66 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
3 people	e0940927ff	fix(channels): return complete member rosters (#5765) ... ## Summary - return complete channel rosters instead of truncating at 1,000 members - chunk `event_mentions` inserts inside one transaction so large kind `39002` snapshots remain discoverable by every `p` tag - add a targeted `buzz-admin reconcile-channels --channel <uuid>` force-republish path for stale discovery snapshots - cover a 1,501-member roster, 11,000-tag mention index, and kind `39002` tag construction past member 1,000 ## Why The relay builds NIP-29 discovery and several authorization decisions from `get_members()`, but that helper silently returned only the first 1,000 active members. Desktop then counted the truncated kind `39002` event, while late members could be rejected by roster-scanning member actions. Removing the roster cap exposes PostgreSQL's 65,535 bind-parameter ceiling in mention indexing, so the insert is chunked transactionally to preserve all-or-nothing indexing. The existing reconcilers only fill missing discovery events. The targeted admin option bypasses the separately known 1,000-channel reconciliation-list ceiling and replaces an existing channel snapshot using the configured production relay key. ## Attribution This supersedes and builds on #3166 by @LordMelkor. Thank you for identifying the roster boundary and contributing the original complete-roster and mention-index patch. The production roster/query changes and the two PostgreSQL regressions retain that work's shape; this PR rebases it onto current `main`, adds relay coverage, and adds the targeted repair operation requested for rollout. ## Validation Exact pushed head: `24d02e4f3824150ed84913c9d230e675502e5b12` - `cargo check -p buzz-db -p buzz-admin` - `cargo test -p buzz-db channel::tests::get_members_returns_full_roster_beyond_1000 -- --ignored --exact --nocapture` - `cargo test -p buzz-db feed::tests::insert_mentions_indexes_rosters_past_bind_parameter_cap -- --ignored --exact --nocapture` - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib handlers::side_effects::tests::group_members_snapshot_keeps_members_past_one_thousand -- --exact` - `cargo run -q -p buzz-admin -- reconcile-channels --help` - mandatory pre-push hook: branch-skew, desktop checks/typecheck/tests, mobile tests, Rust tests, and desktop Tauri checks all passed on the pushed head ## Rollout 1. Deploy the relay/backend build. 2. Run `buzz-admin reconcile-channels --channel <general-channel-uuid>` with `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY` configured. 3. Verify the replacement kind `39002` roster count matches the active database membership count. No schema migration or desktop release is required. Fixes #3156 Supersedes #3166 --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-08-13 14:48:04 -07:00
5 people	2693e0db1f	Make workflow run history authoritative in Desktop (#5780) ... ## Summary - persist stable workflow run `error_code` values separately from human diagnostics - expose NIP-98 authenticated, channel-authorized run history and approval reads with stable keyset pagination - connect Desktop to those authoritative reads and return the relay-created run ID on trigger - show truthful loading, failure, and pending-trace states, and do not render approval actions from non-actionable stored hashes ## Validation - pre-push `branch-skew`, `desktop-typecheck`, `desktop-test`, `rust-tests`, `desktop-tauri-checks`, and `desktop-check` all passed on `a097dbe5f` - Desktop tests: 4,761 passed, 0 failed - `cargo check -p buzz-relay` - `git diff --check` ## Remaining gate This does not claim a relay-backed Playwright workflow journey. The browser relay bridge still routes workflow invokes through in-memory handlers; that production-shaped acceptance gate remains follow-up work before Workflows can leave preview. --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Mongo <5c25403eab7271f9f94ddd4f2b270e8cac2c92e2c830c51877cca6ec974ffb3f@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Princess Donut <68157ebd23b3897c1991015c3038658ea916200c67d3a54620b0754d1b92f6e0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-08-13 12:56:37 -07:00
5 people	8a2c9af2db	feat(deletion): add durable whole-community deletion (#4425) ... ## Summary Adds a durable, operator-controlled V1 for deleting an entire Buzz community without deleting another tenant's data. The workflow is exposed through `buzz-admin deletions`: - `sweep` records independent fleet storage-taxonomy observations - `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, and `approve` manage a deletion request - `unblock` resumes a fail-closed request after an operator records remediation identity and reason - `run` and `drain` execute bounded work Requests advance through a PostgreSQL-backed state machine and stop at `retention_pending` after logical deletion has been independently verified across PostgreSQL, object storage, and Redis. This PR ships the engine and CLI, not a continuously running worker or Kubernetes packaging. For V1, a cluster/VM administrator invokes `/usr/local/bin/buzz-admin` from the existing relay image, for example with `kubectl exec` or an equivalent container/VM exec path. ## What whole-community V1 removes For the target community, V1 removes: - rows from the allowlisted community-scoped PostgreSQL catalog, including members, profiles, authored events and bodies, DMs, reactions, mentions, memberships, tokens, workflows, moderation, audit, feedback, and rate-limit state - media sidecars and upload-attribution records under `_meta/<community>/` and `_uploads/<community>/` - Git repository pointers under `repos/<community>/` - Redis keys under `buzz:<community>:*` The community row survives as a permanent tombstone, and deletion control-plane records remain as evidence of the request, approval, execution, and result. ## Safety model Deletion is not a broad `DELETE CASCADE` followed by optimistic cleanup. The destructive boundaries are durable and fail closed. ### 1. Inventory and approval - `submit` resolves the target and freezes the schema plus summary-only storage inventory. - Approval is bound to the exact request, community, and frozen inventory digest. - Unsupported manifest versions, malformed keys inside the target's owned prefixes, live scoped-table/write-fence coverage drift, frozen-inventory mismatch, and approval mismatch block execution rather than guessing. Migration and catalog revision numbers are not authorization gates; the executor validates the live safety shape instead. - Storage inventory is server-side prefix scoped to exactly: - `_meta/<community>/` - `_uploads/<community>/` - `repos/<community>/` - The deletion path never lists the whole shared bucket and has no arbitrary per-community object cap. Its listing work is proportional to the target community's bindings, not total fleet storage. - Fleet-wide taxonomy sweeps remain independent observability. They report unknown writer shapes but do not gate deletion submission, fencing, or destructive progress. Maintainers must add deletion taxonomy coverage whenever a new community-owned object-key class is introduced; writer-coverage tests bind the current media and Git writers to that contract. ### 2. Quiesce, fence, and destructive freeze - Writes continue through submission, inventory, and approval. They stop when execution moves the target into `quiescing` and then establishes the durable fence. - Already-admitted external effects finish under heartbeated serving-write leases; the exact admitted lease may renew while the community is quiescing, but new lease acquisition is rejected. The executor drains admitted leases before destructive work. - Invite minting after quiescing begins fails as typed `AccessDenied` (HTTP 503 at the relay boundary) before an invite can be persisted. - Database triggers enforce the community write fence across the complete catalog of community-scoped tables. Startup/readiness and destructive execution validate that catalog so a newly added but unfenced table cannot silently escape. - **Named isolation assumption — fresh write snapshot.** Every writer transaction that can reach a community-fenced relation must use PostgreSQL `READ COMMITTED`; each guarded write therefore observes a statement snapshot no older than acquisition of the community deletion lock. `REPEATABLE READ` and `SERIALIZABLE` can retain a pre-fence snapshot and are unsupported for writers. The writer pool refuses non-`READ COMMITTED` sessions at connection setup, and both SQL fence functions reject an explicit per-transaction isolation override with SQLSTATE `25000`. Configuration-delivered bad isolation can surface through SQLx as a pool-acquire timeout because every `after_connect` attempt is rejected; the precise `community writes require READ COMMITTED isolation` reason remains observable when the SQL guard is reached. Read-only replica transactions are outside this assumption. - Holding the shared advisory lock until the guarded write executes is a separate liveness condition: under `READ COMMITTED`, releasing it early does not permit resurrection because the trigger rechecks the fence, but it can turn a fleet sweep into a statement-wide SQLSTATE `55000` abort. - After the fence closes writers, storage is re-enumerated into chunked side-table rows. Per-prefix counts and digests bind those concrete keys to the destructive manifest. - Manifest chunk insertion, update, and deletion are protected after freeze. This closes the race where an unbound key could otherwise appear after the manifest was committed. ### 3. Checkpointed destruction - Target-owned object bindings are deleted from the frozen destructive manifest in bounded batches with durable progress. - The concrete key list lives in chunked side-table rows rather than one request-row JSON value. It supports large communities, resumable execution, and terminal cleanup. - Missing objects are accepted as idempotent crash-window outcomes; malformed ownership, changed evidence, and unexplained target-prefix drift fail closed. - PostgreSQL purging remains scoped by `community_id`, including the guarded NIP-RS hard-delete path discovered with real Desktop kind `30078` read-state data. - Redis cleanup explicitly scans and `UNLINK`s only `buzz:<community_id>:*`. Natural expiry is insufficient because some keys, including tunnel generation counters used as fencing state, are deliberately persistent. ### 4. Independent verification - PostgreSQL logical absence is checked after purge. - The three target-owned storage prefixes are freshly inventoried again and must be empty. - Redis requires two complete empty namespace scans. - Only after all three stores pass does the request advance through `logically_verified` to `retention_pending`. ## What V1 deliberately does not erase ### Shared content-addressed storage Per-community deletion removes bindings, metadata, attribution records, and Git pointers. It does **not** physically delete fleet-shared CAS bytes that another community may still reference: - media blobs and thumbnails - Git manifests, packs, and indexes (`manifests/`, `packs/`, and `idx/`) Safe reclamation requires a separate fleet-wide reachability and retention GC. Unknown keys elsewhere in the shared bucket do not block one community's deletion; malformed or unrecognized keys inside that community's three owned prefixes still fail closed. ### External retained copies The online logical-deletion proof does not erase object versions/replicas, database backups/WAL, CDN copies, provider retention copies, or observability exports. Those require their own retention and purge controls. ### Member-only erasure This PR erases a whole community. It does not implement the different operation "erase one npub while preserving the community." Removing membership or accepting NIP-09 is not member erasure. A member-only workflow would need to find and selectively remove or redact authored event content and pubkeys, profile data, DMs, reactions, mentions, memberships/roles, tokens, workflows/subscriptions, upload attribution, moderation/audit history, repository attribution, and identity embedded in tags or JSON. It would also need explicit rules for ownership transfer, surviving replies and thread metadata, audit-chain integrity, immutable Git history, and shared-CAS reachability. That requires a pubkey-level fence and selective graph rewrite; it is a separate deletion product, not a safe extension of this whole-tenant worker. ## In scope - migration `0029_community_deletion.sql`: requests, approvals, leases, manifest chunks, checkpoints, tombstones, and the universal write-fence catalog - durable executor leases, generations, heartbeats, retry/block state, and resumable stage transitions - operator-driven `sweep`, `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, `approve`, `unblock`, `run`, and `drain` commands - serving-path fences for database writes and external effects across event ingest, media, Git, workflow, push, invites, mesh/tunnel, and related paths - target-prefix-only storage inventory, summary manifests, post-fence destructive chunks, and bounded batch deletion - exact community Redis namespace purge and two-pass absence verification - cross-community isolation, crash/resume, manifest-integrity, writer-taxonomy, and schema/migration regressions - desired-state `schema/schema.sql` support without requiring a SQLx migration ledger ## Deferred / not covered - dedicated Helm/chart worker Deployment, service account, secrets, probes, resources, and network policy - autonomous `buzz-admin deletions worker` poll loop and worker-only health server - least-privilege separation among migration, relay-serving, and destructive execution roles - fleet-wide shared-CAS physical GC - backup/provider/CDN/observability retention completion - member-only erasure - provider-native conditional-delete improvements - a general force-continue escape hatch; permanent safety failures remain fail closed unless an operator remediates the cause and records an audited `unblock` The removed continuous-worker implementation remains deferred; no remote follow-up branch is claimed by this PR. ## Validation ### Current PR head and repository state Current pushed head: `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`, rebased onto `cc9a2f783375e51a6e8d1f2f9d01d5f7e22813d1` (`origin/main` at push time). The complete PR diff is now 47 files, 9,834 additions, and 517 deletions. The bespoke source-scanner stack was removed to keep this PR scoped to community deletion. Tyler/team requested the underlying fenced-write safety behavior, not `ast-grep`, `crates/buzz-db/tests/community_fenced_writes.rs`, its 27 fixtures, or the new `scripts/lints/community_*.yml` rules. Those scanner-specific files, dependencies, Hermit links, and runner wiring are absent from the current tree. The production database write fence, startup/destructive live-catalog validation, and deletion behavior remain. Source validation on this exact SHA passed: - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `bash -n scripts/run-tests.sh` - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --all-targets`: 102 passed, 173 skipped, 0 failed - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-deletion --all-targets`: 10 passed, 9 skipped, 0 failed - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-admin --all-targets`: 1 passed, 0 failed - affected-package/all-target Clippy with warnings denied - lockfile consistency - Helm 3.16.4 lint and all 44 chart unit tests - Helm region controls using that fixture: default `BUZZ_S3_REGION=us-east-1`, explicit `eu-west-2` override, and blank-region schema rejection The prior Kubernetes battery below was run against `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04`. It remains useful evidence for the patch-equivalent production deletion implementation, but it is **not** claimed as exact-SHA evidence for current head `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`; the current cleanup removes only scanner/test/tooling infrastructure. CI restarted for the new head after the rebase and is pending. Human review remains `CHANGES_REQUESTED`. ### Prior-head live Kubernetes deletion and safety gates The full program used one immutable image, real PostgreSQL, Redis, MinIO, and a three-relay Kubernetes release: - source: `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04` (**prior head**) - image: `buzz-e2e:sha-928992237358` - immutable image digest: `sha256:a1a204f4618ac22d9e210be5e5290645a15d79831ae30b0e44379357c8e4a895` - evidence root: `/tmp/buzz-e2e/20260807T033025Z-928992237358-full-gates/` - evidence-manifest digest: `82875c5bc9bea7370b796a7aef3457b3a1c8306c84c59e0f7388bbb5ad30e865` Passed gates at that prior head: - **Chart/operator region:** default `us-east-1`, explicit nondefault propagation, blank-region schema rejection, live in-pod environment, and an in-pod taxonomy sweep over 18 objects with zero unknown. - **Fenced writers and lifecycle:** open-write/fence ordering; 100-attempt anti-starvation; invite, push matcher, and exhausted-reaper bystander isolation; non-`READ-COMMITTED` rejection; manifest/tombstone contracts; eight-failure stage block and audited `unblock`. - **Destructive lifecycle:** submit → approve → run → `retention_pending`; PostgreSQL tombstone and Redis/S3 verification true; zero retries/errors; terminal reruns rejected with exit 5. - **Fresh 10,001-object crash boundary:** exactly two chunks (10,000 + 1). The executor deleted chunk 0 from MinIO while its PostgreSQL stamp was row-lock-blocked, was killed with `SIGKILL`, left one object and both stamps absent, then resumed the same request under generation 2 to zero objects and terminal state. - **Independent dead-owner recovery:** a dedicated executor claimed generation 1, blocked before effects, and was killed through containerd with `SIGKILL` (no TERM cleanup). The request remained owned and unreclaimable before lease expiry; a successor claimed generation 2 after 60 seconds and completed with two attempts and zero retries. - **Three-pod socket isolation:** ordinary NIP-42 and joined huddle-audio target witnesses on every replica received exact `1008 / community deleted`; healthy-tenant witnesses on those pods remained live; deleted-host reconnect returned HTTP 404. - **Health/provenance:** all replicas independently returned ready and retained the exact image digest before/after destructive runs and an audio-enabled rolling restart; PostgreSQL, Redis, and MinIO were healthy at close. Instrument corrections were retained as evidence rather than counted as product failures: a foreground PostgreSQL forward caused an initial `PoolTimedOut`; Kubernetes pod deletion exercised graceful TERM rather than dead-owner recovery; shell-background socket witnesses died with their parent; and the first image build hit the corporate TLS proxy. Detached forwarding/witnesses, containerd `SIGKILL`, and the configured internal CA/Artifactory mirror produced the discriminating runs without weakening product security. ### Prior-head cleanup For the prior-head Kubernetes run, the Helm release was removed, namespace absence was verified, run-owned Screen sessions were absent, and that source worktree remained clean. The evidence manifest was independently recomputed and every indexed artifact passed `shasum -a 256 -c`. The current `359d8402` source worktree is also clean after the scanner-only cleanup and push. --------- Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-08-12 09:25:58 -07:00
3 people	397796c5f3	feat(tracing): add PostgreSQL tracing spans (#3678) ... ## Why Expose PostgreSQL datastore latency within existing request traces so slow logical database operations can be identified without recording tenant data or query arguments. ## What - Add client spans around logical PostgreSQL operations across the database facade, search, audit, replica fencing, and command persistence - Use a dedicated `buzz_datastore` target and `db.system.name = "postgresql"` for filtering and backend classification - Exclude health-check database calls and scrub raw identifiers and errors from newly traced paths ## Risk Assessment Medium — this instruments frequently used datastore paths and increases trace volume when enabled, but does not change SQL execution or datastore behavior. Existing OpenTelemetry filtering controls export. ## References - Pre-push clippy and fast unit-test hooks passed Generated with Amp --------- Signed-off-by: David Grochowski <dgrochowski@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Amp <amp@ampcode.com>	2026-08-12 08:04:54 +10:00
3 people	2777189d96	fix(channels): restore member invitations to private channels (#5493) ... ## Summary - restore private-channel invitations for every active member - keep owner/admin-only enforcement for elevated role grants, active role changes, and removals - preserve #4612's unrelated Desktop/mobile failure handling and hardening - add relay coverage for the ordinary actor/target role matrix (`member`, `guest`, `bot`) ## Validation - pre-push hook passed on `7de700e17642ad7e10155f9537033168d9249268`: branch skew, Desktop checks/typecheck/tests/Tauri checks, mobile tests, and Rust tests - `cargo test -p buzz-test-client --test e2e_relay --no-run` - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `git diff --check` - Donut and Mongo independently reviewed the cross-layer authorization behavior; Donut's role-matrix coverage finding is addressed in this revision --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-08-10 10:59:22 -07:00
3 people	2ea9385015	fix(reactions): support max-length custom emoji (#3833) ... **Category:** fix **User Impact:** Custom emoji with valid 64-character names can now be used as reactions without errors. **Problem:** Buzz accepted 64-character custom emoji names during registration, but rejected them as reactions after the required surrounding colons made the payload 66 characters. Validation also differed between desktop, SDK, relay, and storage boundaries. <img width="554" height="47" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4013452f-210e-4dd3-9003-f45ff3b28dc8" /> **Solution:** Keep the product limit at 64 ASCII characters for custom emoji names, enforce it consistently when emoji sets are registered, and allow only valid matching custom reaction payloads up to 66 characters. Widen the reaction projection to preserve the wrapped payload while retaining the existing 64-character limit for ordinary reactions. <details> <summary>File changes</summary> **crates/buzz-sdk/src/builders.rs** Defines the shared custom emoji boundaries and covers accepted 64-character and rejected 65-character shortcodes. **crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/ingest.rs** Validates emoji-set shortcodes and permits 66-character reactions only when they are valid colon-wrapped custom emoji with a matching tag. **crates/buzz-db/src/event.rs** Adds storage regression coverage for maximum-length custom emoji reactions. **crates/buzz-db/src/migration.rs** Verifies the reaction column migration is applied correctly. **desktop/src/shared/api/customEmoji.ts** Enforces the existing 64-character shortcode maximum during desktop normalization and registration/import. **desktop/src/shared/api/customEmoji.test.mjs** Covers the desktop shortcode boundary. **migrations/0027_long_reaction_payloads.sql** Widens stored reaction payloads to 66 characters for the two required surrounding colons. **schema/schema.sql** Keeps the desired schema aligned with the migration. </details> ## Reproduction Steps 1. Register or import a custom emoji whose ASCII shortcode is exactly 64 characters. 2. Select that emoji as a reaction to a message. 3. Confirm the reaction publishes, persists, and renders without an error. 4. Attempt to register a 65-character shortcode and confirm it is rejected. 5. Publish an ordinary or malformed reaction over 64 characters and confirm the relay rejects it. ## Verification - `cargo test -p buzz-sdk`: 243 passed - `cargo test -p buzz-db`: 94 passed, 152 Postgres-required tests ignored - `pnpm test` in `desktop`: 3,859 passed - `cargo test -p buzz-relay`: 795 passed, 9 existing Postgres-unavailable failures, 35 ignored; new reaction boundary tests pass directly - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `git diff --check` Originating Buzz channel: `f2ec9671-d78e-4cde-894c-9f4c458c7f1f` --------- Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1223z34hd7vtwc6qj4s7flsxkj644nlre2nthu7lrrmkumhu3xddsrx9r6w <52a228d6edf316ec6812ac3c9fc0d696ab59fc7954d77e7be31eedcddf91335b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-08-05 21:02:57 +00:00
3 people	efe1893dd3	fix(channels): restrict private-channel invitations (#4612) ... This change requires an active owner or administrator for third-party additions to private channels. The relay validator and transactional database authority enforce the same rule, including removed-member reactivation and role-change paths. Idempotent self-target behavior remains available, while ordinary members can no longer extend private-channel access to another identity. ## Testing - `git diff --check origin/main...codex/security-private-channel-invite-authority` - Rebased onto `origin/main` at `5c98932` - Full CI pending Originating Buzz thread: `buzz://message?channel=3928fe05-df61-4b5d-b9c7-d623b9b10ea1&id=3c6c02312f763fbe0d2bfc33a6c1a362f91d0354f3d18b039cf7a0558c1439d1` --------- Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Eli Foster <efoster@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Eli Foster <efoster@squareup.com>	2026-08-05 10:47:00 -07:00
