Files
8a2c9af2db feat(deletion): add durable whole-community deletion (#4425)
## Summary

Adds a durable, operator-controlled V1 for deleting an entire Buzz
community without deleting another tenant's data.

The workflow is exposed through `buzz-admin deletions`:

- `sweep` records independent fleet storage-taxonomy observations
- `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, and `approve` manage a deletion request
- `unblock` resumes a fail-closed request after an operator records
remediation identity and reason
- `run` and `drain` execute bounded work

Requests advance through a PostgreSQL-backed state machine and stop at
`retention_pending` after logical deletion has been independently
verified across PostgreSQL, object storage, and Redis.

This PR ships the engine and CLI, not a continuously running worker or
Kubernetes packaging. For V1, a cluster/VM administrator invokes
`/usr/local/bin/buzz-admin` from the existing relay image, for example
with `kubectl exec` or an equivalent container/VM exec path.

## What whole-community V1 removes

For the target community, V1 removes:

- rows from the allowlisted community-scoped PostgreSQL catalog,
including members, profiles, authored events and bodies, DMs, reactions,
mentions, memberships, tokens, workflows, moderation, audit, feedback,
and rate-limit state
- media sidecars and upload-attribution records under
`_meta/<community>/` and `_uploads/<community>/`
- Git repository pointers under `repos/<community>/`
- Redis keys under `buzz:<community>:*`

The community row survives as a permanent tombstone, and deletion
control-plane records remain as evidence of the request, approval,
execution, and result.

## Safety model

Deletion is not a broad `DELETE CASCADE` followed by optimistic cleanup.
The destructive boundaries are durable and fail closed.

### 1. Inventory and approval

- `submit` resolves the target and freezes the schema plus summary-only
storage inventory.
- Approval is bound to the exact request, community, and frozen
inventory digest.
- Unsupported manifest versions, malformed keys inside the target's
owned prefixes, live scoped-table/write-fence coverage drift,
frozen-inventory mismatch, and approval mismatch block execution rather
than guessing. Migration and catalog revision numbers are not
authorization gates; the executor validates the live safety shape
instead.
- Storage inventory is server-side prefix scoped to exactly:
  - `_meta/<community>/`
  - `_uploads/<community>/`
  - `repos/<community>/`
- The deletion path never lists the whole shared bucket and has no
arbitrary per-community object cap. Its listing work is proportional to
the target community's bindings, not total fleet storage.
- Fleet-wide taxonomy sweeps remain independent observability. They
report unknown writer shapes but do not gate deletion submission,
fencing, or destructive progress. Maintainers must add deletion taxonomy
coverage whenever a new community-owned object-key class is introduced;
writer-coverage tests bind the current media and Git writers to that
contract.

### 2. Quiesce, fence, and destructive freeze

- Writes continue through submission, inventory, and approval. They stop
when execution moves the target into `quiescing` and then establishes
the durable fence.
- Already-admitted external effects finish under heartbeated
serving-write leases; the exact admitted lease may renew while the
community is quiescing, but new lease acquisition is rejected. The
executor drains admitted leases before destructive work.
- Invite minting after quiescing begins fails as typed `AccessDenied`
(HTTP 503 at the relay boundary) before an invite can be persisted.
- Database triggers enforce the community write fence across the
complete catalog of community-scoped tables. Startup/readiness and
destructive execution validate that catalog so a newly added but
unfenced table cannot silently escape.
- **Named isolation assumption — fresh write snapshot.** Every writer
transaction that can reach a community-fenced relation must use
PostgreSQL `READ COMMITTED`; each guarded write therefore observes a
statement snapshot no older than acquisition of the community deletion
lock. `REPEATABLE READ` and `SERIALIZABLE` can retain a pre-fence
snapshot and are unsupported for writers. The writer pool refuses
non-`READ COMMITTED` sessions at connection setup, and both SQL fence
functions reject an explicit per-transaction isolation override with
SQLSTATE `25000`. Configuration-delivered bad isolation can surface
through SQLx as a pool-acquire timeout because every `after_connect`
attempt is rejected; the precise `community writes require READ
COMMITTED isolation` reason remains observable when the SQL guard is
reached. Read-only replica transactions are outside this assumption.
- Holding the shared advisory lock until the guarded write executes is a
separate liveness condition: under `READ COMMITTED`, releasing it early
does not permit resurrection because the trigger rechecks the fence, but
it can turn a fleet sweep into a statement-wide SQLSTATE `55000` abort.
- After the fence closes writers, storage is re-enumerated into chunked
side-table rows. Per-prefix counts and digests bind those concrete keys
to the destructive manifest.
- Manifest chunk insertion, update, and deletion are protected after
freeze. This closes the race where an unbound key could otherwise appear
after the manifest was committed.

