Files
buzz/mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart
Taylor HoandGitHub d8281b9c93 feat(mobile): require device authentication for identity export (#5116)
**Category:** new-feature
**User Impact:** Mobile users must confirm with Face ID, biometrics, or
their device passcode before sending their Buzz identity to Desktop.

**Problem:** A signed-in phone could send its full identity, including
the `nsec`, to a desktop without fresh local verification.

**Solution:** Require OS device authentication before opening the
identity-recovery scanner, retain that authorization only for the active
pairing session and short pairing window, and require fresh
authentication again if it expires before the identity payload is sent.
Normal app opening, identity import, and community removal remain
unchanged.

## Screencasts

| Enable Face ID | Use Face ID |
| --- | --- |
| ![Enabling Face ID during identity
import](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/5116/enable-face-id.gif)
| ![Using Face ID for identity
export](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/5116/use-face-id.gif)
|

<details>
<summary>File changes</summary>

**Android and iOS integration**
- `mobile/android/app/build.gradle.kts` declares the AppCompat
dependency required by the biometric activity theme.
-
`mobile/android/app/src/main/kotlin/xyz/block/buzz/mobile/MainActivity.kt`
uses the activity type required by the system authentication prompt.
- `mobile/android/app/src/main/res/values/styles.xml` and
`mobile/android/app/src/main/res/values-night/styles.xml` use the
compatible launch theme.
- `mobile/ios/Podfile.lock` records the native local-authentication
dependency.
- `mobile/ios/Runner/Info.plist` explains why Buzz requests Face ID
access.

**Identity policy and pairing flow**
- `mobile/lib/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart` wraps OS
authentication and maps platform errors to stable app-level outcomes.
- `mobile/lib/shared/community/community.dart` and
`mobile/lib/shared/community/community_storage.dart` persist the
sensitive-action policy.
- `mobile/lib/features/invites/invite_join_provider.dart` assigns the
explicit policy for invite-created communities.
- `mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart` gates export,
binds grants to the active community/session, reauthenticates expired
grants, and clears grants on every terminal path.
- `mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_page.dart` lets users choose
biometric protection while importing an identity.
- `mobile/lib/features/settings/settings_page.dart` wires pairing into
settings.
- `mobile/lib/features/settings/settings_page/connection_section.dart`
authenticates before opening export recovery and bounds the
foreground-resume wait.
- `mobile/pubspec.yaml` and `mobile/pubspec.lock` add and lock
`local_auth`.

**Coverage**
- `mobile/test/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer_test.dart`
covers native result mapping, unsupported devices, and single-flight
behavior.
- `mobile/test/shared/community/community_test.dart` and
`mobile/test/shared/community/community_storage_test.dart` cover policy
defaults and persistence.
- `mobile/test/features/invites/invite_join_provider_test.dart` covers
the invite policy.
- `mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_page_test.dart` covers import
protection controls.
- `mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_provider_test.dart` covers
export/import authorization, stale/reset/concurrent guards, malformed
payload cleanup, and no-export failure paths.
- `mobile/test/features/settings/connection_section_test.dart` covers
the tap gate, lifecycle resume, and timeout behavior.

</details>

## Reproduction steps

1. Pair an identity into the mobile app.
2. Open Settings and choose “Send identity to desktop.”
3. Verify Face ID, biometrics, or the device passcode is required before
the recovery scanner opens.
4. Cancel device authentication and verify the scanner does not open and
no identity transfer begins.
5. Authenticate, scan a Desktop recovery code, confirm the SAS, and
verify the identity transfer completes.

## Validation

At `be5620f5f10aa6cc16e86a4f01f102f3d9aeef9b`:
- `cd mobile && ../bin/flutter analyze` — no issues
- `cd mobile && ../bin/flutter test` — 1,368 tests passed
- `cd mobile/android && JAVA_HOME=$(/usr/libexec/java_home -v 21)
./gradlew app:assembleDebug` — debug APK assembled successfully