Jemiah WestermanandGitHub	bc9e6528a7	perf(relay): index channel-id lookups and skip trace-only reads (#4647) ... ## Problem `SELECT id, community_id FROM channels WHERE id = ANY($1) AND deleted_at IS NULL` is the top **Load by waits (AAS)** on the Buzz Postgres writer. Two independent causes compound, and both are fixed here. ### 1. No index can serve it `channels` is `PRIMARY KEY (community_id, id)`, and every secondary index leads with `community_id`: | Index | Columns | |---|---| | *(primary key)* | `(community_id, id)` | | `idx_channels_nip29_group` | `(community_id, nip29_group_id)` | | `idx_channels_dm_hash` | `(community_id, participant_hash)` | | `idx_channels_community_type` | `(community_id, channel_type)` | | `idx_channels_community_visibility` | `(community_id, visibility)` | | `idx_channels_created_by` | `(community_id, created_by)` | | `idx_channels_ttl_expiry` | `(ttl_deadline)` *(partial)* | The two tenant-independent lookups carry **no `community_id` predicate** — deliberately: - `Db::communities_of_channels` — `WHERE id = ANY($1) AND deleted_at IS NULL` - `Db::community_of_channel` — `WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL` That independence is load-bearing, not an oversight: projecting a row's *true* owning community regardless of the fetch query's `WHERE` clause is what makes `Inv_NonInterference` non-vacuous. If the fetch ever dropped its tenant scoping, this lookup would still report the real label and the checker would catch the mismatch. But a composite btree is only usable when its leading column is constrained, so neither query can use the primary key, and nothing else leads with `id`. **Both sequentially scan `channels` on every call.** ### 2. In production the result is discarded Both call sites feed `record_read_message_rows` / `record_read_by_id_rows`, which call `tracer.record(...)`. Production binds `NoopTracer` (`crates/buzz-relay/src/state.rs`), whose `record` body is empty. The existing guard tests `trace_state`, which is `Some` for every well-formed request — it only goes `None` on malformed pubkey bytes. So the scan ran on the hot read path and its output was dropped. This is the classic eager-argument bug: `log.debug("..." + expensiveCall())` with no `isDebugEnabled()` check. ### 3. Multiplied per filter The non-search call site sits **inside the phase-3 per-filter loop**, so a `REQ` carrying N filters performed N sequential scans of `channels` before responding. ## Changes **`Tracer::enabled()`** — a capability check on the trait (the `isDebugEnabled()` of this seam), defaulting to `true`. `NoopTracer` overrides it to `false`, and both emitters in `req.rs` now gate on it, skipping the trace-only DB read entirely in production. **`migrations/0027_channels_id_lookup_index.sql`** ```sql CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_channels_id_live ON channels (id) INCLUDE (community_id) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL; ``` - `INCLUDE (community_id)` — both queries select exactly `(id, community_id)`, so this is covering and can be served index-only. - Partial on `deleted_at IS NULL` — matches both predicates exactly, excludes soft-deleted history, and lets Postgres skip the recheck. - **Not `UNIQUE`.** `id` alone is *not* unique in this table — `command_executor.rs` documents that `community_of_channel(channel_id)` is ambiguous because the same channel id can appear under more than one community. A unique index would encode a false constraint and fail to build on any database already holding such a pair. Worth keeping the index even though fix #1 removes the production caller: it still runs under conformance, and `community_of_channel` has the same problem on its own paths. **`schema/schema.sql`** — mirrored, since a test asserts desired-state parity. ## Conformance is unchanged This is the part worth reviewing closely. Under a real tracer `enabled()` returns `true` and **every emit happens exactly as before** — the gate only skips *building* emit inputs when nothing observes them, never an emit that would otherwise have been made. The coverage-breach guard stays non-vacuous. `CountingTracer` forwards `enabled()` to its inner tracer rather than inheriting the `true` default. Both directions matter and both fail silently: - inheriting `true` over a `NoopTracer` would keep the overhead this PR removes; - hardcoding `false` over a live tracer would suppress the emits whose absence `EmitGuard` reports as `ImplBug` — masking real breaches behind expected ones. Covered by a new regression test, `counting_tracer_delegates_enabled_to_inner`, which asserts delegation in both directions. ## Verification - `cargo check -p buzz-conformance -p buzz-relay` — clean - `cargo clippy --all-targets` — clean, zero warnings - `cargo test -p buzz-conformance` — 6/6 - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib conformance` — 11/11 - `cargo test -p buzz-db --lib migration` — 7/7 - `just test-unit` (pre-push) — green Migration-count assertions in `crates/buzz-db/src/migration.rs` were bumped 26 → 27, with content assertions for 0027 following the existing per-migration pattern (including a guard that it never becomes `UNIQUE`). ## Open questions for reviewers 1. **Lock strategy.** Built *without* `CONCURRENTLY`, following migration 0004's precedent, because sqlx runs each migration inside a transaction and `CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY` cannot run in one. This takes a brief `SHARE` lock on `channels` (blocks writes, not reads) — small relative to `events`, but an operator preferring zero write-blocking can pre-build it by hand and `IF NOT EXISTS` makes the migration a no-op. I could not confirm whether sqlx 0.9 supports a `-- no-transaction` directive; if it does, that may be preferable. 2. **Diagnosis is static.** This comes from reading the source, not from `EXPLAIN` against the live database. Worth confirming with `EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS)` on the writer before/after — that also sizes the win by revealing the real table size and row counts. 3. **Expected impact** scales with average filters-per-`REQ`, which I did not measure. `pg_stat_statements` ordered by `total_exec_time` would confirm this query drops off the top and show whether anything else is scanning the same way. Signed-off-by: Jemiah Westerman <jemiah@squareup.com>	2026-08-04 13:59:54 -04:00
3 people	ac4fa13b8e	perf(relay): serve relay-membership checks from the read replica (#4124) ... ## Summary Route `Db::is_relay_member` — the membership check that runs on every authenticated HTTP request and WS AUTH — through the standard `route_read` machinery on the bounded arm, instead of adding a bespoke cache (replaces #3844). - `crates/buzz-db/src/relay_members.rs`: add `is_relay_member_on(&mut PgConnection, ...)` executor seam; the pool version delegates to it. - `crates/buzz-db/src/lib.rs`: `Db::is_relay_member` now routes via `route_read("relay_membership", RoutePredicate::Bounded)` — replica only on a proved fresh session, writer on any route rejection, writer re-run on replica query error. Exactly the shape of every other routed read. This is the one permission read served from the replica, by explicit product decision (Tyler accepted ≤1s bounded staleness on reads we choose): the fleet-wide fence guarantee (`BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS`, deploy target 1s) is an order of magnitude tighter than the 10s TTL proposed in #3844 and needs no invalidation machinery. Staleness is symmetric for admits and revokes. `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS` unset = writer-only = kill switch. It is not precedent for routing other permission reads. ## Validation At this exact commit (`git rev-parse HEAD` confirmed in the same shell, rustc 1.95): - `cargo test -p buzz-db` — 94 passed, 0 failed - PG-gated suite single-threaded — **151 passed, 2 failed**; the 2 failures are the per-owner-limit tests broken on main by #3829 (limit 3→5, tests still seed 3) — they fail identically at base `19d57b0d4` in a pristine control checkout; separate trivial fix to follow - New PG-gated test `is_relay_member_is_bounded_routed_and_fails_closed` — divergent writer/replica fixtures prove: budget unset ⇒ writer; budget set + fresh proof ⇒ replica; over-budget entry ⇒ writer - clippy `-D warnings` + fmt clean; pre-push hooks green (desktop check/test, rust tests, tauri checks) - **Live-local pass** (TESTING.md, release binary, `BUZZ_REQUIRE_RELAY_MEMBERSHIP=true`, fresh DB): - writer-only (no `READ_DATABASE_URL`): member accepted, outsider 403 `relay_membership_required`; metrics `route_decision{path="relay_membership",decision="writer",reason="disabled"}` - replica configured + `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS=1000`: member accepted / outsider denied via `decision="replica",reason="fresh"`; admit visible to the routed check within ~1.2s; revoke enforced within ~1.2s - reader outage mid-flight (TCP proxy killed): member send still succeeds in <200ms via `decision="writer",reason="reader_acquire_timeout"`; outsider still denied — fails closed, no availability loss Reviewed by Wren: 9/10 minimalness, 9/10 elegance, 9.5/10 correctness at this SHA. Supersedes the 10s-cache approach in PR 3844, which should be closed unmerged once this lands. Signed-off-by: Tyler <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-08-01 13:32:16 -04:00
3 people	5765fc74b7	fix(relay): allow open relays to set their NIP-11 workspace icon (kind:9033) (#3998) ... ## Problem The desktop deliberately shows the workspace icon editor on open relays (#2640, gate: `canEditIcon` in `desktop/src/features/communities/ui/EditCommunityDialog.tsx`) and defers to the relay-side kind:9033 check — which required an admin/owner row in `relay_members`. For a community with **no admin/owner row at all** (the `ensure_configured_community` path, which never writes an owner), every 9033 was refused and the icon was permanently unsettable. **Correction from review (thanks @Dawn):** the original version of this PR claimed nobody holds a role on an open relay. That's false — `main.rs` bootstraps `RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY` as owner regardless of `BUZZ_REQUIRE_RELAY_MEMBERSHIP`, so a production open relay like bb-block *does* have an owner row, and the old gate was refusing everyone except that owner. The first revision of this diff would have silently widened that owner-only control to any NIP-42-authenticated sender. ## Fix — steward-wins `may_set_workspace_profile(sender_role, membership_enforced, community_has_steward)`: | Relay mode | Community has admin/owner row? | Who may set the icon | |---|---|---| | Closed (`require_relay_membership=true`) | any | admin or owner (unchanged) | | Open | yes (e.g. bb-block) | admin or owner (unchanged posture) | | Open | no (genuinely rosterless) | any NIP-42-authenticated sender | - New DB helper `has_admin_or_owner(community)` (`crates/buzz-db/src/relay_members.rs`); the call site only queries it on open relays. - The rosterless admit logs a `warn!` with the sender pubkey — 9033 writes no audit row and publishes no announcement event (unlike 9030/9031), so this is the only durable attribution. - Kinds 9030–9032, NIP-42 auth, `AdminUsers` scope, ban gate, and icon validation are all untouched. - Doc comment fixed: cited nonexistent `canEditCommunityProfile`; real symbol is `canEditIcon`. ## Test coverage — closing the mutation gap Dawn's mutation testing showed the original unit tests pinned only the helper's truth table: inverting the flag at the call site or deleting the gate entirely survived the full suite. - Unit tests now cover the 3-arg truth table (closed steward-independent, open-with-steward stays steward-only, rosterless-open admits). - Two `#[ignore]`d Postgres integration tests drive `handle_relay_admin_event` with a real `AppState` (open rosterless admit → steward appears → roleless refused again; closed relay member refused). Wired into the Backend Integration CI job as a dedicated nextest step. - **Both of Dawn's mutants verified killed** at this head: flag inversion fails 1 unit test; gate deletion fails both integration tests (`Ok(())` where `Rejected` expected). ## CI wrinkle found and fixed: pre-existing schema drift The first Backend Integration run of the new 9033 tests failed with `column "icon" of relation "communities" does not exist` — migration `0003_community_icon.sql` added the column, but `schema/schema.sql` (the desired-state file that CI job applies via pgschema) was never updated. Pre-existing drift, invisible until a test in that job actually wrote the column. Fixed in `297148f62` (3-line addition to `schema/schema.sql`). ## Receipts (at `1b4b52db8` code / `297148f62` head) - `cargo test -p buzz-relay`: 835 pass, 1 fail — `api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo`, pre-existing (fails identically at the old base and on clean main); `telemetry::trace_context_lookup_does_not_enable_callsites` is a known order-dependent flake, passes in isolation. - `cargo test -p buzz-db`: 94 pass. - Both ignored integration tests pass live against local Postgres. - `cargo fmt --all -- --check`: clean. - Live-local pass per TESTING.md at this head (release build, relay on :3199, real WS + NIP-42 via nak): - open rosterless: roleless key sets icon → NIP-11 serves it; `warn!` with sender pubkey in the relay log - open + owner row inserted: fresh roleless key refused ("must be admin or owner"); owner sets icon - closed relay (owner bootstrapped, `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY` set): plain member refused, owner sets icon, `javascript:` URL rejected, empty icon clears (NIP-11 → null) --------- Signed-off-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-08-01 12:03:31 -04:00
