Merge auth-tenant-scope: community-scoped RateLimiter + NIP-98 replay guard

Integrates Sami's auth lane (15dd8dfc3) into relay-wiring: community-scoped
rate_limit_key, RedisNip98ReplayGuard, and the IpConnections fence primitives.
Brings RateLimiter + Nip98ReplayGuard into the workspace so the relay can wire
the IP-fence-before-host ordering and the NIP-98 verify-then-mark call site.

Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>

* origin/rewrite/auth-tenant-scope:
  feat(auth): NIP-98 replay seen-set — shared, community-scoped, atomic
  feat(auth): community-scope RateLimiter pubkey quotas

crates/buzz-auth/src/error.rs

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ pub enum AuthError {
     #[error("NIP-98 HTTP Auth verification failed: {0}")]
     Nip98Invalid(String),
 
+    /// A NIP-98 event with the same id has already been observed within the
+    /// replay-prevention window. The event itself was structurally valid; the
+    /// rejection is on freshness, not validity.
+    #[error("NIP-98 replay: event id already seen within window")]
+    Nip98Replay,
+
     /// The pubkey in the auth event does not match the expected identity.
     #[error("pubkey mismatch: event pubkey does not match authenticated identity")]
     PubkeyMismatch,

crates/buzz-auth/src/lib.rs

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ pub mod error;
 pub mod nip42;
 /// NIP-98 HTTP Auth verification (kind:27235).
 pub mod nip98;
+/// NIP-98 replay protection — shared, community-scoped, atomic seen-set.
+pub mod nip98_replay;
 /// Per-connection rate limiting.
 pub mod rate_limit;
 /// OAuth scope parsing and enforcement.
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ pub use access::{check_read_access, check_write_access, require_scope, ChannelAc
 pub use error::AuthError;
 pub use nip42::{generate_challenge, verify_nip42_event};
 pub use nip98::verify_nip98_event;
+pub use nip98_replay::{nip98_replay_key, Nip98ReplayGuard, DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS};
 pub use rate_limit::{
     ip_rate_limit_key, rate_limit_key, LimitType, RateLimitConfig, RateLimitResult, RateLimiter,
 };
@@ -40,6 +43,8 @@ pub use scope::{parse_scopes, Scope};
 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-utils"))]
 pub use access::MockAccessChecker;
 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-utils"))]
+pub use nip98_replay::AlwaysFreshReplayGuard;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-utils"))]
 pub use rate_limit::AlwaysAllowRateLimiter;
 
 /// How the connection was authenticated.

