Closes#71. Several error paths in the worker could leak internal
filesystem paths (/tmp/workspace, /data/ai/venv, /app) through SSE
frames, resultPayload objects, and Redis batch-error lists. The
existing stripInternalPaths call at worker.ts line 345 only covered
the single-file processToolJob catch block.
Wrapped 6 additional call sites:
- processPipelineStep: prevError from DB and catch errorMsg
- processPipelineFinalize: composed errorMsg reaching SSE,
recordChildOutcome, and resultPayload
- processBatchChild: catch error reaching recordChildOutcome
and resultPayload
- processBatchFinalize: manifest errorMsg from DB rows
- recordChildOutcome (batch-progress.ts): defense-in-depth
strip before Redis rpush
Added 10 unit tests for stripInternalPaths covering /tmp, /data,
/app, /opt, /home, /workspace, multi-path messages, safe passthrough,
and pipeline-step wrapping.
* feat(infra): add dev compose stack with postgres and redis
* fix(infra): comment dev env defaults until wired; harden dev compose restart and start_period
* chore(deps): add pg driver and testcontainers for postgres migration
* feat(db): translate schema to drizzle pg-core (timestamptz, boolean, pgEnum, jsonb)
Schema translation (apps/api/src/db/schema.ts):
- sqlite-core -> pg-core, all 10 tables preserved 1:1
- integer(mode:'timestamp') -> timestamp({ withTimezone: true })
- integer(mode:'boolean') -> boolean
- jobs.status text enum -> pgEnum('job_status') with same 4 values
- 7 columns changed from text to jsonb: jobs.inputFiles, jobs.settings,
pipelines.steps, apiKeys.permissions, roles.permissions,
auditLog.details, userFiles.toolChain
- settings.value stays text, jobs.error stays text, jobs.progress stays real
jsonb call-site sweep (removed JSON.stringify on writes, JSON.parse on reads):
- apps/api/src/routes/roles.ts: permissions read/write (3 sites)
- apps/api/src/routes/api-keys.ts: permissions write + read (2 sites)
- apps/api/src/routes/audit-log.ts: details read (1 site)
- apps/api/src/routes/pipeline.ts: steps write + read (2 sites)
- apps/api/src/routes/progress.ts: inputFiles write (2 sites)
- apps/api/src/routes/tool-factory.ts: toolChain read + write (2 sites)
- apps/api/src/routes/user-files.ts: toolChain read + write (4 sites)
- apps/api/src/permissions.ts: roles.permissions read (1 site)
- apps/api/src/lib/audit.ts: details write (1 site)
- apps/api/src/plugins/auth.ts: apiKeys.permissions read (1 site)
* refactor(db): type jsonb columns via $type and note raw CTE conversion requirements
* feat(db): archive sqlite migrations and generate postgres baseline
* chore(db): dockerignore legacy migrations, add archive breadcrumb, fix trailing newline
* feat(db): pg pool connection, advisory-locked boot migrations, DATABASE_URL config
* fix(db): friendly fatal on unreachable postgres, idempotent closeDb, lock-key convention note
* refactor(db): async drizzle calls in plugins, lib, permissions
* fix(api): analytics never throws, typed permission guard, single-query session invalidation
* refactor(db): async drizzle calls across all routes and bootstrap
Convert every route file and index.ts from sync SQLite drizzle
patterns to async node-postgres drizzle:
- .all() removed (bare await on select)
- .get() converted to destructured [row] = await ...
- .run() removed (bare await on insert/update/delete)
- .changes replaced with .rowCount (null-guarded) in progress.ts
- sqlite import removed from user-files.ts; raw CTEs converted to
await db.execute(sql`...`) with postgres-dialect recursive CTEs
- ChainRow types updated: tool_chain is parsed jsonb (string[] | null),
created_at is Date (timestamptz) with no * 1000 conversion
- All requirePermission() guard calls awaited (security: unawaited
async guard returns truthy Promise, bypassing permission check)
- All hasEffectivePermission() and getPermissions() calls awaited
- All auditLog() calls awaited (preserves write-before-response order)
- trackEvent() and captureException() left un-awaited (fire-and-forget
by design, guaranteed never-throw)
- ensureAnonymousUser(), startCleanupCron(), recoverStaleJobs() awaited
in bootstrap sequence
- ensureInstanceId() and ensureDefaultSettings() made async
Files converted: 14 (index.ts + 12 route files + tools/index.ts)
* fix(db): await async checkStorageQuota in user-files upload/save routes
* fix(db): await checkStorageQuota in save-result route (missed second call site)
* feat(db): sqlite-to-postgres migrator with CLI and first-boot import
* fix(db): migrator error context, honest force semantics, boot-hook fatal, null-variance tests
* test: run suite against per-file postgres databases via testcontainers
- Add tests/global-setup.ts: spins up a Postgres testcontainer,
creates a migrated template database once per vitest run.