---------

Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
2026-08-15 18:34:02 -07:00

970 lines
30 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:math' as math;
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import '../../shared/auth/auth.dart';
import '../../shared/crypto/ecdh.dart';
import '../../shared/crypto/nip44.dart';
import '../../shared/relay/relay.dart';
import '../../shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart';
import 'pairing_crypto.dart';
import 'pairing_socket.dart';
/// HTTP client used by [PairingNotifier] for the validation request.
final pairingHttpClientProvider = Provider<http.Client>((ref) {
final client = http.Client();
ref.onDispose(client.close);
return client;
});
enum PairingStatus {
idle,
connecting,
confirmingSas,
transferring,
storing,
success,
error,
}
class PairingState {
final PairingStatus status;
final String? errorMessage;
final String? sasCode;
final bool userConfirmedSas;
final bool sendsIdentityToDesktop;
final bool protectSensitiveActions;
final bool authorizationInProgress;
const PairingState({
this.status = PairingStatus.idle,
this.errorMessage,
this.sasCode,
this.userConfirmedSas = false,
this.sendsIdentityToDesktop = false,
this.protectSensitiveActions = true,
this.authorizationInProgress = false,
});
PairingState copyWith({
PairingStatus? status,
String? errorMessage,
String? sasCode,
bool? userConfirmedSas,
bool? sendsIdentityToDesktop,
bool? protectSensitiveActions,
bool? authorizationInProgress,
bool clearErrorMessage = false,
}) => PairingState(
status: status ?? this.status,
errorMessage: clearErrorMessage ? null : errorMessage ?? this.errorMessage,
sasCode: sasCode ?? this.sasCode,
userConfirmedSas: userConfirmedSas ?? this.userConfirmedSas,
sendsIdentityToDesktop:
sendsIdentityToDesktop ?? this.sendsIdentityToDesktop,
protectSensitiveActions:
protectSensitiveActions ?? this.protectSensitiveActions,
authorizationInProgress:
authorizationInProgress ?? this.authorizationInProgress,
);
}
typedef PairingSocketFactory =
PairingSocket Function({
required String wsUrl,
required String ephemeralPrivkey,
required void Function(List<dynamic> message) onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
});
typedef PairingCredentialValidator =
Future<void> Function({required String relayUrl, required String? nsec});
const identityExportAuthorizationTtl = Duration(minutes: 2);
final identityExportClockProvider = Provider<DateTime Function()>((ref) {
return DateTime.now;
});
class PairingNotifier extends Notifier<PairingState> {
final PairingSocketFactory _socketFactory;
final PairingCredentialValidator? _credentialValidator;
PairingSocket? _socket;
Timer? _sessionTimeout;
Community? _identityExportCommunity;
bool _identityExportBiometricOnly = false;
PairingNotifier({
PairingSocketFactory? socketFactory,
PairingCredentialValidator? credentialValidator,
}) : _socketFactory = socketFactory ?? _createPairingSocket,
_credentialValidator = credentialValidator;
static PairingSocket _createPairingSocket({
required String wsUrl,
required String ephemeralPrivkey,
required void Function(List<dynamic> message) onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
}) => PairingSocket(
wsUrl: wsUrl,
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
@override
PairingState build() => const PairingState();
Future<void> pair(String rawInput) async {
if (state.status == PairingStatus.connecting ||
state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.status == PairingStatus.transferring) {
return;
}
final trimmed = rawInput.trim();
if (trimmed.startsWith('nostrpair://')) {
return _pairNipAb(trimmed);
}
// Legacy buzz:// flow.
return _pairLegacy(trimmed);
}
Future<bool> authorizeIdentityExport({required Community community}) async {
if (state.authorizationInProgress) return false;
final biometricOnly =
community.sensitiveActionPolicy == SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled;
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(
authorizationInProgress: true,
clearErrorMessage: true,
);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizationSessionProvider)
.authorize(biometricOnly: biometricOnly);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration) return false;
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
state = state.copyWith(
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _authorizationError(result),
);
return false;
}
_identityExportCommunity = community;
_identityExportBiometricOnly = biometricOnly;
_identityExportAuthorizedAt = ref.read(identityExportClockProvider)();
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: false);
return true;
}
/// Confirm that the SAS code matches. Called by the UI after user approval.
void confirmSas() {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
_userConfirmedSas = true;
state = state.copyWith(userConfirmedSas: true);
if (_sasConfirmReceived) unawaited(_continueAfterSas());
}
void setProtectSensitiveActions(bool value) {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.sendsIdentityToDesktop ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