### 3. Checkpointed destruction

- Target-owned object bindings are deleted from the frozen destructive
manifest in bounded batches with durable progress.
- The concrete key list lives in chunked side-table rows rather than one
request-row JSON value. It supports large communities, resumable
execution, and terminal cleanup.
- Missing objects are accepted as idempotent crash-window outcomes;
malformed ownership, changed evidence, and unexplained target-prefix
drift fail closed.
- PostgreSQL purging remains scoped by `community_id`, including the
guarded NIP-RS hard-delete path discovered with real Desktop kind
`30078` read-state data.
- Redis cleanup explicitly scans and `UNLINK`s only
`buzz:<community_id>:*`. Natural expiry is insufficient because some
keys, including tunnel generation counters used as fencing state, are
deliberately persistent.

### 4. Independent verification

- PostgreSQL logical absence is checked after purge.
- The three target-owned storage prefixes are freshly inventoried again
and must be empty.
- Redis requires two complete empty namespace scans.
- Only after all three stores pass does the request advance through
`logically_verified` to `retention_pending`.

## What V1 deliberately does not erase

### Shared content-addressed storage

Per-community deletion removes bindings, metadata, attribution records,
and Git pointers. It does **not** physically delete fleet-shared CAS
bytes that another community may still reference:

- media blobs and thumbnails
- Git manifests, packs, and indexes (`manifests/`, `packs/`, and `idx/`)

Safe reclamation requires a separate fleet-wide reachability and
retention GC. Unknown keys elsewhere in the shared bucket do not block
one community's deletion; malformed or unrecognized keys inside that
community's three owned prefixes still fail closed.

### External retained copies

The online logical-deletion proof does not erase object
versions/replicas, database backups/WAL, CDN copies, provider retention
copies, or observability exports. Those require their own retention and
purge controls.

### Member-only erasure

This PR erases a whole community. It does not implement the different
operation "erase one npub while preserving the community."

Removing membership or accepting NIP-09 is not member erasure. A
member-only workflow would need to find and selectively remove or redact
authored event content and pubkeys, profile data, DMs, reactions,
mentions, memberships/roles, tokens, workflows/subscriptions, upload
attribution, moderation/audit history, repository attribution, and
identity embedded in tags or JSON. It would also need explicit rules for
ownership transfer, surviving replies and thread metadata, audit-chain
integrity, immutable Git history, and shared-CAS reachability. That
requires a pubkey-level fence and selective graph rewrite; it is a
separate deletion product, not a safe extension of this whole-tenant
worker.

## In scope

- migration `0029_community_deletion.sql`: requests, approvals, leases,
manifest chunks, checkpoints, tombstones, and the universal write-fence
catalog
- durable executor leases, generations, heartbeats, retry/block state,
and resumable stage transitions
- operator-driven `sweep`, `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, `approve`,
`unblock`, `run`, and `drain` commands
- serving-path fences for database writes and external effects across
event ingest, media, Git, workflow, push, invites, mesh/tunnel, and
related paths
- target-prefix-only storage inventory, summary manifests, post-fence
destructive chunks, and bounded batch deletion
- exact community Redis namespace purge and two-pass absence
verification
- cross-community isolation, crash/resume, manifest-integrity,
writer-taxonomy, and schema/migration regressions
- desired-state `schema/schema.sql` support without requiring a SQLx
migration ledger

## Deferred / not covered

- dedicated Helm/chart worker Deployment, service account, secrets,
probes, resources, and network policy
- autonomous `buzz-admin deletions worker` poll loop and worker-only
health server
- least-privilege separation among migration, relay-serving, and
destructive execution roles
- fleet-wide shared-CAS physical GC
- backup/provider/CDN/observability retention completion
- member-only erasure
- provider-native conditional-delete improvements
- a general force-continue escape hatch; permanent safety failures
remain fail closed unless an operator remediates the cause and records
an audited `unblock`

The removed continuous-worker implementation remains deferred; no remote
follow-up branch is claimed by this PR.

