Files
SnapOtter/tests/integration/adversarial.test.ts
T
ashim-hq babca4cf97 test: comprehensive test coverage expansion (+965 tests)
Add 42 new test files covering all untested tool routes, image engine
internals, AI sidecar bridge, Zustand stores, and cross-format
compatibility. Expand e2e-docker suite with 7 spec files covering all
48 tools against a real Docker container.

Unit tests:
- Image engine: format detection, MIME mapping, metadata parsing, pipeline
- AI bridge: sidecar lifecycle, all 11 tool functions (mocked)
- Web stores: 14 Zustand stores (collage, settings, features, analytics, etc.)
- API helpers: format decoders, page range, file validation

Integration tests:
- 25 tool routes that had zero dedicated tests
- Cross-format matrix: 17 input formats x 3 tools
- Edge cases: zero-byte files, corrupted headers, path traversal, XSS, SQL injection
- Concurrent request handling and pipeline edge cases

E2E-Docker (Playwright against real container):
- 7 spec files: essential, adjustment, conversion, creative, utility, AI, pipeline
- Custom buildMultipart helper for multi-file tool uploads
- AI tools gracefully skip when sidecar not installed

Fixtures:
- Organized test media: formats/ (18 formats) + content/ (17 content types)
- Reduced from 3.1 GB unorganized samples to 33 MB structured fixtures

Bug fix:
- color-adjustments: gamma exposure used invalid single-param gamma() for
  positive values; fixed to use two-param gamma(gammaIn, gammaOut) form
2026-04-23 17:12:02 +08:00

