This commit is contained in:
Toby
2026-01-27 17:35:45 -05:00
commit 2639af6531
176 changed files with 27104 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
# Incident Response Playbook
## Incident Severity Levels
| Level | Name | Description | Response Time | Example |
|-------|------|-------------|---------------|---------|
| SEV1 | Critical | Active breach, data exfiltration | Immediate | Ransomware, active attacker |
| SEV2 | High | Confirmed compromise, contained | 1 hour | Malware, credential theft |
| SEV3 | Medium | Suspicious activity, potential threat | 4 hours | Phishing success, anomaly |
| SEV4 | Low | Minor security event | 24 hours | Policy violation |
## Response Phases
### 1. Detection & Triage (0-15 minutes)
```
□ Confirm the incident is real (not false positive)
□ Assess initial scope and severity
□ Assign Incident Commander
□ Open incident channel (#incident-YYYY-MM-DD)
□ Start incident timeline documentation
```
**Key Questions:**
- What systems are affected?
- Is the threat active?
- What data may be compromised?
- Is it contained or spreading?
### 2. Containment (15-60 minutes)
**Short-term Containment:**
```
□ Isolate affected systems (network/firewall)
□ Block malicious IPs/domains
□ Disable compromised accounts
□ Preserve evidence before changes
```
**Commands:**
```bash
# Network isolation
iptables -I INPUT -s <malicious-ip> -j DROP
iptables -I OUTPUT -d <malicious-ip> -j DROP
# Account disable
usermod -L <username>
passwd -l <username>
# Service isolation
systemctl stop <compromised-service>
```
### 3. Investigation (1-4 hours)
```
□ Collect evidence (logs, memory, disk)
□ Identify attack vector
□ Determine scope of compromise
□ Document findings in timeline
```
**Log Sources:**
- Authentication: /var/log/auth.log, CloudTrail
- Application: Application logs, APM
- Network: Firewall logs, VPC Flow Logs
- System: syslog, journald
### 4. Eradication (1-24 hours)
```
□ Remove malware/backdoors
□ Patch vulnerabilities
□ Reset compromised credentials
□ Update security controls
□ Verify complete removal
```
### 5. Recovery (1-48 hours)
```
□ Restore systems from clean backups
□ Validate system integrity
□ Monitor for re-infection
□ Gradually restore services
□ Communicate status updates
```
### 6. Post-Incident (1-2 weeks)
```
□ Conduct blameless post-mortem
□ Document lessons learned
□ Create action items
□ Update runbooks and detection
□ Report to stakeholders
□ File regulatory notifications (if required)
```
## Communication Templates
### Internal Notification
```
SECURITY INCIDENT - [SEV LEVEL]
Status: Active/Contained/Resolved
Incident Commander: [Name]
Channel: #incident-YYYY-MM-DD
Summary: [Brief description]
Impact:
- Systems: [List]
- Data: [Type if applicable]
- Users: [Count/scope]
Current Actions:
- [Action 1]
- [Action 2]
Next Update: [Time]
```
### External Notification (if required)
```
Subject: Security Incident Notification
We are writing to inform you of a security incident
that occurred on [DATE].
What Happened: [Description]
Data Involved: [Types]
Actions Taken: [Response measures]
What You Can Do: [Recommendations]
Contact: [Security team contact]
```
## Escalation Contacts
| Role | Primary | Secondary |
|------|---------|-----------|
| Incident Commander | [Name] | [Name] |
| Security Lead | [Name] | [Name] |
| Engineering Lead | [Name] | [Name] |
| Legal/Compliance | [Name] | [Name] |
| Communications | [Name] | [Name] |
| Executive Sponsor | [Name] | [Name] |
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
# Indicator of Compromise (IOC) Hunting Guide
## Common IOC Types
| Type | Description | Example |
|------|-------------|---------|
| IP Address | Malicious source/destination | 192.168.1.100 |
| Domain | C2 or phishing domain | malware.evil.com |
| File Hash | Malware signature | SHA256:abc123... |
| File Path | Suspicious file location | /tmp/.hidden |
| Process | Malicious process name | cryptominer |
| User | Compromised account | admin |
## Log Hunting Queries
### SSH Brute Force Detection
```bash
# Failed SSH attempts
grep "Failed password" /var/log/auth.log | \
awk '{print $(NF-3)}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head
# Successful logins after failures
grep -E "Accepted|Failed" /var/log/auth.log | \
grep -B5 "Accepted" | grep "Failed"
```
### Suspicious Process Activity
```bash
# Processes running from /tmp
ps aux | grep -E "^.*/tmp/|^.*/dev/shm/"
# Hidden processes
ps aux | awk '$11 ~ /^\./'
# Processes with deleted binaries
ls -la /proc/*/exe 2>/dev/null | grep deleted
# Unusual parent-child relationships
ps -eo pid,ppid,cmd | grep -E "bash.*-c|sh.*-c"
```
### Network IOCs
```bash
# Connections to known bad ports
ss -anp | grep -E ":4444|:5555|:6666|:31337"
# Outbound connections from unusual processes
ss -anp | grep -v -E "chrome|firefox|curl|wget" | grep ESTAB
# DNS queries to suspicious domains
grep -E "query.*\.(tk|ml|ga|cf|gq)$" /var/log/syslog
# Large outbound transfers
ss -anp | awk '$3 > 1000000'
```
### File System IOCs
```bash
# Recently modified files in sensitive locations
find /etc /usr/bin /usr/sbin -mtime -1 -ls 2>/dev/null
# Files with suspicious permissions
find / -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 -ls 2>/dev/null
# Hidden files
find / -name ".*" -type f -ls 2>/dev/null | head -50
# World-writable files
find / -perm -002 -type f -ls 2>/dev/null
```
### User Activity IOCs
```bash
# Recent sudo usage
grep sudo /var/log/auth.log | tail -50
# Users logged in from multiple IPs
last | awk '{print $1, $3}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
# SSH keys added recently
find /home -name "authorized_keys" -mtime -7 -ls
# Unusual cron jobs
for user in $(cut -d: -f1 /etc/passwd); do
crontab -l -u $user 2>/dev/null | grep -v "^#"
done
```
## AWS CloudTrail Hunting
```bash
# Console logins from unusual locations
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
--lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=ConsoleLogin \
--query 'Events[*].[CloudTrailEvent]' --output text | jq '.'
# Root account usage
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
--lookup-attributes AttributeKey=Username,AttributeValue=root
# Security group changes
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
--lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress
```
## YARA Rule Example
```yara
rule Suspicious_Shell_Script {
meta:
description = "Detects suspicious shell scripts"
severity = "medium"
strings:
$s1 = "curl" ascii
$s2 = "wget" ascii
$s3 = "/dev/tcp/" ascii
$s4 = "base64 -d" ascii
$s5 = "chmod +x" ascii
condition:
3 of them
}
```
## Response Actions
### Block IOC
```bash
# Block IP
iptables -I INPUT -s <IP> -j DROP
iptables -I OUTPUT -d <IP> -j DROP
# Block domain (via hosts)
echo "127.0.0.1 malicious.domain.com" >> /etc/hosts
# Kill process
kill -9 <PID>
```
### Preserve Evidence
```bash
# Capture process memory
gcore <PID>
# Copy suspicious file
cp --preserve=all /path/to/file /evidence/
# Capture network traffic
tcpdump -i any -w /evidence/capture.pcap &
```