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## Summary - resolve the OAuth cache home directory with the repository's platform-aware `dirs` convention - preserve the existing `.config/buzz-agent/oauth` cache layout on macOS and Linux - make the cache-path regression assertion portable across path separators ## Problem `buzz-agent` read only `$HOME` when constructing the OAuth token cache path. Packaged Windows processes do not guarantee that Unix variable, so OAuth source construction failed with `oauth cache: $HOME not set` even though Windows had a valid user profile. ## Validation Independent reviewers validated exact commit `836d820483b141b7291170cb33535ac7cb49b2eb` on Windows/MSVC with `HOME` unset and `USERPROFILE` present: - `cargo +1.94.1 clippy -p buzz-agent --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings` - `cargo +1.94.1 fmt --all -- --check` - `git diff --check f53bbd1..836d820` - `auth::` tests: 11/11 passed with `HOME` unset - full package lib target: 396 passed / 2 failed; identical-base controls classified both as pre-existing Windows failures The changed regression fails on the base with `$HOME not set` and passes on this branch. `dirs 6.0.0` was already locked by other workspace crates; the lockfile change adds only the `buzz-agent` dependency edge. Signed-off-by: Kalvin C <kalvinnchau@users.noreply.github.com>
848 lines
32 KiB
Rust
848 lines
32 KiB
Rust
//! Token sources for the LLM transport layer.
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//!
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//! [`TokenSource`] decouples request auth from `Config::api_key`: providers
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//! can supply a static string ([`StaticTokenSource`]) or a refreshable OAuth
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//! 2.0 PKCE engine ([`PkceOAuthTokenSource`]). Engines own their own cache
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//! and refresh logic; the [`Llm`] just asks for a bearer per request.
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//!
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//! The PKCE engine implements RFC 6749 + RFC 7636 with on-disk token
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//! caching keyed by `sha256(discovery_url|client_id|scopes)`. It's the
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//! same shape goose uses for Databricks, but we own the wire format and
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//! cache directory so the two are independently upgradable.
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//!
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//! First-use (cache empty) requires a browser: the engine opens
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//! `authorization_endpoint` in `webbrowser`, listens on `127.0.0.1:0`,
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//! captures the redirect, and exchanges the code for a token. Subsequent
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//! calls hit the cache and silently refresh when expired.
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use std::fs;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
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use async_trait::async_trait;
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use base64::Engine;
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use reqwest::Client;
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use serde_json::Value;
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use sha2::Digest;
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use tokio::sync::Mutex;
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use crate::types::AgentError;
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/// Buffer before `expires_at` to consider a cached token "still good".
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/// Keeps us off the cliff if the clock or the server's clock drifts.
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const TOKEN_REFRESH_LEEWAY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
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/// Wall-clock budget for the interactive browser dance. Goose uses 60s.
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/// We match: any longer and the user has gone to lunch.
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const BROWSER_AUTH_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
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/// Asynchronous source of a bearer token. The [`Llm`] calls this per
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/// request, so impls are expected to be cheap on the cache-hit path.
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#[async_trait]
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pub trait TokenSource: Send + Sync {
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async fn bearer(&self) -> Result<String, AgentError>;
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/// Return a bearer token from cache or refresh, **never** opening a browser.
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///
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/// The default delegates to [`bearer`](Self::bearer) — correct for token
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/// sources (e.g. static API keys) that can never trigger a browser flow.
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/// [`PkceOAuthTokenSource`] overrides this to stop before the browser step.
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async fn bearer_no_browser(&self) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
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self.bearer().await
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}
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/// Force a fresh bearer after the server rejected the current one (401).
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///
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/// `rejected` is the exact access token that just got the 401. Unlike
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/// [`bearer`](Self::bearer), which trusts the local expiry clock, this is
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/// driven by the server's verdict: the cached token looked valid to us
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/// (well within its local expiry) but the provider rejected it — clock
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/// skew, server-side revocation, or a node that never saw it. The clock
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/// therefore can't decide whether to refresh; the caller passes the
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/// rejected token so the impl can refresh unless a concurrent caller has
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/// *already* replaced it. Implementations must obtain a new token without
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/// any interactive step, so a headless harness never hangs. The default
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/// returns the existing bearer — correct for sources that can't refresh
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/// (a static key); the caller's retry then fails terminally rather than
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/// looping.