3 people	cb9701cd30	feat(relay): accept kind:30621 multi-repo projects at ingest (#3171) ... Buzz renders one card per `kind:30617`, so a project spanning several repositories has no representation. [NIP-MP](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/3163) defines `kind:30621` as an addressable container holding a group's name, description, channel binding, and member coordinates. This adds the kind to `buzz-core` and its structural validation to the relay ingest path. ## Event shape ```json { "kind": 30621, "tags": [ ["d", "platform"], ["name", "Platform"], ["description", "Relay, desktop, and mobile."], ["a", "30617:<owner-a-hex>:buzz"], ["a", "30617:<owner-b-hex>:buzz-infra"], ["buzz-channel", "<channel-uuid>"], ["buzz-visibility", "listed"] ] } ``` ## Validation at ingest | Rule | Behavior | |------|----------| | `d` tag | exactly one, non-empty (length already bounded by the generic `D_TAG_MAX_LEN` check) | | member `a` tag arity | exactly 2 or 3 elements per NIP-01's `a` tag grammar; a 4th element has no defined meaning and is rejected | | member `a` tag coordinate | must parse as `30617:<lowercase-64-hex-owner>:<non-empty-d>` | | duplicate members | rejected on exact string match of the canonical coordinate | | member cap | 64, counted over raw `a` tags | | metadata cardinality | at most one each of `name`, `description`, `buzz-channel`, `buzz-visibility` | | metadata length | `name` ≤ 256 bytes, `description` ≤ 2048 bytes, `buzz-channel` ≤ 256 bytes, `buzz-visibility` ≤ 256 bytes | | zero members | valid | | unknown tags | ignored | Rejection order is normative so a client can predict which rule fires: `d`-cardinality → `d`-empty → member-cap → member-arity → coordinate parse → member-duplicate → metadata cardinality → metadata length. ## Design notes **No membership authorization.** Members are `a` tags, so one project may name repositories owned by different pubkeys — the entire point of the kind. That is safe because membership grants nothing: push policy reads a repository's own `kind:30617` (`api/git/policy.rs`) and never a project. `buzz-channel` is a metadata reference, not a routing directive, so projects are classified global-only. **Owner-only editing is free.** NIP-33 addressing keys replacement on `(pubkey, kind, d)`, so one signer can never overwrite another's project. No relay-side permission check exists or is needed, and `test_project_same_d_under_two_authors_are_independent` pins it. **Duplicates are rejected, not deduped.** A relay cannot rewrite tags inside a signed event without invalidating its id and signature, so the alternative to rejection is a stored duplicate-member head that every consumer must apply a first-wins rule to. **The cap is checked before the duplicate set is built.** Counting raw `a` tags rather than distinct coordinates means an event naming one coordinate thousands of times is refused on count, instead of being bounded only by the relay frame limit. **No side-effect handler.** Generic NIP-33 replacement and generic NIP-09 coordinate soft-delete already cover replacement and deletion; `kind:30621` needs no entry in `is_side_effect_kind`. ## Generic NIP-09 fix carried along `soft_delete_by_coordinate` (`crates/buzz-db/src/event.rs`) previously deleted the live coordinate head regardless of the tombstone's own `created_at`, so a delayed or replayed `a`-tag deletion signed between two versions destroyed the newer replacement. NIP-09 scopes an `a`-tag deletion to versions at or before the deletion request, so the `UPDATE` now carries `created_at <= $5` and `handle_a_tag_deletion` threads the deletion event's `created_at` through. The bug predates `kind:30621` and affected every parameterized-replaceable kind on the generic path — `kind:30617` repository announcements included — so the fix lands there rather than as a project special case. `events.created_at` is immutable per row, so the predicate guarantees a tombstone can never erase a version newer than itself; the UPDATE re-evaluates its WHERE clause after any lock wait. Under READ COMMITTED, a same-coordinate replacement racing the deletion may cause the deletion to evaluate before the new head lands, returning `Ok(false)` — but that outcome is state-identical to the deletion having arrived first, a valid Nostr ordering Nostr never fixes. The return value feeds only a debug log. No coordinate-level lock is needed. ## Coverage 32 unit tests in `crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/ingest.rs` pin the envelope contract (accept: minimal, cross-owner, zero-member, same repo `d` under two owners, colon-bearing repo `d`, cap boundary, unknown tags, relay hint on member `a` tag, max-length metadata, stranger-owned member, uninterpreted metadata values, non-empty content; reject: every rule above plus valueless `d`/`a` tags). A fixture-driven test (`project_envelope_validates_all_shared_fixtures`) runs every case in the shared `NIP-MP.fixtures.json` oracle (11 accept + 20 reject) against `validate_project_envelope`, so any future change that breaks a case turns the test suite red. 6 `#[ignore]`d e2e tests in `crates/buzz-test-client/tests/e2e_project.rs` cover behavior that only exists past storage — coordinate round-trip, newer-wins replacement, two authors sharing a `d`, an `a`-tag tombstone that removes the project while leaving referenced `kind:30617`s intact, and a tombstone timestamped between V1 and V2 that must leave V2 live. The negative e2e case asserts on the rejection message so a refusal for an unrelated reason cannot satisfy it; that is what proves the validator is reachable from the live write path rather than merely correct in isolation. The new e2e binary is wired into the Relay E2E job. The timestamp predicate is additionally pinned at the storage layer by `coordinate_delete_spares_head_newer_than_the_deletion` in `crates/buzz-db/src/lib.rs`, which asserts both directions: a stale tombstone deletes nothing and leaves the newer head readable, and a tombstone at the head's own timestamp still deletes it. This test is wired into the Backend Integration job. Related: #3163 (the NIP-MP spec and shared conformance fixtures). Independent — either can merge first. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-07-31 16:22:57 -04:00
3 people	10d5a26414	feat(relay): raise hosted community limit to five (#3829) ... ## Summary - raise the relay authoritative default community ownership limit from 3 to 5 - raise the desktop hosted-community treatment from 3 to 5 - preserve `BUZZ_MAX_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` as a deployment override ## Validation - `pnpm -r check` - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `cargo test -p buzz-db` (94 passed, 151 Postgres-dependent tests ignored) - pre-push hooks: desktop checks/tests, Rust tests, Tauri checks (all passed; 1,995 desktop Rust tests passed) Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-07-30 18:20:58 -07:00
3 people	23f0c26b1c	fix(relay): align NIP-11 max_limit with REQ ceiling (#3635) ... Buzz's NIP-11 document advertised `limitation.max_limit: 10_000`, but the effective websocket REQ page ceiling was `1_000` — a 10x lie. The websocket REQ path never sets `EventQuery::max_limit`, so `query_events` applied its own `unwrap_or(1000)` clamp to every historical query. Only the COUNT fallback (`apply_count_fallback_limit`) ever raises that clamp. A client that trusts the advertised value asks for 10,000 events, silently receives 1,000, and — with no error and no continuation signal — reads that short page as exhaustion. Up to 9,000 events are dropped without anyone noticing. `MAX_HISTORICAL_LIMIT = 2_000` in `handlers/req.rs` was dead weight for the same reason: nothing clamped to 2,000 could survive the DB's 1,000 clamp one layer down. ## Change `buzz_db::DEFAULT_MAX_PAGE_LIMIT` (`1_000`) is now the single source of truth. It is the `query_events` clamp default, the value both REQ clamp sites use, and the value advertised as NIP-11 `max_limit`. `MAX_HISTORICAL_LIMIT` is removed rather than re-pointed — an alias for a constant used four lines away adds a name without adding meaning. The NIP-50 search path carries a second, independent bound. It clamps its emission target to the shared ceiling like any other REQ, but how many FTS candidates it will scan was bounded separately, by a bare 10-page loop over 100-hit pages. That product only coincidentally equalled the ceiling, so raising the ceiling — or shrinking a page — would shrink the scan relative to what clients may now request, degrading search quality while nothing in the code registered the change. The page count is now ceiling-divided from `DEFAULT_MAX_PAGE_LIMIT` over a named `SEARCH_PAGE_SIZE`, so the scan budget tracks the advertised ceiling by construction. That budget is a resource policy, not a delivery promise. It bounds candidates *scanned*, not events *emitted*: post-filtering (NIP-01 match, channel access, reader visibility, dedup) discards an unpredictable share of every page, so a search result smaller than the requested limit remains possible. This is not a NIP-11 violation — `max_limit` is defined as a clamp the relay applies to a requested `limit`, not a guaranteed count in the response. Two guards hold the pair together: - `req_filter_limit_clamps_to_advertised_nip11_max_limit` reads `max_limit` back out of a built `RelayInfo` and asserts the REQ path clamps to exactly that number. - `search_scan_capacity_covers_advertised_nip11_max_limit` asserts the scan budget covers exactly one advertised ceiling's worth of candidates — no less, and with no spare page of slack, so the derivation can't be quietly replaced by a hand-tuned constant that happens to pass today. ## Behavior Websocket behavior is unchanged: 1,000 was already the real ceiling on every path, including NIP-50. The advertisement now tells the truth about it. Raising the effective limit is a capacity decision and is deliberately not made here. The generic HTTP bridge's page-2+ offsets do change, as a consequence of the corrected clamp. `extract_page_offset` sizes a page from `query.limit` *before* the DB clamp applies, so an absent limit previously produced an offset of 2,000 and a requested 1,500 produced 1,500 — while the page actually returned held at most 1,000 rows. Both now produce 1,000. This corrects paging that had been skipping rows the previous page never returned; `extract_page_offset_sizes_pages_from_clamped_limit` locks it down. ## Scope note The bridge's per-endpoint ceilings — `BRIDGE_WINDOW_MAX_LIMIT` (200) for channel windows and `BRIDGE_THREAD_MAX_LIMIT` (500) for thread reads — are endpoint contracts on a non-NIP-01 transport, not values NIP-11 speaks for, and are unchanged. Fixes #3757 --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-07-30 18:42:18 -04:00
