## Summary
Makes Gemini — and every other non-Claude, non-GPT-5 model on the
Databricks MLflow route (`databricks_v2`) — usable in an agent loop.
These are the non-`benchmarks/` changes from
`benchmark/harness-accounting-and-solo`, lifted onto a clean base off
`main` so they can land independently while the harness work continues.
Two defects made these models unusable, one fatal and one silent. Both
live only in `openai_body` / `parse_openai`, which is the
least-exercised of the three `databricks_v2` sub-routes — the
`luna`/`sol` conditions run the Responses route and the `opus`
conditions run the Anthropic route, so **this change is inert for every
model already in use** and only lights up the MLflow path.
## Why a third route at all
`databricks_v2_route_for_model` buckets by model family: `claude*` →
Anthropic Messages, `gpt-5`/code-names → OpenAI Responses, **everything
else → MLflow chat-completions**. Gemini, Qwen, gpt-oss, and friends all
fall through to that third pair — and both bugs below live only there.
## D1 — dropped thought signatures (fatal)
Gemini returns a `thoughtSignature` on every tool call and **requires it
echoed back**. `openai_body` reserialized each call as `{id, type,
function}` only, dropping the field, so the next request 400'd:
```
HTTP 400 Function call is missing a thought_signature in functionCall parts.
```
For a coding agent this fires on the **first** tool call, so the model
never completes a single turn.
**Position is load-bearing.** A four-shape replay probe against the live
gateway established that the signature must sit as a *sibling* of
`function` — nesting it inside `function{}` fails with the *same* 400 as
omitting it. A fix that "preserves the field" without preserving its
position passes a unit test and still 400s.
The fix: `ToolCall` gains `provider_extra: Map<String, Value>`.
`parse_openai` captures every top-level wire key except the three we
model (`id`, `type`, `function`); `openai_body` re-emits them beside
`function`. Keeping *whatever we did not model*, rather than naming
`thoughtSignature`, means the next provider with an opaque per-call
token needs no change here. The Responses and Anthropic replay shapes
are fully modelled, so they pass `Default::default()` and stay
**byte-identical** to before.
### D1b — duplicate tool-call ids (same root cause)
Gemini returns the **function name** as the id, so two parallel calls to
one function arrive sharing an id — and that id is what pairs a
`role:"tool"` result back to its call, making two results
indistinguishable. `dedupe_provider_ids` suffixes collisions
(`get_weather`, `get_weather-2`). Safe because both halves of the
pairing (the assistant `tool_calls[].id` and the result's
`tool_call_id`) are re-emitted from this same value; the provider never
sees its original id again.
## D2 — block-array content discarded (silent, worse than a crash)
`parse_openai` read `content` with `as_str()`, which returns `""` for
anything that isn't a JSON string. Gemini (and Qwen35, gpt-oss) send an
array of typed blocks:
```json
"content": [
{"type": "reasoning", "summary": [{"type": "summary_text", "text": "…"}]},
{"type": "text", "text": "391"}
]
```
So the model answered and the answer was thrown away — no error, no
warning, just a turn that looked like the model had said nothing. On a
benchmark this reads as "Gemini is bad at the task" rather than "buzz
dropped the reply."
`openai_content_parts` now accepts either shape — string as before, or a
block array where `text` blocks concatenate into text and `reasoning`
blocks into reasoning (Gemini nests the prose one level down under
`summary`). Message-level `reasoning_content` / `reasoning` still win
when present, so DeepSeek and vLLM-style hosts are unchanged; block
reasoning is the last fallback.
## Also: a turn-start log line (`buzz-acp` `pool.rs`)
Small, independent observability change that also rides in the
non-benchmark delta: `run_prompt_task` now emits a `pool::prompt` "turn
starting" line, labelled by the same `prompt_label` helper as
`log_stop_reason`, so a log reads as start/stop pairs. An unpaired start
is the only durable evidence that a turn was entered and never returned
— without it, a stalled agent and an agent nobody woke leave identical
(zero-completion) logs.