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async fn refresh_now(&self, _rejected: &str) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
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self.bearer().await
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}
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}
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/// A token that never changes for the life of the process.
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pub struct StaticTokenSource(String);
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impl StaticTokenSource {
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pub fn new(token: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
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Self(token.into())
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}
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}
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#[async_trait]
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impl TokenSource for StaticTokenSource {
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async fn bearer(&self) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
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Ok(self.0.clone())
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}
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}
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/// Static config for an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code + PKCE provider.
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///
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/// The `discovery_url` must return a JSON document with at least
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/// `authorization_endpoint` and `token_endpoint` (RFC 8414). The
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/// `cache_namespace` is the directory under `~/.config/buzz-agent/oauth/`
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/// the token JSON lives in — separates providers' caches cleanly.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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pub struct PkceOAuthConfig {
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pub discovery_url: String,
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pub client_id: String,
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pub scopes: Vec<String>,
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pub cache_namespace: String,
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/// When `Some`, the engine writes tokens here instead of
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/// `~/.config/buzz-agent/oauth/<cache_namespace>/`. Production code
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/// leaves this `None`. Integration tests use it to avoid stomping on
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/// a shared `$HOME` when running in parallel.
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pub cache_dir_override: Option<PathBuf>,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)]
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struct CachedToken {
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access_token: String,
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refresh_token: Option<String>,
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/// Unix seconds. `None` means the server didn't advertise an expiry;
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/// we use it without checking and rely on refresh on 401.
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expires_at: Option<u64>,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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struct OidcEndpoints {
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authorization_endpoint: String,
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token_endpoint: String,
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}
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/// PKCE OAuth token source with on-disk refresh cache.
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///
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/// First call:
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/// 1. Loads from cache if present and unexpired.
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/// 2. Otherwise tries `refresh_token` if cached.
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/// 3. Otherwise runs the full browser flow.
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///
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/// Subsequent calls hit an in-memory copy of the cached token and only
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/// touch disk/network if the access token is past `expires_at`.
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pub struct PkceOAuthTokenSource {
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cfg: PkceOAuthConfig,
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http: Client,
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cache_path: PathBuf,
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/// Single-flight guard: only one refresh/browser flow at a time, even
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/// if many tool calls land concurrently.
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state: Mutex<Option<CachedToken>>,
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}
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impl PkceOAuthTokenSource {
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pub fn new(cfg: PkceOAuthConfig) -> Result<Arc<Self>, AgentError> {
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let cache_path = cache_path_for(&cfg)?;
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if let Some(parent) = cache_path.parent() {
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fs::create_dir_all(parent)
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.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth cache dir {parent:?}: {e}")))?;
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}
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let initial = read_cache(&cache_path);
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Ok(Arc::new(Self {
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cfg,
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http: Client::new(),
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cache_path,
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state: Mutex::new(initial),
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}))
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}
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/// Discover authorization + token endpoints from the well-known URL.
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async fn endpoints(&self) -> Result<OidcEndpoints, AgentError> {
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let v: Value = self
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.http
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.get(&self.cfg.discovery_url)
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.send()
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.await
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.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth discovery: {e}")))?
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.error_for_status()
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.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth discovery status: {e}")))?
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.json()
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.await
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.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth discovery json: {e}")))?;
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let auth = v
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.get("authorization_endpoint")
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.and_then(Value::as_str)
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.ok_or_else(|| {
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AgentError::Llm("oauth discovery: authorization_endpoint missing".into())
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})?
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.to_string();
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let token = v
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.get("token_endpoint")
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.and_then(Value::as_str)
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.ok_or_else(|| AgentError::Llm("oauth discovery: token_endpoint missing".into()))?
