feat(security): verify binaries with pinned Ed25519 signature on SHA256SUMS

Replace the same-origin checksum with a detached Ed25519 signature
(SHA256SUMS.sig) verified against a pinned public key before extraction,
closing #308: a compromised download mirror can no longer certify a
tampered binary. The signed manifest also binds the release version,
rejecting a forced downgrade to an older signed build.

Verification is mandatory and non-bypassable on the official download path;
custom CLOAKBROWSER_DOWNLOAD_URL mirrors keep the legacy skippable checksum.
Silent auto-update is preserved for everyone because only a constant public
key is pinned, not per-version hashes. Older installed wrappers are
unaffected — the version= line is ignored by their checksum parser.

Python uses cryptography; JS uses node:crypto. Adds tamper, downgrade, and
fail-closed tests in both languages.
This commit is contained in:
CloakHQ
2026-06-21 02:42:18 +02:00
parent 50bf14b3f9
commit 660b6bf58c
10 changed files with 839 additions and 34 deletions
+13
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,19 @@ PLATFORM_CHROMIUM_VERSIONS: dict[str, str] = {
"windows-x64": "146.0.7680.177.5",
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Ed25519 public keys for verifying downloaded binaries.
#
# Each release publishes SHA256SUMS and a detached signature SHA256SUMS.sig.
# The wrapper verifies that signature against the keys below before trusting
# any hash in the manifest, so the download origin alone cannot certify a
# tampered binary. Values are base64 of the 32-byte raw public key. Multiple
# entries are accepted to allow key rotation.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BINARY_SIGNING_PUBKEYS: list[str] = [
"MKFKwIhUcKWq5xTuNA0Ovg99njcDEcEJvmWYYhApvaU=",
]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Playwright default args to suppress — these leak automation signals.
# --enable-automation: exposes navigator.webdriver = true
+163 -18
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import httpx
from ._version import __version__ as _wrapper_version
from .config import (
BINARY_SIGNING_PUBKEYS,
CHROMIUM_VERSION,
DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL,
GITHUB_API_URL,
@@ -162,9 +163,11 @@ def _download_and_extract(version: str | None = None) -> None:
)
_download_file(fallback_url, tmp_path)
# Verify checksum before extraction
if os.environ.get("CLOAKBROWSER_SKIP_CHECKSUM", "").lower() != "true":
_verify_download_checksum(tmp_path, version)
# Verify the download before extraction. On the official path this is a
# mandatory, non-bypassable Ed25519 signature check (see
# _verify_download_checksum); the skip flag only applies to custom
# self-hosted CLOAKBROWSER_DOWNLOAD_URL setups.
_verify_download_checksum(tmp_path, version)
_extract_archive(tmp_path, binary_dir, binary_path)
_show_welcome()
@@ -174,22 +177,159 @@ def _download_and_extract(version: str | None = None) -> None:
def _verify_download_checksum(file_path: Path, version: str | None = None) -> None:
"""Fetch SHA256SUMS and verify the downloaded file. Warn if unavailable, fail on mismatch."""
checksums = _fetch_checksums(version)
"""Verify the downloaded archive's integrity and authenticity.
Official path (cloakbrowser.dev / GitHub Releases): fetch SHA256SUMS plus
its detached Ed25519 signature SHA256SUMS.sig, verify the signature against
the pinned public keys FIRST, then verify the archive's SHA-256 against the
now-authenticated manifest. Mandatory and non-bypassable — a same-origin
manifest can no longer certify a tampered binary (#308).
Custom self-hosted path (CLOAKBROWSER_DOWNLOAD_URL set): the pinned keys do
not apply to a third-party server, so fall back to the plain same-origin
SHA256SUMS check, which CLOAKBROWSER_SKIP_CHECKSUM may bypass.
"""
tarball_name = get_archive_name()
if checksums is None:
logger.warning("SHA256SUMS not available for this release — skipping checksum verification")
if os.environ.get("CLOAKBROWSER_DOWNLOAD_URL"):
# Self-hosted mirror: signature scheme does not apply. Preserve the
# legacy same-origin checksum behavior, skippable as before.
if os.environ.get("CLOAKBROWSER_SKIP_CHECKSUM", "").lower() == "true":
logger.warning(
"CLOAKBROWSER_SKIP_CHECKSUM set — skipping verification for custom download URL"
)
return
checksums = _fetch_checksums(version)
if checksums is None:
logger.warning(
"SHA256SUMS not available from custom URL — skipping checksum verification"
)
return
expected = checksums.get(tarball_name)
if expected is None:
logger.warning(
"SHA256SUMS found but no entry for %s — skipping verification", tarball_name
)
return
_verify_checksum(file_path, expected)
return
# Official path: signature is the trust root and is non-bypassable.
manifest = _fetch_signed_manifest(version)
if manifest is None:
raise RuntimeError(
"Could not fetch a signed SHA256SUMS (SHA256SUMS + SHA256SUMS.sig) "
"for this release — refusing to use an unverified binary. "
"Retry, or report at https://github.com/CloakHQ/cloakbrowser/issues"
