Files
buzz/mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_provider_test.dart
6eb65919f1 feat(identity): recover desktop identity from a signed-in phone (#4845)
**Category:** new-feature
**User Impact:** People who lose a desktop identity can securely restore
it from a signed-in Buzz phone without creating a replacement identity.

**Problem:** A fresh or identity-lost desktop could not recover its
existing full Buzz identity from an already-authorized phone.

**Solution:** Add a SAS-confirmed reverse NIP-AB transfer, durable
desktop import, a dedicated mobile recovery entry point, and clearer
desktop recovery dialogs with tested loading, drag-and-drop, and failure
states.


https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e9215c9c-80d0-462f-9161-0fa184ca2f74

<details>
<summary>File changes</summary>

**crates/buzz-core/src/pairing/session.rs**
Adds the reverse encrypted payload and source-completion state
transitions used for phone-to-desktop recovery.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/identity.rs**
Exposes the existing guarded identity commit path for recovery imports.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/pairing.rs**
Adds recovery-mode pairing, durable nsec import, start serialization,
stale-task protection, and explicit rejection of unsupported recovery
payloads.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/lib.rs**
Registers the recovery pairing command.

**desktop/src/app/App.tsx**
Refreshes the recovered identity before continuing onboarding.

**desktop/src/features/onboarding/machineOnboarding.ts**
Adds recovery transitions to the onboarding state machine.

**desktop/src/features/onboarding/ui/BackupPasswordTimeline.tsx**
Adds the visual backup-to-password-to-unlock progression.

**desktop/src/features/onboarding/ui/IdentityRecoveryPairing.tsx**
Implements QR generation, copy fallback, SAS confirmation, cancellation,
expiry, and completion UI.

**desktop/src/features/onboarding/ui/MachineOnboardingFlow.tsx**
Connects private-key, phone, and backup recovery paths to the onboarding
flow.

**desktop/src/features/onboarding/ui/NostrKeyImportForm.tsx**
Polishes recovery dialogs, backup drag-and-drop, loading stability, and
security copy.

**desktop/src/shared/api/tauri.ts**
Keeps the existing pairing API surface focused on standard
desktop-to-mobile pairing.

**desktop/src/shared/api/tauriPairing.ts**
Adds the recovery pairing invoke without growing the ratcheted shared
API file.

**desktop/src/testing/e2eBridge.ts**
Mocks recovery pairing commands and lifecycle events for browser tests.

**desktop/tests/e2e/identity-lost.spec.ts**
Covers lost-identity entry, QR/copy recovery, SAS, cancellation, expiry,
success, errors, backup import, drag-and-drop, and screenshots.

**desktop/tests/e2e/onboarding.spec.ts**
Verifies recovered identities continue through harness setup without
replacement-key side effects.

**mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_page.dart**
Adds recovery-only scanning and explicit identity-handoff warnings.

**mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart**
Recognizes recovery codes, returns the signed-in nsec after mutual SAS
approval, and waits for desktop completion.

**mobile/lib/features/settings/settings_page.dart**
Accepts the recovery route builder at the app composition boundary to
preserve feature isolation.

**mobile/lib/features/settings/settings_page/connection_section.dart**
Adds the signed-in “Send identity to desktop” settings action.

**mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_page_test.dart**
Covers recovery-only validation and handoff messaging.

**mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_provider_test.dart**
Covers reverse payload encryption, confirmation ordering, success,
failure, timeout, and cleanup.

</details>

## Reproduction steps

1. Launch Buzz Desktop with identity-lost state and choose **Recover
from your phone**.
2. Confirm the QR and persistent **Copy pairing code** fallback appear
without layout shift.
3. On a signed-in phone, open **Settings → Send identity to desktop**,
scan or paste the recovery code, and compare the six-digit SAS on both
devices.
4. Confirm on both sides and verify Desktop restores the identity and
continues to harness setup.
5. Repeat from identity-lost state with **Recover from a backup file**;
verify picker and drag-and-drop both advance to password entry and
restore the encrypted backup.
6. Exercise cancellation, mismatched/unsupported codes, expired
sessions, and an invalid backup; verify each returns actionable,
non-stuck UI.