crates/buzz-auth/src/nip98_replay.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+//! NIP-98 replay protection — shared, community-scoped, atomic seen-set.
+//!
+//! NIP-98 verification ([`crate::nip98::verify_nip98_event`]) is structurally
+//! complete: it checks signature, kind, timestamp window, URL, method, and
+//! optional body hash. It does **not** check whether the same event id has
+//! already been used — that requires shared state. With multiple relay pods
+//! ("any pod, any connection" per the rewrite §4 architecture), an in-process
+//! cache (moka, DashMap) does not carry the freshness proof across pods, so
+//! replay protection is a §5 hard gate.
+//!
+//! The required shape (§5):
+//!
+//! - shared state (Redis), atomic set-if-absent, TTL ≥ 120s
+//! - community-scoped key — see [`nip98_replay_key`]
+//!
+//! ## Usage shape
+//!
+//! Verify first, then mark. Burning a seen-set slot on a forgery would let an
+//! attacker who knows a future event id of a victim DoS the legitimate event.
+//!
+//! ```ignore
+//! let pubkey = buzz_auth::verify_nip98_event(json, url, method, body)?;
+//! if !replay.try_mark(&ctx, &event_id).await? {
+//!     return Err(AuthError::Nip98Replay);
+//! }
+//! // safe to honor the request as `pubkey`
+//! ```
+//!
+//! The TTL must cover the verifier's clock-skew tolerance (currently ±60s, so
+//! the window over which a duplicate event id is even plausible is 2×60 = 120s).
+//! [`DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS`] is the floor; deployments may raise it.
+
+use buzz_core::TenantContext;
+use nostr::EventId;
+
+use crate::error::AuthError;
+
+/// Floor for the replay-prevention window, in seconds.
+///
+/// Matches the §5 gate ("TTL ≥ 120s") and the doubled NIP-98 timestamp
+/// tolerance (±60s window → 120s span). Implementations MAY use a larger TTL
+/// for safety margin; they MUST NOT use a smaller one.
+pub const DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS: u64 = 120;
+
+/// Shared seen-set for NIP-98 event ids, scoped per community.
+///
+/// The production implementation lives in `buzz-pubsub` (Redis `SET NX EX`).
+/// A test impl is provided behind `cfg(any(test, feature = "test-utils"))`.
+pub trait Nip98ReplayGuard: Send + Sync {
+    /// Atomically claim `event_id` for `ctx`'s community.
+    ///
+    /// Returns `Ok(true)` when the id is newly inserted (proceed) and
+    /// `Ok(false)` when an entry already exists (the caller MUST reject the
+    /// request as replay).
+    ///
+    /// On `Err` (Redis unreachable, etc.) callers MUST fail closed — reject
+    /// the request rather than admitting it. The shared seen-set is a
+    /// correctness fence; degrading to "best effort, allow on error" forfeits
+    /// the freshness proof.
+    ///
+    /// Implementations MUST use an atomic set-if-absent operation; a
+    /// read-then-write sequence loses to concurrent inserts and forfeits the
+    /// freshness proof.
+    ///
+    /// `ttl_secs` MUST be at least [`DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS`]. Implementations
+    /// MAY clamp a smaller value up to the floor rather than reject; they MUST
+    /// NOT honor it as-given.
+    fn try_mark(
+        &self,
+        ctx: &TenantContext,
+        event_id: &EventId,
+        ttl_secs: u64,
+    ) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = Result<bool, AuthError>> + Send;
+}
+
+/// Redis key for a NIP-98 replay marker:
+/// `buzz:{community}:nip98:{event_id_hex}`.
+///
+/// The community prefix is the S1 isolation fence at the replay layer.
+/// Event ids are content-addressed (SHA-256 of the canonical event tuple) so
+/// natural cross-community collision is zero, but the gate is fail-closed
+/// isolation: a same-id replay across communities must consult two distinct
+/// seen-set rows, not one shared row.
+pub fn nip98_replay_key(ctx: &TenantContext, event_id: &EventId) -> String {
+    format!("buzz:{}:nip98:{}", ctx.community(), event_id.to_hex())
+}
+
+/// Always-fresh seen-set for unit tests — every `try_mark` returns `Ok(true)`.
+///
+/// Use only in test code that does not exercise the replay path itself.
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-utils"))]
+pub struct AlwaysFreshReplayGuard;
+
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-utils"))]
+impl Nip98ReplayGuard for AlwaysFreshReplayGuard {
+    async fn try_mark(
+        &self,
+        _ctx: &TenantContext,
+        _event_id: &EventId,
+        _ttl_secs: u64,
+    ) -> Result<bool, AuthError> {
+        Ok(true)
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use buzz_core::CommunityId;
+    use nostr::{EventBuilder, Keys, Kind};
+    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+    use uuid::Uuid;
+
+    fn fixture_ctx(host: &str) -> TenantContext {
+        let bytes = Sha256::digest(host.as_bytes());
+        let mut uuid_bytes = [0u8; 16];
+        uuid_bytes.copy_from_slice(&bytes[..16]);
+        let id = CommunityId::from_uuid(Uuid::from_bytes(uuid_bytes));
+        TenantContext::resolved(id, host)
+    }
+
+    fn fixture_event_id() -> EventId {
+        let keys = Keys::generate();
+        EventBuilder::new(Kind::HttpAuth, "")
+            .sign_with_keys(&keys)
+            .expect("sign")
+            .id
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn key_includes_community_prefix() {
+        let ctx = fixture_ctx("relay-a.example");
+        let eid = fixture_event_id();
+        let key = nip98_replay_key(&ctx, &eid);
+        let expected_prefix = format!("buzz:{}:nip98:", ctx.community());
+        assert!(
+            key.starts_with(&expected_prefix),
+            "key {key} should start with {expected_prefix}"
+        );
+        assert!(key.ends_with(&eid.to_hex()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn key_isolates_communities_for_same_event_id() {
+        // Belt-and-suspenders: even if a same-id event surfaces in two
+        // communities (which content-addressing makes implausible), the
+        // seen-set MUST consult two distinct rows.
+        let eid = fixture_event_id();
+        let ctx_a = fixture_ctx("relay-a.example");
+        let ctx_b = fixture_ctx("relay-b.example");
+        let key_a = nip98_replay_key(&ctx_a, &eid);
+        let key_b = nip98_replay_key(&ctx_b, &eid);
+        assert_ne!(
+            key_a, key_b,
+            "same event id in two communities must not share a seen-set key"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn default_ttl_meets_gate_floor() {
+        // §5 gate: TTL ≥ 120s. Drift this constant down and the gate breaks.
+        assert!(DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS >= 120);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn always_fresh_returns_true() {
+        let guard = AlwaysFreshReplayGuard;
+        let ctx = fixture_ctx("relay-a.example");
+        let eid = fixture_event_id();
+        assert!(guard
+            .try_mark(&ctx, &eid, DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS)
+            .await
+            .unwrap());
+    }
+}

