test: coverage campaign and mutation testing across five packages (#628)

Coverage 83.6 to 87.36% lines, 81.63 to 84.14% branches. Mutation testing across five packages: image-engine 85, media-engine 92, doc-engine 87, shared+enterprise 86, apps/api security and jobs slice. Runs all five lanes weekly. Fixes the silently-broken mutation CI (babel pin), a redact-pdf envelope-shape test bug, an untested enterprise license valid-signature path, and an audit test that only exercised a hand-copied reproduction. Test and config only, no product code changes beyond the babel pin and one test-only oidc export. Full suite: 16,712 pass, 0 fail.
This commit is contained in:
SnapOtter
2026-07-24 17:36:57 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent eee6f0d470
commit 301e6eb01a
129 changed files with 30900 additions and 276 deletions
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* password-change side effects, register validation.
*/
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import { asc, eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { db, schema } from "../../../apps/api/src/db/index.js";
import { buildTestApp, loginAsAdmin, type TestApp } from "../test-server.js";
@@ -13,6 +13,19 @@ let adminToken: string;
const uid = () => `auth_test_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`;
// Upsert a global setting row (mirrors upsertSetting in settings-helpers).
async function setSetting(key: string, value: string): Promise<void> {
await db
.insert(schema.settings)
.values({ key, value })
.onConflictDoUpdate({ target: schema.settings.key, set: { value } });
}
// Remove a global setting row so it cannot bleed into sibling tests in the fork.
async function clearSetting(key: string): Promise<void> {
await db.delete(schema.settings).where(eq(schema.settings.key, key));
}
beforeAll(async () => {
testApp = await buildTestApp();
adminToken = await loginAsAdmin(testApp.app);
@@ -511,3 +524,564 @@ describe("Forced password change gate", () => {
expect(after.statusCode).toBe(200);
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// DISABLED-USER PATHS (login, session endpoint, auth middleware)
// A user whose role is prefixed "disabled:" is treated as deactivated.
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Disabled user paths", () => {
it("login is rejected with 403 USER_DISABLED before any password check", async () => {
const { username, password, id } = await createUser();
await db.update(schema.users).set({ role: `disabled:user` }).where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/auth/login",
payload: { username, password },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("USER_DISABLED");
// The failed attempt is audited with the disabled_user reason.
const audit = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/v1/audit-log?action=LOGIN_FAILED&limit=100",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
});
const entries = JSON.parse(audit.body).entries as Array<{
action: string;
details?: { username?: string; reason?: string };
}>;
const match = entries.find(
(e) => e.details?.username === username && e.details?.reason === "disabled_user",
);
expect(match).toBeDefined();
});
it("session endpoint denies and purges the session once the user is disabled", async () => {
const { username, password, id } = await createUser();
const token = await loginAs(username, password);
// Session works while active.
const before = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/auth/session",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
});
expect(before.statusCode).toBe(200);
await db.update(schema.users).set({ role: `disabled:user` }).where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/auth/session",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
});
// The auth middleware rejects and purges a disabled user's session before
// the route body runs, so a disabled user is denied (the route's own 403
// branch is defense in depth behind the middleware).
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
// The session row is purged as a side effect.
const [row] = await db.select().from(schema.sessions).where(eq(schema.sessions.id, token));
expect(row).toBeUndefined();
});
it("auth middleware 403s a protected route and purges the session for a disabled user", async () => {
const { username, password, id } = await createUser();
const token = await loginAs(username, password);
await db.update(schema.users).set({ role: `disabled:editor` }).where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/v1/api-keys",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("USER_DISABLED");
const [row] = await db.select().from(schema.sessions).where(eq(schema.sessions.id, token));
expect(row).toBeUndefined();
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// CONCURRENT SESSION LIMIT (FIFO eviction on login)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Concurrent session limit", () => {
it("evicts the oldest sessions when maxSessionsPerUser is exceeded", async () => {
const { username, password, id } = await createUser();
await setSetting("maxSessionsPerUser", "2");
try {
const t1 = await loginAs(username, password);
const t2 = await loginAs(username, password);
// Third login pushes the count to 3 > 2, so the single oldest is evicted.