Will PflegerandGitHub	114d40d9d3	feat(relay): gate kind 30178 team-catalog reads behind the shared tag (#3358) ... Team catalog projections (`kind:30178`) embed every member's system prompt, so they need the same read gate personas already have: only the author sees an unshared event. The gate was hardcoded to `kind:30175` at six read surfaces plus the SQL pushdown, so rather than adding a second special case it becomes kind-generic over `SHARED_GATED_KINDS = {30175, 30178}`. ## Kind 30178 New parameterized-replaceable kind, addressed by `(pubkey_o, 30178, team_id)`. It embeds sanitized member projections instead of referencing `kind:30175` heads — a foreign reader of a shared team could not otherwise hydrate members whose own persona events are unshared or, for built-ins, absent entirely. `kind:30176`'s wire body is untouched, so device sync keeps its contract. ## Kind-generic shared gate `buzz_core::kind` replaces `is_persona_shared_kind` / `is_unshared_persona_event` / `persona_event_is_shared` with `SHARED_GATED_KINDS` and the kind-agnostic `is_shared_gated_kind` / `is_unshared_gated_event` / `event_is_shared`. Every read surface consults the set: | Surface | File | |---|---| | REQ historical delivery + `ids` lookup | `crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/req.rs` | | Live fan-out | `crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/event.rs` | | COUNT fallback | `crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/count.rs` | | NIP-98 HTTP `/query`, `/count`, `/search` | `crates/buzz-relay/src/api/bridge.rs` | | Pre-`LIMIT` SQL pushdown | `crates/buzz-db/src/event.rs` | The SQL clause generalizes from `kind != 30175` to `kind NOT IN (...)` bound from `SHARED_GATED_KINDS`, still applied before `ORDER BY … LIMIT` so a page of newer private events cannot starve an older shared one off the candidate set. `EventQuery::persona_reader` is renamed `shared_gated_reader` and `needs_persona_filtering` to `needs_shared_gate_filtering` to match. Because the `buzz-core` rename has consumers outside the relay, the four desktop call sites of `persona_event_is_shared` travel with it: `desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/personas/pending.rs`, `desktop/src-tauri/src/event_sync.rs`, and two in `desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/persona_events.rs`. Each call is unchanged apart from the name — the persona `shared` projection behaves exactly as before. ## Ingest validation `validate_persona_envelope` splits into two reusable pieces — `validate_shared_tag` (exactly-two-element `["shared","true"]`, at most one occurrence) and `single_bounded_d_tag` (exactly one `d` tag, non-empty, `<=64` chars, no ASCII control characters or whitespace). `validate_team_catalog_envelope` composes both; personas additionally keep the slug grammar `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$`. `kind:30178` deliberately does **not** get the slug grammar. Team ids are UUIDs or built-in identifiers such as `builtin-team:welcome`, and the colon is not slug-legal; rewriting ids to fit would break NIP-33 addressing against the team's own `kind:30176` head. The non-empty and exactly-one checks are load-bearing regardless — without them generic NIP-33 storage maps a missing `d` onto `(pubkey_o, 30178, "")` and every team overwrites its predecessor. The exact two-element `shared` shape is enforced because the SQL visibility clause is JSONB containment (`tags @> '[["shared","true"]]'`), which would match a three-element superset such as `["shared","true","extra"]`. `kind:30178` is also added to the `Scope::UsersWrite` allowlist and to `is_global_only_kind`, so a stray `h` tag cannot channel-scope an owner-authored definition. ## Deferred `kind:30176` is deliberately not a gate member. Its writers never emit `shared`, so catalog opt-in semantics do not describe it — it needs owner-private reads driven by an authenticated principal set, tracked as a separate follow-up. ## Tests - 19 new `ingest.rs` unit tests covering the 30178 envelope (UUID and colon `d` tags, 64-char boundary, non-ASCII bound, empty/valueless/duplicate/missing `d`, embedded newline, `shared` false/three-element/duplicate, scope and global-only membership). - Persona regressions for the valueless `["d"]` shapes, since the `d`-tag helper is shared by both validators. - Existing `kind.rs` gate tests generalized and extended to assert the gate applies to 30178 as it does to 30175. - New `crates/buzz-test-client/tests/e2e_team_catalog.rs`: 9 WS-level tests over a live relay covering author reads of unshared heads, foreign omission from REQ, `ids`-lookup denial, COUNT existence-leak, share and unshare transitions, and the mixed-kind filter case. - `.github/workflows/ci.yml` adds `--test e2e_team_catalog` to the Relay E2E job so the new suite runs. ## Docs `docs/nips/NIP-AP.md` gains a "Team catalog projection: kind:30178" section and an "Ingest validation: kind:30178" subsection, records the gate as kind-generic, documents 30178 deletion vs. unshare semantics, and adds a security note that sharing a team exposes every member's instructions even when that member's own `kind:30175` head is unshared. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>	2026-07-30 17:53:30 -04:00
MatthewandGitHub	dba97eecd9	fix(db): isolate usage metrics advisory-lock test on scratch DB (#3670) ... ## What Problem This Solves `test_usage_metrics_lock_has_single_owner_and_releases_on_drop` hardcodes the **production** advisory lock key (`0x4255_5A5A_4D45_5452`) on the shared `TEST_DATABASE_URL`. Postgres advisory locks are per-database, so any live `buzz-relay` pointed at the same DB holds that key and the test fails (or races the relay tick). Diagnosis time was burned during #3268 verification, including near-misses on live dev relays. Fixes #3619. ## Why This Change Was Made Preferred fix from the issue: run the test on a private scratch DB via existing `create_scratch_db` / `drop_scratch_db` (same pattern as replica-routing fixtures). Keep the production lock key so the test still documents the real constant, without colliding with a running relay. ## User Impact - Local `cargo test -p buzz-db -- --ignored` no longer fails when a dev relay is running against the shared test DB - Safer: no temptation to `pg_terminate_backend` a live relay to "fix" the test ## Evidence - Code review of fixture isolation - Pattern matches existing `create_scratch_db` usage in this file - Test remains `#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]` (same as before) ## Related - Issue: #3619 - None found among open PRs for this exact fix Signed-off-by: NanoRisk6 <aidashtherapy@gmail.com>	2026-07-30 17:03:53 -04:00
4 people	63496cc1d4	feat(replica): portable heartbeat-token fence with snapshot-local reader routing (#3268) ... ## Summary Expands read-replica usage on the relay per the Rev 2 design (thread 39d1e174 in #buzz-read-only-replica-usage): replaces the Aurora-incompatible WAL-LSN read-side fence observation with a portable **heartbeat token**, makes the freshness proof **snapshot-local to the serving reader session**, and adds a default-off bounded-staleness gate for head fetches. ### Probe (writer side, unchanged ordering) The ordered writer scan is kept verbatim — `S = clock_timestamp()` → masked-visibility `pg_stat_activity` oldest-xact scan — and now ends by committing a heartbeat token **last** on the same pinned connection (single-row `UPDATE replica_heartbeat ... RETURNING token, epoch`, migration `0026`). The single-row update serializes all pods' probes, so tokens are globally commit-ordered; the three-bucket completeness argument carries over unchanged. Ring retains `(token, committed_at, fence_wall)`; epoch change resets the ring; a same-epoch token regression (restore adversary) clears the ring **and rotates the epoch on the writer** so pre-rewind readers fail the epoch check. Cadence 1s. ### Routing (snapshot-local proof) Every routed read opens `BEGIN ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ, READ ONLY` on a reader session and observes the heartbeat as the transaction's **first statement** — the proof's snapshot is exactly the snapshot the page, participants batch, and bridge aux closure read from (`ReadSession` carries the open transaction; drop = rollback). Fail-closed everywhere: begin failure, missing heartbeat row, epoch mismatch, token below the ring, over-budget entry → writer. - **Predicate B (cursor pages, default-on):** same completeness math as the existing fence — cursor timestamp must be ≤ the proved wall; thread candidate-terminal and above-wall pages re-run on the writer. - **Predicate A (head fetches, default-OFF):** gated by `BUZZ_REPLICA_HEAD_MAX_AGE_SECS` (0 = off, clamped to fence staleness). Bounded-stale head semantics are an explicit product decision — **do not enable anywhere without Tyler's backdated-event-semantics acceptance.** ### Observability `buzz_db_route_decision{path, decision, reason}` across all five paths, `buzz_db_replica_heartbeat_age_seconds` gauge, and per-decision debug logs carrying the proved token plus backend identity: `addr:port pid=N`, prefixed with `aurora_db_instance_identifier()` when the endpoint supports it (probed once per process on an autocommit checkout; SQLSTATE 42883 caches a definitive false; identity is evidence, never a routing gate). ## Review & verification - **Wren:** full review 9/9/9 at `5f81b10e5`; identity delta re-review approved at exact head `fedb46368` (90/90 unit, clippy `-D warnings`, fmt independently reproduced). - **Max:** local E2E **PASS** at `5f81b10e5` — isolated PG17 writer + two streaming standbys behind HAProxy; paused-reader legs split exactly as designed (6 replica/fresh + 6 writer/stale), recovery clean, RR snapshot hardening observed in runtime logs. Evidence: `WORK_LOGS/2026-07-28_REPLICA_HEARTBEAT_REPLACEMENT_SHA_E2E.md`. - **My gates at head (same shell):** buzz-db 90 unit + 143 Postgres-gated green (scratch DBs); buzz-relay 767/768 — lone red is the pre-existing `mesh_demo` flake, red on base; clippy `-D warnings` + fmt clean. - Key regression tests: `routed_request_holds_one_snapshot_across_page_and_aux` (mutation-verified both directions), same-epoch rotation, capability-probe negative, head-gate truth table, divergent-fixture routing suite. ## Post-merge plan Merge publishes the immutable `sha-*` main image → bb-public PR pins it → ArgoCD sync → Max runs the production cursor-routing canary on Aurora (positive identity branch proven live). Head gate stays off. Client `since`-widening ships separately. --- ## Update — full read routing (Rev 6, commit `9fa3c9c0b`) Extends routing to the remaining read seams per `PLANS/REPLICA_FULL_READ_ROUTING_DESIGN.md` Rev 6 (thread cf5deba4 in #buzz-read-only-replica-usage). ### New routed seams — ALL deploy-default dark The new seams (`query_events_routed`, `query_events_routed_bounded`, `count_events_routed`, `get_events_by_ids_routed`, `query_feed_{mentions,needs_action,activity}_routed`) are **Bounded-only** and gated on `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS`: unset ⇒ every new seam records `writer/disabled` and merging is a no-op. COUNT and feed/by-ids never take the covered arm (deletion visibility: covered bounds insert-completeness only). **Note:** the pre-existing cursor paths (channel windows, thread pages) are *not* gated by this env var — they route at B=0 today and that status quo is unchanged. ### Reader pool (D4/D5) - Lazy pool (`connect_lazy`, `min_connections(0)`): reader-down at boot can't crash the relay; a warn-only boot ping is the only boot-time visibility, and it primes the Aurora identity capability cache. Priming is an optimization only — the routed path itself spends a single acquire budget regardless (see the single-checkout fix below), because a boot ping that *fails* is correlated with exactly the reader-unavailable case the budget bound exists for. - `READER_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` = 150ms; a miss fails closed to the writer with reason **`reader_acquire_timeout`** — named for the mechanism, not a diagnosis. The budget includes cold connects and sqlx's `size` counts in-flight dials, so this metric alone does not distinguish contention from slow connection establishment (see `proved_reader` doc-comment for the runbook guidance; the pool gauges are 10s samples and are for capacity planning). - `BUZZ_DB_READ_POOL_SIZE` sizes the reader independently (invalid/0 inherits writer sizing); `read_pool_stats().max` reports the reader's own ceiling. ### Community isolation (formal-model question) Isolation is structural — an explicit `community_id = $n` predicate compiled into every query builder; no RLS, no session-GUC tenant state (zero `CREATE POLICY` across migrations). The `_on` variants reuse the exact same builders with only the executor swapped. Proven by a seven-seam two-community divergent-fixture test (`routed_reads_are_confined_to_the_requested_community`), mutation-tested by Dawn: all four single-predicate stubs killed; the mention-join feeds are defended in depth (three independent predicates) so only complete removal leaks there. ### Accepted limitation D6: client-side staleness on bounded reads (up to `_MS`) is accepted product behavior when the gate is enabled; gate stays off at merge. ## Update — single acquire budget per routed read (commit `dd26caa9f`) Max found (and Dawn independently reproduced, 302–330ms measured) that the boot-unavailable cold path spent **two** stacked `READER_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` budgets: the Aurora capability probe did its own `pool.acquire()` before `begin_with` acquired again. Fixed by acquiring **once** per routed read — the capability probe runs on the held connection (`reader_aurora_capability_on`) and the read-only `REPEATABLE READ` transaction begins on that same connection (`Transaction::begin` accepts a `PoolConnection` at `'static` via sqlx's `MaybePoolConnection`). Reason codes unchanged; capability still never negatively cached. Measured routed fallback: ~150ms (one budget). Ships with a PG-gated regression fixture (`routed_fallback_spends_one_acquire_budget_when_aurora_cache_is_cold`, authored by Dawn): size-1 reader saturated, capability cache asserted