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.to_string();
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Ok(OidcEndpoints {
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authorization_endpoint: auth,
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token_endpoint: token,
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})
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}
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/// Persist a token to disk and the in-memory cell.
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fn save(&self, state: &mut Option<CachedToken>, token: CachedToken) -> Result<(), AgentError> {
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let body = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&token)
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.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth cache serialize: {e}")))?;
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// Atomic rename so a concurrent reader never sees a partial write.
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let tmp = self.cache_path.with_extension("json.tmp");
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fs::write(&tmp, &body)
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.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth cache write {tmp:?}: {e}")))?;
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fs::rename(&tmp, &self.cache_path)
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.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth cache rename: {e}")))?;
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*state = Some(token);
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Exchange a refresh token for a fresh access token.
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async fn refresh(
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&self,
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endpoints: &OidcEndpoints,
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refresh_token: &str,
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) -> Result<CachedToken, AgentError> {
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let params = [
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("grant_type", "refresh_token"),
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("refresh_token", refresh_token),
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("client_id", &self.cfg.client_id),
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];
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let resp = self
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.http
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.post(&endpoints.token_endpoint)
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.form(¶ms)
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.send()
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.await
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.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth refresh: {e}")))?;
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if !resp.status().is_success() {
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let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
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return Err(AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth refresh failed: {body}")));
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}
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let v: Value = resp
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.json()
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.await
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.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth refresh json: {e}")))?;
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token_from_response(&v, Some(refresh_token))
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}
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/// Run the full browser-mediated Authorization Code + PKCE flow.
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/// Caller must hold a TTY/browser: this opens a window and blocks.
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pub async fn interactive_login(&self) -> Result<(), AgentError> {
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let endpoints = self.endpoints().await?;
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let token = browser_pkce_flow(&self.http, &self.cfg, &endpoints).await?;
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let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
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self.save(&mut state, token)?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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#[async_trait]
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impl TokenSource for PkceOAuthTokenSource {
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async fn bearer(&self) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
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let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
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// 1. In-memory cache hit, still fresh.
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if let Some(tok) = state.as_ref() {
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if !is_expired(tok) {
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return Ok(tok.access_token.clone());
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}
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}
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// 2. Re-read disk — another process may have refreshed already.
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if let Some(disk_tok) = read_cache(&self.cache_path) {
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if !is_expired(&disk_tok) {
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let bearer = disk_tok.access_token.clone();
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*state = Some(disk_tok);
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return Ok(bearer);
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}
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}
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// 3. Try refresh if we have a refresh token. Discover endpoints once
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// here — deliberately hoisted above the refresh-token check so the
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// browser flow at step 5 (which also needs them) reuses this call.
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let endpoints = self.endpoints().await?;
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let refresh = state.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.refresh_token.clone());
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if let Some(rt) = refresh {
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match self.refresh(&endpoints, &rt).await {
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Ok(fresh) => {
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let bearer = fresh.access_token.clone();
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self.save(&mut state, fresh)?;
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return Ok(bearer);
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}
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Err(e) => {
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tracing::warn!(error = %e, "oauth refresh failed; falling back to browser flow");
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}
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}
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// 4. Re-read disk after refresh failure — another process may have won the race.
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if let Some(disk_tok) = read_cache(&self.cache_path) {
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if !is_expired(&disk_tok) {
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let bearer = disk_tok.access_token.clone();
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*state = Some(disk_tok);
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return Ok(bearer);
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}
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}
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}
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// 5. No usable cache: full browser dance.
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let fresh = browser_pkce_flow(&self.http, &self.cfg, &endpoints).await?;
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let bearer = fresh.access_token.clone();
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self.save(&mut state, fresh)?;
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Ok(bearer)
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}
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async fn bearer_no_browser(&self) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
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self.try_bearer_no_browser().await
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}
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/// Force-refresh after a 401, never touching the browser flow.