const t3 = await loginAs(username, password);
const remaining = await db
.select({ id: schema.sessions.id })
.from(schema.sessions)
.where(eq(schema.sessions.userId, id))
.orderBy(asc(schema.sessions.createdAt));
const ids = remaining.map((r) => r.id);
// Exactly the cap survives, the newest token is always retained, and
// precisely one of the two earlier tokens was evicted (FIFO). Asserting
// on the count rather than a specific victim keeps this robust even if
// t1 and t2 share a createdAt tick.
expect(ids).toHaveLength(2);
expect(ids).toContain(t3);
const survivingEarlier = [t1, t2].filter((t) => ids.includes(t));
expect(survivingEarlier).toHaveLength(1);
// The evicted earlier token no longer authenticates.
const evictedToken = [t1, t2].find((t) => !ids.includes(t)) as string;
const evicted = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/auth/session",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${evictedToken}` },
});
expect(evicted.statusCode).toBe(401);
} finally {
await clearSetting("maxSessionsPerUser");
}
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// IDLE TIMEOUT ENFORCEMENT (auth middleware)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Session idle timeout", () => {
it("expires a session whose last activity predates the idle window", async () => {
const { username, password } = await createUser();
const token = await loginAs(username, password);
// Backdate lastActivity well beyond a 1-minute idle window. The token has
// never hit a guarded route, so no Redis idle key exists -- the middleware
// falls back to the Postgres lastActivity and finds it stale.
await db
.update(schema.sessions)
.set({ lastActivity: new Date(Date.now() - 5 * 60 * 1000) })
.where(eq(schema.sessions.id, token));
await setSetting("sessionIdleTimeoutMinutes", "1");
try {
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/v1/api-keys",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("IDLE_TIMEOUT");
const [row] = await db.select().from(schema.sessions).where(eq(schema.sessions.id, token));
expect(row).toBeUndefined();
} finally {
await clearSetting("sessionIdleTimeoutMinutes");
}
});
it("flushes lastActivity to Postgres on a fresh session within the idle window", async () => {
const { username, password } = await createUser();
const token = await loginAs(username, password);
// A brand-new session row has a null lastActivity.
const [before] = await db
.select({ lastActivity: schema.sessions.lastActivity })
.from(schema.sessions)
.where(eq(schema.sessions.id, token));
expect(before.lastActivity).toBeNull();
await setSetting("sessionIdleTimeoutMinutes", "30");
try {
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/v1/api-keys",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
// On the cache miss the middleware writes lastActivity forward.
const [after] = await db
.select({ lastActivity: schema.sessions.lastActivity })
.from(schema.sessions)
.where(eq(schema.sessions.id, token));
expect(after.lastActivity).not.toBeNull();
} finally {
await clearSetting("sessionIdleTimeoutMinutes");
}
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// MALFORMED / MISSING BEARER ON GUARDED ROUTES
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Bearer token extraction edge cases", () => {
it("a non-Bearer Authorization header is treated as no token (401 on a guarded route)", async () => {
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/v1/api-keys",
headers: { authorization: "Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
});
it("a Bearer token that matches no session is rejected on the session endpoint", async () => {
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/auth/session",
headers: { authorization: "Bearer not-a-real-session-token" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).error).toBe("Session expired or invalid");
});
it("a non-si_ Bearer token on a guarded route falls through to 401 (not treated as an API key)", async () => {
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/v1/api-keys",
headers: { authorization: "Bearer plain-garbage-token" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// TEAM RESOLUTION BY ID (register + update paths)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Team resolution by id", () => {
it("register resolves a team passed by id (not name)", async () => {
const [defaultTeam] = await db
.select()
.from(schema.teams)
.where(eq(schema.teams.name, "Default"));
expect(defaultTeam).toBeDefined();
const username = uid();
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/auth/register",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
// Passing the team id exercises the name-miss -> id-lookup fallback.