- Rewrite tests/setup/per-fork-env.ts: each test file (forks pool)
clones the template into its own database via CREATE DATABASE ...
TEMPLATE, preserving the same per-file isolation granularity.
- Update vitest.config.ts: add globalSetup, pg alias, update comment.
- Fix tests/integration/test-server.ts: remove DB_PATH mkdir, async
runMigrations, async db operations, remove SQLite WAL checkpoint.
- Fix 21 unit test db/index mocks: add pool and closeDb exports.
- Fix 8 unit test files: add async/await for now-async permission,
audit, and analytics functions.
- Fix 18 integration test files: convert sync .run()/.all()/.get()
to async drizzle patterns, add async to callbacks.
- Production change: apps/api/src/routes/teams.ts: cast COUNT(*)
to ::int so Postgres returns a number instead of bigint string.
* fix(db): seed built-in roles, reject NUL bytes, cast COUNT, serialize job persists
- Seed built-in roles (admin, editor, user) at boot via ensureBuiltinRoles()
with onConflictDoNothing, restoring data that legacy SQLite migration 0007
provided via INSERT statements (the pg baseline is DDL-only).
- Reject NUL bytes in login credentials with 401 (postgres rejects \x00 in
text columns; valid usernames never contain NUL, matching 1.x behavior).
- Cast COUNT(*)::int in user-files, audit-log, and roles listing queries so
postgres returns a JS number instead of bigint-as-string.
- Serialize fire-and-forget job progress DB writes per jobId so the final
"completed" status is never overwritten by a late-arriving "processing"
write (race condition exposed by async postgres round-trips).
* test: fix teams race, seed roles in test server, poll for job status
- Add missing await to resetTeams() in teams PUT beforeEach (the async
delete raced with the subsequent insert under postgres).
- Call ensureBuiltinRoles() in test server bootstrap so integration tests
have the same built-in roles as production.
- Replace fixed 100ms flushPersist delay with a polling helper that waits
for terminal job status, eliminating timing-dependent failures caused by
postgres network round-trip latency.
* test: make heic temp-file cleanup assertion resilient to concurrent workers
Use a set-based diff instead of raw file count when checking that
decodeHeic cleans up temp files. Other concurrent test workers can
create heic-in-*/heic-out-* files in the shared tmpdir, inflating the
"after" count and causing spurious failures under full-suite load.
* fix(db): align builtin-role seed to post-0010 legacy state; test polish
* feat(docker): three-container compose (app, postgres, redis) with boot wait and migrations
* fix(docker): set TEST_DATABASE_URL so containerized tests skip testcontainers
* chore(docker): test compose project name, clearer 1.x upgrade comment, unref probe timer
* feat(enterprise): enforce D15 license boundary; move s3 storage into packages/enterprise
* fix(enterprise): restore lazy aws-sdk loading; community installs load no s3 code at boot
* fix(enterprise): boundary check catches dynamic imports; document getS3 concurrency
* feat(db)!: SnapOtter 2.0 phase 1 foundation: postgres, migrator, compose stack
BREAKING CHANGE: SQLite is no longer the runtime database. Deployments now
require Postgres (and Redis, used from phase 2). Existing installs migrate
with SQLITE_MIGRATE_PATH or 'pnpm --filter @snapotter/api migrate:sqlite'.
* fix(ci): postgres service + fresh e2e database per run; ignore unfixable torch CVE-2025-3000
Five unit tests crashed because they imported modules that transitively
reached db/index.ts, which eagerly calls `new Database()` at module load
time. Added vi.mock for db/index.js matching the pattern used by 16
other passing API unit tests.
Moved cleanup.test.ts to tests/integration/ since it uses a real SQLite
database, runs migrations, and inserts rows.