state = state.copyWith(protectSensitiveActions: value);
}
Future<void> _continueAfterSas() async {
if (!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (_sendIdentityToSource && !_exportIdentityIsCurrent()) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
errorMessage:
'The active community changed. Start identity export again.',
);
return;
}
final authorizedAt = _identityExportAuthorizedAt;
final elapsed = authorizedAt == null
? null
: ref.read(identityExportClockProvider)().difference(authorizedAt);
final hasFreshExportAuthorization =
elapsed != null &&
!elapsed.isNegative &&
elapsed < identityExportAuthorizationTtl;
if (_sendIdentityToSource && !hasFreshExportAuthorization) {
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: true);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizationSessionProvider)
.authorize(biometricOnly: _identityExportBiometricOnly);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
!state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _authorizationError(result),
);
return;
}
} else if (!_sendIdentityToSource && state.protectSensitiveActions) {
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: true);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider)
.authorizeBiometricProtection();
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
!state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _biometricProtectionError(result),
);
return;
}
}
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
status: PairingStatus.transferring,
authorizationInProgress: false,
);
if (_sendIdentityToSource) {
_sendIdentityPayload();
} else {
final pending = _pendingPayload;
if (pending != null) {
_pendingPayload = null;
_handlePayload(pending);
}
}
}
static String _biometricProtectionError(
DeviceAuthResult result,
) => switch (result) {
DeviceAuthResult.cancelled =>
'Biometric setup was cancelled. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.unavailable =>
'Biometrics are unavailable. Enroll Face ID or biometrics and try again, or turn this option off.',
DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut =>
'Biometrics are locked. Unlock them in system settings and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.failed =>
'Biometric confirmation failed. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.success => '',
};
static String _authorizationError(
DeviceAuthResult result,
) => switch (result) {
DeviceAuthResult.cancelled =>
'Identity confirmation was cancelled. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.unavailable =>
'Device authentication is unavailable. Configure a device passcode or biometrics and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut =>
'Device authentication is locked. Unlock it in system settings and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.failed =>
'Identity confirmation failed. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.success => '',
};
/// Deny the SAS code. Send abort and terminate.
void denySas() {
_sendAbort('sas_mismatch');
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'SAS code mismatch — pairing cancelled for security.',
);
}
void reset() {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState();
}
void _cleanup() {
_pairingGeneration++;
_sessionTimeout?.cancel();
_sessionTimeout = null;
_socket?.dispose();
_socket = null;
_processedEventIds.clear();
_sasConfirmReceived = false;
_userConfirmedSas = false;
_pendingPayload = null;
_sendIdentityToSource = false;
_identityExportCommunity = null;
_identityExportBiometricOnly = false;
_identityExportAuthorizedAt = null;
}
// ── NIP-AB pairing flow ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Session state kept between steps.
String? _ephemeralPrivkey;
String? _ephemeralPubkey;
Uint8List? _sessionSecret;
String? _sourcePubkey;
Uint8List? _sessionId;
Uint8List? _sasInput;
Uint8List? _conversationKey;
bool _sasConfirmReceived = false;
bool _userConfirmedSas = false;
bool _sendIdentityToSource = false;
int _pairingGeneration = 0;
DateTime? _identityExportAuthorizedAt;
Map<String, dynamic>? _pendingPayload; // buffered until user confirms SAS
final Set<String> _processedEventIds = {}; // NIP-AB §Duplicate Event Handling
Future<void> _pairNipAb(String uri) async {
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.connecting);
try {
// 1. Parse the nostrpair:// URI.
final qr = parseNostrpairUri(uri);
_sourcePubkey = qr.sourcePubkey;
_sessionSecret = qr.sessionSecret;
_sendIdentityToSource =
Uri.parse(uri).queryParameters['mode'] == 'recover';
final relayWsUrl = qr.relays.first;
// 2. Generate ephemeral keypair.
final keychain = nostr.Keys.generate();
_ephemeralPrivkey = keychain.secret;
_ephemeralPubkey = keychain.public;
// 3. Derive session ID and SAS immediately (we know source pubkey from QR).
_sessionId = deriveSessionId(qr.sessionSecret);
final ecdhShared = ecdhSharedSecret(_ephemeralPrivkey!, qr.sourcePubkey);
final (sasCode, sasInput) = deriveSas(ecdhShared, qr.sessionSecret);
_sasInput = sasInput;
// Pre-compute NIP-44 conversation key for encrypting events.
_conversationKey = getConversationKey(
_ephemeralPrivkey!,
qr.sourcePubkey,
);
