Files
SnapOtter/tests/e2e-analytics/egress-allowlist.spec.ts
SnapOtterandGitHub d10d0f544f fix: release QA hardening across processing, media, security, and CI gates (#649)
A release-readiness QA pass over the whole product. The commits split into
defects a user would hit and gates that were reporting green while measuring
nothing.

## Fixes that change behaviour

Rate limiting was bypassable on every install: TRUST_PROXY defaulted to true, so
request.ip came from a client-set header and a forged X-Forwarded-For got past
the login limiter. The default is now a private-network trust list.

A transient Postgres outage stranded in-flight jobs, leaving finished output on
disk with no row pointing at it. A reconciler now resolves those rows and adopts
the bytes rather than dropping the work.

A Redis connection that moved to a new address wedged every read-blocked
consumer, so completions stopped signalling while health still answered 200.
Socket timeouts plus subscriber pings recover it.

Installing more than one AI bundle left the shared venv multi-versioned and
silently broke three tools. The installer now reconciles distributions to one
version each.

Converting an image to JXL at quality 1 through 4 returned a 500, because
libjxl 0.7 rejects the distance those values compute. The quality is floored at
what the encoder honours. A missing ffmpeg was also reported to the user as a
corrupt upload; it now says the engine is unavailable.

RAW uploads reached an unpatched LibRaw on arm64, so it is built from source at
0.22.2, and the release scan was split so it can fail on an unfixed critical
instead of hiding it behind ignore-unfixed.

## Gates that could not fail

Two mutation lanes ran zero mutants because Stryker crawled the gitignored docs
build; coverage discarded its whole report on any failing test; the lint gate
skipped root tests, scripts, and two workspaces; and several generated matrices
counted a host missing ffmpeg as a passing tool. Each now measures what it
claims.

Full evidence and the outstanding release items are tracked locally and are not
part of this branch.
2026-07-27 15:37:30 +08:00

122 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Third-party egress allowlist.
*
* PostHog and Sentry are the only destinations this app may ever contact, and
* only while analytics is effectively enabled. Map tiles, API-reference fonts,
* editor fonts and the landing star count are all self-hosted or baked at build
* time precisely so that no page load reaches an origin the operator did not
* choose. This asserts that directly: every request that is not loopback is
* recorded and aborted, and the allowlist is derived from the instance's own
* effective analytics config rather than hard-coded.
*
* On a source build the bake is empty, so the allowlist is empty and ANY
* third-party request fails this test. That is the case that catches a newly
* added CDN font, analytics snippet or github.com fetch.
*/
import type { Page, Route } from "@playwright/test";
import { expect, test } from "./helpers";
const ROUTES = ["/", "/image/resize", "/automate", "/files", "/editor", "/privacy"];
interface AnalyticsConfig {
enabled: boolean;
posthogHost: string;
sentryDsn: string;
sentryDsnWeb: string;
}
function originOf(value: string): string | null {
if (!value) return null;
try {
return new URL(value).origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function isLoopback(hostname: string): boolean {
return hostname === "127.0.0.1" || hostname === "localhost" || hostname === "[::1]";
}
/**
* Record and block every non-loopback request. Blocking rather than observing
* keeps the check from becoming the leak it is testing for.
*/
async function captureExternalRequests(page: Page, sink: string[]): Promise<void> {
await page.route("**/*", (route: Route) => {
const url = new URL(route.request().url());
if (isLoopback(url.hostname)) return route.continue();
sink.push(`${route.request().method()} ${url.origin}${url.pathname}`);
return route.abort();
});
}
async function visitEveryRoute(page: Page): Promise<void> {
for (const path of ROUTES) {
await page.goto(path);
await page.waitForLoadState("networkidle");
}
}
test.describe("Third-party egress", () => {
test("no route reaches an origin outside the analytics allowlist", async ({ page }) => {
const config = (await (
await page.request.get("/api/v1/config/analytics")
).json()) as AnalyticsConfig;
const allowed = new Set(
[config.posthogHost, config.sentryDsn, config.sentryDsnWeb]
.map(originOf)
.filter((origin): origin is string => origin !== null),
);
const external: string[] = [];
await captureExternalRequests(page, external);
await visitEveryRoute(page);
const disallowed = external.filter((entry) => {
const origin = entry.split(" ")[1];
return ![...allowed].some((permitted) => origin.startsWith(permitted));
});
expect(
disallowed,
"PostHog and Sentry are the only permitted destinations; everything else must be self-hosted",
).toEqual([]);
});
test("opting out leaves no destination the client could contact", async ({
loggedInPage: page,
}) => {
const token = await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem("snapotter-token"));
const auth = token ? { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {};
const optOut = await page.request.put("/api/v1/settings", {
headers: auth,
data: { analyticsEnabled: "false" },
});
expect(optOut.ok(), `opt-out failed with ${optOut.status()}`).toBe(true);
try {
const config = (await (
await page.request.get("/api/v1/config/analytics")
).json()) as AnalyticsConfig;
// Blanked, not merely flagged off: a client that ignored `enabled` would
// still have nowhere to send anything.
expect(config.enabled).toBe(false);
expect(config.posthogHost).toBe("");
expect(config.sentryDsn).toBe("");
expect(config.sentryDsnWeb).toBe("");
const external: string[] = [];
await captureExternalRequests(page, external);
await visitEveryRoute(page);
expect(external, "an opted-out instance must make no third-party request at all").toEqual([]);
} finally {
await page.request.put("/api/v1/settings", {
headers: auth,
data: { analyticsEnabled: "true" },
});
}
});
});