crates/buzz-auth/src/rate_limit.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 
 use std::net::IpAddr;
 
+use buzz_core::TenantContext;
 use nostr::PublicKey;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 
@@ -147,14 +148,32 @@ impl Default for RateLimitConfig {
 /// The Redis-backed production implementation lives in `buzz-relay` / `buzz-pubsub`.
 /// A no-op `AlwaysAllowRateLimiter` is provided for unit tests.
 ///
+/// ## Tenant scoping
+///
+/// Pubkey-keyed limits ([`check_and_increment`]) take `&TenantContext` and the Redis
+/// key is community-prefixed (`buzz:{community}:ratelimit:{pubkey}:{suffix}`). The
+/// same pubkey active in two communities consumes two independent quotas — that is
+/// the correct behavior under multi-tenant isolation (S1 cross-community fence).
+///
+/// IP-keyed limits ([`check_ip_connection`]) are **operator-global** by design. They
+/// gate connection acceptance at the network edge, before host→community resolution
+/// has completed (or, on resolve failure, instead of it). Threading `&TenantContext`
+/// through the connection-rate fence would invert the order of operations. If
+/// per-(community, IP) caps are ever needed as a tenant-fairness signal, that
+/// belongs in an additive `LimitType` keyed on `(community, ip)`, not in this trait.
+///
 /// ⚠️ The fixed-window algorithm used by the Redis implementation allows up to 2×
 /// burst at window boundaries. Upgrade to a sliding window or token bucket if strict
 /// per-second limiting is required.
 pub trait RateLimiter: Send + Sync {
-    /// Increment the counter for `pubkey` + `limit_type` and return whether the
-    /// request is within the configured `limit` for the given `window_secs`.
+    /// Increment the per-(community, pubkey) counter for `limit_type` and return
+    /// whether the request is within `limit` for the given `window_secs`.
+    ///
+    /// `ctx` scopes the counter to the resolved community; the same pubkey in two
+    /// communities is two independent quotas.
     fn check_and_increment(
         &self,
+        ctx: &TenantContext,
         pubkey: &PublicKey,
         limit_type: LimitType,
         window_secs: u64,
@@ -162,7 +181,10 @@ pub trait RateLimiter: Send + Sync {
     ) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = Result<RateLimitResult, AuthError>> + Send;
 
     /// Increment the per-IP connection counter and return whether the connection
-    /// is within the configured `limit` for the given `window_secs`.
+    /// is within `limit` for the given `window_secs`.
+    ///
+    /// Operator-global — see trait docs. This fence runs before / outside of host
+    /// resolution and intentionally does not take a `TenantContext`.
     fn check_ip_connection(
         &self,
         ip: &IpAddr,
@@ -171,16 +193,23 @@ pub trait RateLimiter: Send + Sync {
     ) -> impl std::future::Future<Output = Result<RateLimitResult, AuthError>> + Send;
 }
 