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///
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/// `rejected` is the access token the server just 401'd. Coalescing keys
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/// off token *identity*, not the expiry clock: a 401 means the token was
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/// rejected while it still looked locally fresh, so `is_expired()` would
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/// say "keep it" and no grant would ever run. Instead, under the lock we
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/// compare the current cached token to `rejected` — if they differ, a
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/// concurrent caller (this process or a sibling) already refreshed, so we
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/// return the new token without burning a second grant. If they still
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/// match, this is the rejected token and we run the refresh-token grant
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/// unconditionally. The whole check→refresh→save runs under one lock hold
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/// so concurrent callers serialize. On any failure the refresh token is
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/// preserved (never nulled) and the error is terminal `LlmAuth` — no
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/// browser, no hang.
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async fn refresh_now(&self, rejected: &str) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
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let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
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// 1. Coalesce by identity: if the cached token (in-memory, then disk)
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// is no longer the one the server rejected, someone already
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// refreshed it. Return that instead of grabbing another grant.
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if let Some(tok) = state.as_ref() {
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if tok.access_token != rejected {
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return Ok(tok.access_token.clone());
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}
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}
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if let Some(disk_tok) = read_cache(&self.cache_path) {
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if disk_tok.access_token != rejected {
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let bearer = disk_tok.access_token.clone();
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*state = Some(disk_tok);
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return Ok(bearer);
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}
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}
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// 2. The cached token is still the rejected one. Run the refresh-token
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// grant unconditionally — the expiry clock can't be trusted here, a
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// locally-fresh token is exactly what got 401'd.
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let refresh = state.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.refresh_token.clone());
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let Some(rt) = refresh else {
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return Err(AgentError::LlmAuth(
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"token rejected and no refresh token available".into(),
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));
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};
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let endpoints = self.endpoints().await?;
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match self.refresh(&endpoints, &rt).await {
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Ok(fresh) => {
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let bearer = fresh.access_token.clone();
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self.save(&mut state, fresh)?;
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Ok(bearer)
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}
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// 3. Refresh token is itself dead. Terminal — surfacing LlmAuth
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// stops the retry loop instead of falling to the browser flow,
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// which would hang a headless harness.
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Err(e) => Err(AgentError::LlmAuth(format!("token refresh failed: {e}"))),
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}
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}
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}
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impl PkceOAuthTokenSource {
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/// Return a bearer token from cache or refresh, **never** opening a browser.
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///
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/// Follows the same steps as [`bearer`](TokenSource::bearer) but stops at
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/// step 4 — if no usable token is available after cache + refresh attempts,
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/// returns `Err(LlmAuth(...))` instead of launching the browser PKCE flow.
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/// Used by model-discovery paths that must not block on user interaction.
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pub(crate) async fn try_bearer_no_browser(&self) -> Result<String, AgentError> {
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let mut state = self.state.lock().await;
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// 1. In-memory cache hit, still fresh.
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if let Some(tok) = state.as_ref() {
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if !is_expired(tok) {
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return Ok(tok.access_token.clone());
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}
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}
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// 2. Re-read disk — another process may have refreshed already.
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if let Some(disk_tok) = read_cache(&self.cache_path) {
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if !is_expired(&disk_tok) {
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let bearer = disk_tok.access_token.clone();
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*state = Some(disk_tok);
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return Ok(bearer);
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}
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}
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// 3. Try refresh if we have a refresh token. Endpoints are discovered
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// lazily here — only when a refresh token is actually present — so
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// that an unreachable OIDC discovery URL cannot prevent the
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// no-token/no-cache path from returning `LlmAuth` (graceful
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// fallback) instead of `Llm` (hard error).
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let refresh = state.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.refresh_token.clone());
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if let Some(rt) = refresh {
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let endpoints = self.endpoints().await?;
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match self.refresh(&endpoints, &rt).await {
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Ok(fresh) => {
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let bearer = fresh.access_token.clone();
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self.save(&mut state, fresh)?;
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return Ok(bearer);
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}
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Err(e) => {
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tracing::warn!(error = %e, "oauth refresh failed during model discovery");
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}
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}
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// 4. Re-read disk after refresh failure.