// 4. Connect to relay with ephemeral keys.
final socket = _socketFactory(
wsUrl: relayWsUrl,
ephemeralPrivkey: _ephemeralPrivkey!,
onMessage: _handleRelayMessage,
onDisconnected: _handleDisconnected,
);
_socket = socket;
await socket.connect();
if (!socket.isConnected) {
throw StateError('Pairing socket did not reach the connected state');
}
// 5. Subscribe for kind:24134 events tagged to our ephemeral pubkey.
socket.subscribe('pair', 24134, _ephemeralPubkey!);
// 6. Wait briefly for EOSE, then send offer.
// (In practice, we send the offer immediately — the relay will buffer it.)
await Future.delayed(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
// 7. Build and send the offer event.
final offerContent = _encryptMessage({
'type': 'offer',
'version': 1,
'session_id': bytesToHex(_sessionId!),
});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: offerContent,
tags: [
['p', qr.sourcePubkey],
],
);
// 8. Display SAS code and wait for sas-confirm from source.
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
sasCode: formatSas(sasCode),
sendsIdentityToDesktop: _sendIdentityToSource,
protectSensitiveActions: ref.read(relayConfigProvider).nsec == null,
);
// 9. Start 120s session timeout.
_sessionTimeout = Timer(const Duration(seconds: 120), () {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.success &&
state.status != PairingStatus.error) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Pairing session timed out.',
);
}
});
} on FormatException catch (e) {
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Invalid pairing code: ${e.message}',
);
} catch (e) {
debugPrint('Pairing connection error: $e');
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: _friendlyErrorMessage(e),
);
}
}
static String _friendlyErrorMessage(Object error) {
final message = error.toString();
if (message.contains('SocketException') ||
message.contains('Connection refused') ||
message.contains('Network is unreachable') ||
message.contains('No route to host') ||
message.contains('Failed to connect')) {
return 'Could not reach the pairing relay. Check your internet '
'connection and VPN, then try again.';
}
if (error is PairingAuthException) {
return 'The pairing relay rejected authentication. Try creating a new '
'pairing code.';
}
if (error is StateError ||
message.contains('Null check operator used on a null value')) {
return 'Pairing stopped because of an internal error. Please try again.';
}
if (message.contains('HandshakeException') ||
message.contains('CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED')) {
return 'Secure connection failed. Check your network settings '
'and try again.';
}
if (message.contains('TimeoutException') || message.contains('timed out')) {
return 'Connection timed out. Check your internet connection and '
'try again.';
}
return 'Connection failed. Please check your internet connection '
'and try again.';
}
void _handleRelayMessage(List<dynamic> data) {
if (data.isEmpty) return;
final type = data[0] as String;
if (type == 'EVENT' && data.length >= 3) {
final eventJson = data[2] as Map<String, dynamic>;
_handlePairingEvent(eventJson);
}
// Ignore EOSE, NOTICE, etc.
}
void _handlePairingEvent(Map<String, dynamic> eventJson) {
try {
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: validate kind.
final kind = eventJson['kind'] as int?;
if (kind != 24134) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: validate pubkey is from expected source.
final eventPubkey = eventJson['pubkey'] as String?;
if (eventPubkey == null) return;
if (_sourcePubkey != null && eventPubkey != _sourcePubkey) return;
// NIP-AB §Duplicate Event Handling: discard already-processed events.
final eventId = eventJson['id'] as String?;
if (eventId == null) return;
if (_processedEventIds.contains(eventId)) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: check p-tag points to us.
final tags = (eventJson['tags'] as List<dynamic>?) ?? [];
final hasOurPTag = tags.any((t) {
if (t is List && t.length >= 2) {
return t[0] == 'p' && t[1] == _ephemeralPubkey;
}
return false;
});
if (!hasOurPTag) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: verify event signature (NIP-01).
// The nostr package's Event.fromJson verifies id + sig on construction.
try {
final event = nostr.Event.fromJson(jsonEncode(eventJson));
if (event.id != eventId) return; // id mismatch
} catch (_) {
return; // invalid signature or malformed event
}
// Decrypt NIP-44 content.
final content = eventJson['content'] as String?;
if (content == null || content.isEmpty) return;
final decryptKey = getConversationKey(_ephemeralPrivkey!, eventPubkey);
final decrypted = nip44Decrypt(decryptKey, content);
final msg = jsonDecode(decrypted) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final msgType = msg['type'] as String?;
switch (msgType) {
case 'sas-confirm':
_handleSasConfirm(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId); // record after successful processing
case 'payload':
_handlePayload(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'abort':
_handleAbort(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'complete':
_handleComplete(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