-/// Redis key for pubkey-based rate limit: `buzz:ratelimit:<hex>:<suffix>`
-pub fn rate_limit_key(pubkey: &PublicKey, limit_type: &LimitType) -> String {
+/// Redis key for pubkey-based rate limit:
+/// `buzz:{community}:ratelimit:{pubkey_hex}:{suffix}`.
+///
+/// Community-prefixed: the same pubkey in two communities maps to two distinct
+/// keys, so quotas don't bleed across the tenancy fence.
+pub fn rate_limit_key(ctx: &TenantContext, pubkey: &PublicKey, limit_type: &LimitType) -> String {
     format!(
-        "buzz:ratelimit:{}:{}",
+        "buzz:{}:ratelimit:{}:{}",
+        ctx.community(),
         pubkey.to_hex(),
         limit_type.key_suffix()
     )
 }
 
-/// Redis key for IP-based rate limit: `buzz:ratelimit:ip:<ip>:conn`
+/// Redis key for IP-based rate limit: `buzz:ratelimit:ip:{ip}:conn`.
+///
+/// Operator-global by design — see [`RateLimiter`] docs.
 pub fn ip_rate_limit_key(ip: &IpAddr) -> String {
     format!("buzz:ratelimit:ip:{}:conn", ip)
 }
@@ -193,6 +222,7 @@ pub struct AlwaysAllowRateLimiter;
 impl RateLimiter for AlwaysAllowRateLimiter {
     async fn check_and_increment(
         &self,
+        _ctx: &TenantContext,
         _pubkey: &PublicKey,
         _limit_type: LimitType,
         window_secs: u64,
@@ -214,19 +244,52 @@ impl RateLimiter for AlwaysAllowRateLimiter {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use buzz_core::CommunityId;
     use nostr::Keys;
+    use sha2::Digest;
     use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
+    use uuid::Uuid;
+
+    fn fixture_ctx(host: &str) -> TenantContext {
+        // Deterministic community id from host so test assertions can name the prefix.
+        let bytes = sha2::Sha256::digest(host.as_bytes());
+        let mut uuid_bytes = [0u8; 16];
+        uuid_bytes.copy_from_slice(&bytes[..16]);
+        let id = CommunityId::from_uuid(Uuid::from_bytes(uuid_bytes));
+        TenantContext::resolved(id, host)
+    }
 
     #[test]
-    fn rate_limit_key_format() {
+    fn rate_limit_key_includes_community_prefix() {
+        let ctx = fixture_ctx("relay-a.example");
         let keys = Keys::generate();
-        let key = rate_limit_key(&keys.public_key(), &LimitType::Messages);
-        assert!(key.starts_with("buzz:ratelimit:"));
+        let key = rate_limit_key(&ctx, &keys.public_key(), &LimitType::Messages);
+        let expected_prefix = format!("buzz:{}:ratelimit:", ctx.community());
+        assert!(
+            key.starts_with(&expected_prefix),
+            "key {key} should start with {expected_prefix}"
+        );
         assert!(key.ends_with(":msg"));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn rate_limit_key_isolates_communities_for_same_pubkey() {
+        // The S1 cross-community isolation fence at the rate-limit key layer:
+        // same pubkey, two communities -> two distinct Redis keys -> independent quotas.
+        let keys = Keys::generate();
+        let ctx_a = fixture_ctx("relay-a.example");
+        let ctx_b = fixture_ctx("relay-b.example");
+        let key_a = rate_limit_key(&ctx_a, &keys.public_key(), &LimitType::Messages);
+        let key_b = rate_limit_key(&ctx_b, &keys.public_key(), &LimitType::Messages);
+        assert_ne!(
+            key_a, key_b,
+            "same pubkey in two communities must not share a rate-limit key"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn ip_rate_limit_key_format() {
+        // IP fence stays operator-global — no community in the key.
         let ip = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 1, 1));
         assert_eq!(ip_rate_limit_key(&ip), "buzz:ratelimit:ip:192.168.1.1:conn");
     }
@@ -234,9 +297,10 @@ mod tests {
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn always_allow_limiter() {
         let limiter = AlwaysAllowRateLimiter;
+        let ctx = fixture_ctx("relay-a.example");
         let keys = Keys::generate();
         let result = limiter
-            .check_and_increment(&keys.public_key(), LimitType::Messages, 60, 60)
+            .check_and_increment(&ctx, &keys.public_key(), LimitType::Messages, 60, 60)
             .await
             .unwrap();
         assert!(result.allowed);