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if let Some(disk_tok) = read_cache(&self.cache_path) {
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if !is_expired(&disk_tok) {
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let bearer = disk_tok.access_token.clone();
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*state = Some(disk_tok);
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return Ok(bearer);
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}
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}
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}
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|
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// No usable token — return error instead of opening a browser.
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Err(AgentError::LlmAuth(
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"no cached Databricks token; run `buzz-agent auth databricks` first".into(),
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))
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}
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}
|
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|
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// ---- helpers -------------------------------------------------------------
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|
|
|
/// Aborts a spawned task when dropped. Used to guarantee the localhost
|
|
/// callback server doesn't outlive a failed/abandoned PKCE attempt.
|
|
struct AbortOnDrop(tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>);
|
|
|
|
impl Drop for AbortOnDrop {
|
|
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
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self.0.abort();
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}
|
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}
|
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|
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fn is_expired(t: &CachedToken) -> bool {
|
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let Some(exp) = t.expires_at else {
|
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return false;
|
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};
|
|
let now = SystemTime::now()
|
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.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
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.map(|d| d.as_secs())
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.unwrap_or(0);
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|
now + TOKEN_REFRESH_LEEWAY.as_secs() >= exp
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn cache_path_for(cfg: &PkceOAuthConfig) -> Result<PathBuf, AgentError> {
|
|
let mut h = sha2::Sha256::new();
|
|
h.update(cfg.discovery_url.as_bytes());
|
|
h.update(b"|");
|
|
h.update(cfg.client_id.as_bytes());
|
|
h.update(b"|");
|
|
h.update(cfg.scopes.join(",").as_bytes());
|
|
let hash = hex::encode(h.finalize());
|
|
|
|
let dir = match &cfg.cache_dir_override {
|
|
Some(p) => p.join(&cfg.cache_namespace),
|
|
None => dirs::home_dir()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| AgentError::Llm("oauth cache: home directory not found".into()))?
|
|
.join(".config")
|
|
.join("buzz-agent")
|
|
.join("oauth")
|
|
.join(&cfg.cache_namespace),
|
|
};
|
|
Ok(dir.join(format!("{hash}.json")))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn read_cache(path: &PathBuf) -> Option<CachedToken> {
|
|
let body = fs::read(path).ok()?;
|
|
serde_json::from_slice(&body).ok()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Parse a token-endpoint JSON response. Fails loudly when `access_token`
|
|
/// is missing or empty — without this, a malformed server response would
|
|
/// be cached and `bearer()` would silently return `""` until the entry
|
|
/// expires or is deleted by hand.
|
|
fn token_from_response(
|
|
v: &Value,
|
|
fallback_refresh: Option<&str>,
|
|
) -> Result<CachedToken, AgentError> {
|
|
let access_token = v
|
|
.get("access_token")
|
|
.and_then(Value::as_str)
|
|
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| AgentError::Llm("oauth: token response missing/empty access_token".into()))?
|
|
.to_string();
|
|
let refresh_token = v
|
|
.get("refresh_token")
|
|
.and_then(Value::as_str)
|
|
.map(str::to_string)
|
|
.or_else(|| fallback_refresh.map(str::to_string));
|
|
let expires_at = v.get("expires_in").and_then(Value::as_u64).map(|secs| {
|
|
SystemTime::now()
|
|
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
|
|
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
|
|
.unwrap_or(0)
|
|
+ secs
|
|
});
|
|
Ok(CachedToken {
|
|
access_token,
|
|
refresh_token,
|
|
expires_at,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// PKCE pieces: URL-safe random verifier (~64 chars) and its SHA-256
|
|
/// challenge (RFC 7636 §4.2).
