Files
buzz/mobile/test/shared/relay/relay_validation_test.dart
c9a73726be fix(mobile): validate invite relay destinations (#2986)
## Summary

- require invite relay destinations to be secure public origins in
production
- reject non-public and ambiguous IP literals before confirmation and
again before the claim request
- disable redirects for invite claims so a validated relay cannot
redirect the request elsewhere
- preserve explicit debug-only localhost support

## Validation

- pre-commit `dart format` and `flutter analyze`
- pre-push full mobile test suite: 666 passed, 1 skipped
- independent source reviews from Princess Donut and Mongo found no
remaining blockers

## Scope and residual risk

This fixes the mobile invite trust boundary without changing NIP-98 or
NIP-42. Hostnames are not resolved and pinned by this patch, so DNS
rebinding remains a networking-layer residual risk requiring
connect-time resolution/pinning.

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
2026-07-26 09:16:36 -07:00

162 lines
4.0 KiB
Dart

import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/relay/relay_validation.dart';
void main() {
group('validateInviteRelayUri', () {
test('accepts public secure relay origins', () {
for (final url in [
'wss://relay.example.com',
'wss://relay.example.com/',
'wss://relay.example.com:8443',
'wss://8.8.8.8',
'wss://[2001:4860:4860::8888]',
'wss://[2001:1::1]',
'wss://[2001:1::2]',
'wss://[2001:1::3]',
'wss://[2001:3::1]',
'wss://[2001:4:112::1]',
'wss://[2001:20::1]',
'wss://[2001:30::1]',
'wss://[2001:200::1]',
'wss://[2620:4f:8000::1]',
'wss://[3fff:1000::1]',
'wss://[2606:4700:4700::1111]',
]) {
expect(
() => validateInviteRelayUri(
Uri.parse(url),
allowInsecureLocalhost: false,
),
returnsNormally,
reason: url,
);
}
});
test('allows plaintext localhost only when explicitly enabled', () {
for (final url in ['ws://localhost:3000', 'ws://relay.localhost:3000']) {
expect(
() => validateInviteRelayUri(
Uri.parse(url),
allowInsecureLocalhost: true,
),
returnsNormally,
reason: url,
);
expect(
() => validateInviteRelayUri(
Uri.parse(url),
allowInsecureLocalhost: false,
),
throwsFormatException,
reason: url,
);
}
});
test('rejects plaintext public relays', () {
expect(
() => validateInviteRelayUri(
Uri.parse('ws://relay.example.com'),
allowInsecureLocalhost: false,
),
throwsFormatException,
);
});
test('rejects non-public IPv4 literals', () {
for (final host in [
'0.0.0.0',
'10.0.0.1',
'100.64.0.1',
'127.0.0.1',
'169.254.169.254',
'172.16.0.1',
'192.168.0.1',
'198.18.0.1',
'224.0.0.1',
]) {
expect(
() => validateInviteRelayUri(
Uri.parse('wss://$host'),
allowInsecureLocalhost: false,
),
throwsFormatException,
reason: host,
);
}
});
test('rejects non-public IPv6 literals and mapped IPv4', () {
for (final host in [
'[::]',
'[::1]',
'[::ffff:127.0.0.1]',
'[::ffff:169.254.169.254]',
'[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]',
'[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]',
'[100::1]',
'[100:0:0:1::1]',
'[2001::1]',
'[2001:1::4]',
'[2001:2::1]',
'[2001:4:111::1]',
'[2001:10::1]',
'[2001:40::1]',
'[2001:db8::1]',
'[2002:a9fe:a9fe::1]',
'[3fff::1]',
'[3fff:fff::1]',
'[5f00::1]',
'[fc00::1]',
'[fd00::1]',
'[fe80::1]',
'[fec0::1]',
'[ff02::1]',
]) {
expect(
() => validateInviteRelayUri(
Uri.parse('wss://$host'),
allowInsecureLocalhost: false,
),
throwsFormatException,
reason: host,
);
}
});
test('rejects legacy numeric IPv4 spellings', () {
for (final host in ['2130706433', '0x7f000001', '0177.0.0.1', '127.1']) {
expect(
() => validateInviteRelayUri(
Uri.parse('wss://$host'),
allowInsecureLocalhost: false,
),
throwsFormatException,
reason: host,
);
}
});
test('rejects non-origin URLs', () {
for (final url in [
'https://relay.example.com',
'wss://user@relay.example.com',
'wss://relay.example.com/path',
'wss://relay.example.com?query=x',
'wss://relay.example.com#fragment',
]) {
expect(
() => validateInviteRelayUri(
Uri.parse(url),
allowInsecureLocalhost: false,
),
throwsFormatException,
reason: url,
);
}
});
});
}