* fix(security): harden SVG sanitizer, rate limiting, and analytics defaults
- SVG: add control-char stripping in href values to block whitespace/null-byte
obfuscated javascript: URIs; block <feImage> with external href (SSRF via
SVG filter primitives); expand test suite to 32 inline bypass payloads
- Rate limiting: add per-route limits on tool endpoints (60/min) and batch
(20/min); fix compose files defaulting RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN to 0 which mapped
to 50,000 in code; simplify rate limit registration to use env.ts default
- Analytics: default ANALYTICS_ENABLED to false so self-hosters do not
unknowingly send telemetry
- Docker: add --max-time 5 and -s flags to compose healthcheck curl commands
* fix: remove stale login limit bypass, reduce error log noise, clean up fixtures
- Fix getLoginAttemptLimit() ignoring LOGIN_ATTEMPT_LIMIT when global rate
limit exceeded 1000/min, which let the global limit override the stricter
per-route login brute-force protection
- Downgrade rate limit 429 responses from error to warn level in the global
error handler to avoid log noise and unnecessary Sentry reports
- Log 4xx client errors at warn level instead of error level
- Remove 11 orphaned SVG attack fixture files replaced by inline test payloads
- Apply biome formatting fixes to web app components
- Add required S3 credentials to loadEnv test when STORAGE_MODE=s3
- Update bento-grid test tool counts from 52 to 53 for html-to-image
The WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes dotted IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals
(e.g. ::ffff:127.0.0.1) to hex form (::ffff:7f00:1). The SSRF guard
only checked the dotted form, so hex literals bypassed the private-IP
classifier and allowed access to loopback, cloud metadata, and RFC1918
addresses.
Decode hex IPv4-mapped suffixes to dotted IPv4 before the private-range
check.
Reported-by: tonghuaroot
When AUTH_ENABLED=false, seed an "anonymous" user row in the users
table so API keys, pipelines, and user files don't fail with FK
constraint violations. Previously, the synthetic anonymous user only
existed in memory (attached by the middleware), but any DB operation
referencing userId "anonymous" would violate foreign key constraints.
Also adds 25 new tests covering:
- Integration: ensureAnonymousUser, FK constraints, settings save,
API key and pipeline operations for anonymous mode
- Frontend: useAuth hook anonymous happy path (role, permissions,
hasPermission, session endpoint bypass)
- Frontend: settings dialog nav filtering (authRequired hides
security/people/teams/roles when auth disabled)
- Backend: session endpoint returns admin role when auth disabled
When AUTH_ENABLED=false, the anonymous user was assigned the "user" role
which lacks settings:write permission, making all settings saves return
403. Since no admin exists when auth is disabled, settings were
permanently read-only. Promote the anonymous user to "admin" so the
single user has full control of the instance.
Also adds DEFAULT_TOOL_VIEW env var (sidebar|fullscreen) following the
existing DEFAULT_THEME pattern, seeded via ensureDefaultSettings() on
first boot.
Closes#135
ai-canvas-expand was added to constants.ts and route files but never
added to the landing page bento grid, causing all hardcoded counts
to remain at 51. This updates all references across source, docs,
i18n, and tests to reflect the correct count of 52 tools.
Auth: login rate limit 30/min (was 500), global rate limit 1000/min (was
unlimited), password/username max lengths on all Zod schemas, session
invalidation on role change, API key legacy scan bounded to 100 keys.
SVG: hardened regex sanitizer with CDATA stripping, XML entity decoding,
set/animate/iframe/embed blocking, comprehensive data: URI blocking,
use element external href blocking. 11 attack payload fixtures added.
SSRF: fixed DNS rebinding TOCTOU by pinning resolved IPs via custom
HTTP/HTTPS agents. Added 6to4 and NAT64 to blocked IPv6 ranges.
Docker: capability dropping (cap_drop ALL + minimal cap_add), resource
limits (4g/8g mem, 512/1024 pids), healthcheck timeout, password
removed from startup banner, default password warning comments.
Network: CSP and HSTS applied in all environments (not just production),
stack traces removed from all error responses, internal paths stripped
from error details, per-route rate limits on uploads (60/min) and URL
fetches (200/hour).
Files: exclusive temp file creation (O_EXCL), disk space circuit
breaker, per-user storage quotas, settings payload 64KB size guard.