}
} catch (e) {
// Silently discard invalid events per NIP-AB §Event Validation.
}
}
void _handleSasConfirm(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas) return;
final receivedHash = msg['transcript_hash'] as String?;
if (receivedHash == null) return;
// Verify transcript hash.
final expectedHash = deriveTranscriptHash(
_sessionId!,
hexToBytes(_sourcePubkey!),
hexToBytes(_ephemeralPubkey!),
_sasInput!,
_sessionSecret!,
);
final receivedBytes = hexToBytes(receivedHash);
if (!constantTimeEquals(receivedBytes, expectedHash)) {
// NIP-AB §Step 3: target MUST send abort with reason "sas_mismatch".
_sendAbort('sas_mismatch');
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Security verification failed — possible attack. Pairing aborted.',
);
return;
}
_sasConfirmReceived = true;
// If the user already tapped "Codes Match", complete the transition now
// that the transcript hash is verified.
if (_userConfirmedSas) {
unawaited(_continueAfterSas());
}
// Otherwise stay in confirmingSas — user must still confirm via confirmSas().
}
bool _exportIdentityIsCurrent() {
final authorizedCommunity = _identityExportCommunity;
final currentConfig = ref.read(relayConfigProvider);
return authorizedCommunity != null &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec != null &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec!.isNotEmpty &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec == currentConfig.nsec &&
authorizedCommunity.relayUrl == currentConfig.storedOrigin;
}
void _sendIdentityPayload() {
if (!_exportIdentityIsCurrent()) {
_sendAbort('identity_changed');
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'The active community changed. Start identity export again.',
);
return;
}
final nsec = _identityExportCommunity!.nsec!;
final content = _encryptMessage({
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'nsec',
'payload': nsec,
});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
}
void _handlePayload(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
// Only accept payload after the transcript hash was verified.
if (!_sasConfirmReceived) return;
// If the user hasn't confirmed SAS yet, buffer the payload.
// It will be processed when confirmSas() is called.
if (state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas) {
_pendingPayload = msg;
return;
}
if (state.status != PairingStatus.transferring) return;
state = state.copyWith(status: PairingStatus.storing);
final payloadType = msg['payload_type'] as String?;
final payload = msg['payload'] as String?;
if (payload == null) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Received empty payload from source.',
);
return;
}
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
final protectSensitiveActions = state.protectSensitiveActions;
unawaited(
_processPayload(
payloadType,
payload,
pairingGeneration: pairingGeneration,
protectSensitiveActions: protectSensitiveActions,
),
);
}
void _handleComplete(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
if (!_sendIdentityToSource || state.status != PairingStatus.transferring) {
return;
}
if (msg['success'] != true) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Desktop could not store the identity.',
);
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.success);
}
void _handleAbort(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
final reason = msg['reason'] as String? ?? 'unknown';
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Source device aborted pairing: $reason',
);
}
Future<void> _processPayload(
String? payloadType,
String payload, {
required int pairingGeneration,
required bool protectSensitiveActions,
}) async {
try {
// Parse the custom payload.
final data = jsonDecode(payload) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final relayUrl = data['relayUrl'] as String?;
final pubkey = data['pubkey'] as String?;
final nsec = data['nsec'] as String?;
if (relayUrl == null) {
throw const FormatException('Missing relayUrl in payload');
}
// Validate relay URL to prevent SSRF via private network addresses.
_validateRelayUrl(relayUrl);
// Validate credentials against the relay via NIP-42 WS handshake.
final credentialValidator = _credentialValidator ?? _validateCredentials;
await credentialValidator(relayUrl: relayUrl, nsec: nsec);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
state.status != PairingStatus.storing ||
_sendIdentityToSource) {
return;
}
// Send complete only after credentials are validated.
_sendComplete(true);
// Store as community and switch to it.
final community = Community.create(
name: Community.nameFromUrl(relayUrl),
relayUrl: relayUrl,
pubkey: pubkey,
nsec: nsec,
sensitiveActionPolicy: protectSensitiveActions
? SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled
: SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
await ref
.read(authProvider.notifier)
.authenticateWithCommunity(community);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
state.status != PairingStatus.storing ||
_sendIdentityToSource) {
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.success);
} catch (e) {
