Coverage 83.6 to 87.36% lines, 81.63 to 84.14% branches. Mutation testing across five packages: image-engine 85, media-engine 92, doc-engine 87, shared+enterprise 86, apps/api security and jobs slice. Runs all five lanes weekly. Fixes the silently-broken mutation CI (babel pin), a redact-pdf envelope-shape test bug, an untested enterprise license valid-signature path, and an audit test that only exercised a hand-copied reproduction. Test and config only, no product code changes beyond the babel pin and one test-only oidc export. Full suite: 16,712 pass, 0 fail.
Follow-up to a full re-audit of the 2.0 tree. Most prior findings were already
fixed; this closes the ones that were not:
- SAML assertion replay: validateInResponseTo ifPresent plus a Redis-backed
CacheProvider, so a captured signed assertion cannot be replayed. ifPresent
keeps IdP-initiated SSO working.
- MFA login challenge burned after 5 wrong TOTP codes.
- api_keys.key_prefix indexed; the per-request lookup was a full table scan.
- MAX_AI_JOBS_PER_USER caps a user's in-flight single-file AI jobs (the AI pool
runs at concurrency 1). Batch and pipeline AI stay uncapped.
- MAX_WORKSPACE_SIZE_GB enforced instead of being dead config.
- SUBPROCESS_MEMORY_LIMIT_MB (default off) for the native media and doc engines;
not applied to the AI sidecar.
- SVG sanitizer closes unquoted and whitespace-prefixed javascript: hrefs and
the animateTransform/animateMotion/handler/mpath elements.
- Windows-style paths stripped from error output to match the Sentry scrubber.
- Postgres and Redis compose services get cap_drop plus pids_limit and cpus.
- .env.example ships MAX_SVG_SIZE_MB=50 (0 disabled the cap).
Adds security-focused unit and integration tests. typecheck, biome, and the
full unit and integration suites pass.
Fixes#529 (opened investigating #515).
Setting MFA policy to "required"/"admins only" saved regardless of whether the mfa enterprise feature was licensed, and there was no enrollment UI at all, so any instance that flipped the toggle locked every unenrolled user out with no way back in. The login page and Settings save also both collapsed the resulting error into a generic message, hiding the real reason.
- Reject saving mfaPolicy to admins_only/required server-side unless mfa is licensed
- Surface the specific server error on login and on a failed settings save instead of a generic fallback
- Add a self-service two-factor authentication enrollment flow (QR code, manual entry, recovery codes, verify, disable) so a licensed admin can actually satisfy the policy before it's enforced
- Fix a pending-enrollment dead end, silent error swallowing in verify/disable, and a silent clipboard-copy failure on the recovery codes screen
- Add the integration test that actually proves the fix: a real login attempt returns 403 MFA_ENROLLMENT_REQUIRED