## Validation

### Current PR head and repository state

Current pushed head: `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`, rebased
onto `cc9a2f783375e51a6e8d1f2f9d01d5f7e22813d1` (`origin/main` at push
time). The complete PR diff is now 47 files, 9,834 additions, and 517
deletions.

The bespoke source-scanner stack was removed to keep this PR scoped to
community deletion. Tyler/team requested the underlying fenced-write
safety behavior, not `ast-grep`,
`crates/buzz-db/tests/community_fenced_writes.rs`, its 27 fixtures, or
the new `scripts/lints/community_*.yml` rules. Those scanner-specific
files, dependencies, Hermit links, and runner wiring are absent from the
current tree. The production database write fence, startup/destructive
live-catalog validation, and deletion behavior remain.

Source validation on this exact SHA passed:

- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `bash -n scripts/run-tests.sh`
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --all-targets`: 102 passed, 173 skipped,
0 failed
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-deletion --all-targets`: 10 passed, 9
skipped, 0 failed
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-admin --all-targets`: 1 passed, 0 failed
- affected-package/all-target Clippy with warnings denied
- lockfile consistency
- Helm 3.16.4 lint and all 44 chart unit tests
- Helm region controls using that fixture: default
`BUZZ_S3_REGION=us-east-1`, explicit `eu-west-2` override, and
blank-region schema rejection

The prior Kubernetes battery below was run against
`928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04`. It remains useful evidence
for the patch-equivalent production deletion implementation, but it is
**not** claimed as exact-SHA evidence for current head
`359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`; the current cleanup removes
only scanner/test/tooling infrastructure. CI restarted for the new head
after the rebase and is pending. Human review remains
`CHANGES_REQUESTED`.

### Prior-head live Kubernetes deletion and safety gates

The full program used one immutable image, real PostgreSQL, Redis,
MinIO, and a three-relay Kubernetes release:

- source: `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04` (**prior head**)
- image: `buzz-e2e:sha-928992237358`
- immutable image digest:
`sha256:a1a204f4618ac22d9e210be5e5290645a15d79831ae30b0e44379357c8e4a895`
- evidence root:
`/tmp/buzz-e2e/20260807T033025Z-928992237358-full-gates/`
- evidence-manifest digest:
`82875c5bc9bea7370b796a7aef3457b3a1c8306c84c59e0f7388bbb5ad30e865`

Passed gates at that prior head:

- **Chart/operator region:** default `us-east-1`, explicit nondefault
propagation, blank-region schema rejection, live in-pod environment, and
an in-pod taxonomy sweep over 18 objects with zero unknown.
- **Fenced writers and lifecycle:** open-write/fence ordering;
100-attempt anti-starvation; invite, push matcher, and exhausted-reaper
bystander isolation; non-`READ-COMMITTED` rejection; manifest/tombstone
contracts; eight-failure stage block and audited `unblock`.
- **Destructive lifecycle:** submit → approve → run →
`retention_pending`; PostgreSQL tombstone and Redis/S3 verification
true; zero retries/errors; terminal reruns rejected with exit 5.
- **Fresh 10,001-object crash boundary:** exactly two chunks (10,000 +
1). The executor deleted chunk 0 from MinIO while its PostgreSQL stamp
was row-lock-blocked, was killed with `SIGKILL`, left one object and
both stamps absent, then resumed the same request under generation 2 to
zero objects and terminal state.
- **Independent dead-owner recovery:** a dedicated executor claimed
generation 1, blocked before effects, and was killed through containerd
with `SIGKILL` (no TERM cleanup). The request remained owned and
unreclaimable before lease expiry; a successor claimed generation 2
after 60 seconds and completed with two attempts and zero retries.
- **Three-pod socket isolation:** ordinary NIP-42 and joined
huddle-audio target witnesses on every replica received exact `1008 /
community deleted`; healthy-tenant witnesses on those pods remained
live; deleted-host reconnect returned HTTP 404.
- **Health/provenance:** all replicas independently returned ready and
retained the exact image digest before/after destructive runs and an
audio-enabled rolling restart; PostgreSQL, Redis, and MinIO were healthy
at close.