payload: { username, password: "ValidPass1", team: defaultTeam.id },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(201);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).team).toBe("Default");
const [row] = await db
.select({ team: schema.users.team })
.from(schema.users)
.where(eq(schema.users.username, username));
expect(row.team).toBe(defaultTeam.id);
});
it("update resolves a team passed by id and persists it", async () => {
const { id } = await createUser();
const [defaultTeam] = await db
.select()
.from(schema.teams)
.where(eq(schema.teams.name, "Default"));
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "PUT",
url: `/api/auth/users/${id}`,
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { team: defaultTeam.id },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const [row] = await db
.select({ team: schema.users.team })
.from(schema.users)
.where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
expect(row.team).toBe(defaultTeam.id);
});
it("update with an unknown team returns 400 and does not touch the row", async () => {
const { id } = await createUser();
const [before] = await db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "PUT",
url: `/api/auth/users/${id}`,
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { team: `ghost_team_${Date.now()}` },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("VALIDATION_ERROR");
const [after] = await db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
expect(after.team).toBe(before.team);
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// ADMIN USER-MANAGEMENT GUARDS (update / delete / reset authority + shape)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Admin user-management guards", () => {
it("update with an unknown role is a no-op (200, role unchanged)", async () => {
const { id } = await createUser({ role: "user" });
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "PUT",
url: `/api/auth/users/${id}`,
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { role: "totally-bogus-role" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const [row] = await db
.select({ role: schema.users.role })
.from(schema.users)
.where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
expect(row.role).toBe("user");
});
it("update against an unknown user id returns 404", async () => {
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "PUT",
url: "/api/auth/users/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { role: "editor" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(404);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("NOT_FOUND");
});
it("promoting a user to editor invalidates the target's existing sessions", async () => {
const { username, password, id } = await createUser({ role: "user" });
const targetToken = await loginAs(username, password);
// Session valid before the role change.
const before = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/auth/session",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${targetToken}` },
});
expect(before.statusCode).toBe(200);
const upd = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "PUT",
url: `/api/auth/users/${id}`,
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { role: "editor" },
});
expect(upd.statusCode).toBe(200);
const remaining = await db.select().from(schema.sessions).where(eq(schema.sessions.userId, id));
expect(remaining).toHaveLength(0);
const after = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "GET",
url: "/api/auth/session",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${targetToken}` },
});
expect(after.statusCode).toBe(401);
});
it("delete authority: a below-admin users:manage actor cannot delete an admin", async () => {
// Custom role that holds users:manage but sits below admin in the hierarchy.
const roleName = `delmgr_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`;
const roleRes = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/v1/roles",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { name: roleName, permissions: ["users:manage"] },
});
expect(roleRes.statusCode, roleRes.body).toBe(201);
const target = await createUser({ role: "admin" });
const managerName = uid();
const managerPassword = "DelMgrPass1";
const reg = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/auth/register",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { username: managerName, password: managerPassword, role: roleName },
});
expect(reg.statusCode, reg.body).toBe(201);
await db
.update(schema.users)
.set({ mustChangePassword: false })
.where(eq(schema.users.username, managerName));
const managerToken = await loginAs(managerName, managerPassword);
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "DELETE",
url: `/api/auth/users/${target.id}`,
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${managerToken}` },
});
// Past the users:manage gate, but the target outranks the actor.
