlowType = ui.FlowTypeGuard
|
||||
reportData.DryRun = cfg.DryRun
|
||||
reportData.InsecureMode = cfg.InsecureInstallation
|
||||
reportData.TransitiveEnabled = cfg.Config.Transitive
|
||||
reportData.ParanoidMode = cfg.Config.Paranoid
|
||||
reportData.SandboxEnabled = cfg.Config.Sandbox.Enabled
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.Config.Sandbox.Enabled {
|
||||
if policyRef, exists := cfg.Config.Sandbox.PolicyFor(f.pm.Name()); exists {
|
||||
reportData.SandboxProfile = policyRef.Profile
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if cfg.SandboxProfileOverride != "" {
|
||||
reportData.SandboxProfile = cfg.SandboxProfileOverride
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
startTime := time.Now()
|
||||
|
||||
malysisQueryAnalyzer, err := analyzer.NewMalysisAnalyzer(analyzer.MalysisQueryAnalyzerConfig{})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create malware analyzer: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
analyzers = append(analyzers, malysisQueryAnalyzer)
|
||||
|
||||
interaction := guard.PackageManagerGuardInteraction{
|
||||
SetStatus: ui.SetStatus,
|
||||
ClearStatus: ui.ClearStatus,
|
||||
ShowWarning: ui.ShowWarning,
|
||||
GetConfirmationOnMalware: ui.GetConfirmationOnMalware,
|
||||
Block: ui.BlockNoExit,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
guardConfig := guard.DefaultPackageManagerGuardConfig()
|
||||
guardConfig.DryRun = cfg.DryRun
|
||||
guardConfig.InsecureInstallation = cfg.InsecureInstallation
|
||||
|
||||
pmName := f.pm.Name()
|
||||
executor := func(ctx context.Context, pc *packagemanager.ParsedCommand) error {
|
||||
return runner.Execute(ctx, pc, pmName, cfg.DryRun)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
guardManager, err := guard.NewPackageManagerGuard(guardConfig, f.pm, f.packageResolver, analyzers, interaction, executor)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create package manager guard: %s", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
guardResult, err := guardManager.Run(ctx, args, parsedCmd)
|
||||
|
||||
// Populate report data from guard result
|
||||
reportData.StartTime = startTime
|
||||
if guardResult != nil {
|
||||
reportData.TotalAnalyzed = guardResult.TotalAnalyzed
|
||||
reportData.TrustedSkipped = guardResult.TrustedSkipped
|
||||
reportData.AllowedCount = guardResult.AllowedCount
|
||||
reportData.ConfirmedCount = guardResult.ConfirmedCount
|
||||
reportData.BlockedCount = guardResult.BlockedCount
|
||||
reportData.BlockedPackages = guardResult.BlockedPackages
|
||||
reportData.ConfirmedPackages = guardResult.ConfirmedPackages
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Infer outcome from data and config using shared inference logic
|
||||
blockedCount := 0
|
||||
userCancelledCount := 0
|
||||
|
||||
if guardResult != nil {
|
||||
blockedCount = guardResult.BlockedCount
|
||||
// In guard flow, if user cancelled, all blocked packages are due to user cancellation
|
||||
// (guard returns immediately on ActionBlock, so we can't have both types)
|
||||
if guardResult.WasUserCancelled {
|
||||
userCancelledCount = guardResult.BlockedCount
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reportData.Outcome = inferOutcome(cfg.InsecureInstallation, cfg.DryRun, blockedCount, userCancelledCount, err)
|
||||
|
||||
// Session complete is called here (not deferred) because guard.Run() calls
|
||||
// LogInstallStarted internally, and all paths after guard.Run() reach this point.