Instrument corrections were retained as evidence rather than counted as
product failures: a foreground PostgreSQL forward caused an initial
`PoolTimedOut`; Kubernetes pod deletion exercised graceful TERM rather
than dead-owner recovery; shell-background socket witnesses died with
their parent; and the first image build hit the corporate TLS proxy.
Detached forwarding/witnesses, containerd `SIGKILL`, and the configured
internal CA/Artifactory mirror produced the discriminating runs without
weakening product security.

### Prior-head cleanup

For the prior-head Kubernetes run, the Helm release was removed,
namespace absence was verified, run-owned Screen sessions were absent,
and that source worktree remained clean. The evidence manifest was
independently recomputed and every indexed artifact passed `shasum -a
256 -c`. The current `359d8402` source worktree is also clean after the
scanner-only cleanup and push.

---------

Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-12 09:25:58 -07:00
..

Buzz Helm Chart

Buzz is a Nostr-based messaging platform for humanagent collaboration: a single relay binary serving WebSocket + REST + web UI, backed by PostgreSQL, Redis, and S3-compatible object storage.

This chart has two operating profiles selected by values:

Profile When What you get
Production (default) Self-hosted multi-tenant, regulated, or GitOps-managed External managed Postgres/Redis/S3, secrets.existingSecret:, no chart-side autogen, HA-capable (replicaCount ≥ 2)
Quickstart (eval) Eval, single-node, one-off demo In-cluster Postgres + Redis + MinIO subcharts/Deployments, chart auto-generates relay + service secrets, single replica

Quickstart (eval only)

helm install buzz oci://ghcr.io/block/buzz/charts/buzz --version 0.1.7 \
  --create-namespace --namespace buzz \
  --set quickstart=true \
  --set postgresql.enabled=true \
  --set redis.enabled=true \
  --set minio.enabled=true \
  --set relayUrl=wss://buzz.example.com \
  --set ownerPubkey=<64-char-hex-pubkey>

This brings up everything in-cluster — Postgres, Redis, and MinIO (with its bucket created by a post-install Job) — and composes the relay's BUZZ_S3_ENDPOINT plus autogenerated credentials automatically. No external services required. The quickstart=true flag is an intent marker surfaced in NOTES.txt; the bundled services are opted in via the four *.enabled flags above (see ci/quickstart-values.yaml for the exact set CI installs). Eval-only: every bundled service is a single replica with no HA.

Production (GitOps)

The chart is designed for ArgoCD and Flux. Both render charts with helm template, in which mode Helm's lookup function returns empty — any chart-side randAlphaNum call would regenerate secrets on every sync. The chart-managed Secret path is only safe for helm install / helm upgrade.

Production deploys MUST use secrets.existingSecret:. The Secret is consumed for any keys present and ignored for keys missing — extras are harmless.

See:

Required inputs

Key What When required
relayUrl Public wss:// URL clients connect to Always
ownerPubkey 64-char lowercase hex Nostr pubkey of the relay operator When relay.requireRelayMembership=true (default)
secrets.existingSecret Name of pre-created Secret Production / GitOps
externalPostgresql.url / externalRedis.url / s3.endpoint External service URLs Production — when the matching bundled service is disabled (the default)

The chart fails at helm install / helm template time with a clear message if any of these are missing or malformed (see templates/_validate.tpl).