## Interaction with #3538
#3538 (already merged) rewrote `databricks_v2_route_for_model` to route
by boundary-aware model-family segments. That change and this one touch
**different functions** in `llm.rs` — routing vs. body/parse — and
compose cleanly; the family routing decides *which* pair runs, and this
fixes the MLflow pair it can now select.
## Testing
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy -p buzz-agent -p buzz-acp
--all-targets -- -D warnings` — clean.
- `cargo test -p buzz-agent -p buzz-acp` — all green (304 + 632 lib
tests plus integration suites, 0 failures). Five new tests cover:
block-array text extraction, plain-string regression, passthrough
capture (and non-duplication of the modelled keys), replay position
(`thoughtSignature` beside `function`, not inside it), and id
de-duplication.
- Wire evidence: the four-shape replay table and the reasoning-effort
probe were run against `block-lakehouse-staging` (recorded in the design
doc).
## Relationship to the benchmark branch
The full design write-up (four-shape replay table, position-matters
analysis, effort verification, and open pricing item) lives in
`docs/08-gemini-provider-fixes.md` on
`benchmark/harness-accounting-and-solo`. The benchmark manifests and
endpoint-config entries that exercise these models are separable and
stay on that branch.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Signed-off-by: Atish Patel <atish@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
buzz-agent
Minimal, unbreakable ACP-compliant LLM agent. Stdio in, tool calls out. Non-streaming. No persistence. No cleverness.
ACP is the Agent Client Protocol — JSON-RPC 2.0 over stdio between a client (Zed, JetBrains, buzz-acp, …) and an agent. MCP is how the agent talks to its tools.
buzz-agent is the agent.
What It Is
+--------+ stdio (JSON-RPC 2.0) +---------------+
| client | <----------------------> | buzz-agent |
+--------+ ACP frames +---------------+
│ │
│ │ rmcp (stdio)
│ ▼
│ MCP servers
│ (your tools)
▼
HTTPS
│
▼
Anthropic Messages API
or any OpenAI-compat
(vLLM, llama.cpp, OpenRouter,
Block Gateway, Ollama, …)
A client sends session/prompt. The agent loops: call the LLM → get tool calls → run them via MCP → feed results back → repeat. The loop terminates when the LLM stops asking for tools, the round cap is hit, or the client cancels.
The agent's output is its tool calls. Generated text is forwarded to the client as agent_message_chunk updates, but the real work happens in the tools. The LLM call is non-streaming — one HTTP POST, one response.
Quick Start
# Build
cargo build --release -p buzz-agent
# Run against Anthropic
BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=anthropic \
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-... \
ANTHROPIC_MODEL=claude-sonnet-4-5 \
./target/release/buzz-agent
# Or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint
BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=openai \
OPENAI_COMPAT_API_KEY=sk-... \
OPENAI_COMPAT_MODEL=gpt-5 \
OPENAI_COMPAT_BASE_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1 \
./target/release/buzz-agent
# Or Databricks model serving via OAuth 2.0 PKCE
BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=databricks \
DATABRICKS_HOST=https://dbc-...cloud.databricks.com \
DATABRICKS_MODEL=goose-claude-4-6-sonnet \
./target/release/buzz-agent
That's the whole setup. The agent reads JSON-RPC frames from stdin, writes them to stdout, and logs to stderr.
ACP Transcript
A complete round-trip. Lines starting with → are client→agent (stdin); ← are agent→client (stdout). Each line is one newline-terminated JSON value. Comments are not part of the wire.
// 1. Handshake.
→ {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":1,"clientCapabilities":{}}}
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{
"protocolVersion":1,
"agentCapabilities":{
"loadSession":false,
"promptCapabilities":{"image":false,"audio":false,"embeddedContext":false},
"mcpCapabilities":{"http":false,"sse":false}
},
"agentInfo":{"name":"buzz-agent","version":"0.1.0"}
}}
// 2. Open a session. The client passes the MCP servers to spawn.
→ {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"session/new","params":{
"cwd":"/tmp",
"mcpServers":[{"name":"echo","command":"/usr/local/bin/echo-mcp","args":[],"env":[]}]
}}
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8"}}
// 3. Prompt. The agent loops until the LLM stops calling tools.