cold, routes through `count_events_routed`, asserts writer answer + one-budget elapsed + `writer/reader_acquire_timeout` label (mutation-tested: `pool_busy` and `reader_validation_error` mutants both killed). It fails at 330ms on the previous commit and passes on this one. ### Verification at `dd26caa9f` (pinned toolchain rustc 1.95.0 via repo `bin/`; ambient rustc 1.89 fails sqlx resolution — always prepend `bin/`) - buzz-db: 94 unit + **150/151** PG-gated serial (`--test-threads=1`; suite is not parallel-safe against one Postgres). The 1 red is `test_usage_metrics_lock_has_single_owner_and_releases_on_drop` — a **pre-existing** same-key-same-database advisory-lock collision with any live relay pointed at the shared `buzz` DB (the relay re-arms `USAGE_METRICS_LOCK_KEY` on a 300s tick). It passes on a private scratch DB with the relay still running — verified this run. Remedy is a scratch `TEST_DATABASE_URL`, **not** terminating lock holders: inspect `pg_locks`/`pg_stat_activity` and resolve the owning process first; an idle advisory holder may be a live dev relay. Pre-existing, not a #3268 blocker — filed as #3619. - buzz-relay: 773/773; clippy `-D warnings` + fmt clean. (`mesh_demo` echo test is a known pre-existing Redis-dependent flake — Dawn confirmed it fails identically on the base commit, untouched by this PR.) - Dawn: independent re-verification at `dd26caa9f` — byte-identical diff application confirmed, suite reproduced, and fixture proven to still discriminate (fails at 320ms with only the production fix reverted). Gate clear. Max: independent rig pass at `dd26caa9f` — 94/94 unit, **15/15 routing/fallback matrix** (cursor behavior, default-dark seams, seven-seam confinement, one-snapshot, dead-reader/no-URL fallback, hard-delete fail-closed, reader max), 773/773 relay, private-DB lock control. Gate clear; recommends merge + staged bb-block rollout (no-reader-URL no-op → cursor-only → observe `buzz_db_route_decision` → conservative nonzero `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS`; rollback is config-only). ## Known gap — CI does not run the PG-backed fixtures (#3622) Dawn found post-sign-off (confirmed by Max and Eva at `dd26caa9f`): **every Postgres-backed fixture in this PR is `#[ignore]`d and no CI job selects it.** `Unit Tests` runs `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --lib` (`Justfile:279-285`, ignored tests excluded); the only `--run-ignored ignored-only` invocations (`ci.yml:690`, `:702`) filter to `relay_invite::tests`. So the one-budget regression, the seven-seam isolation fixture, and the fence/floor-guard/fallback tests have zero automated execution — the verification record above is exhaustive but manual, at this exact SHA. Not introduced by this PR (the `#[ignore]` + narrow-filter pattern predates it; 34 ignored tests total) and not a merge blocker: all new seams are dark until `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS` is set. But it changes the rollout gate — **do not set a nonzero `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS` in bb-block until CI enforces these fixtures.** Filed as #3622 (explicit CI selection against the existing backend-integration Postgres archive; ordering note: #3619 must land first or be excluded, since widening the filter would select the colliding usage-metrics lock test). ## Live redteam results (Max, real Helm + PG17 streaming replication at `dd26caa9f`) — #3643, #3644 Max deployed this exact SHA via the repo chart against a physical writer/standby pair and attacked it. **The PR's fenced routing passed every fault**: healthy baseline routes proven on the real standby; paused WAL replay moved head/cursor reads to `writer/stale`; B=0 moved routed reads to `writer/disabled`; reader-URL removal rolled back cleanly. The redteam also found a **pre-existing** production risk this PR does not create and does not fix: NIP-50 search builds its own eager, unfenced pool straight from `READ_DATABASE_URL` (`main.rs:389-402`, introduced by #2084, present in the deployed bb-block `sha-dd222a5` and bb-public `sha-22be8bb` images, and both production ESOs already template `READ_DATABASE_URL`). Measured: ~30s search stall on reader loss, acknowledged-but-unsearchable writes under replica lag (unaffected by `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS`), fatal eager connect blocking pod startup when the reader is down, and `replica=true` FTS even at B=0. Filed as **#3643** (fix: pin FTS to the writer, or fence it like the routed seams) with **#3644** for the writer-pointing-reader-URL telemetry gap. Aurora's cluster-ro writer-fallback DNS softens the outage modes in prod but not the lag mode. **Revised ladder consequence:** step 2 ("add `READ_DATABASE_URL`, budget unset") is NOT a no-op with today's binary — it hands FTS an unfenced replica pool. Rollout order is now: merge (still a true no-op — bb-block/bb-public already run the unfenced-FTS code and this PR only adds dark seams) → fix #3643 → CI enforcement #3622 → then reader URL + budget per the original ladder, re-running Max's three deployment tests (reader-down latency, reader-down cold boot, paused-replay read-your-own-write search). ## Activation gate (consolidated) — merge is clear; ALL of the below precede any nonzero `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS` Six independent verification passes at `dd26caa9f` (Dawn ×2 incl. byte-level + defang check, Max matrix + live Helm redteam, Wren full CRUD regression + greenfield 0026 + 151/151 PG, Eva). Every induced fault was either handled correctly by this PR's machinery or traced to pre-existing main code. Remaining work gates **activation, not merge**: 1. **#3643** — unfenced NIP-50 FTS pool (pre-existing #2084; live in prod today; also explains the blackhole search hang Wren observed — the routed path was measured bounded at 151-152ms against a silent endpoint, sqlx `inner.rs:252-255`). 2. **#3651** — reader `statement_timeout`: statements after acquire are unbounded; mid-transaction blackhole reproduced hanging ≥15s (Dawn). Small fix via `.after_connect` on the reader pool. 3. **#3622** — CI enforcement of the PG fixtures (with #3619 ordering). 4. **Recovery-conflict cancellation live test** — standby cancels a routed read mid-snapshot → complete writer page, never partial (#3651's fix also bounds the cancellation-never-arrives shape). 5. **DDL replication lag test** — migration on writer + paused replay + budget on → fallback, not client-visible SQL errors. 6. **Reader-tx soak** — 30-60min mixed load; no idle-in-tx accumulation on the standby. Then Max's three deployment tests (reader-down latency, reader-down cold boot, paused-replay read-your-own-write search) re-run on the fixed binary before the first nonzero budget on bb-block. --------- Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>	2026-07-29 20:35:15 -04:00
5 people	d500c2d5cf	feat(invites): add use-limited invite links (#3141) ... ## Summary - add database-backed v2 invite links with optional maximum-use limits and atomic final-slot redemption - preserve v1 invite compatibility while adding exhausted/expired/invalid client handling across desktop, web, and mobile - emit structured claim-outcome logs with community, invite ID, outcome, maximum uses, and post-claim count ## Verification - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `cargo test -p buzz-db` (85 passed, 134 Postgres-dependent ignored) - `cargo clippy -p buzz-db --all-targets -- -D warnings` - desktop `npm run typecheck` - push hook: desktop checks/tests, desktop Tauri tests, Rust tests, and branch-skew passed - Postgres integration tests were previously reviewed green at the pre-rebase tree; local rerun on this session was unavailable because Postgres/Docker were not running - mobile push-hook check could not start because Flutter is unavailable locally --------- Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1c4alndp82zyt9veaklm5d965quss79vlhk9awv7qu5erwhmf42qqlvc25c <c57bf9b4275088b2b33db7f746975407210f159fbd8bd733c0e532375f69aa80@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-07-27 15:19:39 -07:00
4 people	f069a85503	feat(admin): show reported message content in report detail (#3149) ... ## Summary - include the reported event's complete stored content, author, creation time, and deletion state in the admin report detail response - resolve the event through a community-scoped join so an event ID collision cannot cross tenant boundaries - render the message only on report detail, with an explicit unavailable state when retention has removed it - preserve the existing report list contract so message bodies are not returned during queue browsing ## Security - the existing admin host/origin authorization runs before the detail database read; a route test pins that ordering - the target event is selected using both `events.community_id = moderation_reports.community_id` and `events.id = moderation_reports.target_event_id` - the client supplies only the report UUID; it cannot choose a community or arbitrary event ID - soft-deleted content is visible only through this restricted admin detail route and is labeled deleted - responses retain the admin API's `no-store`, CSP, `nosniff`, frame denial, and referrer policy middleware ## Testing - `pnpm -C admin-web check` - `pnpm -C admin-web test:e2e` (10 passed) - `cargo test -p buzz-db` (84 passed, 130 ignored) - `cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings` - focused admin authorization tests - pre-push Rust and desktop/Tauri suites passed The new Postgres integration test is ignored under the repository convention and will run when explicitly enabled against migrated Postgres. Local Postgres and Redis were unavailable, so the full `buzz-relay --lib` run had 8 existing infrastructure-dependent failures after 749 tests passed. --------- Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-07-27 12:49:21 -07:00
4 people	9b0f744804	resolve findings (#3150) ... Fixes all six HIGH findings from the buzz security report, one commit per finding. Independently reviewed to approval by Max at `0158ae542`, plus a deep isolated live pass (clean-room compose stack, weird ports, full product matrix) at the same head — see the buzz-security thread for evidence. `fe65c07c3` merges current `origin/main` on top (new commit, no rebase), inheriting the nostr 0.44.6 bump (#3135) and relay-admin ban gate (#3128). ## Findings and fixes | Finding | Commit | Fix | |---|---|---| | 003 — quinn-proto RUSTSEC-2026-0185 | `e5dcdec72` | Bump quinn-proto 0.11.14 → 0.11.16 (lockfile-only) | | 002/004 — linkify-it quadratic-parse DoS (GHSA-22p9-wv53-3rq4, GHSA-v245-v573-v5vm) | `923b3c20f` | pnpm override `linkify-it: ^5.0.2`; `pnpm why` confirms a single 5.0.2 copy | | 001 — media reads served unauthenticated by default | `0f277e3e2` | Helm `requireMediaGetAuth` defaults to `true` + rendered-chart test pinning the default | | 006 — removed workflow owners retain webhook-exfiltration authority | `4749bd56c` | Fail-closed per-fire authority gate (current owner/admin membership) on **all four** trigger doors (on_event, scheduler pre-claim, manual trigger, webhook — masked as generic 404), save-time gate for `call_webhook` defs, durable disable-on-removal wired to kinds 9001 + 9022 | | 005 — git Smart-HTTP reads ignore channel membership | `e648f2dba` + `0158ae542` | `authorize_git_read`: caller's **current active membership** in the repo's bound channel, checked before any hydration/subprocess on all three read doors (`info_refs` for both services + `upload_pack` POST). Uniform generic 404 denials (no membership probing), no repo-owner bypass, first-`buzz-channel`-tag binding semantics fail closed on ambiguous duplicates (mutation-verified test). Resolution follows the live kind:30617 announcement, so deleted/replaced announcements deny immediately. The committed `e2e-git-perms.sh` guest scenario previously asserted the vulnerability — now asserts denial. | ## Behavior changes to be aware of 1. **Unbound repos fail closed for git reads.** `buzz repos create` emits no `buzz-channel` tag, so CLI-created repos without a binding are unreadable via git HTTP. Correct per finding 005's fail-closed posture; a follow-up could bind CLI-created repos at creation time. 2. **006 is conservative:** a workflow disabled on owner removal does not auto-re-enable if the owner is re-added — explicit re-enable required. 3. Merge conflict resolution in `fe65c07c3`: kept main's `@radix-ui/react-dismissable-layer` 1.1.19 bump alongside the linkify-it security override (`pnpm-workspace.yaml` + lockfile). ## Verification at the merge head `fe65c07c3` (same shell) - buzz-relay `--lib`: 761 passed / 1 failed — the lone red is the known pre-existing `mesh_demo::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` 504 flake, present on main - SEC-005 module incl. PG behavioral matrix: 8/8 (removed-member, never-member, owner-no-bypass, deleted-30617, malformed/ambiguous binding, owner-mismatch all denied) - buzz-workflow 153/0, buzz-db 84/0; `clippy --all-targets -D warnings` + `fmt --check` clean - Desktop JS 3637/3637, tsc clean, biome clean, file-size/px-text/pubkey-truncation gates clean - `helm lint` + `helm unittest` (40/40) on `deploy/charts/buzz` - All five pre-push hooks green (desktop-check, desktop-test, rust-tests, desktop-tauri-test, branch-skew) Prior review evidence at `0158ae542` (pre-merge): Max's independent exact-head approval + clean-room live regression pass (`WORK_LOGS/2026-07-27_SECURITY_HIGH_LIVE_TEST.md` in his workspace). Max will re-run the deep local pass at this post-merge head before merge. --------- Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>	2026-07-27 14:18:24 -04:00