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("ESCALATION_DENIED");
// The target admin still exists.
const [row] = await db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, target.id));
expect(row).toBeDefined();
});
it("admin can delete a normal user and cascades their sessions", async () => {
const { username, password, id } = await createUser({ role: "user" });
await loginAs(username, password);
const sessionsBefore = await db
.select()
.from(schema.sessions)
.where(eq(schema.sessions.userId, id));
expect(sessionsBefore.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "DELETE",
url: `/api/auth/users/${id}`,
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).ok).toBe(true);
const [userRow] = await db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
expect(userRow).toBeUndefined();
const sessionsAfter = await db
.select()
.from(schema.sessions)
.where(eq(schema.sessions.userId, id));
expect(sessionsAfter).toHaveLength(0);
});
it("reset-password against an unknown user id returns 404", async () => {
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/auth/users/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000/reset-password",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { newPassword: "ResetValid1" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(404);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("NOT_FOUND");
});
it("reset-password with a weak new password returns 400", async () => {
const { id } = await createUser();
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: `/api/auth/users/${id}/reset-password`,
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { newPassword: "weak" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("VALIDATION_ERROR");
});
it("reset-password on a passwordless (OIDC/SSO) user returns 400 OIDC_NO_PASSWORD", async () => {
const { id } = await createUser();
// Null out the local password hash to emulate an externally-provisioned user.
await db.update(schema.users).set({ passwordHash: null }).where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: `/api/auth/users/${id}/reset-password`,
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { newPassword: "ResetValid1" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("OIDC_NO_PASSWORD");
});
it("change-password on a passwordless account returns 400 OIDC_NO_PASSWORD", async () => {
const { username, password, id } = await createUser();
const token = await loginAs(username, password);
// Strip the password hash after the session exists.
await db.update(schema.users).set({ passwordHash: null }).where(eq(schema.users.id, id));
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/auth/change-password",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
payload: { currentPassword: password, newPassword: "NewValid9" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("OIDC_NO_PASSWORD");
});
it("change-password with a wrong current password returns 401 INVALID_PASSWORD", async () => {
const { username, password } = await createUser();
const token = await loginAs(username, password);
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/auth/change-password",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
payload: { currentPassword: "TotallyWrong1", newPassword: "NewValid9" },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).code).toBe("INVALID_PASSWORD");
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// REGISTER: role authority for a custom users:manage actor
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("Register role authority", () => {
it("a users:manage actor below admin cannot create an admin (403 ESCALATION_DENIED)", async () => {
// Build a custom role that can manage users but is not admin-level.
const roleName = `usrmgr_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 6)}`;
const roleRes = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/v1/roles",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { name: roleName, permissions: ["users:manage"] },
});
expect(roleRes.statusCode, roleRes.body).toBe(201);
const managerName = uid();
const managerPassword = "ManagerPass1";
const reg = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/auth/register",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${adminToken}` },
payload: { username: managerName, password: managerPassword, role: roleName },
});
expect(reg.statusCode, reg.body).toBe(201);
await db
.update(schema.users)
.set({ mustChangePassword: false })
.where(eq(schema.users.username, managerName));
const managerToken = await loginAs(managerName, managerPassword);
// The manager tries to create an admin -- above its authority.
const escalate = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/auth/register",
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${managerToken}` },
payload: { username: uid(), password: "ValidPass1", role: "admin" },
});
expect(escalate.statusCode).toBe(403);
expect(JSON.parse(escalate.body).code).toBe("ESCALATION_DENIED");
});
});
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// SSO ENFORCEMENT SETTING WITHOUT THE ENTERPRISE FEATURE
// The setting alone must not block local login when sso_enforcement is unlicensed.
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
describe("SSO enforcement without license", () => {
it("local login still works when ssoEnforcement is on but the feature is unlicensed", async () => {
const { username, password } = await createUser();
await setSetting("ssoEnforcement", "true");
try {
const res = await testApp.app.inject({
method: "POST",
url: "/api/auth/login",
payload: { username, password },
});
// Enterprise is not licensed in this plain harness, so isFeatureEnabled
// is false and the enforcement branch is skipped -- login proceeds.
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
expect(JSON.parse(res.body).token).toBeTruthy();
} finally {
await clearSetting("ssoEnforcement");
}
});
});