S3 URL addressing

Buzz uses one URL style for both media and Git/CAS object-store requests:

s3.addressingStyle Request shape Use for
path (default) https://endpoint/bucket/key Bundled MinIO and endpoints whose DNS does not resolve bucket subdomains
virtual https://bucket.endpoint/key AWS-style providers and new Railway Storage Buckets

The chart always renders s3.addressingStyle as BUZZ_S3_ADDRESSING_STYLE and s3.region as BUZZ_S3_REGION. The region defaults to us-east-1, keeping bundled MinIO and the in-pod buzz-admin deletions workflow operable without an ambient AWS_REGION. Production providers must set their credential region explicitly when it differs. Existing releases that previously omitted s3.region will begin rendering BUZZ_S3_REGION=us-east-1 after upgrade, even if an image or relay.extraEnv entry supplied AWS_REGION; set s3.region to the provider's actual credential region before upgrading. Only path and virtual addressing styles are accepted; invalid values fail chart rendering and relay startup. The bundled MinIO quickstart deliberately keeps path because its Service DNS resolves one endpoint hostname, not arbitrary <bucket>.<service> names.

For a Railway Storage Bucket, map its variables to chart values in the service or generated Helm configuration:

s3:
  endpoint: "${{Object Storage.ENDPOINT}}"
  bucket: "${{Object Storage.BUCKET}}"
  region: "${{Object Storage.REGION}}"
  addressingStyle: virtual

Store BUZZ_S3_ACCESS_KEY=${{Object Storage.ACCESS_KEY_ID}} and BUZZ_S3_SECRET_KEY=${{Object Storage.SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}} in the Secret named by secrets.existingSecret. Railway's Credentials tab is authoritative for older buckets, which may still require path. The setting changes request routing and SigV4 signing, so do not put the bucket into s3.endpoint; pass Railway's base ENDPOINT and BUCKET separately.

Object storage is contacted during relay startup only when BUZZ_GIT_CONFORMANCE_PROBE is enabled (the relay default). A probe failure is startup-fatal, so Kubernetes readiness never opens. If an operator explicitly disables that probe through relay.extraEnv, /_readiness does not test object storage; configuration is still parsed strictly, but reachability and addressing errors surface on the first storage operation.

Relay Pod extensions

The chart exposes narrow extension points for init containers, volumes, relay volume mounts, and image command/argument overrides. extraManifests creates independent Kubernetes resources but cannot modify the chart-managed relay Deployment. These extension values insert fields into that Deployment, avoiding duplication of its environment, probes, security context, secrets, and chart-owned volumes.

For example, an init container can copy a wrapper binary into a shared volume and make that wrapper the relay entrypoint:

extraInitContainers:
  - name: install-wrapper
    image: example.com/wrapper-init:v1
    args: [/opt/wrapper/wrapper]
    securityContext:
      runAsNonRoot: true
      runAsUser: 65532
      runAsGroup: 65532
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      capabilities:
        drop: [ALL]
    resources:
      requests:
        cpu: 10m
        memory: 16Mi
    volumeMounts:
      - name: wrapper
        mountPath: /opt/wrapper

extraVolumes:
  - name: wrapper
    emptyDir: {}

relay:
  command: [/opt/wrapper/wrapper]
  args: [/usr/local/bin/buzz-relay]
  extraVolumeMounts:
    - name: wrapper
      mountPath: /opt/wrapper

These values are raw Kubernetes fragments rendered with toYaml, not tpl. The chart does not validate cross-field relationships: extension names must not collide with chart-owned containers or volumes, mounts must reference existing volumes, and each init container must define an appropriate security context and resources. Empty relay.command and relay.args arrays preserve the image defaults; non-empty values override its entrypoint and arguments respectively.

Device pairing relay

The chart can run Buzz's stateless pairing WebSocket relay as an independent Deployment and Service using the same image as the main relay:

pairingRelay:
  enabled: true
  url: wss://pairing.example.com

pairingRelay.url is advertised in the main relay's NIP-11 document so Buzz clients connect directly to the dedicated endpoint. The chart does not create an Ingress or HTTPRoute for the pairing Service; route the public hostname to <release>-buzz-pairing:5000 with your platform's ingress configuration.

HA (production)

replicaCount > 1 hard-requires Redis:

  • Redis (redis.enabled=true, externalRedis.url, or REDIS_URL in existingSecret) — for buzz-pubsub fan-out

It does not require ReadWriteMany git storage. Git ref/object state is object-store-backed (each request hydrates an ephemeral repo from S3-compatible storage; writer serialization is the object-store pointer CAS — see docs/git-on-object-storage.md), and repo-name uniqueness lives in Postgres. Each replica can use its own ReadWriteOnce volume; no shared filesystem is needed.