|
||||
audit.LogSessionComplete(audit.Outcome(reportData.Outcome.String()), audit.FlowTypeGuard)
|
||||
|
||||
// Show the report
|
||||
ui.Report(reportData)
|
||||
|
||||
// Exit after report for blocked/cancelled outcomes
|
||||
if reportData.Outcome == ui.OutcomeBlocked || reportData.Outcome == ui.OutcomeUserCancelled {
|
||||
os.Exit(1)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to run package manager guard: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ package flows
|
||||
import "github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/ui"
|
||||
|
||||
// inferOutcome determines the execution outcome based on configuration and execution data.
|
||||
// This function is shared across different flow implementations (guard-based, proxy-based)
|
||||
// to maintain consistent outcome logic without coupling flows to each other.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Outcome precedence:
|
||||
// 1. Error (if no packages were blocked)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/dry/log"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/analyzer"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/config"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/guard"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/audit"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/localstore"
|
||||
"github.com/safedep/pmg/internal/runner"
|
||||
@@ -21,20 +20,37 @@ import (
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
type proxyFlow struct {
|
||||
pm packagemanager.PackageManager
|
||||
packageResolver packagemanager.PackageResolver
|
||||
pm packagemanager.PackageManager
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ProxyFlow creates a new proxy-based flow for package manager protection
|
||||
func ProxyFlow(pm packagemanager.PackageManager, packageResolver packagemanager.PackageResolver) *proxyFlow {
|
||||
func ProxyFlow(pm packagemanager.PackageManager) *proxyFlow {
|
||||
return &proxyFlow{
|
||||
pm: pm,
|
||||
packageResolver: packageResolver,
|
||||
pm: pm,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// RunProxy parses args with pm and runs the proxy flow on the parsed command.
|
||||
// It is the shared entry point for package manager commands.
|
||||
func RunProxy(ctx context.Context, pm packagemanager.PackageManager, args []string) error {
|
||||
parsedCommand, err := pm.ParseCommand(args)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse command: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return ProxyFlow(pm).Run(ctx, args, parsedCommand)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Run executes the proxy-based flow
|
||||
func (f *proxyFlow) Run(ctx context.Context, args []string, parsedCmd *packagemanager.ParsedCommand) (runErr error) {
|
||||
// Guard mode is removed: a config or environment that still disables proxy
|
||||
// interception must fail loudly instead of being silently switched to proxy
|
||||
// mode. Checked here rather than at CLI startup so non-install commands
|
||||
// (pmg config, setup remove, doctor, ...) stay usable to fix the config.
|
||||
if err := config.RejectRemovedProxyOptOut(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if we have a supported ecosystem else fail fast
|
||||
ecosystem := f.pm.Ecosystem()
|
||||
if !interceptors.IsSupported(ecosystem) {
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +84,6 @@ func (f *proxyFlow) Run(ctx context.Context, args []string, parsedCmd *packagema
|
||||
reportData.FlowType = ui.FlowTypeProxy
|
||||
reportData.DryRun = cfg.DryRun
|
||||
reportData.InsecureMode = cfg.InsecureInstallation
|
||||
reportData.TransitiveEnabled = cfg.Config.Transitive
|
||||
reportData.ParanoidMode = cfg.Config.Paranoid
|
||||
reportData.SandboxEnabled = cfg.Config.Sandbox.Enabled
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -157,12 +172,7 @@ func (f *proxyFlow) Run(ctx context.Context, args []string, parsedCmd *packagema
|
||||
|
||||
// Create interaction callbacks for user prompts
|
||||
// Note: We use a pointer so we can later inject the input reader via SetInput
|
||||
interaction := &guard.PackageManagerGuardInteraction{
|
||||
SetStatus: ui.SetStatus,
|
||||
ClearStatus: ui.ClearStatus,
|
||||
ShowWarning: ui.ShowWarning,
|
||||
Block: ui.BlockNoExit,
|
||||
}
|
||||
interaction := &packagemanager.PackageManagerInteraction{}
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract pinned versions from install targets so cooldown handlers can
|
||||
// report when a user's explicitly requested version was blocked.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user