## Screenshots

### Desktop phone recovery — complete flow

| Recovery entry | Pairing QR | Code match | Receiving identity |
|---|---|---|---|
| ![Desktop recovery
entry](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/desktop-phone-01-recovery-entry.png)
| ![Desktop phone recovery
QR](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/desktop-phone-02-qr.png)
| ![Desktop security-code
match](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/desktop-phone-03-sas.png)
| ![Desktop receiving
identity](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/desktop-phone-04-receiving.png)
|

### iOS Simulator — complete handoff flow

| Settings entry | Recovery scanner | Manual recovery code | Code
confirmation |
|---|---|---|---|
| ![iOS Settings entry for Send identity to
desktop](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/ios-01-settings-entry.png)
| ![iOS recovery scanner
entry](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/ios-02-recovery-entry.png)
| ![iOS manual recovery code
entry](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/ios-03-manual-code.png)
| ![iOS security-code
confirmation](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/ios-04-sas-verification.png)
|

### Encrypted backup recovery — adjusted file flow

| File picker | Drag-and-drop target | Password step |
|---|---|---|
| ![Desktop encrypted-backup file
picker](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/desktop-backup-01-file-picker-settled.png)
| ![Desktop encrypted-backup drag-and-drop
target](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/desktop-backup-02-drag-drop.png)
| ![Desktop backup password
step](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/4845/desktop-backup-03-enter-password.png)
|

## Verification

- `cargo test -p buzz-core pairing` — 71 passed
- `just mobile-test` — 1,169 passed
- `pnpm build:e2e && pnpm exec playwright test identity-lost.spec.ts
--project=smoke` — 15 passed
- Full pre-push gates — desktop checks, desktop unit tests, Rust tests,
Tauri checks, and mobile tests passed

---------

Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: npub1223z34hd7vtwc6qj4s7flsxkj644nlre2nthu7lrrmkumhu3xddsrx9r6w <52a228d6edf316ec6812ac3c9fc0d696ab59fc7954d77e7be31eedcddf91335b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Carl <acda9e433d19dcd0e6b6840f7f4b98f3a56f1fab98049d444c087019e6d36560@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-06 11:47:18 -07:00