The chart template-fails if the Redis invariant is broken at replicaCount > 1. No silent degradation.

Relay autoscaling

The optional HPA scales the relay on the larger recommendation from CPU or average active WebSockets per pod:

autoscaling:
  enabled: true
  minReplicas: 5
  maxReplicas: 15
  targetCPUUtilizationPercentage: 65
  websocketMetricEnabled: true
  websocketMetricName: buzz_ws_connections_active
  targetWebsocketConnections: 5000

CPU scaling requires Kubernetes Metrics Server. Set websocketMetricEnabled: false for a CPU-only HPA. WebSocket scaling additionally requires a custom-metrics adapter (for example Prometheus Adapter) configured to expose the relay's buzz_ws_connections_active gauge as a pod metric with the name in websocketMetricName. The chart creates the HPA but deliberately does not install or configure a cluster-wide metrics adapter. Scale-down is gradual by default so long-lived WebSocket connections have time to drain.

Upgrades

Schema migrations are embedded in the relay binary via sqlx::migrate! and run at startup, gated by BUZZ_AUTO_MIGRATE (default true). Multiple replicas race-safely behind a Postgres advisory lock. helm upgrade is the entire upgrade procedure.

If you prefer decoupling migrations from serving, set migrate.autoMigrate=false. In that mode the chart does not run migrations for you — you own running buzz-admin migrate (separate Pod / one-shot Job) against the database before every helm install / helm upgrade. Readiness probes only verify DB connectivity, not schema freshness, so a pod will appear healthy against an unmigrated schema and fail under load. A pre-upgrade Helm Job for this is on the chart roadmap; the values knob migrate.preUpgradeJob.enabled is reserved.

Backups

Save these. Losing any of them is data loss. See NOTES.txt printed by helm install for the live list:

  1. BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY — relay identity. Rotating it = new identity (federation peers will not recognize the relay).
  2. PostgreSQL database — the canonical event store.
  3. S3 bucket — media blobs (chart default bucket: buzz-media).
  4. Git PVC — repo on-disk state served by the relay's git endpoint.
  5. Owner private key — held by the operator, not by this chart. Restore by re-installing with the same ownerPubkey.

Honest limitations (v1)

  • Bundled MinIO is eval-only. The quickstart profile runs an in-cluster MinIO (single replica, no HA, lookup-autogenerated credentials) so the relay starts with zero external object storage. Production leaves minio.enabled off and points s3.endpoint (or BUZZ_S3_* in existingSecret) at managed S3-compatible storage. The bundled Deployment is not GitOps-safe and is not intended for production traffic.
  • Minimal-mode is not yet supported. The relay's BUZZ_PUBSUB=local / filesystem media paths are upstream work in progress — even quickstart currently stands up real Redis and S3 rather than the relay's single-node fallbacks. (Full-text search already runs in Postgres, so no separate search service is provisioned.)
  • Cosign signing of the published chart is a follow-up (the relay image is attested via actions/attest-build-provenance; the chart is not yet). The chart itself is published to GHCR — see Releasing.

Releasing

The chart is published to GHCR as an OCI artifact at oci://ghcr.io/block/buzz/charts/buzz by the helm chart workflow (.github/workflows/helm-chart.yml), versioned independently of the desktop app and the relay image via its own chart-v* tags. Every PR/main push still lints, unit-tests, and render-checks the chart; only a chart-v* tag publishes, so an in-progress main can never overwrite a released version.

To cut a release, push a chart-release/<version> branch whose <version> matches Chart.yaml's version; merging it auto-tags chart-v<version> and dispatches the publish job (same lane machinery as the desktop and relay releases — see .github/workflows/auto-tag-on-release-pr-merge.yml). The publish job fails loudly if the tag version and Chart.yaml version disagree.

Development

# Render every fixture
for f in ci/*-values.yaml tests/fixtures/*-values.yaml; do
  helm template buzz . -f "$f" >/dev/null && echo "ok: $f"
done

# Unit tests
helm plugin install https://github.com/helm-unittest/helm-unittest
helm unittest .

# Lint
helm dependency build .
ct lint --config ../../../ct.yaml --charts .