|
|
fn pkce_pair() -> Result<(String, String), AgentError> {
|
|
let mut bytes = [0u8; 48];
|
|
getrandom::fill(&mut bytes).map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("pkce rng: {e}")))?;
|
|
let verifier = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes);
|
|
let challenge = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
|
|
.encode(sha2::Sha256::digest(verifier.as_bytes()));
|
|
Ok((verifier, challenge))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn random_state() -> Result<String, AgentError> {
|
|
let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];
|
|
getrandom::fill(&mut bytes).map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("state rng: {e}")))?;
|
|
Ok(base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Spin up a localhost callback server, open the authorize URL in a
|
|
/// browser, wait up to [`BROWSER_AUTH_TIMEOUT`] for the redirect, then
|
|
/// exchange the code for a token.
|
|
async fn browser_pkce_flow(
|
|
http: &Client,
|
|
cfg: &PkceOAuthConfig,
|
|
endpoints: &OidcEndpoints,
|
|
) -> Result<CachedToken, AgentError> {
|
|
use axum::{extract::Query, response::Html, routing::get, Router};
|
|
use std::collections::HashMap;
|
|
use std::net::SocketAddr;
|
|
use tokio::sync::oneshot;
|
|
|
|
let (verifier, challenge) = pkce_pair()?;
|
|
let state = random_state()?;
|
|
|
|
let (tx, rx) = oneshot::channel::<Result<String, String>>();
|
|
let tx = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Some(tx)));
|
|
|
|
let expected_state = state.clone();
|
|
let app = Router::new().route(
|
|
"/",
|
|
get(move |Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>| {
|
|
let tx = Arc::clone(&tx);
|
|
let expected = expected_state.clone();
|
|
async move {
|
|
let result = match (params.get("code"), params.get("state")) {
|
|
(Some(code), Some(st)) if st == &expected => Ok(code.clone()),
|
|
(Some(_), Some(_)) => Err("state mismatch".to_string()),
|
|
_ => Err(params
|
|
.get("error")
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.unwrap_or_else(|| "missing code".into())),
|
|
};
|
|
if let Some(sender) = tx.lock().await.take() {
|
|
let _ = sender.send(result.clone());
|
|
}
|
|
match result {
|
|
Ok(_) => Html(
|
|
"<h2>Buzz: signed in</h2><p>You can close this window.</p>".to_string(),
|
|
),
|
|
Err(e) => Html(format!("<h2>Buzz auth failed</h2><pre>{e}</pre>")),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 0)))
|
|
.await
|
|
.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth callback bind: {e}")))?;
|
|
let port = listener
|
|
.local_addr()
|
|
.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth callback addr: {e}")))?
|
|
.port();
|
|
let redirect_uri = format!("http://localhost:{port}");
|
|
|
|
// `_server` is held until this function returns; the drop guard aborts
|
|
// the axum task on every exit path (timeout, callback error, token
|
|
// exchange failure, or success), so we never leak a listener bound to
|
|
// 127.0.0.1 past the auth attempt.
|
|
let _server = AbortOnDrop(tokio::spawn(async move {
|
|
let _ = axum::serve(listener, app).await;
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
let auth_url = format!(
|
|
"{}?response_type=code&client_id={}&redirect_uri={}&scope={}&state={}&code_challenge={}&code_challenge_method=S256",
|
|
endpoints.authorization_endpoint,
|
|
urlencoding::encode(&cfg.client_id),
|
|
urlencoding::encode(&redirect_uri),
|
|
urlencoding::encode(&cfg.scopes.join(" ")),
|
|
urlencoding::encode(&state),
|
|
urlencoding::encode(&challenge),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
eprintln!("Opening browser for authentication. If it doesn't open, visit:\n {auth_url}");
|
|
let _ = webbrowser::open(&auth_url);
|
|
|
|
let code = tokio::time::timeout(BROWSER_AUTH_TIMEOUT, rx)
|
|
.await
|
|
.map_err(|_| AgentError::Llm("oauth: browser auth timed out".into()))?
|
|
.map_err(|_| AgentError::Llm("oauth: callback sender dropped".into()))?
|
|
.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth callback: {e}")))?;
|
|
|
|
// Exchange code for token.