)
manifest_bytes, sig_bytes = manifest
_verify_signature(manifest_bytes, sig_bytes)
manifest_text = manifest_bytes.decode("utf-8")
# Version binding: the signed manifest must declare the version we asked for.
# The signature proves "we made this manifest", not "this is the version you
# requested" — without this check a mirror could serve a genuinely-signed
# older release in place of the requested one (forced downgrade).
requested = version or get_chromium_version()
declared = _parse_manifest_version(manifest_text)
if declared != requested:
raise RuntimeError(
f"Version mismatch in signed SHA256SUMS: requested {requested}, "
f"manifest declares {declared or 'none'}. Refusing (possible downgrade)."
)
checksums = _parse_checksums(manifest_text)
expected = checksums.get(tarball_name)
if expected is None:
logger.warning("SHA256SUMS found but no entry for %s — skipping verification", tarball_name)
return
raise RuntimeError(
f"Signature-verified SHA256SUMS has no entry for {tarball_name}"
f"cannot confirm binary integrity."
)
_verify_checksum(file_path, expected)
def _parse_manifest_version(text: str) -> str | None:
"""Read the 'version=<v>' line from a signed manifest. None if absent.
The line has no internal whitespace so older wrappers' SHA256SUMS parsers
ignore it (they only accept '<hash> <filename>' lines).
"""
for line in text.splitlines():
line = line.strip()
if line.startswith("version="):
return line[len("version="):].strip()
return None
def _fetch_signed_manifest(version: str | None = None) -> tuple[bytes, bytes] | None:
"""Fetch (SHA256SUMS, SHA256SUMS.sig) raw bytes for a version, or None.
Both files are fetched from the SAME origin so the signature always matches
the exact manifest bytes it certifies. The primary origin is tried first,
then the GitHub Releases mirror. follow_redirects mirrors _fetch_checksums:
cloakbrowser.dev 301-redirects /chromium-v* to GitHub Releases.
"""
v = version or get_chromium_version()
bases = [
f"{DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL}/chromium-v{v}",
f"{GITHUB_DOWNLOAD_BASE_URL}/chromium-v{v}",
]
for base in bases:
try:
manifest_resp = httpx.get(
f"{base}/SHA256SUMS", follow_redirects=True, timeout=10.0
)
manifest_resp.raise_for_status()
sig_resp = httpx.get(
f"{base}/SHA256SUMS.sig", follow_redirects=True, timeout=10.0
)
sig_resp.raise_for_status()
return manifest_resp.content, sig_resp.content
except Exception:
continue
return None
def _verify_signature(manifest_bytes: bytes, sig_b64: bytes) -> None:
"""Verify a detached Ed25519 signature over the raw manifest bytes.
sig_b64 is the base64 of the 64-byte raw signature. Tries each pinned key
in BINARY_SIGNING_PUBKEYS; succeeds if any validates. Raises RuntimeError
if the signature is malformed or no pinned key validates it.
"""
import base64
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
try:
signature = base64.b64decode(sig_b64.strip(), validate=True)
except Exception as exc:
raise RuntimeError(f"Malformed SHA256SUMS.sig (not valid base64): {exc}")
for pubkey_b64 in BINARY_SIGNING_PUBKEYS:
try:
pub = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(base64.b64decode(pubkey_b64))
except Exception:
# Skip an unparseable pinned key (e.g. the placeholder) rather than
# aborting — another pinned key may still validate.
continue
try:
pub.verify(signature, manifest_bytes)
logger.info("SHA256SUMS signature verified: Ed25519 OK")
return
except Exception:
# InvalidSignature, or a malformed/wrong-length signature that makes
# verify raise something else — either way this key didn't match,
# so try the next pinned key (and ultimately fail closed below).
continue
raise RuntimeError(
"SHA256SUMS signature verification failed — no pinned key validated the "
"manifest. The binary's authenticity could not be confirmed. "
"Report at https://github.com/CloakHQ/cloakbrowser/issues"
)
def _fetch_checksums(version: str | None = None) -> dict[str, str] | None:
"""Fetch SHA256SUMS file for a version. Returns {filename: hash} or None."""
v = version or get_chromium_version()
@@ -211,17 +351,22 @@ def _fetch_checksums(version: str | None = None) -> dict[str, str] | None:
def _parse_checksums(text: str) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Parse SHA256SUMS format: 'hash filename' per line."""
"""Parse SHA256SUMS format: '<64-hex sha256> filename' per line.
Only lines whose first token is a 64-character hex digest are accepted
(matches the JS parser); blank lines, the version= line, and any other
junk are ignored.
"""
result = {}
for line in text.strip().splitlines():
line = line.strip()
if not line:
parts = line.strip().split(None, 1)
if len(parts) != 2:
continue
parts = line.split(None, 1)
if len(parts) == 2:
hash_val, filename = parts
filename = filename.lstrip("*")
result[filename] = hash_val.lower()
hash_val, filename = parts
hash_val = hash_val.lower()
if len(hash_val) != 64 or any(c not in "0123456789abcdef" for c in hash_val):
continue
result[filename.lstrip("*")] = hash_val
return result