Merge pull request #5 from BagelHole/codex/add-skills-for-openclaw-security-hardening

README.md

@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ No agent? No problem. Browse the skills, copy the scripts, use the configs. It's
 | [container-hardening](security/hardening/container-hardening/) | Secure Docker/K8s configs |
 | [kubernetes-hardening](security/hardening/kubernetes-hardening/) | K8s security contexts and policies |
 | [cis-benchmarks](security/hardening/cis-benchmarks/) | CIS benchmark auditing |
+| [openclaw-deployment-hardening](security/hardening/openclaw-deployment-hardening/) | OpenClaw CI/CD, container, and runtime hardening guardrails |
 
 ### Network Security
 | Skill | Description |
@@ -391,6 +392,7 @@ No agent? No problem. Browse the skills, copy the scripts, use the configs. It's
 | [ollama-stack](infrastructure/local-ai/ollama-stack/) | Private local inference stack with Ollama |
 | [mac-mini-llm-lab](infrastructure/local-ai/mac-mini-llm-lab/) | Mac mini setup for always-on local LLM serving |
 | [openclaw-local-mac-mini](infrastructure/local-ai/openclaw-local-mac-mini/) | OpenClaw setup for local development and Mac mini hosting |
+| [openclaw-security-hardening](infrastructure/local-ai/openclaw-security-hardening/) | OpenClaw host, auth, secrets, and network hardening for self-hosted deployments |
 | [vllm-server](infrastructure/local-ai/vllm-server/) | High-throughput LLM serving with vLLM — PagedAttention, tensor parallelism, OpenAI API |
 | [llm-inference-scaling](infrastructure/local-ai/llm-inference-scaling/) | Auto-scale LLM inference clusters on Kubernetes with KEDA and GPU-aware scheduling |
 | [rag-infrastructure](infrastructure/local-ai/rag-infrastructure/) | Production RAG with vector stores, hybrid search, embedding pipelines, and reranking |

infrastructure/local-ai/openclaw-security-hardening/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+name: openclaw-security-hardening
+description: Harden OpenClaw self-hosted environments with baseline host controls, auth tightening, secret handling, network segmentation, and safe update/rollback workflows. Use when deploying OpenClaw in home labs, startups, or production-like local AI infrastructure.
+license: MIT
+metadata:
+  author: devops-skills
+  version: "1.0"
+---
+
+# OpenClaw Security Hardening
+
+Use this skill to reduce exposure in self-hosted OpenClaw deployments before opening access to teammates or external networks.
+
+## Build a Threat Model First
+
+Map the highest-risk assets and paths:
+
+- Admin/API endpoints for OpenClaw
+- Provider API keys and model credentials
+- Prompt/response logs containing sensitive business data
+- Host-level access (SSH, local admin accounts, remote desktop)
+
+Prioritize controls that reduce credential theft, remote code execution blast radius, and data exfiltration.
+
+## Apply Baseline Host Hardening
+
+1. Keep OS and package dependencies patched on a regular cadence.
+2. Run OpenClaw as a dedicated non-admin user account.
+3. Enable full-disk encryption and secure boot features where available.
+4. Remove unnecessary services and block inbound ports by default.
+5. Lock down remote admin (key-only SSH, no password login, limited source CIDRs).
+
+Example Linux baseline checks:
+
+```bash
+id openclaw
+sudo ss -tulpn
+sudo ufw status verbose
+sudo systemctl --failed
+```
+
+## Harden Application Runtime
+
+- Bind OpenClaw to localhost or private VLAN by default.
+- Place a reverse proxy in front of OpenClaw for TLS, auth, and rate limits.
+- Enforce authentication on every non-health endpoint.
+- Disable debug/dev modes in persistent environments.
+- Restrict outbound egress to only required providers (LLM API, telemetry sink, package mirror).
+
+Example reverse proxy controls to enforce:
+
+- TLS 1.2+ only
+- strict transport security header
+- request body size limits
+- request timeout and upstream timeout guardrails
+- per-IP and per-token rate limiting
+
+## Protect Secrets and Tokens
+
+- Store secrets in a vault or platform secret manager, not committed `.env` files.
+- Rotate provider and admin tokens on a fixed interval and after any incident.
+- Scope tokens minimally (least privilege, per-service keys).
+- Scan repos and deployment artifacts for leaked credentials before release.
+
+Rotation checklist:
+
+1. Generate replacement key.
+2. Update runtime secret store.
+3. Restart or reload OpenClaw.
+4. Validate request success with new key.
+5. Revoke old key.
+
+## Segment Network Access
+
+Use layered access patterns:
+
+- **Tier 1 (private):** OpenClaw service port reachable only from app/proxy subnet.
+- **Tier 2 (operator):** Admin plane reachable only from VPN/Tailscale/WireGuard.
+- **Tier 3 (public):** Expose only hardened reverse proxy with strict ACLs.
+
+Do not publish raw OpenClaw service ports directly to the internet.
+
+## Add Detection and Recovery Paths
+
+- Centralize auth, error, and audit logs.
+- Alert on brute-force attempts, token failures, and unusual outbound traffic.
+- Capture immutable backup snapshots of configs and prompt data retention settings.
+- Test rollback and restore procedures every release cycle.
+
+Minimum operational runbook:
+
+- service restart path
+- key revocation path
+- incident isolation path (network block + token disable)
+- known-good rollback version
+
+## Validation Checklist
+
+- All sensitive endpoints require auth and are unreachable without VPN or gateway policy.
+- Secrets are absent from repo history and plaintext shared directories.
+- Host firewall default deny is active for inbound traffic.
+- TLS termination and rate limits are active at ingress.
+- Rollback drill can restore service within target RTO.
+
+## Related Skills
+
+- [openclaw-local-mac-mini](../openclaw-local-mac-mini/) - Local OpenClaw hosting setup
+- [multi-tenant-llm-hosting](../multi-tenant-llm-hosting/) - Multi-tenant AI isolation patterns
+- [zero-trust](../../networking/zero-trust/) - Private access and identity-aware network controls