Will PflegerandGitHub	a041e2d21e	Revert "fix(cli,relay): resolve agents by verified owner" (#3168) ... Reverts block/buzz#2615	2026-07-27 14:10:16 -04:00
3 people	c3084b36d9	fix(cli,relay): resolve agents by verified owner (#2615) ... ## Context `buzz users get --name Honey` searches relay-wide profiles and returns up to 100 identically named results without verified ownership metadata. An agent resolving “my Honey” cannot distinguish the requesting human's agent from another owner's agent, and the owned match can be excluded by the result limit. This caused the wrong Honey and Bumble pubkeys to be added to a channel. ## Summary This bug fix makes personal-agent resolution owner-aware. Callers can filter profiles by a verified owner identity before result limits are applied, and all profile results expose enough ownership context to diagnose duplicate names. ## Changes - Adds `buzz users get --owner me|<hex>|<npub>` for name and pubkey lookups. - Resolves `me` to the NIP-OA owner identity when the CLI runs as an agent. - Filters profiles by the relay's verified `agent_owner_pubkey` relationship before applying the result limit. - Returns `owner_pubkey`, `owner_display_name`, and client-relative `owned_by_me` in compact and JSON output. - Returns an empty result when no owned profile matches instead of removing the ownership constraint. - Rejects malformed owner values instead of silently running an unscoped query; explicit `null` remains equivalent to no owner filter for ordinary CLI lookups. - Rejects owner constraints on specialized channel-window, feed, and thread filters that cannot enforce author filtering. - Scopes owner filtering and enrichment to the active community. - Adds a partial `(community_id, agent_owner_pubkey)` index for owner lookups. - Documents the safe `users get --name Honey --owner me` lookup. ## Reviewer-reproducible examples The relay-backed test creates two same-name agents with different verified owners, queries through the HTTP `/query` route, verifies only the selected owner's agent is returned with verified owner metadata, and verifies a missing owner returns `[]`. ```bash cargo test -p buzz-relay query_agent_owner_returns_only_verified_owner_matches --lib -- --ignored ``` The owner/author intersection and unsupported-specialized-filter contracts also have infrastructure-free relay tests: ```bash cargo test -p buzz-relay agent_owner --lib ``` The CLI surface is visible in command help: ```bash cargo run -q -p buzz-cli -- users get --help | grep -- --owner ``` ```text --owner <OWNER> Filter agents by verified owner (`me`, 64-char hex, or npub) ``` ## Validation - `cargo test -p buzz-cli` (252 passed) - `cargo test -p buzz-db` (84 passed, 122 infrastructure tests ignored) - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib` (owner-filter tests pass; the full local suite is blocked by unrelated Postgres pool timeouts in media/admin tests) - `cargo test -p buzz-relay query_agent_owner_returns_only_verified_owner_matches --lib -- --ignored` (passed) - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets` - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - Pre-push Rust, Desktop, and Desktop Tauri suites passed - Pre-push mobile suite could not start because `flutter` is not installed - `pnpm check:file-sizes` (passed after rebasing onto current `main`) --------- Signed-off-by: npub1qye6rec0htgg3np8yt6plpyyg8cyffaq66emt3kmk05eylckkzhq0hnf2k <0133a1e70fbad088cc2722f41f848441f044a7a0d6b3b5c6dbb3e9927f16b0ae@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qye6rec0htgg3np8yt6plpyyg8cyffaq66emt3kmk05eylckkzhq0hnf2k <0133a1e70fbad088cc2722f41f848441f044a7a0d6b3b5c6dbb3e9927f16b0ae@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-07-27 13:10:42 -04:00
3 people	00ecf2cac7	fix(security): authorize kind:9000 role changes in both directions (#3017) ... ## Summary NIP-29 `kind:9000` (PUT_USER) role changes were only authorized when the **new** role was elevated. Demotions were unauthorized, so any authenticated user could strip a channel owner to `member` with a single event — and the demotion was unrecoverable, since the ex-owner then lacked the privilege to restore themselves. Reported by @Tyler in `#buzz-security`. Verified true, plus two adjacent defects the report flagged and one it did not. ## The defects 1. **Demotion unauthorized.** The actor check only fired when the *requested* role was elevated. Lowering someone's role skipped it entirely. 2. **Open channels skipped the actor check.** It was nested under `visibility == "private"`. 3. **`add_member` had no last-owner guard** while `remove_member` did — so a channel could be left with zero owners. 4. **(Not in the report.)** An absent `role` tag defaulted to `Member`, so a bare self-targeted PUT_USER silently demoted the sender. No attacker required. ## The fix **`crates/buzz-db/src/channel.rs`** — the authority, because it also covers the desktop/admin callers that bypass the relay validator: - Changing an **active** member's role requires an elevated actor **in both directions**. Re-adding at the same role stays unguarded and idempotent (the huddle bot-add and `kind:9021` join paths depend on this). - Last-owner guard in `add_member`, mirroring `remove_member`. - Keyed on the **active** role (`removed_at IS NULL`). A soft-removed row's role is history, not live authority — otherwise soft-deleted ownership becomes a resurrection token: a kicked owner self-rejoins via `9021` and silently regains ownership. - New `pg_advisory_xact_lock` on a channel-membership namespace, taken as the first statement in both `add_member` and `remove_member`. Both read an owner `COUNT` and then write a *different* row, so READ COMMITTED alone lets two concurrent demotions each observe 2 owners and together leave 0. - `remove_member`'s `is_agent_owner` lookup moved before the transaction opens — it borrows a second pool connection, and issuing it while holding the lock could self-deadlock on a small pool. Safe because `agent_owner_pubkey` is immutable (first-mint-wins). **`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/side_effects.rs`**: - Role tag is now `Option` — absent means "no role change requested" rather than defaulting to `Member`. - Actor-role lookup hoisted out of the `visibility == "private"` block, so open channels are covered. - Role-change and last-owner guards on every visibility. Rejecting here *as well as* in the DB means clients get a real error instead of an `OK` whose side effect then fails silently. ## Verification **Mutation tested — every guard stubbed individually to confirm a test actually dies.** Three of eight guards were originally uncovered and survived being disabled with the suite fully green: | Guard | Dying test | |---|---| | DB actor-auth | *survived* → **new** `unprivileged_member_cannot_demote_a_co_owner` | | DB last-owner | `owner_can_still_manage_roles_after_demotion_guard` | | DB active-role (soft-remove) | `kicked_owner_rejoins_as_member_not_owner` + 3 | | `add_member` advisory lock | `membership_writes_serialize_on_the_shared_channel_lock` | | `remove_member` advisory lock | + `remove_member_rejects_an_actor_demoted_while_it_waited` | | relay no-role-tag preservation | `test_nip29_put_user_without_role_tag_preserves_role` | | relay actor-auth | *survived* → **new** `test_nip29_relay_rejects_role_change_by_unprivileged_actor` | | relay last-owner | *survived* → **new** `test_nip29_relay_rejects_last_owner_self_demotion` | The three gaps shared one cause: every existing test asserts resulting **state** ("the role did not change"), and the DB guards enforce that state, masking every layer above them. With a relay guard stubbed the relay answers `accepted:true` and logs `Side effect failed: access denied: ...` while the state assertion still passes — the entire relay validator could be deleted unnoticed. The new relay tests assert `accepted == false` instead, the one observable only the validator controls. Each new test is verified in both directions: green against the real fix, failing with its intended message when its guard alone is stubbed. **Test runs** (at `9461eedb`): - `buzz-db`, serial: **210 passed / 3 failed** — the same 3 failures as clean `main` (202/3), which are pre-existing and unrelated (`concurrent_same_owner_create…`, `create_community_with_owner_is_atomic…`, `test_usage_metrics_lock_has_single_owner…`). +8 = the new tests. - `e2e_relay --ignored`: **40 passed / 3 failed**. Clean `main` on the same relay is 35/6 — the same 3 infra failures (`test_invite_mint_and_claim…`, `test_subscription_limit_enforced`, `test_unarchive_emits_member_added_notification`) plus the 3 security tests that fail unpatched and pass here. - `cargo fmt`, `clippy`, `git diff --check` all clean. **Live manual drive** against a locally running relay, using raw `nak`-signed events (the `buzz` CLI refuses malformed `kind:9000`, so the guards have to be exercised directly): - *Rejected:* member demotes owner; member demotes admin; self-promote to owner; self-promote to admin; admin demotes the last owner; sole owner self-demote; demoted ex-owner demotes last owner; private-channel member demotes owner; non-member demotes owner in private. - *Allowed:* bare PUT_USER with no role tag (owner keeps role); idempotent re-add at same role; owner promotes admin→owner, then owner2 legitimately demotes owner1. - *Resurrection defeated:* owner promotes attacker to admin → kicks them (`9001`) → attacker self-rejoins (`9021`) → returns as **member**, not admin, and cannot demote the owner. - Normal ops unaffected throughout: channel creation, messaging, member listing, and legitimate governance all work. ## Behavior change to be aware of Huddle bot-add sends `role="bot"`. If the target is **already an active member at a different role**, that is now a role change and requires an elevated actor. Previously it silently re-roled them — the same privesc primitive through a different door, so narrowing it is intended. This does not break the huddle flow in the path that matters: the ephemeral channel add (the one that fails hard) is performed by the host, who *created* that channel and is therefore its owner — verified live. The parent-channel add is already explicitly best-effort, capturing the error into `parent_error` with a comment anticipating "may already be member"; adding a non-member agent there still works. Flagging it rather than burying it. ## Notes - Commit is **signoff-only, not cryptographically signed** — `-S` fails in this environment (git tries to load the agent npub as an SSH key file). DCO trailers are present and correct. - Branch was merged with `origin/main` via `--no-ff` (not rebased). Upstream had 17 commits, none touching these files, no migration changes. --------- Signed-off-by: tlongwell-block <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Dawn (sprout agent) <c6237ef84fa537c78dcee78efd2d4e59f728859c7f194da42ac51ededfa0be05@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-27 10:24:19 -04:00
thomaspblockandGitHub	c5c4f390b6	feat(desktop): handle project work from Inbox (#3117) ... ## Summary Pull requests and issues that mention you now appear as repository-scoped Inbox conversations, so project work can be reviewed without first navigating to Projects. Opening a project item resolves its current canonical state and reuses the existing review, comment, merge, and issue actions. Repository-aware grouping keeps identical event IDs from different repositories separate, while loading, missing-data, and partial-query states avoid exposing stale actions. ### Related issue None found. ### Testing - `node --import ./test-loader.mjs --experimental-strip-types --test src/features/home/lib/projectInbox.test.mjs` — 6 tests passed - `CI=1 pnpm exec playwright test tests/e2e/project-inbox.spec.ts --project=smoke` — passed - Pre-push desktop, mobile, Tauri, and Rust checks — passed --------- Signed-off-by: Thomas Petersen <thomasp@squareup.com>	2026-07-27 15:14:22 +01:00