crates/buzz-pubsub/src/lib.rs

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
 pub mod cache_invalidation;
 /// Error types for pub/sub operations.
 pub mod error;
+/// Redis-backed NIP-98 replay seen-set.
+pub mod nip98_replay;
 /// Online/offline presence tracking in Redis.
 pub mod presence;
 /// Redis PUBLISH for channel event fan-out.

crates/buzz-pubsub/src/nip98_replay.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+//! Redis-backed NIP-98 replay seen-set.
+//!
+//! Implements the [`Nip98ReplayGuard`] trait from `buzz-auth`. Uses Redis
+//! `SET NX EX` for an atomic set-if-absent with TTL — the §5 pre-build gate
+//! for multi-tenant HA replay protection.
+
+use buzz_auth::{
+    error::AuthError,
+    nip98_replay::{nip98_replay_key, Nip98ReplayGuard, DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS},
+};
+use buzz_core::TenantContext;
+use nostr::EventId;
+
+/// Redis-backed NIP-98 replay seen-set.
+///
+/// Each `try_mark(ctx, event_id, ttl)` issues a single
+/// `SET buzz:{community}:nip98:{event_id_hex} 1 NX EX <ttl>` against Redis.
+/// `NX` makes the operation atomic set-if-absent — the freshness proof comes
+/// from Redis returning `OK` only on the first claim. Subsequent claims within
+/// the TTL window return `nil`, which we surface as `Ok(false)` so the caller
+/// rejects the request as replay.
+pub struct RedisNip98ReplayGuard {
+    pool: deadpool_redis::Pool,
+}
+
+impl RedisNip98ReplayGuard {
+    /// Create a new replay guard backed by the given Redis connection pool.
+    pub fn new(pool: deadpool_redis::Pool) -> Self {
+        Self { pool }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Nip98ReplayGuard for RedisNip98ReplayGuard {
+    async fn try_mark(
+        &self,
+        ctx: &TenantContext,
+        event_id: &EventId,
+        ttl_secs: u64,
+    ) -> Result<bool, AuthError> {
+        // §5 gate floor — never accept a sub-floor TTL silently.
+        let ttl = ttl_secs.max(DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS);
+
+        let mut conn = self
+            .pool
+            .get()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| AuthError::Internal(format!("Redis pool: {e}")))?;
+
+        let key = nip98_replay_key(ctx, event_id);
+
+        // SET key 1 NX EX <ttl>. redis-rs typed return: Some("OK") on first
+        // claim, None on existing key. Any other value would be a Redis-side
+        // bug; treat it as internal error.
+        let result: Option<String> = redis::cmd("SET")
+            .arg(&key)
+            .arg("1")
+            .arg("NX")
+            .arg("EX")
+            .arg(ttl)
+            .query_async(&mut *conn)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| AuthError::Internal(format!("Redis SET NX EX: {e}")))?;
+
+        match result.as_deref() {
+            Some("OK") => Ok(true),
+            None => Ok(false),
+            Some(other) => Err(AuthError::Internal(format!(
+                "unexpected SET NX EX reply: {other}"
+            ))),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use buzz_core::{CommunityId, TenantContext};
+    use deadpool_redis::{Config, Runtime};
+    use nostr::{EventBuilder, Keys, Kind};
+    use uuid::Uuid;
+
+    fn redis_pool() -> deadpool_redis::Pool {
+        let url = std::env::var("REDIS_URL").unwrap_or_else(|_| "redis://127.0.0.1:6379".into());
+        Config::from_url(url)
+            .create_pool(Some(Runtime::Tokio1))
+            .expect("create pool")
+    }
+
+    fn fresh_ctx() -> TenantContext {
+        TenantContext::resolved(CommunityId::from_uuid(Uuid::new_v4()), "test.example")
+    }
+
+    fn fresh_event_id() -> EventId {
+        EventBuilder::new(Kind::HttpAuth, "")
+            .sign_with_keys(&Keys::generate())
+            .expect("sign")
+            .id
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[ignore = "requires Redis"]
+    async fn first_claim_succeeds_replay_fails() {
+        let guard = RedisNip98ReplayGuard::new(redis_pool());
+        let ctx = fresh_ctx();
+        let eid = fresh_event_id();
+
+        assert!(guard
+            .try_mark(&ctx, &eid, DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS)
+            .await
+            .expect("first mark"));
+        assert!(!guard
+            .try_mark(&ctx, &eid, DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS)
+            .await
+            .expect("replay mark"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[ignore = "requires Redis"]
+    async fn isolation_between_communities() {
+        let guard = RedisNip98ReplayGuard::new(redis_pool());
+        let ctx_a = fresh_ctx();
+        let ctx_b = fresh_ctx();
+        let eid = fresh_event_id();
+
+        assert!(guard
+            .try_mark(&ctx_a, &eid, DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS)
+            .await
+            .expect("mark in A"));
+        // Same event id under ctx_b is still a first claim — communities are
+        // independent seen-sets.
+        assert!(guard
+            .try_mark(&ctx_b, &eid, DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS)
+            .await
+            .expect("mark in B"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[ignore = "requires Redis"]
+    async fn sub_floor_ttl_is_lifted_to_default() {
+        let guard = RedisNip98ReplayGuard::new(redis_pool());
+        let ctx = fresh_ctx();
+        let eid = fresh_event_id();
+
+        // Caller asks for 30s; impl lifts to ≥ DEFAULT_REPLAY_TTL_SECS.
+        // Smoke-test the path: pass sub-floor TTL, claim once, then expect
+        // replay rejection — the TTL lift kept the marker alive past 30s and
+        // the contract holds.
+        assert!(guard.try_mark(&ctx, &eid, 30).await.expect("mark"));
+        assert!(!guard.try_mark(&ctx, &eid, 30).await.expect("replay"));
+    }
+}