447 lines
15 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_crypto.dart';
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart';
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_socket.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/auth/auth.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/ecdh.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/nip44.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/relay/relay.dart';
/// Tests for [PairingNotifier]'s legacy `buzz://` payload parsing and
/// SSRF-prevention validation.
///
/// The pairing flow used to validate by calling `GET /api/users/me/profile`
/// over HTTP. That has been replaced with a NIP-42 WebSocket handshake via
/// [RelaySocket], which is constructed directly inside the provider with no
/// dependency-injection hook — so the "happy path" that exercises the
/// network is no longer mockable in a unit test.
///
/// What we still cover here:
/// - Initial state.
/// - Parsing every documented payload format (raw base64, `buzz://`
/// prefix, whitespace).
/// - Failure modes that return BEFORE any network call: invalid base64,
/// wrong shape (non-object, missing fields, missing nsec), and SSRF
/// guards (private IPs, non-http schemes).
/// - `reset()` returning to idle from an error state.
void main() {
group('PairingNotifier', () {
late ProviderContainer container;
late FakeAuthNotifier fakeAuth;
ProviderContainer createContainer() {
fakeAuth = FakeAuthNotifier();
return ProviderContainer(
overrides: [authProvider.overrideWith(() => fakeAuth)],
);
}
tearDown(() => container.dispose());
test('starts in idle state', () {
container = createContainer();
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(state.errorMessage, isNull);
});
test(
'disconnect during connect does not null-dereference the socket',
() async {
final notifier = PairingNotifier(
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
}) => _DisconnectingSocket(disconnectCallback: onDisconnected),
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier)],
);
const code =
'nostrpair://62287897da61e3fa294b4570575f7db8bea147d6631150f2e4656714c645fb1e'
'?secret=abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1';
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('internal error'),
);
},
);
test('payload missing nsec errors before contacting relay', () async {
container = createContainer();
// Valid payload shape but no nsec — provider should refuse without
// attempting any network call.
final code = _encodePairingCode();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
});
test('accepts buzz scheme prefix', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = 'buzz://${_encodePairingCode()}';
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
});
test('invalid base64 sets format error', () async {
container = createContainer();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
});
test('base64 with valid JSON but missing fields errors', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode({'foo': 'bar'})));
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Missing relayUrl'));
});
test('empty input errors', () async {
container = createContainer();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('');
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
});
test('rejects private IP relay URLs (SSRF)', () async {
container = createContainer();
for (final ip in [
'10.0.0.1',
'172.16.0.1',
'192.168.1.1',
'169.254.169.254',
]) {
final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'http://$ip:3000');
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error, reason: 'should reject $ip');
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('private network'));
container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
}
});
test('rejects non-http/https schemes', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'file:///etc/passwd');
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
});
test('rejects JSON array payload', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode([1, 2, 3])));
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('not a JSON object'));
});
test('reset returns to idle from error state', () async {
container = createContainer();
// Trigger an error.
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
});
group('desktop identity recovery', () {
const sourceSecret =
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506';
const sessionSecretHex =
'abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789';
late _ControllableSocket socket;
late PairingNotifier notifier;
late String recoveryCode;
setUp(() {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
recoveryCode =
'nostrpair://${source.public}'
'?secret=$sessionSecretHex'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1&mode=recover';
notifier = PairingNotifier(
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required onDisconnected,
}) {
socket = _ControllableSocket(
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
return socket;
},
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
relayConfigProvider.overrideWith(_RecoveryRelayConfig.new),
],
);
container.read(pairingProvider);
notifier = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier);
});
test('recovery URI enables phone-to-desktop transfer', () async {
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.sendsIdentityToDesktop, isTrue);
expect(state.sasCode, hasLength(6));
});
test(
'matching SAS sends nsec and successful completion finishes',
() async {
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).userConfirmedSas, isTrue);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
final sentMessages = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret);
expect(
sentMessages.any(
(message) =>
message['type'] == 'payload' &&
message['payload_type'] == 'nsec' &&
message['payload'] == _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec,
),
isTrue,
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': true},
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.success);
},
);
test('desktop storage failure surfaces an error', () async {
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': false},
);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('could not store'));
});
});
});
}
/// Encode a credentials payload the same way the desktop app would.
String _encodePairingCode({
String relayUrl = 'http://test:3000',
String? pubkey,
String? nsec,
}) {
final json = <String, dynamic>{
'relayUrl': relayUrl,
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
if (pubkey != null) 'pubkey': pubkey,
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
if (nsec != null) 'nsec': nsec,
};
return base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode(json)));
}
/// A fake [AuthNotifier] that records calls instead of touching secure storage.
class FakeAuthNotifier extends AsyncNotifier<AuthState>
implements AuthNotifier {
Community? lastCommunity;
bool signedOut = false;
@override
Future<AuthState> build() async =>
const AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated);
@override
Future<void> signOut() async {
signedOut = true;
state = const AsyncData(AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated));
}
@override
Future<void> authenticateWithCommunity(Community community) async {
lastCommunity = community;
state = AsyncData(
AuthState(status: AuthStatus.authenticated, community: community),
);
}
}
class _DisconnectingSocket extends PairingSocket {
final void Function(Object? error) disconnectCallback;
_DisconnectingSocket({required this.disconnectCallback})
: super(
wsUrl: 'ws://unused',
ephemeralPrivkey:
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506',
onMessage: (_) {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
@override
Future<void> connect() async {
disconnectCallback(Exception('Connection closed'));
}
}
class _RecoveryRelayConfig extends RelayConfigNotifier {
static final nsec = nostr.Keys(
'1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111',
).nsec;
@override
RelayConfig build() => RelayConfig(baseUrl: 'https://relay.test', nsec: nsec);
}
class _ControllableSocket extends PairingSocket {
final String ephemeralPrivkey;
final void Function(List<dynamic> message) relayMessageCallback;
final List<Map<String, dynamic>> published = [];
bool _connected = false;
int _eventSequence = 0;
_ControllableSocket({
required this.ephemeralPrivkey,
required super.onMessage,
required super.onDisconnected,
}) : relayMessageCallback = onMessage,
super(wsUrl: 'ws://unused', ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey);
@override
bool get isConnected => _connected;
@override
Future<void> connect() async => _connected = true;
@override
void subscribe(String subId, int kind, String pubkeyHex) {}
@override
void publishEvent(Map<String, dynamic> event) => published.add(event);
@override
void dispose() => _connected = false;
List<Map<String, dynamic>> decryptedPublishedMessages(String sourceSecret) {
final key = getConversationKey(
sourceSecret,
nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public,
);
return published
.map(
(event) =>
jsonDecode(nip44Decrypt(key, event['content'] as String))
as Map<String, dynamic>,
)
.toList();
}
void sendSourceMessage({
required String sourceSecret,
required String sessionSecretHex,
required Map<String, dynamic> message,
bool includeTranscriptHash = false,
}) {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
final targetPubkey = nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public;
final sessionSecret = hexToBytes(sessionSecretHex);
final body = Map<String, dynamic>.from(message);
if (includeTranscriptHash) {
final shared = ecdhSharedSecret(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
final (_, sasInput) = deriveSas(shared, sessionSecret);
body['transcript_hash'] = bytesToHex(
deriveTranscriptHash(
deriveSessionId(sessionSecret),
hexToBytes(source.public),
hexToBytes(targetPubkey),
sasInput,
sessionSecret,
),
);
}
final key = getConversationKey(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
final event = nostr.Event.from(
kind: 24134,
content: nip44Encrypt(key, jsonEncode(body)),
tags: [
['p', targetPubkey],
],
secretKey: sourceSecret,
createdAt: 1_700_000_000 + _eventSequence++,
);
relayMessageCallback(['EVENT', 'pair', event.toMap()]);
}
}