Files
SnapOtter/docker/entrypoint.sh
T
SnapOtterandGitHub 1fec97111b fix(docker): make storage writable under non-root/foreign UIDs (TrueNAS, OpenShift) (#299)
The entrypoint only fixed volume permissions when started as root (chown +
gosu-drop to snapotter). Launched under a non-root/foreign UID (TrueNAS app
user, Kubernetes runAsUser, OpenShift) it did no permission setup, so /data and
/tmp/workspace -- owned by uid 999 from the image -- were not writable by the
running user. Uploads and processing then failed with a cryptic EACCES
("workspace folder is not writable") and AI bundle installs failed the same way,
while health checks still reported the container healthy.

- entrypoint: source new entrypoint-lib.sh; verify writability up front when
  non-root, and as snapotter after chown when root (catches root-squashed
  mounts), failing fast with an actionable message (which dir, uid/gid, how to
  fix) instead of a late, cryptic EACCES
- Dockerfile: own /data and /tmp/workspace as snapotter:0, group-writable with
  setgid, so an arbitrary UID with the root supplementary group (OpenShift /
  Kubernetes fsGroup) can write; keep /opt/venv world-readable for the AI venv
  bootstrap under arbitrary UIDs
- api: assert storage writability at boot (lib/storage-writable.ts), failing
  fast with the same guidance even when the entrypoint is bypassed
- docs: add a Storage permissions section (named volumes, bind mounts, TrueNAS,
  Kubernetes/OpenShift) and cross-link it from the security guide