→ {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"session/prompt","params":{
"sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8",
"prompt":[{"type":"text","text":"echo hello"}]
}}
// 4. Agent emits tool_call (status: pending) — visible to the UI.
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{
"sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8",
"update":{
"sessionUpdate":"tool_call",
"toolCallId":"toolu_01XYZ",
"title":"echo__say",
"kind":"other",
"status":"pending",
"rawInput":{"text":"hello"}
}
}}
// 5. Agent moves the call to in_progress, runs the MCP tool, then completed.
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{
"sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8",
"update":{"sessionUpdate":"tool_call_update","toolCallId":"toolu_01XYZ","status":"in_progress"}
}}
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{
"sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8",
"update":{
"sessionUpdate":"tool_call_update",
"toolCallId":"toolu_01XYZ",
"status":"completed",
"content":[{"type":"content","content":{"type":"text","text":"hello"}}]
}
}}
// 8. The model sees the result, decides it's done, and the prompt resolves.
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"result":{"stopReason":"end_turn"}}
That's ACP. Three request methods (initialize, session/new, session/prompt), one inbound notification (session/cancel), and three outbound update variants (agent_message_chunk, tool_call, tool_call_update). The full server is hand-rolled in main.rs.
Configuration
Everything is environment variables. No flags, no config files. (We are a subprocess; subprocess config is environment.)
| Variable | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|
BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER |
— | Required. anthropic, openai, databricks, or databricks_v2. No implicit fallback — the agent errors at startup when this is unset. |
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |
— | Required when provider=anthropic. |
ANTHROPIC_MODEL |
— | Required when provider=anthropic. |
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL |
https://api.anthropic.com |
|
ANTHROPIC_API_VERSION |
2023-06-01 |
|
OPENAI_COMPAT_API_KEY |
— | Required when provider=openai. |
OPENAI_COMPAT_MODEL |
— | Required when provider=openai. |
OPENAI_COMPAT_BASE_URL |
https://api.openai.com/v1 |
Point at vLLM, llama.cpp, OpenRouter, Ollama, etc. |
OPENAI_COMPAT_API |
auto |
auto | chat | responses. auto picks Responses for *.openai.com, Chat Completions everywhere else. |
DATABRICKS_HOST |
— | Required when provider=databricks or provider=databricks_v2. |
DATABRICKS_MODEL |
— | Required when provider=databricks or provider=databricks_v2. |
DATABRICKS_TOKEN |
— | Optional static bearer escape hatch. If unset, Databricks uses browser OAuth + refresh cache. |
BUZZ_AGENT_SYSTEM_PROMPT |
built-in | Inline system prompt. |
BUZZ_AGENT_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE |
— | File path. Mutually exclusive with the above. |
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_ROUNDS |
0 |
Tool-loop iteration cap. 0 = unlimited. |
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS |
32768 |
Per LLM call. Headroom for large tool-call inputs (e.g. file writes via heredoc); Sonnet 4 / Opus 4 cap at 64K. |
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS |
200000 |
Provider context window used by the handoff gate. |
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_HANDOFFS |
10 |
Max context handoffs per session before falling back to truncation. |
BUZZ_AGENT_LLM_TIMEOUT_SECS |
240 |
Max seconds with no response bytes before abandoning an LLM call (per-read inactivity, not wall-clock). |
BUZZ_AGENT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS |
660 |
Per-tool call timeout in seconds |
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_PARALLEL_TOOLS |
8 |
Max concurrent tool calls per turn (1 = sequential) |
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_SESSIONS |
unlimited | Max concurrent ACP sessions. Sessions are cheap; default has no cap. |
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_LINE_BYTES |
4194304 |
4 MiB. Hard cap on inbound JSON-RPC frames. |
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_HISTORY_BYTES |
1048576 |
1 MiB. Old turns are evicted past this. |
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_TOOL_RESULT_TEXT_BYTES |
51200 |
50 KiB. Per-result cap on tool-output text; oversize is middle-elided (head + tail kept) with an inline marker. Images are exempt. |
Providers
buzz-agent speaks a few HTTP dialects. Pick with BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER.
