The WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes dotted IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals
(e.g. ::ffff:127.0.0.1) to hex form (::ffff:7f00:1). The SSRF guard
only checked the dotted form, so hex literals bypassed the private-IP
classifier and allowed access to loopback, cloud metadata, and RFC1918
addresses.
Decode hex IPv4-mapped suffixes to dotted IPv4 before the private-range
check.
Reported-by: tonghuaroot
Auth: login rate limit 30/min (was 500), global rate limit 1000/min (was
unlimited), password/username max lengths on all Zod schemas, session
invalidation on role change, API key legacy scan bounded to 100 keys.
SVG: hardened regex sanitizer with CDATA stripping, XML entity decoding,
set/animate/iframe/embed blocking, comprehensive data: URI blocking,
use element external href blocking. 11 attack payload fixtures added.
SSRF: fixed DNS rebinding TOCTOU by pinning resolved IPs via custom
HTTP/HTTPS agents. Added 6to4 and NAT64 to blocked IPv6 ranges.
Docker: capability dropping (cap_drop ALL + minimal cap_add), resource
limits (4g/8g mem, 512/1024 pids), healthcheck timeout, password
removed from startup banner, default password warning comments.
Network: CSP and HSTS applied in all environments (not just production),
stack traces removed from all error responses, internal paths stripped
from error details, per-route rate limits on uploads (60/min) and URL
fetches (200/hour).
Files: exclusive temp file creation (O_EXCL), disk space circuit
breaker, per-user storage quotas, settings payload 64KB size guard.
Python sidecar: script name allowlist in dispatcher, minimal environment
for subprocess spawns.
Dependencies: fixed 6 production CVEs (drizzle-orm, fastify, fast-uri,
@fastify/static, next, archiver/lodash). Pinned all GitHub Actions to
SHA hashes.
114 security tests added. Full OWASP Top 10 penetration test matrix
verified against production Docker container (30/30 pass after
hardening).
SnapOtter