3 people dcc1231d6d fix(desktop): externalize boot <style> to prevent Tauri CSP nonce override (#5242) ...

## Problem

Two v0.5.6-only regressions were introduced by #4614 (the first enforced
Tauri CSP):

1. **Tab-complete caret regression** — after tab-completing an @mention,
#channel, or :emoji: shortcode, the cursor landed inside the inserted
text instead of after the trailing space. TipTap inserts the correct
text including the trailing space, but without its base stylesheet
(`.ProseMirror { white-space: break-spaces }`) the trailing space
collapses visually and the caret appears mid-name.

2. **Emoji picker unstyled** — the emoji-mart picker rendered as a giant
unstyled layout (oversized search SVG, collapsed grid) because
emoji-mart's shadow-root stylesheet injection was also blocked.

Both symptoms have the same root cause.

## Root Cause

Tauri's build-time asset processor scans `index.html` for inline
`<style>` elements, injects a nonce token, and adds the corresponding
`'nonce-…'` source to `style-src` at runtime. Per the CSP spec, **once a
nonce is present in a directive, the browser ignores `'unsafe-inline'`
for that directive**.

`index.html` contained an inline `<style>` with the boot background
color. When Tauri nonced it and injected `'nonce-…'` into `style-src`,
the intended `style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'` became effectively
`style-src 'self' 'nonce-…'` — blocking any runtime stylesheet injection
not covered by a matching nonce:

- TipTap's `injectCSS()` → `createStyleTag()` injecting `.ProseMirror {
white-space: break-spaces; … }`
- emoji-mart's shadow-root `document.createElement('style')` injection

(Inline scripts follow a separate path — they are SHA-256 hashed, not
nonced.)

This only reproduces in packaged builds (where Tauri's custom protocol
serves the HTML and enforces the policy). `tauri dev` loads from the
Vite dev server and is not affected.

## Fix

Move `html { background-color: #000; }` from an inline `<style>` in
`index.html` to `desktop/public/boot.css`, linked via `<link
rel="stylesheet">`. A linked stylesheet is not subject to Tauri's nonce
injection, so `'unsafe-inline'` in `style-src` applies as declared.

The `<link>` is render-blocking (same as the inline style was), so
boot-flash behaviour is identical.

**The production CSP string is unchanged.** This fix makes the policy
apply as intended — no security properties are altered. Will's follow-up
with the security team (Jordan Mecom / Eli Foster, authors of #4614) is
noted for post-ship.

A Tauri-faithful CSP harness for the Vite dev path (so this class of
regression is visible before a packaged build) is tracked as a separate
follow-up.

## Files Changed

- `desktop/index.html` — replace inline `<style>` with `<link
rel="stylesheet" href="/boot.css" />`
- `desktop/public/boot.css` — new file, the extracted `html {
background-color: #000; }` plus rationale comment
- `desktop/src-tauri/tests/csp.rs` — update comment: nonce for styles,
SHA-256 for the boot script

## Testing

- `just desktop-typecheck` ✅
- `just desktop-test` ✅ (4535/4535)
- `just desktop-tauri-test` ✅ (all Rust tests including `csp.rs`)
- Packaged validation: `pnpm tauri build --debug` completed; compiled
binary bakes `style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'` with no nonce source
injected ✅

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>

2026-08-07 15:05:38 -07:00

..

csp.rs

fix(desktop): externalize boot <style> to prevent Tauri CSP nonce override (#5242)

2026-08-07 15:05:38 -07:00

rodio_mixer_diagnostic.rs

feat(huddle): fix concurrent-speaker mixing + jitter buffer + protocol v2 (up to 10 peers) (#609)

2026-05-18 16:34:52 -04:00