| Provider | BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER |
Endpoint (auto) | Tested with |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthropic | anthropic |
POST {base}/v1/messages |
claude-sonnet-4-5, claude-opus-4 |
| OpenAI | openai |
POST {base}/responses |
gpt-5, gpt-5-mini, o4-mini, gpt-4o |
| vLLM | openai |
POST {base}/chat/completions |
any tool-calling model |
| llama.cpp | openai |
POST {base}/chat/completions |
any tool-calling GGUF |
| Ollama | openai |
POST {base}/chat/completions |
llama3.1, qwen2.5-coder |
| OpenRouter | openai |
POST {base}/chat/completions |
anything they route |
| Block Gateway | openai |
POST {base}/chat/completions |
gpt-5, claude |
| Databricks | databricks |
POST {host}/serving-endpoints/{model}/invocations |
goose-claude-4-6-sonnet |
| Databricks AI Gateway v2 | databricks_v2 |
POST {host}/ai-gateway/{provider}/v1/... |
databricks-gpt-5-5, databricks-claude-opus-4-7 |
If BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=anthropic is selected without ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, or BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=openai is selected without OPENAI_COMPAT_API_KEY, the agent returns an error — there is no implicit fallback to another provider.
provider=openai speaks two HTTP dialects: the Responses API (/v1/responses, required for GPT-5 / o-series tool-calling on OpenAI's own service) and the Chat Completions API (/chat/completions, the broadly-supported OpenAI-compatible wire format).
By default (OPENAI_COMPAT_API=auto) the agent picks Responses when OPENAI_COMPAT_BASE_URL points at an *.openai.com host and Chat Completions everywhere else. Pin the choice explicitly with OPENAI_COMPAT_API=chat or OPENAI_COMPAT_API=responses for providers that diverge from the default (e.g. a Responses-compatible self-hosted gateway).
Provider is a Rust enum with one match in Llm::complete. There is no trait, no Box<dyn>, no async-trait. Adding a provider is a match arm and one body/parse pair in llm.rs.
MCP Servers
The client passes MCP server specs in session/new. The agent spawns each one as a stdio subprocess, calls tools/list, and merges everything into a single tool catalog the LLM sees. Tool names are namespaced as server__tool (double underscore separator). Bare tool names containing __ are rejected at registration.
Example: a single echo MCP server.
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"method": "session/new",
"params": {
"cwd": "/work",
"mcpServers": [
{
"name": "echo",
"command": "/usr/local/bin/echo-mcp",
"args": ["--mode", "stdio"],
"env": [
{ "name": "ECHO_VERBOSE", "value": "1" }
]
}
]
}
}
Multiple servers: just add more entries. Tool calls fan out to the right server by namespace prefix.
Transport: stdio only. No HTTP, no SSE. We advertise this in agentCapabilities (mcpCapabilities.http: false, mcpCapabilities.sse: false); spec-compliant clients won't ask for what we don't have.
Security Model
The trust boundary is the operator who launched the agent. The harness, MCP server binaries, and API keys are all trusted. Untrusted input — model output, tool results, prompts — is bounded.