|
|
let params = [
|
|
("grant_type", "authorization_code"),
|
|
("code", &code),
|
|
("redirect_uri", &redirect_uri),
|
|
("code_verifier", &verifier),
|
|
("client_id", &cfg.client_id),
|
|
];
|
|
let resp = http
|
|
.post(&endpoints.token_endpoint)
|
|
.form(¶ms)
|
|
.send()
|
|
.await
|
|
.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth exchange: {e}")))?;
|
|
if !resp.status().is_success() {
|
|
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
|
|
return Err(AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth exchange failed: {body}")));
|
|
}
|
|
let v: Value = resp
|
|
.json()
|
|
.await
|
|
.map_err(|e| AgentError::Llm(format!("oauth exchange json: {e}")))?;
|
|
token_from_response(&v, None)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use super::*;
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn pkce_pair_produces_valid_challenge() {
|
|
let (verifier, challenge) = pkce_pair().unwrap();
|
|
assert!(verifier.len() >= 43);
|
|
let expected = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
|
|
.encode(sha2::Sha256::digest(verifier.as_bytes()));
|
|
assert_eq!(expected, challenge);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn cached_token_no_expiry_is_not_expired() {
|
|
let t = CachedToken {
|
|
access_token: "x".into(),
|
|
refresh_token: None,
|
|
expires_at: None,
|
|
};
|
|
assert!(!is_expired(&t));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn cached_token_far_future_is_not_expired() {
|
|
let future = SystemTime::now()
|
|
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.as_secs()
|
|
+ 3600;
|
|
let t = CachedToken {
|
|
access_token: "x".into(),
|
|
refresh_token: None,
|
|
expires_at: Some(future),
|
|
};
|
|
assert!(!is_expired(&t));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn cached_token_within_leeway_is_expired() {
|
|
let near = SystemTime::now()
|
|
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.as_secs()
|
|
+ 10; // 10s away, leeway is 60s → counts as expired
|
|
let t = CachedToken {
|
|
access_token: "x".into(),
|
|
refresh_token: None,
|
|
expires_at: Some(near),
|
|
};
|
|
assert!(is_expired(&t));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn cache_path_uses_platform_home_directory() {
|
|
let cfg = PkceOAuthConfig {
|
|
discovery_url: "https://example.com/.well-known".into(),
|
|
client_id: "abc".into(),
|
|
scopes: vec!["a".into(), "b".into()],
|
|
cache_namespace: "demo".into(),
|
|
cache_dir_override: None,
|
|
};
|
|
let p = cache_path_for(&cfg).unwrap();
|
|
let expected_dir = dirs::home_dir()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.join(".config")
|
|
.join("buzz-agent")
|
|
.join("oauth")
|
|
.join("demo");
|
|
assert_eq!(p.parent(), Some(expected_dir.as_path()));
|
|
assert_eq!(p.extension().and_then(|s| s.to_str()), Some("json"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn token_from_response_uses_fallback_refresh() {
|
|
let v: Value = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"access_token":"abc","expires_in":3600}"#).unwrap();
|
|
let t = token_from_response(&v, Some("old-refresh")).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(t.access_token, "abc");
|
|
assert_eq!(t.refresh_token.as_deref(), Some("old-refresh"));
|
|
assert!(t.expires_at.is_some());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn token_from_response_rejects_missing_access_token() {
|
|
let v: Value = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"expires_in":3600}"#).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(token_from_response(&v, None).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn token_from_response_rejects_empty_access_token() {
|
|
let v: Value = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"access_token":""}"#).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(token_from_response(&v, None).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_bearer_reuses_disk_token_after_expiry() {
|
|
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
|
let cfg = PkceOAuthConfig {
|
|
discovery_url: "https://example.com/.well-known".into(),
|
|
client_id: "test-client".into(),
|
|
scopes: vec!["offline_access".into()],
|
|
cache_namespace: "test".into(),
|
|
cache_dir_override: Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
|
|
};
|
|
let source = PkceOAuthTokenSource::new(cfg).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Expire the in-memory state.
