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CloakHQ 660b6bf58c feat(security): verify binaries with pinned Ed25519 signature on SHA256SUMS
Replace the same-origin checksum with a detached Ed25519 signature
(SHA256SUMS.sig) verified against a pinned public key before extraction,
closing #308: a compromised download mirror can no longer certify a
tampered binary. The signed manifest also binds the release version,
rejecting a forced downgrade to an older signed build.

Verification is mandatory and non-bypassable on the official download path;
custom CLOAKBROWSER_DOWNLOAD_URL mirrors keep the legacy skippable checksum.
Silent auto-update is preserved for everyone because only a constant public
key is pinned, not per-version hashes. Older installed wrappers are
unaffected — the version= line is ignored by their checksum parser.

Python uses cryptography; JS uses node:crypto. Adds tamper, downgrade, and
fail-closed tests in both languages.
2026-06-21 02:42:18 +02:00

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# Never let signing material enter a Docker build context / image.
# The test image (test-infra/Dockerfile.test) uses selective COPY today, but
# this is defense-in-depth against a future `COPY . .`.
test-infra/signing/
*.pem