crates/buzz-pubsub/src/rate_limiter.rs

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ use buzz_auth::{
     error::AuthError,
     rate_limit::{LimitType, RateLimitResult, RateLimiter},
 };
+use buzz_core::TenantContext;
 use nostr::PublicKey;
 use redis::Script;
 
@@ -79,9 +80,11 @@ async fn run_rate_limit(
 
 /// Redis-backed rate limiter using fixed-window counters.
 ///
-/// Each key is `buzz:ratelimit:<pubkey_hex>:<suffix>` (pubkey) or
-/// `buzz:ratelimit:ip:<ip>:conn` (IP). The counter and its TTL are managed
-/// atomically via a Lua script to prevent keys from persisting without expiry.
+/// Pubkey keys are community-scoped via `&TenantContext`:
+/// `buzz:{community}:ratelimit:{pubkey_hex}:{suffix}`. IP keys remain
+/// operator-global: `buzz:ratelimit:ip:{ip}:conn`. The counter and its TTL are
+/// managed atomically via a Lua script to prevent keys from persisting without
+/// expiry.
 pub struct RedisRateLimiter {
     pool: deadpool_redis::Pool,
 }
@@ -96,12 +99,13 @@ impl RedisRateLimiter {
 impl RateLimiter for RedisRateLimiter {
     async fn check_and_increment(
         &self,
+        ctx: &TenantContext,
         pubkey: &PublicKey,
         limit_type: LimitType,
         window_secs: u64,
         limit: u64,
     ) -> Result<RateLimitResult, AuthError> {
-        let key = buzz_auth::rate_limit::rate_limit_key(pubkey, &limit_type);
+        let key = buzz_auth::rate_limit::rate_limit_key(ctx, pubkey, &limit_type);
         run_rate_limit(&self.pool, &key, window_secs, limit).await
     }