| Boundary | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Stdout discipline | Single-consumer mpsc channel feeding stdout. No two tasks can interleave bytes. All logs go to stderr. |
| MCP child env | Whitelist (PATH, HOME, TERM, LANG, LC_ALL, TMPDIR) plus what the client explicitly passes. Your ANTHROPIC_API_KEY does not leak into MCP children. |
| MCP child lifetime | Process group via setpgid(0,0) in pre_exec. On transport break or shutdown: killpg(SIGKILL). Grandchildren die too. |
| Server poisoning | After a timeout or transport break, the offending server is marked dead. Future calls trigger a lazy restart with exponential backoff. Other servers keep working. |
| Frame size | BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_LINE_BYTES (default 4 MiB). Oversize → connection killed. |
| LLM response size | 16 MiB hard cap. Both Content-Length precheck and streaming-buffer cap. |
| Cancellation | tokio::select! { biased; _ = cancel.changed() => ... } at every loop boundary. Cancel always wins the race. |
| Session isolation | Unlimited concurrent sessions by default (configurable via BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_SESSIONS). One prompt per session at a time. Each session gets its own MCP servers. |
tool_use ↔ tool_result pairing |
Encoded in the type system. Every ToolCall and ToolResult carries a provider_id: String (not Option). |
Bounded Everything
| Limit | Default | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Inbound JSON-RPC frame | 4 MiB | BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_LINE_BYTES |
| Single prompt | 1 MiB | MAX_PROMPT_BYTES |
| History window | 1 MiB | BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_HISTORY_BYTES |
| LLM response body | 16 MiB | MAX_LLM_RESPONSE_BYTES |
| LLM error body | 4 KiB | MAX_LLM_ERROR_BODY_BYTES |
| Tool result body (total, incl. images) | 8 MiB | MAX_TOOL_RESULT_BYTES |
| Tool result text | 50 KiB | BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_TOOL_RESULT_TEXT_BYTES |
| MCP servers / session | 16 | MAX_MCP_SERVERS |
| Tools / session | 128 | MAX_TOOLS_PER_SESSION |
| Tool description bytes | 1 KiB | MAX_DESCRIPTION_BYTES |
| Tool schema bytes | 4 KiB | MAX_SCHEMA_BYTES (oversize → replaced with {}) |
| Tool calls per turn | 64 | MAX_TOOL_CALLS_PER_TURN |
| Loop rounds | 0 (unlimited) | BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_ROUNDS |
| LLM read inactivity timeout | 240 s | BUZZ_AGENT_LLM_TIMEOUT_SECS |
| Tool call timeout | 660 s | BUZZ_AGENT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS |
What This Is NOT
A short list, because the answer is mostly "no":
- Not a framework. No plugins, no recipes, no slash commands, no modes. MCP servers can participate in agent lifecycle via hook tools (
_Stop,_PostCompact), but these are advisory, fail-open, and budget-bounded — not a plugin system. - Not streaming. One non-streaming HTTP POST per round. The LLM's generated text is forwarded to the client as
agent_message_chunk, but there is no token-level streaming. - Not persistent. Everything is in-memory, per-process. No SQLite. When context fills, the agent summarizes its own history and continues (context handoff). No external persistence.
- Not an SDK. This is a binary. The protocol seam is stdin/stdout. Use it from any language.
- Not a UI. No TUI, no web, no notifications. The client renders.
- Not authenticated. API keys come from env. Use systemd, Docker secrets, or a wrapper.
- Not networked MCP. Stdio transport only. No HTTP/SSE MCP transport.
- Not load-able. No
session/load. We advertiseloadSession: false. - Not a router. No agent-to-agent, no fan-out, no orchestration. One model. One loop.
Concurrency model:
┌──── reader task ──────────┐
│ (stdin → JSON-RPC → ...) │
│ │
stdin ─────────┤ dispatch │
│ │ │
│ ├── initialize │ (sync reply)
│ ├── session/new │ (sync reply)
│ ├── session/prompt ───┼─── spawn ──> prompt task
│ │ │ │
│ ├── session/cancel ───┼─> watch::send│ (biased select wins)
│ │ │ │
└───────────────────────────┘ │
│
┌── writer task ────────────────┐ │
stdout ────────┤ mpsc<WireMsg> consumer │<─────────┘
│ (the only stdout writer) │
└───────────────────────────────┘
One reader, one writer, up to 8 concurrent prompt tasks (one per session).
Building
cargo build --release -p buzz-agent
Testing
cargo test -p buzz-agent
Test strategy is real subprocess, no mocks:
- Fake LLM —
tests/fake_llm.rsand the helpers intests/regressions.rsspin up a realtokio::net::TcpListeneron port 0, parseContent-Length, and return scripted JSON. No HTTP mocking library. - Fake MCP server —
tests/bin/fake_mcp.rsis a separate binary controlled by env vars:FAKE_MCP_HANG_INIT,FAKE_MCP_TOOL_DELAY,FAKE_MCP_SPAWN_GRANDCHILD, etc. Each fault path is a real process being abused. - Regression tests are the changelog. Each
#[test]inregressions.rsis named for the bug it locks down:assistant_text_preserved_across_prompts,cancel_leaves_history_valid_for_next_prompt,mcp_init_timeout_kills_child,oversize_line_kills_connection. Read them in order to learn the protocol's failure modes.