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
state.status != PairingStatus.storing ||
_sendIdentityToSource) {
return;
}
_sendComplete(false);
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Failed to import credentials: $e',
);
}
}
void _sendAbort(String reason) {
try {
final content = _encryptMessage({'type': 'abort', 'reason': reason});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
} catch (_) {
// Best-effort.
}
}
void _sendComplete(bool success) {
try {
final content = _encryptMessage({'type': 'complete', 'success': success});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
} catch (_) {
// Best-effort — complete is advisory per NIP-AB.
}
}
/// Encrypt a message using NIP-44 with the ephemeral conversation key.
String _encryptMessage(Map<String, dynamic> message) {
final plaintext = jsonEncode(message);
return nip44Encrypt(_conversationKey!, plaintext);
}
/// Build and publish a kind:24134 event signed with ephemeral keys.
void _publishEvent({
required int kind,
required String content,
required List<List<String>> tags,
}) {
// Add timestamp jitter (0-30s) for metadata privacy.
final jitter = math.Random.secure().nextInt(31);
final createdAt = (DateTime.now().millisecondsSinceEpoch ~/ 1000) - jitter;
final event = nostr.Event.from(
kind: kind,
content: content,
tags: tags,
secretKey: _ephemeralPrivkey!,
createdAt: createdAt,
);
_socket?.publishEvent(event.toMap());
}
void _handleDisconnected(Object? error) {
if (state.status == PairingStatus.success ||
state.status == PairingStatus.error) {
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Lost connection to pairing relay.',
);
}
// ── Legacy buzz:// flow ───────────────────────────────────────────────
Future<void> _pairLegacy(String rawInput) async {
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.connecting);
try {
final community = _parseLegacyInput(rawInput);
await _validateCredentials(
relayUrl: community.relayUrl,
nsec: community.nsec,
);
await ref
.read(authProvider.notifier)
.authenticateWithCommunity(community);
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.success);
} on FormatException catch (e) {
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Invalid pairing code: ${e.message}',
);
} on RelayException catch (e) {
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Could not connect to relay (${e.statusCode}). '
'Check that the pairing code is valid.',
);
} catch (e) {
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Connection failed. Make sure your device can reach the '
'relay server.',
);
}
}
Future<void> _validateCredentials({
required String relayUrl,
required String? nsec,
}) async {
if (nsec == null || nsec.isEmpty) {
throw const FormatException('Pairing payload missing nsec');
}
final uri = Uri.parse(relayUrl);
final scheme = uri.scheme == 'https' ? 'wss' : 'ws';
final wsUrl = uri.replace(scheme: scheme).toString();
final socket = RelaySocket(
wsUrl: wsUrl,
nsec: nsec,
onMessage: (_) {},
onConnected: () {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
try {
await socket.connect().timeout(const Duration(seconds: 8));
} finally {
await socket.disconnect();
}
}
Community _parseLegacyInput(String raw) {
var payload = raw.trim();
if (payload.startsWith('buzz://')) {
payload = payload.substring('buzz://'.length);
}
final normalized = base64Url.normalize(payload);
final jsonStr = utf8.decode(base64Url.decode(normalized));
final decoded = jsonDecode(jsonStr);
if (decoded is! Map<String, dynamic>) {
throw const FormatException('Pairing payload is not a JSON object');
}
final relayUrl = decoded['relayUrl'] as String?;
if (relayUrl == null) {
throw const FormatException('Missing relayUrl in payload');
}
_validateRelayUrl(relayUrl);
return Community.create(
name: Community.nameFromUrl(relayUrl),
relayUrl: relayUrl,
pubkey: decoded['pubkey'] as String?,
nsec: decoded['nsec'] as String?,
sensitiveActionPolicy: SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
}
void _validateRelayUrl(String url) {
final uri = Uri.parse(url);
if (!kDebugMode && uri.scheme != 'https') {
throw const FormatException('Relay URL must use HTTPS');
}
if (uri.scheme != 'http' && uri.scheme != 'https') {
throw FormatException('Invalid URL scheme: ${uri.scheme}');
}
final host = uri.host.toLowerCase();
if (host == 'localhost' || host == '127.0.0.1' || host == '::1') {
if (!kDebugMode) {
throw const FormatException('Relay URL cannot target localhost');
}
return;
}
final ip = Uri.tryParse('http://$host')?.host ?? host;
if (_isPrivateHost(ip)) {
throw const FormatException(
'Relay URL cannot target private network addresses',
);
}
}
static bool _isPrivateHost(String host) {
final parts = host.split('.');
if (parts.length != 4) return false;
final octets = parts.map(int.tryParse).toList();
if (octets.any((o) => o == null)) return false;
final a = octets[0]!;
final b = octets[1]!;
if (a == 10) return true;
if (a == 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;
if (a == 192 && b == 168) return true;
if (a == 169 && b == 254) return true;
return false;
}
}
final pairingProvider = NotifierProvider<PairingNotifier, PairingState>(
PairingNotifier.new,
);