Fixes #230
2026-06-22 16:58:59 +08:00

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#!/bin/sh
set -e
# Shared permission helpers (dir_writable, ensure_writable). Lives beside this
# script in the image; sourcing only defines functions (no side effects).
. /usr/local/bin/entrypoint-lib.sh
# --- Docker secret file convention (_FILE suffix) ---
# For each supported var, if VAR_FILE is set, read the secret from that file
# path into VAR. This lets users mount Docker/Kubernetes secrets instead of
# passing credentials as plain-text environment variables.
#
# Supported: DEFAULT_PASSWORD, S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID, S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY,
# OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, COOKIE_SECRET, SNAPOTTER_LICENSE_KEY
resolve_file_env() {
var="$1"
file_var="${var}_FILE"
eval current_val="\"\${${var}:-}\""
eval file_path="\"\${${file_var}:-}\""
if [ -z "$file_path" ]; then
return
fi
if [ -n "$current_val" ]; then
echo "WARNING: Both $var and $file_var are set. $file_var takes precedence." >&2
fi
if [ ! -f "$file_path" ] || [ ! -r "$file_path" ]; then
echo "ERROR: $file_var points to '$file_path' but the file does not exist or is not readable." >&2
exit 1
fi
# Command substitution strips trailing newlines (standard for secret files)
export "$var"="$(cat "$file_path")"
unset "$file_var"
}
resolve_file_env DEFAULT_PASSWORD
resolve_file_env S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID
resolve_file_env S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY
resolve_file_env OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
resolve_file_env COOKIE_SECRET
resolve_file_env SNAPOTTER_LICENSE_KEY
# Apply auth defaults at runtime so they are never baked into image layers.
# Users can override any of these via -e flags at docker run time.
export AUTH_ENABLED="${AUTH_ENABLED:-true}"
export DEFAULT_USERNAME="${DEFAULT_USERNAME:-admin}"
export DEFAULT_PASSWORD="${DEFAULT_PASSWORD:-admin}"
# Writable directories the runtime needs: WS = processing scratch, DD = data
# root (holds files, logs, and the AI venv/models). Honor env overrides.
WS="${WORKSPACE_PATH:-/tmp/workspace}"
DD="${DATA_DIR:-/data}"
# When NOT starting as root we cannot chown mounted volumes (TrueNAS, Kubernetes
# runAsUser / OpenShift). Verify up front that the volumes are writable by this
# user and fail fast with actionable guidance -- otherwise the venv bootstrap
# and the app below would die later with a cryptic EACCES.
if [ "$(id -u)" != "0" ]; then
mkdir -p "$DD/files" "$DD/logs" "$DD/ai/models" "$DD/ai/pip-cache" "$DD/ai/venv" "$WS" 2>/dev/null || true
ensure_writable "$WS" "$DD" || exit 1
fi
# Clean up any interrupted bootstrap from a previous start
AI_VENV="/data/ai/venv"
AI_VENV_TMP="/data/ai/venv.bootstrapping"
if [ -d "$AI_VENV_TMP" ]; then
echo "Cleaning up interrupted venv bootstrap..."
rm -rf "$AI_VENV_TMP"
fi
# Bootstrap AI venv from base image (first run or upgrade).
# The image stamps /opt/venv/.venv-version with a hash of `pip freeze`.
# When the stamp in /data/ai/venv doesn't match, the base packages changed
# and we need a fresh copy so 2.0 Python tools don't fail with ImportError.
if [ -d "/opt/venv" ]; then
NEED_BOOTSTRAP=false
if [ ! -d "$AI_VENV" ]; then
NEED_BOOTSTRAP=true
echo "First run: bootstrapping AI venv from base image..."
elif [ -f "/opt/venv/.venv-version" ]; then
IMAGE_STAMP=$(cat /opt/venv/.venv-version)
CURRENT_STAMP=""
if [ -f "$AI_VENV/.venv-version" ]; then
CURRENT_STAMP=$(cat "$AI_VENV/.venv-version")
fi
if [ "$CURRENT_STAMP" != "$IMAGE_STAMP" ]; then
NEED_BOOTSTRAP=true
echo "Base venv updated (stamp mismatch): refreshing AI venv..."
fi
fi
if [ "$NEED_BOOTSTRAP" = true ]; then
mkdir -p /data/ai/models /data/ai/pip-cache
rm -rf "$AI_VENV"
cp -r /opt/venv "$AI_VENV_TMP"
mv "$AI_VENV_TMP" "$AI_VENV"
# Reset installed-bundle state: their packages lived in the old venv.
# Models in /data/ai/models survive, so reinstalling a bundle only
# reruns pip (model downloads are idempotent and skip existing files).
if [ -f "/data/ai/installed.json" ]; then
echo '{"bundles":{}}' > /data/ai/installed.json
echo "WARNING: Installed AI feature bundles were reset after base venv upgrade. Reinstall them from the Settings page."
fi
echo "AI venv ready at $AI_VENV"
fi
fi
# Wait for Postgres to be reachable before starting the app
if [ -n "${DATABASE_URL:-}" ]; then
echo "Waiting for Postgres..."
i=0
until node /app/docker/wait-for-postgres.mjs; do
i=$((i+1))
if [ "$i" -ge 60 ]; then echo "FATAL: Postgres unreachable after 60s"; exit 1; fi
sleep 1
done
echo "Postgres is reachable."
fi
print_security_warnings() {
if [ "${DEFAULT_PASSWORD}" = "admin" ]; then
printf ' \033[33mWARNING:%b Default admin password is still "admin". Change it for any non-local deployment.\n' '\033[0m' >&2
fi
if echo "${DATABASE_URL:-}" | grep -q "snapotter:snapotter@"; then
printf ' \033[33mWARNING:%b Default Postgres credentials in use. Set POSTGRES_PASSWORD for production.\n' '\033[0m' >&2
fi
if echo "${REDIS_URL:-}" | grep -q ":snapotter@"; then
printf ' \033[33mWARNING:%b Default Redis password in use. Set REDIS_PASSWORD for production.\n' '\033[0m' >&2
fi
}
print_banner() {
RST='\033[0m'
printf '\n'
printf ' \033[1;36m🦦 SnapOtter%b\n' "$RST"
printf ' \033[2m────────────────────────────────────────%b\n' "$RST"
printf '\n'
printf ' \033[32m➜%b Open \033[1;4mhttp://localhost:%s%b\n' "$RST" "${PORT:-1349}" "$RST"
printf ' \033[33m➜%b Login \033[1m%s%b / \033[1m[CHANGE ON FIRST LOGIN]%b\n' "$RST" "${DEFAULT_USERNAME}" "$RST" "$RST"
printf ' \033[36m➜%b Docs \033[2mhttps://docs.snapotter.com%b\n' "$RST" "$RST"
printf '\n'
print_security_warnings
}
# Fix ownership of mounted volumes so the non-root snapotter user can write.
# This runs as root, fixes permissions, then drops to snapotter via gosu.
if [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ]; then
# PUID/PGID support: remap the snapotter user/group to match host UID/GID.
# This prevents permission conflicts when using bind mounts.
PUID="${PUID:-$(id -u snapotter)}"
PGID="${PGID:-$(id -g snapotter)}"
if [ "$PUID" = "0" ] || [ "$PGID" = "0" ]; then
echo "WARNING: PUID=0 or PGID=0 would run the app as root. Ignoring — using default snapotter UID/GID." >&2
PUID=$(id -u snapotter)
PGID=$(id -g snapotter)
fi
CUR_UID=$(id -u snapotter)
CUR_GID=$(id -g snapotter)
if [ "$CUR_UID" != "$PUID" ] || [ "$CUR_GID" != "$PGID" ]; then
# Evict any conflicting user/group that holds the target UID/GID.
# Delete user first (may cascade-delete its primary group).
if [ "$CUR_UID" != "$PUID" ]; then
EXISTING_USER=$(getent passwd "$PUID" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f1 || true)
if [ -n "$EXISTING_USER" ] && [ "$EXISTING_USER" != "snapotter" ]; then
deluser "$EXISTING_USER" 2>/dev/null || userdel "$EXISTING_USER" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
fi
if [ "$CUR_GID" != "$PGID" ]; then
EXISTING_GROUP=$(getent group "$PGID" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f1 || true)
if [ -n "$EXISTING_GROUP" ] && [ "$EXISTING_GROUP" != "snapotter" ]; then
delgroup "$EXISTING_GROUP" 2>/dev/null || groupdel "$EXISTING_GROUP" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
groupmod -g "$PGID" snapotter 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if [ "$CUR_UID" != "$PUID" ]; then
usermod -u "$PUID" snapotter 2>/dev/null || true
fi
fi
# Ensure all writable subdirectories exist before chown
mkdir -p /data/files /data/logs /data/ai/models /data/ai/pip-cache /data/ai/venv /tmp/workspace
# Chown writable directories (/data is the persistent volume, /tmp/workspace is ephemeral).
# /app and /opt/venv are read-only at runtime -- no chown needed.
chown -R snapotter:snapotter /data /tmp/workspace 2>&1 || \
echo "WARNING: Could not fix volume permissions. Use named volumes (not Windows bind mounts) to avoid this. See docs for details." >&2
# Root can write anywhere, so verify as the unprivileged snapotter user that
# actually runs the app. This catches root-squashed or foreign-owned mounts
# where the chown above silently failed, and fails fast with guidance.
if ! gosu snapotter sh -c '. /usr/local/bin/entrypoint-lib.sh; ensure_writable "$@"' _ "$WS" "$DD"; then
exit 1
fi
print_banner
exec gosu snapotter "$@"
fi
# Already running as snapotter (e.g. Kubernetes runAsUser)
print_banner
exec "$@"