Files
oc/tests
only-cli 3ca462e353 fix: validate resolved IPs, not hostname strings, in the SSRF guard
PR #5's guard pattern-matched the URL's hostname against a regex, which
both under- and over-blocked: IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback ([::ffff:127.0.0.1]),
0.0.0.0, and any DNS name that merely resolves to a private address all
sailed through, while a legitimate public hostname like 10.example.com was
wrongly rejected because it starts with "10.". It also only checked the
original URL, so a public URL that redirects to an internal address was
never re-validated.

This replaces the regex with net.isIP + dns.lookup: IP literals are checked
directly (including decoding IPv4-mapped/-compatible IPv6), and DNS names
are resolved first so every address they point to is validated before
connecting. The same check now reruns on every redirect hop for both the
impers and native-fetch transports. Resolving before connecting doesn't
pin the address for the actual connection (neither impers nor fetch expose
that here), so a name that re-resolves differently between this check and
the real connect remains a known, documented residual gap.
2026-08-19 14:43:43 -04:00
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