|
|
{
|
|
let mut state = source.state.lock().await;
|
|
*state = Some(CachedToken {
|
|
access_token: "stale".into(),
|
|
refresh_token: None,
|
|
expires_at: Some(0), // long expired
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Write a valid token to disk (simulating another process refreshing).
|
|
let future_exp = SystemTime::now()
|
|
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.as_secs()
|
|
+ 7200;
|
|
let fresh_token = CachedToken {
|
|
access_token: "fresh-from-disk".into(),
|
|
refresh_token: Some("rt".into()),
|
|
expires_at: Some(future_exp),
|
|
};
|
|
let body = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&fresh_token).unwrap();
|
|
fs::write(&source.cache_path, &body).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// bearer() should pick up the disk token without any network call.
|
|
let result = source.bearer().await.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(result, "fresh-from-disk");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_bearer_falls_through_to_browser_when_disk_also_expired() {
|
|
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
|
let cfg = PkceOAuthConfig {
|
|
discovery_url: "https://example.com/.well-known".into(),
|
|
client_id: "test-client".into(),
|
|
scopes: vec!["offline_access".into()],
|
|
cache_namespace: "test".into(),
|
|
cache_dir_override: Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
|
|
};
|
|
let source = PkceOAuthTokenSource::new(cfg).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Expire the in-memory state.
|
|
{
|
|
let mut state = source.state.lock().await;
|
|
*state = Some(CachedToken {
|
|
access_token: "stale".into(),
|
|
refresh_token: None,
|
|
expires_at: Some(0),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Write an expired token to disk too.
|
|
let expired_token = CachedToken {
|
|
access_token: "also-stale".into(),
|
|
refresh_token: None,
|
|
expires_at: Some(0),
|
|
};
|
|
let body = serde_json::to_vec_pretty(&expired_token).unwrap();
|
|
fs::write(&source.cache_path, &body).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// bearer() should fall through past the disk check.
|
|
// It will fail at the endpoints() discovery call since there's no server,
|
|
// which proves it didn't short-circuit on the expired disk token.
|
|
let result = source.bearer().await;
|
|
assert!(result.is_err());
|
|
let err_msg = format!("{}", result.unwrap_err());
|
|
assert!(
|
|
err_msg.contains("oauth discovery"),
|
|
"expected discovery error, got: {err_msg}"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// `try_bearer_no_browser` with an empty cache and no refresh token must
|
|
/// return `LlmAuth` immediately — it must NOT attempt OIDC discovery even
|
|
/// when the `discovery_url` is unreachable/invalid. This guards the
|
|
/// regression where `endpoints()` was called unconditionally before the
|
|
/// refresh-token check, causing an `Llm` error (hard failure) instead of
|
|
/// the intended graceful `LlmAuth` fallback.
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_try_bearer_no_browser_empty_cache_no_refresh_returns_llm_auth_without_discovery()
|
|
{
|
|
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
|
// Intentionally invalid/unreachable discovery URL — if endpoints() is
|
|
// called, the test will get an `Llm` error and the assertion below fails.
|
|
let cfg = PkceOAuthConfig {
|
|
discovery_url: "https://invalid.example.test/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server"
|
|
.into(),
|
|
client_id: "test-client".into(),
|
|
scopes: vec!["offline_access".into()],
|
|
cache_namespace: "test".into(),
|
|
cache_dir_override: Some(dir.path().to_path_buf()),
|
|
};
|
|
let source = PkceOAuthTokenSource::new(cfg).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Empty in-memory state (no token, no refresh token).
|
|
{
|
|
let mut state = source.state.lock().await;
|
|
*state = None;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No disk cache file either — dir is empty.
|
|
|
|
let result = source.try_bearer_no_browser().await;
|
|
assert!(result.is_err(), "expected Err, got Ok");
|
|
match result.unwrap_err() {
|
|
AgentError::LlmAuth(_) => {} // correct: graceful fallback
|
|
other => panic!(
|
|
"expected LlmAuth (no discovery attempted), got: {other:?}\n\
|
|
This means endpoints() was called before the refresh-token check."
|
|
),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|