Files
SnapOtter/tests/unit/security-file-processing.test.ts
T
SnapOtter 4e64ee2779 fix(security): comprehensive security audit and hardening
Auth: login rate limit 30/min (was 500), global rate limit 1000/min (was
unlimited), password/username max lengths on all Zod schemas, session
invalidation on role change, API key legacy scan bounded to 100 keys.

SVG: hardened regex sanitizer with CDATA stripping, XML entity decoding,
set/animate/iframe/embed blocking, comprehensive data: URI blocking,
use element external href blocking. 11 attack payload fixtures added.

SSRF: fixed DNS rebinding TOCTOU by pinning resolved IPs via custom
HTTP/HTTPS agents. Added 6to4 and NAT64 to blocked IPv6 ranges.

Docker: capability dropping (cap_drop ALL + minimal cap_add), resource
limits (4g/8g mem, 512/1024 pids), healthcheck timeout, password
removed from startup banner, default password warning comments.

Network: CSP and HSTS applied in all environments (not just production),
stack traces removed from all error responses, internal paths stripped
from error details, per-route rate limits on uploads (60/min) and URL
fetches (200/hour).

Files: exclusive temp file creation (O_EXCL), disk space circuit
breaker, per-user storage quotas, settings payload 64KB size guard.

Python sidecar: script name allowlist in dispatcher, minimal environment
for subprocess spawns.

Dependencies: fixed 6 production CVEs (drizzle-orm, fastify, fast-uri,
@fastify/static, next, archiver/lodash). Pinned all GitHub Actions to
SHA hashes.

114 security tests added. Full OWASP Top 10 penetration test matrix
verified against production Docker container (30/30 pass after
hardening).
2026-05-13 21:33:50 +08:00

72 lines
2.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { constants } from "node:fs";
import { open, rm, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
/**
* Helper that mirrors the writeTempExclusive pattern used in
* format-decoders.ts and heic-converter.ts.
*/
async function writeTempExclusive(filePath: string, buffer: Buffer): Promise<void> {
const fh = await open(filePath, constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | constants.O_WRONLY);
try {
await fh.writeFile(buffer);
} finally {
await fh.close();
}
}
describe("Temp file exclusive creation (O_EXCL)", () => {
it("creates a new temp file successfully", async () => {
const filePath = join(tmpdir(), `test-excl-${randomUUID()}.tmp`);
try {
await writeTempExclusive(filePath, Buffer.from("test data"));
const info = await stat(filePath);
expect(info.size).toBe(9);
} finally {
await rm(filePath, { force: true }).catch(() => {});
}
});
it("fails if the file already exists (prevents overwrite)", async () => {
const filePath = join(tmpdir(), `test-excl-${randomUUID()}.tmp`);
try {
// Create the file first
await writeTempExclusive(filePath, Buffer.from("original"));
// Attempting to write again should fail with EEXIST
await expect(writeTempExclusive(filePath, Buffer.from("overwrite"))).rejects.toThrow();
// Verify original content is preserved
const fh = await open(filePath, constants.O_RDONLY);
try {
const buf = await fh.readFile();
expect(buf.toString("utf-8")).toBe("original");
} finally {
await fh.close();
}
} finally {
await rm(filePath, { force: true }).catch(() => {});
}
});
it("cleans up in finally blocks even after write failure", async () => {
const filePath = join(tmpdir(), `test-excl-${randomUUID()}.tmp`);
// Pre-create to force the exclusive open to fail
await writeTempExclusive(filePath, Buffer.from("existing"));
try {
try {
await writeTempExclusive(filePath, Buffer.from("new"));
} catch {
// Expected failure
}
// Cleanup should still work
await rm(filePath, { force: true });
await expect(stat(filePath)).rejects.toThrow();
} finally {
// Ensure cleanup in case test itself fails
await rm(filePath, { force: true }).catch(() => {});
}
});
});