Lee SalminenandGitHub	2a051a404d	feat(relay): make per-owner community limit configurable via BUZZ_MAX_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER (#2599) ... Closes #2600 ## Summary Self-hosted multi-tenant deployments (one relay serving many communities via host-based tenancy) routinely need more than three communities owned by the same operator identity. `MAX_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` is currently a hardcoded const, and hitting it surfaces as a `limit_reached` 409 from `POST /operator/communities` — which provisioning UIs tend to mislabel (mine reported it as "subdomain already taken"). This makes the limit configurable per deployment: - New env var `BUZZ_MAX_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` — read once per process, must parse as a positive integer; missing/invalid/non-positive values fall back to the existing default of **3**, so current deployments are unaffected. - Enforcement locations are unchanged and stay in the authoritative relay-layer checks: community provisioning (`create_community_with_owner`) and ownership transfer (inside the advisory-lock transaction). - Parse/fallback rules are extracted into a pure helper (`effective_owner_limit`) with unit tests, keeping the cached getter trivial. ## Test plan - `cargo test -p buzz-db --lib` — new `owner_limit_*` tests cover default, invalid, non-positive, and positive-override cases. (Pre-existing unrelated failure on clean main: `replica_fence::tests::fence_starts_closed_and_opens_on_advance`, tracked in #2369.) - `cargo clippy -p buzz-db --all-targets` and `cargo fmt` clean. - Deployed on my multi-tenant relay (vibecode.casa) with `BUZZ_MAX_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER=100`: provisioning a 4th community for the same owner succeeds; without the var the stock limit of 3 still applies. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: Lee Salminen <leesalminen@gmail.com>	2026-07-25 14:24:39 +00:00
3 people	ab3af82871	feat(relay): add author-only-unless-shared read gate for kind 30175 (#2768) ... Kind 30175 persona sync events carry plaintext `system_prompt` and `respond_to_allowlist`. This PR adds **author-only-unless-shared read semantics**: events without `["shared","true"]` are visible only to the author; events with that tag are community-readable. ## What changed ### New read class (kind 30175) Kind 30175 gets per-event gating at every relay read surface. The `shared` marker is a **tag**, not a content field, so content bytes (which double as the `source_version` drift basis) are not affected when toggling share state. ### `event_visible_to_reader` helper (`handlers/req.rs`) Centralizes the three per-event access predicates — `is_author_only_event`, `is_unshared_persona_event`, `reader_authorized_for_event` — into one `pub(crate)` fn callable from both WS and HTTP adapters. All result-visibility sites now call this single helper. ### NIP-98 HTTP bridge (`api/bridge.rs`) - `POST /query` catchall: replaced the two-step author-only + result-gated checks with `event_visible_to_reader` (now also covers the persona shared-gate). - `POST /count`: added `needs_persona_filtering` to the fast-path guard (forces per-event fallback when filter can match `kind:30175`) and replaced both fallback loops' individual checks with `event_visible_to_reader`. - FTS `/search` bridge helper: replaced `is_author_only_event` with `event_visible_to_reader` as defense-in-depth (30175 is not in the FTS allowlist today; comment at site explains the future-proofing intent). ### Ingest validation (`handlers/ingest.rs`) `validate_persona_envelope` rejects malformed `shared` tags: wrong value, missing value, duplicates. Accepts exactly `["shared","true"]` and tag-absent. ### Kind helpers (`buzz-core/src/kind.rs`) `is_persona_shared_kind`, `is_unshared_persona_event`, `filter_can_match_persona_shared_kinds`. ### Tests (`e2e_persona.rs`) 8 unit tests in `kind.rs`, 6 in `ingest.rs`, 8 e2e tests total: - AC-1–6 covering the gated surfaces - `test_persona_live_fanout_shared_gate`: reworked with explicit monotonic `created_at` timestamps (t0 < t1 < t2) and per-step head assertions, eliminating the NIP-33 event-id tie-break race. Also asserts foreign live subscription receives nothing on shared→unshared transition. - `test_persona_ingest_shared_tag_validation`: added `shared=x` and missing-value wire-level rejection cases. - `test_persona_mixed_kind_filter_does_not_leak`: publishes a kind-9 event and asserts it IS returned; absence-only assertion no longer sufficient. - `test_persona_http_query_cross_author_gate`: NIP-98 `/query` cross-author gate (authors filter, kindless `ids` — both blocked; shared `ids` — passes). - `test_persona_http_count_cross_author_gate`: NIP-98 `/count` cross-author gate (foreign sees 1/shared, author sees all, wildcard checked). ### NIP-AP.md Replaced aspirational "every relay read chokepoint" wording with an enumerated list of gated surfaces including NIP-98 `/query`, `/count`, and FTS/search with their enforcement mechanism named. Added **Non-goal** note for side-band existence oracles (reaction/report/deletion target resolution). ## Existing tests All pre-existing `e2e_persona` tests use `{ids:[event_id]}` or `{authors:[self]}` filters — author self-reads bypass the gate and are unaffected. ## Gates `just check` ✅ | `just test-unit` ✅ | `cargo test -p buzz-relay` ✅ (749 passed, 1 pre-existing failure in `demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` — flaky on `main`, unrelated to this PR, verified red at `origin/main` before this branch) --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-07-24 23:17:30 -04:00
4 people	d0ab3fdb05	fix(channels): strip leading hash prefixes from names (#2250) ... Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: npub1z3hmzc9ryehxzedl5wzlvpyvja0d483peaja5zt6pd0209f9x2jspe2dxh <146fb160a3266e6165bfa385f6048c975eda9e21cf65da097a0b5ea7952532a5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub13n66s06epmqf2kc3v373ez8hj65cuzyvxzjf93vwpervxqn2u7jq2qd9je <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1z3hmzc9ryehxzedl5wzlvpyvja0d483peaja5zt6pd0209f9x2jspe2dxh <146fb160a3266e6165bfa385f6048c975eda9e21cf65da097a0b5ea7952532a5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub13n66s06epmqf2kc3v373ez8hj65cuzyvxzjf93vwpervxqn2u7jq2qd9je <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-07-23 12:56:10 -04:00
TylerandGitHub	0fb820f9bf	Revert "feat(relay): inventory unreachable Git objects" (#2275)	2026-07-21 13:09:07 -07:00
thomaspblockandGitHub	3afc9dae15	feat(relay): inventory unreachable Git objects (#2264)	2026-07-21 22:03:24 +02:00
3 people	03fe19d603	fix(cli): paginate channel directory queries (#2181) ... Signed-off-by: npub1jh9wn95s0472h86ahapupaf7m6kx4v9sx2n0atj2hltcfer8k06s5n3pyf <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1jh9wn95s0472h86ahapupaf7m6kx4v9sx2n0atj2hltcfer8k06s5n3pyf <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-20 19:22:11 -04:00
4 people	e43b2d5aac	relay: gate push enqueue on live leases; batch matcher pipeline (T1b/T1a-repair/T2b) (#2145) ... Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>	2026-07-19 21:42:58 -04:00
5 people	2e936d439c	relay: skip TTL deadline bump for known-permanent channels (T1a write-amp) (#2125) ... Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-19 14:55:51 -04:00
4 people	29c48883d3	Route lag-tolerant reads to an optional Postgres read replica (#2084) ... Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>	2026-07-18 22:45:33 -04:00
3 people	ca384d082d	fix: recover community access visibility (#2074) ... Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-18 19:01:03 +00:00
4 people	68e670e001	feat: add read-only deployment moderation dashboard (#1999) ... Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1ntr8jjcqq6gt06q5avvqttfjgpwshmra22pcmcagdnukw4ja4nqqsa9g54 <9ac6794b000690b7e814eb1805ad32405d0bec7d52838de3a86cf967565dacc0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-17 12:50:06 -07:00
5 people	6c2d667575	Apply optional relay join policy across join flows (#1894) ... Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: klopez4212 <klopez4212@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-16 13:59:53 -04:00
3 people	6b9641db2b	feat(relay): add community unarchive endpoint (#1908) ... Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-15 10:21:06 -07:00
Michael NealeandGitHub	54638ff4bb	mesh: upgrade runtime, enforce membership, add shared compute provider (#1656)	2026-07-15 10:10:29 -04:00
3 people	59e9821503	feat(relay): gate usage metrics behind stable leader (#1814) ... Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-14 19:19:31 -04:00
3 people	bffbc5f22c	feat(push): deliver accepted relay events as wakes (#1866) ... Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-14 16:13:04 -04:00
3 people	08ad38a07f	fix(db): resolve duplicate migration version (#1863) ... Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-14 18:46:12 +00:00
3 people	af190c93e1	Add private product feedback sidecar (#1857) ... Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Pinky <44b8e82baa6e0e254e0208d68f335c283c94e7b78dd1fa10d5a49d3f13dd0435@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-14 10:41:48 -07:00
5 people	2b15a72675	feat(relay): add durable community archival (#1834) ... Signed-off-by: npub16ynjrn8tm9gxg4kpgfgj24eup8met48z58m9g0cvmpq9msjht0lq7r96r6 <d12721ccebd9506456c1425125573c09f795d4e2a1f6543f0cd8405dc2575bfe@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Signed-off-by: npub1ks3yhswfl2z70myka7wltdg39qpvqhspt2w3l2ajtaee8tmz5qkqrvl4et <b4224bc1c9fa85e7ec96ef9df5b5112802c05e015a9d1fabb25f7393af62a02c@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub16ynjrn8tm9gxg4kpgfgj24eup8met48z58m9g0cvmpq9msjht0lq7r96r6 <d12721ccebd9506456c1425125573c09f795d4e2a1f6543f0cd8405dc2575bfe@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1ks3yhswfl2z70myka7wltdg39qpvqhspt2w3l2ajtaee8tmz5qkqrvl4et <b4224bc1c9fa85e7ec96ef9df5b5112802c05e015a9d1fabb25f7393af62a02c@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-14 16:02:12 +00:00
3 people	1c006822e4	feat(push): add public APNs gateway (#1770) ... Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-14 11:17:21 -04:00
4 people	52e42ccb9f	feat(relay): add atomic community ownership transfer (#1845) ... Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1c4alndp82zyt9veaklm5d965quss79vlhk9awv7qu5erwhmf42qqlvc25c <c57bf9b4275088b2b33db7f746975407210f159fbd8bd733c0e532375f69aa80@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-14 08:16:22 -07:00
3 people	1b4703021d	Bound NIP-RS retention and search indexing (#1771) ... Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-13 17:58:20 -04:00
3 people	620822899a	feat(relay): per-community usage metrics (#1723) ... Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-12 20:07:34 -04:00
4 people	1de916bdd2	feat(relay): add atomic create-only community provisioning (#1689) ... Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Signed-off-by: npub16ynjrn8tm9gxg4kpgfgj24eup8met48z58m9g0cvmpq9msjht0lq7r96r6 <d12721ccebd9506456c1425125573c09f795d4e2a1f6543f0cd8405dc2575bfe@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub16ynjrn8tm9gxg4kpgfgj24eup8met48z58m9g0cvmpq9msjht0lq7r96r6 <d12721ccebd9506456c1425125573c09f795d4e2a1f6543f0cd8405dc2575bfe@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-09 20:16:02 -07:00
3 people	b41cf3ffc6	fix(desktop): paginate complete channel directory (#1690) ... Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-09 17:07:17 -04:00
3 people	e0f76b0e9c	feat(relay): add operator community provisioning (#1657) ... Signed-off-by: npub1qvn3cujt28pg06ehlstrxyz6ayzp06t4uc7r566vxwwgrv24hglq9zju0n <03271c724b51c287eb37fc1633105ae90417e975e63c3a6b4c339c81b155ba3e@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1qvn3cujt28pg06ehlstrxyz6ayzp06t4uc7r566vxwwgrv24hglq9zju0n <03271c724b51c287eb37fc1633105ae90417e975e63c3a6b4c339c81b155ba3e@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-08 16:56:06 -07:00
8 people	863aeb79f3	Community moderation Phase 1: reports, bans/timeouts, audit, tombstones, relay-DM notices (#1616) ... Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: tlongwell-block <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: npub1mprnacetjua2xx3p5eddmhxyk6wv929ymm5py8kd2xfxurxahspqqlgyta <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub17jjz49l9jjmhhk7cac63j8yt9z555n9cw8vk7v5jz4vzw4ppld5qgj57cc <f4a42a97e594b77bdbd8ee35191c8b28a94a4cb871d96f32921558275421fb68@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1cc3ha7z055mu0rwwu7806t2wt8mj3pvu0uv5mfp2c50dahaqhczshdalg6 <c6237ef84fa537c78dcee78efd2d4e59f728859c7f194da42ac51ededfa0be05@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1jmc9dt2lyvzu3h0kxlwxt5zg4fxp9476awyxw6gwxn72g6cw7exqs64whm <96f056ad5f2305c8ddf637dc65d048aa4c12d7daeb8867690e34fca46b0ef64c@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1mprnacetjua2xx3p5eddmhxyk6wv929ymm5py8kd2xfxurxahspqqlgyta <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-08 13:36:46 -04:00