The audit log has no client-reachable wire surface: there is no /audit
route in the relay, and AuditError is never relayed to a client. A pure
black-box A≡B conformance row (the shape every other row in
conformance_multitenant.rs uses) is therefore impossible, and reaching
behind the wire into Postgres from that file would break its black-box
contract. So the obligation is proven across three honest homes:
1. Doc-only conformance row (conformance_multitenant.rs): cites the
no-wire-surface fact — a strictly stronger isolation claim than "the
oracle is denied" — plus the per-community-chain substrate and the two
executable proofs below.
2. Integrated relay test (buzz-relay handlers::event): drives
dispatch_persistent_event under two tenants against a shared Postgres
and asserts each community's audit chain contains only its own
object_id and verifies independently. Proves the
host→TenantContext→chain wiring keeps tenants isolated end-to-end.
No WS-AUTH in the loop, so it is not blocked on NIP-42.
3. Error-sanitization unit test (buzz-audit error): asserts no AuditError
variant's rendered text embeds a community_id, constraint name, or
cross-community object id, with a non-vacuous check that per-community
seq still appears.
Both runnable pieces mutate-bitten: a stale-tenant scoping bug reds the
isolation assertion ("B's event id appeared in A's chain"); leaking a
constraint name into an #[error] string reds the sanitization assertion.
Co-authored-by: Dawn <c6237ef84fa537c78dcee78efd2d4e59f728859c7f194da42ac51ededfa0be05@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
Signed-off-by: tlongwell-block <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com>
Make the provenance fence visible in the type signature, not a
per-call-site convention. `NewAuditEntry.community_id` becomes
`CommunityId` (the server-resolved newtype) instead of a raw `Uuid`,
so a wiring call site can no longer pass an arbitrary UUID off the
event/channel being acted on — the only doors to a `CommunityId` are
host resolution or a server-scoped DB row, never client input.
The DB-row type `AuditEntry` stays `Uuid`: sqlx reads/writes it directly
and `compute_hash` does `.as_bytes()` on it, so the stored hash bytes are
byte-for-byte identical and the already-integrated chain stays valid — no
migration, no re-hash. The `as_uuid()` dereference moves inside
`AuditService::log` at the DB boundary, where the column is written; the
advisory-lock key is unchanged (CommunityId's Display delegates to Uuid).
Drop the now-orphaned `Serialize`/`Deserialize` derive (and the
`#[serde(default)]` on `detail`) from `NewAuditEntry`: it has no
serde consumer — it travels only through the in-process audit sink
(mpsc), never a wire/DB boundary. Keeping it non-deserializable
reinforces the fence: no client blob can mint a NewAuditEntry.
Full package green (13/13, incl. the 6 PG isolation tests and the
community_id_is_part_of_identity fence); clippy -D warnings + fmt clean.
Adversarially verified the fence is non-vacuous: dropping community_id
from compute_hash turns community_id_is_part_of_identity RED, restored.
(cherry picked from commit 284cc699b2b04c9078456ffda849315fb4562763)
Co-authored-by: Dawn (sprout agent) <c6237ef84fa537c78dcee78efd2d4e59f728859c7f194da42ac51ededfa0be05@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
Signed-off-by: tlongwell-block <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com>
Convert the audit log from one global hash chain to an independent
per-community chain, conforming to the frozen Lane-0 0001 schema.
- Collapse to one DDL: delete schema.rs / AUDIT_SCHEMA_SQL and their
lib.rs exports. The 0001 migration is the sole owner of audit_log.
- Chain shape: PK (community_id, seq), seq monotonic per-community,
UNIQUE (community_id, hash); hash/prev_hash/actor_pubkey as BYTEA;
object_id TEXT generalizes the old event_id/channel_id; detail JSONB.
- community_id is folded into the SHA-256 (leads the hash) so a row
cannot be lifted out of one community's chain and re-verified in
another. Per-community advisory lock — communities never serialize
each other's audit writes (no throughput bottleneck, no timing oracle).
- verify_chain / get_entries scoped to a CommunityId.
- Error variants carry only per-community seq (meaningless without its
chain) — never community_id, hash values, or raw action strings.
- AUTH-body protection becomes caller discipline + the AuditAction enum
(AuthSuccess/AuthFailure carry outcome metadata, never the token);
the dropped event_kind column is not persisted.
13/13 green (7 unit + 6 Postgres isolation). Adversarial: disabling the
community_id line in compute_hash turns community_id_is_part_of_identity
RED (two communities hash identically); restored to green.
(cherry picked from commit ba11d66636)
Co-authored-by: Dawn <c6237ef84fa537c78dcee78efd2d4e59f728859c7f194da42ac51ededfa0be05@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
Signed-off-by: tlongwell-block <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com>