security/hardening/openclaw-deployment-hardening/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+---
+name: openclaw-deployment-hardening
+description: Secure OpenClaw deployments with preflight hardening checks, CI/CD guardrails, container runtime restrictions, and post-deploy verification. Use when shipping OpenClaw with Docker, Kubernetes, or automated release pipelines.
+license: MIT
+metadata:
+  author: devops-skills
+  version: "1.0"
+---
+
+# OpenClaw Deployment Hardening
+
+Use this skill to add repeatable security gates around OpenClaw build and deployment workflows.
+
+## Enforce a Secure Build Pipeline
+
+Add mandatory controls to CI before artifacts are promoted:
+
+1. Dependency and lockfile vulnerability scan (fail on critical CVEs).
+2. Image scan for OS/package vulnerabilities.
+3. Secret scanning across source and build context.
+4. SBOM generation and artifact signing.
+5. Policy check that blocks deploy when controls fail.
+
+Example CI step order:
+
+```bash
+# Build
+npm ci
+npm run build
+
+# Security gates
+trivy fs .
+trivy image my-registry/openclaw:${GIT_SHA}
+syft my-registry/openclaw:${GIT_SHA} -o spdx-json > sbom.json
+cosign sign --key cosign.key my-registry/openclaw:${GIT_SHA}
+```
+
+## Lock Down Container Runtime
+
+Run OpenClaw with restrictive defaults:
+
+- Non-root user in container
+- Read-only root filesystem where possible
+- Drop all Linux capabilities, add back only required
+- `no-new-privileges` enabled
+- Constrained CPU/memory limits to reduce abuse impact
+- Seccomp/AppArmor (or equivalent) profile enforced
+
+Kubernetes-oriented expectations:
+
+- `runAsNonRoot: true`
+- `allowPrivilegeEscalation: false`
+- `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`
+- network policy deny-all baseline with explicit allow rules
+
+## Gate Production Promotion
+
+Require explicit promotion checks:
+
+- Security sign-off on CVE exceptions.
+- Signed artifact verification in deployment stage.
+- Drift check between expected and live manifest values.
+- Deployment only from immutable tags or digests.
+
+Avoid mutable `latest` tags for production OpenClaw services.
+
+## Protect Data and Session Surfaces
+
+- Minimize prompt/response retention by policy.
+- Mask secrets and PII in logs before shipping to SIEM.
+- Encrypt persistent volumes and backups.
+- Isolate tenant/session data boundaries when serving multiple teams.
+
+## Post-Deploy Verification
+
+Run a hardening smoke test immediately after rollout:
+
+```bash
+kubectl get pods -n openclaw
+kubectl auth can-i --as=system:serviceaccount:openclaw:default list secrets -n openclaw
+kubectl get networkpolicy -n openclaw
+kubectl logs deploy/openclaw -n openclaw --tail=200
+```
+
+Verify:
+
+- Pod security context matches policy.
+- Service account permissions are least privilege.
+- Ingress auth/rate limits are effective.
+- No plaintext secrets appear in logs.
+
+## Incident-Ready Rollback Pattern
+
+Maintain a hardened rollback workflow:
+
+1. Freeze further rollouts.
+2. Revoke suspect tokens and rotate secrets.
+3. Roll back to last signed known-good image digest.
+4. Re-run post-deploy hardening verification.
+5. Capture timeline and artifacts for forensics.
+
+## Related Skills
+
+- [container-hardening](../container-hardening/) - Container security baseline controls
+- [kubernetes-hardening](../kubernetes-hardening/) - Pod and cluster hardening patterns
+- [sbom-supply-chain](../../scanning/sbom-supply-chain/) - SBOM, signing, and provenance controls