365 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Adversarial integration tests for the ashim image API.
*
* Tests malicious and stress inputs: corrupted images, truncated data,
* oversized images, invalid dimensions, injection attacks, and malformed
* multipart payloads.
*/
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import sharp from "sharp";
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { buildTestApp, createMultipartPayload, loginAsAdmin, type TestApp } from "./test-server.js";
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Fixtures
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const FIXTURES = join(__dirname, "..", "fixtures");
const PNG_200x150 = readFileSync(join(FIXTURES, "test-200x150.png"));
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Shared state
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
let testApp: TestApp;
let app: TestApp["app"];
let adminToken: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
testApp = await buildTestApp();
app = testApp.app;
adminToken = await loginAsAdmin(app);
}, 30_000);
afterAll(async () => {
await testApp.cleanup();
}, 10_000);
/** Helper to POST a multipart payload to a tool endpoint. */
function postTool(
toolId: string,
fields: Array<{
name: string;
filename?: string;
contentType?: string;
content: Buffer | string;
}>,
) {
const { body, contentType } = createMultipartPayload(fields);
return app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: `/api/v1/tools/${toolId}`,
headers: { "content-type": contentType, authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
body,
});
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// CORRUPTED / TRUNCATED IMAGE DATA
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Corrupted and truncated images", () => {
it("rejects JPEG magic bytes followed by garbage", async () => {
// Valid JPEG header (FF D8 FF E0) then random garbage
const corruptedJpeg = Buffer.concat([
Buffer.from([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xe0]),
Buffer.from("this is not a real jpeg image at all, just garbage data"),
]);
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "corrupt.jpg", content: corruptedJpeg, contentType: "image/jpeg" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
// Should fail gracefully — 400 (validation) or 422 (processing)
expect([400, 422]).toContain(res.statusCode);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.error).toBeDefined();
});
it("rejects a truncated PNG (first 100 bytes only)", async () => {
const truncated = PNG_200x150.subarray(0, 100);
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "truncated.png", content: truncated, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 50 }) },
]);
// A truncated PNG still has valid magic bytes and Sharp can read partial
// metadata, so validation passes. Processing may succeed (partial decode)
// or fail gracefully. The key assertion: the server does not crash.
expect([200, 400, 422]).toContain(res.statusCode);
});
it("rejects random binary garbage as an image", async () => {
const garbage = Buffer.from(
Array.from({ length: 2048 }, () => Math.floor(Math.random() * 256)),
);
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "garbage.png", content: garbage, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect([400, 422]).toContain(res.statusCode);
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// OVERSIZED IMAGE (MAX_MEGAPIXELS)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Image exceeding MAX_MEGAPIXELS", () => {
it("rejects an image exceeding the 100MP limit", async () => {
// Test env has MAX_MEGAPIXELS=100. A 10001x10001 image = ~100.02MP.
const huge = await sharp({
create: {
width: 10001,
height: 10001,
channels: 3,
background: { r: 0, g: 0, b: 0 },
},
})
.png({ compressionLevel: 9 })
.toBuffer();
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "huge.png", content: huge, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.error).toMatch(/exceeds maximum size/i);
}, 60_000);
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// INVALID DIMENSIONS IN SETTINGS
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Invalid dimensions in settings", () => {
it("rejects negative width", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: -1 }) },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.error).toMatch(/invalid settings/i);
});
it("rejects negative height", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ height: -1 }) },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
});
it("rejects zero width", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 0 }) },
]);
// z.number().positive() rejects 0
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
});
it("handles float dimensions", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 1.5 }) },
]);
// Zod allows floats through z.number().positive() — Sharp will round
// Should succeed or get rejected by Zod, but not crash
expect([200, 400, 422]).toContain(res.statusCode);
});
it("rejects extremely large width with 422", async () => {
// Use a large-but-not-absurd value so Sharp rejects it quickly
// rather than trying to allocate gigabytes of RAM and timing out.
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 65536 }) },
]);
// Sharp should fail with a processing error for dimensions this large
// on a tiny input image, or succeed if it can handle it. Must not crash.
expect([200, 400, 422]).toContain(res.statusCode);
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// INJECTION ATTACKS IN TEXT FIELDS
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Injection attacks in text fields", () => {
it("SQL injection in text-overlay does not affect database", async () => {
const res = await postTool("text-overlay", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{
name: "settings",
content: JSON.stringify({
text: "'; DROP TABLE users; --",
fontSize: 24,
}),
},
]);
// Text overlay should process normally — SQL injection is in SVG text
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
// Verify the database is still intact by making an auth request
const healthRes = await app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/v1/health",
});
expect(healthRes.statusCode).toBe(200);
});
it("XSS payload in text-overlay is treated as literal text", async () => {
const res = await postTool("text-overlay", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{
name: "settings",
content: JSON.stringify({
text: "<script>alert(1)</script>",
fontSize: 24,
}),
},
]);
// The escapeXml function should sanitize angle brackets
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// MALFORMED SETTINGS
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Malformed settings field", () => {
it("rejects non-JSON settings string with 400", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: "not json at all" },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.error).toMatch(/json/i);
});
it("rejects settings as JSON array with 400", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: "[]" },
]);
// Zod object schema should reject an array
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
});
it("rejects settings as JSON string with 400", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: '"just a string"' },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
});
it("rejects settings as JSON number with 400", async () => {
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: "42" },
]);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// DUPLICATE FILE FIELDS
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Duplicate file fields in multipart", () => {
it("rejects a request with multiple file parts", async () => {
const { body, contentType } = createMultipartPayload([
{ name: "file", filename: "first.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "file", filename: "second.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
const res = await app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/v1/tools/resize",
headers: { "content-type": contentType, authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
body,
});
// Tool factory rejects multiple file parts with 400
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
const json = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(json.error).toMatch(/one image at a time/i);
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// BINARY GARBAGE IN SETTINGS FIELD
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Binary data in settings field", () => {
it("rejects random bytes as settings with 400", async () => {
const randomBytes = Buffer.from(
Array.from({ length: 64 }, () => Math.floor(Math.random() * 256)),
);
const res = await postTool("resize", [
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: randomBytes.toString("binary") },
]);
// Should return 400 for invalid JSON
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// AUTH — UNAUTHENTICATED ACCESS
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Unauthenticated tool access", () => {
it("rejects tool requests without auth token", async () => {
const { body, contentType } = createMultipartPayload([
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
const res = await app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/v1/tools/resize",
headers: { "content-type": contentType },
body,
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
});
it("rejects tool requests with invalid auth token", async () => {
const { body, contentType } = createMultipartPayload([
{ name: "file", filename: "test.png", content: PNG_200x150, contentType: "image/png" },
{ name: "settings", content: JSON.stringify({ width: 100 }) },
]);
const res = await app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/v1/tools/resize",
headers: {
"content-type": contentType,
authorization: "Bearer totally-fake-token-12345",
},
body,
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
});
});