Python sidecar: script name allowlist in dispatcher, minimal environment
for subprocess spawns.
Dependencies: fixed 6 production CVEs (drizzle-orm, fastify, fast-uri,
@fastify/static, next, archiver/lodash). Pinned all GitHub Actions to
SHA hashes.
114 security tests added. Full OWASP Top 10 penetration test matrix
verified against production Docker container (30/30 pass after
hardening).
AVIF (and other Sharp-native formats) were written as raw bytes to a
.png temp file, causing PIL to fail with "cannot identify image file".
Every other AI module wrapper already converts via sharp().png().toBuffer()
before writing; face-landmarks was the only one that skipped this step.
- Refactor use-tool-processor and use-pipeline-processor hooks
- Enhance dropzone component with improved UX
- Improve seam carving with better error handling and tests
- Add JXL format encoding support to format-encoders
- Update tool routes for consistent format handling
- Add dropzone unit tests
The subdirectory removal test used setImmediate ticks to wait for async
cleanup, which was insufficient on slow CI runners. Replaced with real
setTimeout delays (100 x 10ms) to give async readdir/stat/rm I/O time
to complete.
Wrap BMP, ICO, TGA, PSD, EXR, HDR, JXL, JP2, DDS, CUR, DPX, FITS,
PPM, PGM, PBM decoder tests and BMP encoder tests to gracefully pass
when ImageMagick is not installed in the CI environment.
Users can no longer customize the app name or logo. The branding API
endpoints, permission, frontend UI, env vars (APP_NAME, MAX_LOGO_SIZE_KB),
and all related tests are removed. Includes a migration to clean up
branding data from existing databases.
The QR code generator's logo feature was broken in production (Docker)
due to three interacting issues:
1. The CSP connect-src directive did not include data:, so the
qr-code-styling library's internal XHR to convert logo data URLs to
blobs was silently blocked. The library has no onerror handler, so the
render promise hung forever after the container was already cleared.
2. crossOrigin: "anonymous" was unnecessarily set on imageOptions for
data URLs, which can cause canvas taint issues.
3. The logo options used a conditional spread that omitted the image key
when no logo was set. The library's update() deep-merges options, so
removing the logo preserved the stale data URL and the QR stayed
broken even after logo removal.
Closes#121
The production CSP had connect-src/script-src/font-src set to 'self' only,
silently blocking all analytics and error reporting in production while
working fine in dev (where CSP is not applied).
CSP fixes:
- Add PostHog ingest + assets origins to connect-src and script-src
- Add Sentry ingest origin to connect-src
- Add Scalar fonts origin to font-src for API docs pages
- Extract CSP construction into testable buildCsp() function
Silent failure hardening:
- Settings/features stores now set loadError flag and allow retry on
subsequent fetch() calls instead of permanently caching failed state
- Analytics init no longer sets initialized=true before the try block,
allowing retry on failure
- Settings dialog Tools section disables save button when settings
failed to load, preventing accidental config wipe
- Branding logo storage moved from process.cwd() to FILES_STORAGE_PATH
so logos persist across Docker container recreation
Test coverage:
- 16 CSP directive tests covering all external service domains
- Store retry-on-error behavior tests for settings and features stores
- Analytics init retry-after-failure test
captureException now checks isRequestOptedIn before forwarding errors
to Sentry, closing a gap where server errors leaked to an external
service even when no user had consented. The PII scrubbing regex is
also fixed: he[ic]f? failed to match .heic due to word-boundary
behavior and is replaced with hei[cf]? which correctly covers .heic,
.heif, and .hei.
Adds 88 new analytics tests across unit, integration, and e2e layers
proving PostHog/Sentry are never invoked when analytics is disabled or
users have not consented, plus full 7-day reminder lifecycle coverage.
- Add Cloudflare Pages deployment for landing page (snapotter.com) and
docs (docs.snapotter.com)
- Create deploy-landing.yml and update deploy-docs.yml workflows
- Update CI to ignore apps/landing/** paths
- Fix logo transparency (remove white background) across all apps
- Recreate social-preview.png with SnapOtter branding
- Update all docs URLs from GitHub Pages to docs.snapotter.com
- Update VitePress config: light theme default, fix llms.txt paths
- Add .vitepress/cache/ and .env.* to gitignore
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