A release-readiness QA pass over the whole product. The commits split into
defects a user would hit and gates that were reporting green while measuring
nothing.
## Fixes that change behaviour
Rate limiting was bypassable on every install: TRUST_PROXY defaulted to true, so
request.ip came from a client-set header and a forged X-Forwarded-For got past
the login limiter. The default is now a private-network trust list.
A transient Postgres outage stranded in-flight jobs, leaving finished output on
disk with no row pointing at it. A reconciler now resolves those rows and adopts
the bytes rather than dropping the work.
A Redis connection that moved to a new address wedged every read-blocked
consumer, so completions stopped signalling while health still answered 200.
Socket timeouts plus subscriber pings recover it.
Installing more than one AI bundle left the shared venv multi-versioned and
silently broke three tools. The installer now reconciles distributions to one
version each.
Converting an image to JXL at quality 1 through 4 returned a 500, because
libjxl 0.7 rejects the distance those values compute. The quality is floored at
what the encoder honours. A missing ffmpeg was also reported to the user as a
corrupt upload; it now says the engine is unavailable.
RAW uploads reached an unpatched LibRaw on arm64, so it is built from source at
0.22.2, and the release scan was split so it can fail on an unfixed critical
instead of hiding it behind ignore-unfixed.
## Gates that could not fail
Two mutation lanes ran zero mutants because Stryker crawled the gitignored docs
build; coverage discarded its whole report on any failing test; the lint gate
skipped root tests, scripts, and two workspaces; and several generated matrices
counted a host missing ffmpeg as a passing tool. Each now measures what it
claims.
Full evidence and the outstanding release items are tracked locally and are not
part of this branch.
Auth: login rate limit 30/min (was 500), global rate limit 1000/min (was
unlimited), password/username max lengths on all Zod schemas, session
invalidation on role change, API key legacy scan bounded to 100 keys.
SVG: hardened regex sanitizer with CDATA stripping, XML entity decoding,
set/animate/iframe/embed blocking, comprehensive data: URI blocking,
use element external href blocking. 11 attack payload fixtures added.
SSRF: fixed DNS rebinding TOCTOU by pinning resolved IPs via custom
HTTP/HTTPS agents. Added 6to4 and NAT64 to blocked IPv6 ranges.
Docker: capability dropping (cap_drop ALL + minimal cap_add), resource
limits (4g/8g mem, 512/1024 pids), healthcheck timeout, password
removed from startup banner, default password warning comments.
Network: CSP and HSTS applied in all environments (not just production),
stack traces removed from all error responses, internal paths stripped
from error details, per-route rate limits on uploads (60/min) and URL
fetches (200/hour).
Files: exclusive temp file creation (O_EXCL), disk space circuit
breaker, per-user storage quotas, settings payload 64KB size guard.
Python sidecar: script name allowlist in dispatcher, minimal environment
for subprocess spawns.
Dependencies: fixed 6 production CVEs (drizzle-orm, fastify, fast-uri,
@fastify/static, next, archiver/lodash). Pinned all GitHub Actions to
SHA hashes.
114 security tests added. Full OWASP Top 10 penetration test matrix
verified against production Docker container (30/30 pass after
hardening).
